VZCZCXRO2035
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHKU #0257/01 0511342
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 201342Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8345
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 KUWAIT 000257 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NEA/I, NEA/IR, AND NEA/ARP, NSC FOR RAMCHAND 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/20/2017 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KISL SOCI IZ KU KUWAIT IRAQ RELATIONS
SHI'A 
SUBJECT: UPDATE ON SHI'A-SUNNI RELATIONS IN KUWAIT: STABLE, 
DESPITE RHETORIC AND REGIONAL TENSIONS 
 
REF: A. KUWAIT 146 - KUWAITI SHI'A MARK ASHOURA PEACEFULLY 
     ¶B. 06 KUWAIT 4625 - KUWAITIS TELL PDAS JEFFREY 
        CONSULTATION KEY TO IRAN 
     ¶C. 06 KUWAIT 4583 - MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD LEADER WARNS 
        OF IMPACT OF IRAQ 
     ¶D. 06 KUWAIT 4498 - INFLUENTIAL AL-SABAH EXPRESSES 
        FRUSTRATION WITH PM/PARLIAMENT 
     ¶E. 06 KUWAIT 4418 - SECTARIAN TENSION OVER BOOK 
        DISTRIBUTED BY SHI'A MINISTER 
     ¶F. 06 KUWAIT 4377 - PARLIAMENT APPROVES ZAKAT LAW 
        DESPITE SHI'A OBJECTIONS 
     ¶G. 06 KUWAIT 2883 - TWO MORE PRO-HIZBALLAH PROTESTS 
     ¶H. 06 KUWAIT 2855 - 200 PROTEST OUTSIDE EMBASSY IN 
        SUPPORT OF NASRALLAH 
     ¶I. 06 KUWAIT 661 - KUWAITI SHI'A AND SUNNIS CONDEMN 
        IRAQ SHRINE BOMBING 
     ¶J. 05 KUWAIT 4633 - MOSQUE INCIDENT: LOCALIZED ACT 
        BLOWN OUT OF PROPORTION 
     ¶K. 05 KUWAIT 4451 - SHI'A MOSQUE ATTACKED BY YOUTH 
        IN JAHRA 
     ¶L. 00 KUWAIT 1913 - ACT OF VIGILANTE JUSTICE SPARKS 
        GOVERNMENT ACTION 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Matt Tueller for reasons 1.4 (b) and ( 
d) 
 
¶1.  (S/NF) Summary: Despite a recent surge in sectarian 
rhetoric, the majority of our contacts insist there is no 
near-term threat to Shi'a-Sunni relations in Kuwait.  Most 
Kuwaitis describe the overall relations between the two 
communities as "very good," and say leaders on both sides and 
the Government are "serious" about preventing any escalation 
in sectarian tensions.  Although complaining of 
institutionalized discrimination, Kuwaiti Shi'a seem 
relatively satisfied with their lot: a full portion of 
Kuwait's bountiful economic pie and tacit acceptance that a 
commensurate political influence will remain out of reach. 
While some Kuwaiti Sunnis can be quick to express anti-Shi'a 
views in private, public verbal sparring between conservative 
Shi'a and Salafi Islamists in recent months provoked strong 
condemnation from a broad spectrum of Kuwaitis.  Leaders from 
both communities have stressed the importance of maintaining 
"national unity" and have undertaken a number of joint 
efforts to defuse tensions.  The Amir echoed the national 
unity theme in recent public speeches, and the Government 
acted quickly to prevent a provocative pro-Sunni Iraqi rally 
organized by Salafi Islamists.  These strong reactions 
demonstrate both the importance Kuwaitis' place on preventing 
sectarian confrontations in Kuwait and their dismay at the 
sectarian violence playing out in Iraq. 
 
¶2.  (S/NF) Still, many Kuwaiti Sunnis fear Iranian-backed 
Shi'a ascendancy in the region and some see the Shi'a in 
Kuwait as a significant security threat.  Salafi Islamists 
share this view with many in the Ministry of Defense officer 
core and some senior Government officials.  Despite these 
views, it is unlikely that Shi'a-Sunni tensions in Kuwait 
will worsen significantly in the near future given the 
country's wealth and the generally positive relations between 
the two communities, including a long history of political 
cooperation.  Kuwaiti observers believe that calculus could 
change in the event of a major sectarian-motivated terrorist 
attack in the country or a military conflict between the U.S. 
and Iran.  Over time, however, the use of the "sectarian 
card" by conservative Shi'a and Sunni politicians to achieve 
short-term political gains and continued regional sectarian 
tensions could undermine the generally positive relations 
between the two communities in Kuwait.  End summary. 
 
