VZCZCXRO0304
PP RUEHDE RUEHDIR
DE RUEHKU #0221/01 0471426
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 161426Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8295
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KUWAIT 000221 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR NEA/ARP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/07/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KISL KU BIDOON
SUBJECT: KUWAIT'S EFFORT TO APPEASE BIDOON WITH DRIVER'S 
LICENSES BACKFIRES 
 
REF: A. 06 KUWAIT 4682 
     ¶B. 06 KUWAIT 4514 
 
Classified By: Classified by CDA Matt Tueller for reasons 1.4(b) and (d 
). 
 
¶1.  (C)  Summary:  After months of vague promises to ease 
their plight, the Ministry of Interior (MOI) on January 6 
began issuing driver's licenses to Kuwaiti Bidoon (stateless 
residents) for the first time on a broad scale in many years. 
 The intended goodwill gesture soon gave way to 
disenchantment when Bidoon realized that the licenses were 
marked "illegal resident," and Bidoon leaders publicly 
accused the Government of using the licenses to trap them 
into giving up their citizenship claims.  Issuance was 
suspended on January 28.  As the driver's license issue 
heated up, pro-Bidoon MPs held a boisterous rally in which at 
least one criticized the Ministry of Interior and prominent 
ruling family members.  Bidoon contacts report that urban 
Kuwaitis have used their connections to the ruling family to 
block steps toward Bidoon naturalization because they fear an 
increase in the prominence of the Bidoon, who are primarily 
from tribal ("bedouin") origins.  The Bidoon also see 
increasing likelihood that the lack of progress will push the 
younger generation to crime and extremism.  Most urban 
Kuwaitis vehemently oppose granting citizenship to the 
Bidoon, while human rights activists and tribal MPs are 
sympathetic to the Bidoon.  The GOK faces a tough decision: 
inaction keeps a large, young resident population 
marginalized and disenfranchised, while movement toward 
naturalization is strongly opposed by a large swath of the 
Kuwaiti public and will anger many influential supporters of 
the ruling family.  Recent rallies and parliamentary pressure 
will make it difficult for the Government to keep the Bidoon 
issue off the agenda.  Providing the Bidoon increased civil 
rights and postponing the citizenship issue would buy it some 
time.  End Summary. 
 
GOK Issues Driving Licenses Then Stops Amid Controversy 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
¶2.  (U)  The Ministry of Interior (MOI) began granting 
driver's licenses to Bidoon (stateless residents) on January 
6 after a year of increasingly heated public debate about how 
to deal with Kuwait's 100,000-plus stateless population. 
Until the mid-1980s the Bidoon were treated like Kuwaiti 
citizens in almost all respects: they were able to get jobs, 
study abroad or get medical treatment at government expense, 
and travel in and out of the country freely.  However, in the 
mid-1980s and especially after Kuwait's liberation, the GOK 
began to view the Bidoon as a security issue, and withdrew 
many of the government benefits that had been available in 
the past.  Simple matters such as getting birth certificates, 
driver's licenses, and other official documents became nearly 
impossible without influential (or corrupt) connections, and 
Bidoon were excluded from government schools and most 
government and private-sector jobs. 
 
¶3.  (U)  Throughout 2006 the GOK leaked countless vague 
pledges to resolve the Bidoon problem but took no tangible 
action.  In an effort to appease the increasingly vocal 
Bidoon movement, the MOI announced in late December that it 
would start issuing driver's licenses to Bidoon.  The MOI 
received thousands of applications and issued hundreds of 
licenses.  However, Bidoon and Bidoon supporters almost 
immediately began complaining that the nationality field on 
the licenses said "illegal resident," a more pejorative term 
than Bidoon (which is short for "bidoon jinsiyya" or "without 
citizenship").  Bidoon suspected that the whole operation was 
a trick by the government to get documented admissions by the 
Bidoon that their presence in the country is illegal, which 
could be later used to deny their claims to citizenship.  MOI 
Assistant Undersecretary for Traffic Affairs Thabet 
Al-Mahanna responded to the crisis by ordering the Department 
on January 28 to stop issuing licenses until the naming 
crisis could be resolved. 
 