¶3.  (S/NF) This cable is based on more than 50 meetings with 
Shi'a and Sunni leaders in Kuwait, numerous informal 
conversations, local press reports over the last six months, 
and past embassy reporting.  It has been cleared by SIMO, the 
Defense Attache, and the Office of Military 
Cooperation-Kuwait, and represents a general consensus in the 
Embassy on the current status of Shi'a-Sunni relations in 
Kuwait. 
 
Some Discrimination, But Generally Good Relations 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶4.  (C/NF) Although the State does not publish exact figures, 
it is generally estimated that roughly 300,000-350,000, or 
30-35%, of Kuwait's one million citizens are Shi'a.  There 
are also an unknown number of non-Kuwaiti Shi'a living here, 
including almost all of the estimated 60,000-80,000 person 
Iranian expatriate community.  (Comment: In this cable, 
 
KUWAIT 00000257  002 OF 006 
 
Ministers are Shi'a), and what they perceive to be a Sunni 
bias in educational curricula.  There are also very few Shi'a 
in senior positions in the military and security services, 
which tend to be dominated by tribal Sunnis. 
 
¶5.  (C/NF) Despite these complaints, most Shi'a say their 
overall relations with the Sunni community are "very good" 
and insist they are relatively unconcerned about the 
potential spill-over effect of regional sectarian tensions. 
The former Secretary General of the Islamic National 
Consensus Movement, a moderate Shi'a political association, 
told Poloff recently that the level of discrimination is 
"acceptable" and that "(Kuwaiti) Shi'a understand reality and 
accept that they will never rule the country."  Other Shi'a 
contacts have similarly admitted in private that while in the 
long-term they want more equal rights they understand that 
making such demands in the current context could prove 
counterproductive.  They also note that behind the scenes the 
Shi'a "are slowly being given their rights," as former Shi'a 
Minister of Commerce Dr. Yousef Al-Zalzalah told Poloff. 
 
¶6.  (C/NF) Where relations are most tense is with Salafi 
Islamists, whose conservative interpretation of Islam brands 
Shi'a as unbelievers.  Kuwaiti Shi'a routinely complain that 
Salafi influence in government ministries, particularly 
Education and Islamic Affairs, is the primary reason for the 
discrimination against them and the perpetuation of negative 
stereotypes.  While not always the case, Islamist contacts do 
tend to espouse more anti-Shi'a rhetoric than the average 
Sunni, and the vast majority of public clashes between the 
two communities are between the more hard-line, conservative 
Shi'a and Sunni leaders.  Salafis also routinely use 
sectarian issues as a way to bolster their Islamist 
credentials and achieve short-term political gains, a 
dangerous strategy if pursued over the long term as Shi'a 
fear.  The Salafis' strong animosity towards the Shi'a is 
generally reflective of the views of Kuwait's tribes, which 
are predominantly Sunni and conservative.  When Kuwaiti Shi'a 
express concern about long-term relations between the two 
communities, they cite the influence of the Salafis and the 
tribes, not external factors, as their greatest fear.  Many 
Sunnis express similar concerns about conservative, pro-Iran 
Shi'a, who also tend to play the "sectarian card" for 
political purposes.  While these groups represent a minority 
in both communities, they are very vocal and represent a 
potential long-term threat to sectarian relations in Kuwait. 
 
Rising Sectarian Rhetoric... 
---------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Although overall relations are good, there has been 
a noticeable increase in sectarian rhetoric in Kuwait over 
the past several months, particularly in the media.  In 
October 2006, for example, one of Kuwait's most prominent and 
controversial Shi'a clerics, Sayed Mohammed Baqer Al-Mohri, 
publicly condemned well-known Sunni cleric Yousef Al-Qaradawi 
for questioning Shi'a beliefs, provoking a strong reaction 
from Kuwaiti Islamists.  Later that month, Salafi MPs slammed 
the Minister of State for National Assembly Affairs, a Shi'a, 
for distributing a book advocating Shi'a views and demanded 
it be withdrawn from circulation (ref E).  In November, 
Parliament passed a controversial zakat (religious tax) law 
backed by Islamists, but strongly opposed by Kuwait's Shi'a 
leaders, who argued that it was discriminatory and would 
"adversely affect national unity" (ref F).  In January 2007, 
the Nations Invariables Grouping, a hard-line Salafi 
political association, organized a rally in support of Iraq's 
Sunnis, which the Ministry of Interior blocked from being 
held.  Several Salafi MPs protested, but most Sunni leaders 
supported the Government's move. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Later in January, the Secretary General of the 
Nations Invariables Grouping warned Kuwaiti Shi'a that his 
organization would monitor sermons delivered during Ashoura. 
The Shi'a community strongly protested his comments.  A week 
 
KUWAIT 00000257  003 OF 006 
 
 
later, Al-Mohri sparked another controversy by arguing during 
a television interview that terrorist attacks by Shi'a 
activists in Kuwait during the 1980s were motivated by 
"patriotism."  Although he later retracted his statements, 
Islamists demanded the government prosecute Al-Mohri and 
later filed a suit against him.  Reports on alleged Shi'a 
missionary activities in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and 
Kuwait, including one front-page article in November 
published in two local dailies under the headline "Shiite 
'tidal wave' hits Kuwait," have contributed to Sunni fears of 
rising Shi'a influence in the region. 
 
...Provokes Strong Reaction 
--------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Average Kuwaitis, both Sunni and Shi'a, have 
reacted strongly to this recent rise in sectarian rhetoric. 
Articles over the past month have warned against evoking 
sectarian differences and stressed the importance of 
maintaining "national unity."  For example, on January 19, 
Al-Rai Al-Aam (local Arabic daily) published an editorial by 
Abdul Hussein Al-Sultan, the Secretary General of the Justice 
and Peace Grouping, a moderate Shi'a political association, 
in which he argued that all Kuwaitis should "shoulder the 
historic responsibility of nipping sectarianism in the bud." 
He concluded that sectarian disputes "tear us apart, and that 
is what the real enemy of the nation, the Zionists, want." 
Perhaps responding to Al-Sultan, Dr. Wael Al-Hasawi, the 
Editor-in-Chief of Al-Furqan, the weekly publication of the 
Salafi Movement, said "we support people who call for nipping 
sectarian sedition in the bud" in a January 23 Al-Rai Al-Aam 
op-ed. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Al-Rai Al-Aam's January 22 editorial argued that 
"sectarianism and factionalism are alien to our 
society....and manifest utter backwardness."  Former Shi'a MP 
Dr. Abdul Mohsen Jamal, a member of the National Islamic 
Alliance (NIA), a conservative, Iran-leaning Shi'a political 
association, wrote January 22 that "the fact that five nights 
(of Ashoura) have passed without incident is the best proof 
of the awareness and cohesion of the Kuwaiti people."  In a 
January 25 article, Sunni Islamist Adel Al-Qasser praised 
several Kuwaiti Shi'a leaders for attending the moderation 
conference organized by the Ministry of Awqaf in Washington 
in November.  He said their presence confirmed that "we have 
no option as Muslims but to focus on our similarities and 
freeze all our sectarian disputes." 
 
¶11.  (SBU) Twenty-three "prominent women activists" issued a 
statement on January 23 calling on MPs to "dissociate 
themselves from sectarian affiliations and work to preserve 
peaceful coexistence."  They also "urged Kuwaitis to be 
vigilant and resist any attempt to drag them into a sectarian 
conflict that would threaten everyone."  Six local NGOs 
issued a similar statement on January 24, calling on Kuwaiti 
organizations to "unite for the benefit of the nation."  In a 
national address January 29, the Amir joined the chorus 
condemning sectarianism.  He urged Kuwaitis to "learn the 
lesson of Iraq" and "discard (their) differences," and 
stressed the importance of "national unity."  Shaykh Sabah 
delivered a similar message during a speech to Parliament in 
November in which he emphasized that "Kuwait does not belong 
to one group or sect only." 
 
Putting Words Into Action 
------------------------- 
 
¶12.  (C/NF) Some Kuwaitis have sought to put this verbal 
condemnation of sectarianism into action.  According to 
several contacts, a group of prominent Shi'a politicians and 
intellectuals met with the Editors-in-Chief of Kuwait's 
leading dailies prior to Ashoura and urged them not to 
publish inflammatory articles.  They also communicated their 
intention to control "our own population" and prevent any 
provocative sermons during Ashoura commemorations.  Some of 
the editorials cited above resulted from these meetings.  In 
addition, Shi'a MP Saleh Ashoura called publicly for Imams to 
avoid sectarian rhetoric and stress national unity during 
Ashoura.  Local media later noted positively that Shi'a Imams 
followed these guidelines and Kuwaiti Shi'a observed Ashoura 
peacefully (ref A), though as in past years public marches 
were banned.  Shaykh Ahmed Hussein, a local Shi'a cleric, 
told Poloff January 27 that there were "no problems at all" 
this Ashoura, and Kuwaiti Shi'a did not feel any increased 
tensions with the Sunni community.  "If anything, this year 
it's more open," Shaykh Ahmed said. 
 
 
KUWAIT 00000257  004 OF 006 
 
 
¶13.  (C/NF) Salem Al-Nashi, the Official Spokesman of the 
Salafi Islamic Grouping, a conservative Islamist political 
association, told Poloff February 7 that a group of 
conservative writers, established in 2001 but inactive for 
the past several years, had begun meeting again to address 
sectarian disputes, like the comments made by Al-Mohri. 
Al-Nashi said the group included both Shi'a and Sunni 
Islamists and described cooperation between them as "very 
good." 
 
¶14.  (C/NF) The Government has also played an active role in 
containing sectarian disputes, and most of our contacts 
express confidence in the Kuwaiti leadership's ability to 
keep tensions from escalating.  Former Shi'a Oil Minister Ali 
Al-Baghli told Poloffs January 31 that the Amir's son, Shaykh 
Nasser Al-Ahmed, personally interceded in a dispute between 
police and Shi'a worshippers who wanted to hold an impromptu 
public march during Ashoura.  According to Al-Baghli, Shaykh 
Nasser met with Shi'a leaders at the scene and resolved 
tensions.  Al-Baghli praised Shaykh Nasser's intervention as 
a "good gesture," which demonstrated the Government's 
commitment to preventing sectarianism.  He added that 
Shi'a-Sunni relations were "better now under Shaykh Sabah," 
and claimed Shi'a were being treated more fairly and given 
greater rights than before. 
 
¶15.  (C/NF) During a December 9 meeting with visiting PDAS 
James Jeffrey (ref B), Dr. Bader Al-Nashi, the Secretary 
General of the Islamic Constitutional Movement (ICM), the 
political arm of the Kuwaiti Muslim Brotherhood, similarly 
praised the Government for "maintaining a balance" between 
the two communities and said that Shi'a-Sunni relations were 
"relatively good."  Dr. Ahmed Bishara, the Secretary General 
of the National Democratic Movement (NDM), a liberal 
political association, and a Sunni, told Poloff in November 
that "the Al-Sabah have been very even-handed in dealing with 
the Shi'a population, unlike other regimes in the region." 
As a result, Bishara said he was "not at all concerned" about 
Shi'a-Sunni relations in Kuwait.  Al-Mohri told Poloff 
January 22 that the Government was "very serious" about 
preventing sectarianism in Kuwait and said he had "very 
little concern" about tensions escalating. 
 
Military/Salafis See Shi'a Threat 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶16.  (S/NF) While the majority of Shi'a and Sunnis in Kuwait 
tend to downplay sectarian discord, not everyone shares this 
view.  DATT contacts in Kuwait's military officer core, 
particularly those in military intelligence, tend to view 
Kuwait's Shi'a community as a serious threat and believe 
their ultimate loyalty is "to the mullahs in Iran." (Note: 
There are very few Shi'a in the Ministry of Defense's 
intelligence branch and none in Kuwait State Security (KSS), 
Kuwait's domestic and external intelligence agency.  End 
note.)  MOD intel officers believe there are Shi'a "sleeper 
cells" in Kuwait and argue that an Iranian-backed Shi'a 
terrorist attack in Kuwait is "very likely."  Some have also 
privately told the DATT that they believe Lt. Gen. Ali 
Al-Mumin, Kuwait's Ambassador-designate to Iraq and a Shi'a, 
is an Iranian spy.  (Note: Al-Mumin, the former highest 
ranking Shi'a in Kuwait's military and the head of the 
Humanitarian Operations Center, came under public attack 
recently, accused of funneling Kuwaiti assistance to Iraqi 
Shi'a.  End note.)  However, MOD intel officers do not 
present any evidence to support their claims. 
 
¶17.  (S/NF) At least some members of the ruling family share 
the view that some Kuwaiti Shi'a are secretly allied with 
Iran.  Shaykh Mohammed Abdullah Mubarak, an influential 
younger Shaykh close to National Security Bureau President 
Shaykh Ahmed Al-Fahd and former Kuwait State Security Chief 
Shaykh Athbi Al-Fahd, told Poloff in November (ref C), "If 
you don't know that Hizballah is active in Kuwait, then you 
need to get a new job."  He claimed "Kuwaiti Hizballah" was 
"the same thing" as Hizballah in Lebanon with "the same 
structure and the same funding."  "In fact, Kuwaiti Hizballah 
funds Hizballah in Lebanon," he said.  According to Shaykh 
Mohammed, Shi'a MPs Adnan Abdul Samad and Ahmed Lari are both 
affiliated with "Kuwaiti Hizballah."  (Comment: "Kuwaiti 
Hizballah" is a pejorative term used primarily by Islamists 
and Kuwait's intelligence services to discredit pro-Iran 
Shi'a in Kuwait.  Many contacts also use the term to refer to 
the National Islamic Alliance (NIA), a conservative, pro-Iran 
Shi'a political association, to which both Adnan Abdul Samad 
and Ahmed Lari belong.  Although we do not rule it out, we 
have seen no evidence to suggest that there is a Hizballah 
 
KUWAIT 00000257  005 OF 006 
 
 
branch in Kuwait with direct organizational ties to Lebanese 
Hizballah.  End Comment.) 
 
¶18.  (S/NF) Senior MFA and other GOK officials have also 
presented strongly anti-Shi'a views in private conversations 
with Emboffs.  The MFA Director for Asian Affairs, who has 
responsibility for Iranian issues, described Kuwaiti Shi'a to 
PolChief as "Iranians with Kuwaiti citizenship" and said he 
believed the Iranians were pursuing a region-wide effort to 
convert Sunnis to Shi'ism.  Islamist MP Khudair Al-Enezi 
described Shi'a to Poloffs as "backwards" during a February 
12 meeting.  As an example, he claimed Al-Mumin recently 
exhumed his mother's body 15 years after her death in order 
to bury her in Najaf, Iraq.  Al-Enezi, who as his name 
implies is from the Al-Enza tribe, also believed Kuwaiti 
Shi'a were ultimately loyal to Iran, regardless of how long 
they had lived in Kuwait.  As noted, many Sunnis from tribal 
backgrounds and hard-line Salafis tend to similarly view the 
Shi'a in Kuwait as an Iranian fifth column. 
 
Low Probability of Sectarian Violence in Kuwait 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶19.  (S/NF) In spite of these views, there are substantial 
reasons to believe that sectarian tensions in Kuwait will not 
worsen significantly in the near future.  Verbal denigration 
between Kuwaiti Shi'a and Salafi leaders is not uncommon, and 
while sectarian-motivated attacks have occurred in the past, 
they are rare and have not provoked sectarian reprisals. 
Kuwait weathered several terrorist attacks by Iranian-backed 
Shi'a extremists during the 1980s, including an assassination 
attempt on the Amir, without a major deterioration in 
Shi'a-Sunni relations.  Liberal Sunni political analyst Ahmed 
Deyain told Poloff January 23 that "things are not much 
different today" than they were then.  Attacks on a Shi'a 
husseiniya in April 2000 (ref L) and on a Shi'a mosque in 
October 2005 (refs J and K) were isolated incidents, and were 
quickly and satisfactorily addressed by the authorities. 
There have not been any reported cases of sectarian-motivated 
violence since then. 
 
¶20.  (C/NF) In addition, politically the two communities are 
not evenly divided along sectarian lines.  Shi'a and Sunni 
groups united during last year's elections to push for reform 
and fight corruption.  In Parliament, three of the four Shi'a 
MPs belong to the predominantly Sunni Popular Action Bloc; 
the other Shi'a MP is part of the pro-Government Independent 
Bloc, whose other 11 members are Sunni tribal MPs.  At times, 
Shi'a political associations have even allied with Islamists 
to undermine the political influence of rival Shi'a groups, 
highlighting the deep divisions -- partly due to religious 
and political affiliations, and partly to personal rivalries 
-- within Kuwait's Shi'a community.  These divisions, rather 
than Sunni opposition, were largely responsible for the low 
number of Shi'a elected last June. 
 
¶21.  (C/NF) Even on regional issues, positions are not 
defined by sectarian affiliation.  After the February 2006 
attack on the Shi'a shrine in Samara, Iraq, leaders from both 
communities, including representatives from two conservative 
Islamist political associations, attended a rally at a Shi'a 
mosque during which they strongly condemned the bombing and 
stressed the need for Muslim unity (ref I).  During the 
Israel-Hizballah conflict last summer, the Salafi Movement, 
the Ummah Party (Salafi), the National Islamic Alliance 
(Shi'a), and the Shi'a Clerics Congregation participated in a 
rally in support of Lebanon.  Prior to the rally, one Ummah 
Party representative described the fatwas issued by some 
Saudi clerics prohibiting Sunnis from participating in jihad 
alongside Hizballah as "unforgettable crimes."  Members of 
both communities, and even some liberals, attended other 
pro-Hizballah, anti-U.S./Israel demonstrations held last 
summer (refs G and H). 
 
¶22.  (C/NF) Kuwaiti opinions on Iran cross sectarian lines as 
well.  Some Islamists support Iran's nuclear program as a 
counterbalance to Israel and, according to several Shi'a 
contacts, only a minority of Kuwaiti Shi'a support the 
Iranian regime.  Where Shi'a-Sunni views do tend to differ 
sharply is on Iraq.  While lamenting the violence, many Shi'a 
contacts privately express satisfaction with the fact that 
Iraq's Shi'a majority is finally in power.  Many Sunni 
contacts, on the other hand, express dismay at the course of 
events in Iraq and echo King Abdullah of Jordan's fears of an 
emerging "Shi'a crescent" in the region. 
 
¶23.  (C/NF) Another reason why sectarian relations in Kuwait 
 
KUWAIT 00000257  006 OF 006 
 
 
are unlikely to deteriorate significantly is the country's 
wealth.  As one astute Sunni political analyst told Poloff 
recently, "Oil compensates for a multitude of differences." 
With oil prices soaring and the economy booming, Kuwaitis are 
less likely to engage in political activities of a sectarian 
nature, provided they continue to have access to the 
country's wealth.  In fact, regional sectarian tensions seem 
at times to influence Kuwaiti Shi'a to downplay their 
sectarian identity and emphasize their commitment to the 
country, rather than raise the sectarian flag.  Al-Mohri told 
Poloff that the prosperity of Kuwait's Shi'a community limits 
their susceptibility to Iranian influence.  "After all," he 
said, "they are Kuwaiti first and don't want to lose their 
privileges."  Not only does Kuwait's prosperity tend to 
produce a relatively moderate populace, many contacts argue 
that it also makes it less likely that extremists in Kuwait 
will do something to jeopardize their access to funding, 
although this cannot be completely ruled out. 
 
Where Problems Could Emerge 
--------------------------- 
 
¶24.  (C/NF) While the current situation appears relatively 
stable, problems could emerge.  Shi'a and Sunni leaders admit 
that there are extremist elements on both sides that might do 
something unpredictable.  While downplaying the likelihood of 
an attack by extremists, ICM Secretary General Dr. Bader 
Al-Nashi warned Poloff in December that such an attack would 
significantly increase sectarian tensQns (ref C).  Some 
contacts, however, argue that even were such an attack to 
occur the Government could control the situation and the 
leaders of both communities would act to prevent retaliation. 
 Some Kuwaitis also express concern that a conflict between 
the U.S. and Iran could heighten sectarian tensions here, 
particularly if Iran were to retaliate against Kuwait. 
However, Dr. Sami Al-Faraj, the Director of the Kuwait Center 
for Strategic Studies and a Sunni, told Poloff January 8 that 
an Iranian attack on Kuwait, whether direct or indirect, 
would "bring Shi'a and Sunnis together against Iran, not the 
opposite."  Over the long term, relations could deteriorate 
iQconservative leaders from both communities continue to use 
the "sectarian card" to achieve short-term political gains. 
 
********************************************* * 
For more reporting from Embassy Kuwait, visit: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/?cable s 
 
Visit Kuwait's Classified Website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/ 
********************************************* * 
TUELLER