An Increasingly Volatile Political Issue 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C)  Kuwaiti politicians walk a fine line on the Bidoon 
issue reflecting a sharply divided public opinion.  Urban 
Kuwaitis see the Bidoon as uncultured foreigners hiding their 
true identities to try to freeload off the generous Kuwaiti 
social welfare state.  Human rights activists and tribal MPs 
(most Bidoon come from the tribal MPs' districts) have 
decried the hardships faced by the Bidoon and have raised the 
profile of the Bidoon through the media and public rallies. 
Sectarian and tribal rivalries also divide those who support 
 
KUWAIT 00000221  002 OF 003 
 
 
or oppose Bidoon naturalization.  For instance, some Sunnis 
claim that a large percentage of the Bidoon are Shi'a, which 
they worry would upset Kuwait's sectarian balance.  Tribal MP 
Khudeir Al-Enezi gave PolOff a detailed breakdown of the 
tribal affiliations of Kuwaiti citizens and Bidoon, arguing 
that certain tribes fear a loss in power if the Bidoon are 
naturalized.  If the GOK ever decides to naturalize 
significant numbers of Bidoon, there could be a ferocious 
struggle between different parties competing to naturalize 
"their" Bidoon. 
 
¶5.  (C)  The power of the issue was evident in a rally held 
on January 23 in the heavily-Bidoon governorate of Jahra. 
The rally drew thousands of people, putting it on par with 
the biggest political gatherings in recent memory in Kuwait. 
A number of MPs from the parliamentary committee on Bidoon 
affairs attended and both Bidoons and Kuwaitis made 
impassioned speeches criticizing the Government.  MP Khudeir 
Al-Enezi brazenly leveled harsh criticism at the Assistant 
Undersecretary for Passport and Citizenship Affairs (Shaykh 
Ahmad Al-Nawwaf Al-Sabah), who is the son of the Crown 
Prince.  Several days later, on January 28, Ministry of 
Interior officials attended a meeting of the parliamentary 
Bidoon committee.  According to one newspaper, Al-Enezi 
distanced himself from the rally even though he had actually 
offered to host the event in his diwaniyya.  The media quoted 
him as saying that he merely accepted an invitation and had 
even reprimanded the harshest critics for going too far.  The 
media also quoted Parliamentary Bidoon Committee Chair Hassan 
Jowhar trying to distance himself from the rally (which he 
attended).  The Al-Seyassah and Al-Watan dailies printed 
stories about Al-Enezi and other unnamed MPs going back on 
their public pronouncements of support for Bidoon 
naturalization by encouraging the MOI in private to continue 
the work of the controversial "Executive Committee on Illegal 
Residents,"  which has been accused of coercing Bidoon into 
claiming non-Kuwaiti nationalities.  Al-Enezi told PolOffs 
that the papers were twisting the truth to embarrass him. 
Whatever the case, the tension between Bidoon sympathizers 
and opponents is clearly rising. 
 
Bidoon: Urban Clique Holding Back Reform 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C)  On February 3, PolOff visited a small diwaniyya 
south of Kuwait City frequented by Shia Bidoon to get a 
Bidoon perspective on recent events.  The Bidoon made their 
familiar complaints about difficulties in obtaining work and 
official documents.  They then offered a candid assessment of 
why the Government has still not addressed the problem.  A 
Bidoon Shia cleric named Nasser Musa Al-Neamah said there is 
a group of ten families who enjoy a cozy relationship with 
the ruling Al-Sabah family.  These ten families, he noted, 
get the bulk of the lucrative government contracts and fear 
that an increase in the number of Kuwaiti citizens will 
spread these spoils thin.  Because of their economic power, 
they are able to influence the ruling family.  To illustrate 
the point, another attendee noted that in June of 2006 the 
Prime Minister signaled his intention to solve the Bidoon 
problem within three months.  However, the attendee 
continued, a group of urban MPs including liberals Faisal 
Al-Shaya, Salah Fadhalah, Mohammad Jassem Al-Sager, Ali 
Al-Rashed, independent Islamist Adel Al-Sar'awi, 
liberal/pro-Government MP Marzouq Al-Ghanim, and 
Salafi-leaning Ahmad Baqer approached the Prime Minister and 
dissuaded him.  These liberal and Islamist MPs are generally 
considered political opponents in other contexts, but they 
are all "hadhar" (which roughly translates to "urban" or 
"settled," and is historically connected with the trading 
class) MPs.  Most Bidoons come from outlying areas of the 
city and are considered "bedouin."  (Comment: Though such a 
conspiracy is unverifiable, it is true that a tight 
relationship between a small number of merchant families and 
the ruling Al-Sabah family goes back long before the 
establishment of the State of Kuwait.  Shi'a-Sunni and 
Islamist-Liberal conflicts within Kuwait society tend to 
attract more attention from outside observers, but the 
tribal-urban split is equally powerful, as evidenced by the 
tribal-urban vote split in the December 19 vote against 
writing off Kuwaitis' personal loans (ref A).  End comment.) 
 
Bidoon Could Pose Security Problem 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C)  The Bidoon at the diwaniyya noted their concern over 
the younger generation, which has grown up with few rights or 
privileges.  They claimed that until a few years ago the 
Bidoon had very low rates of crime and drug use and few 
connections to extremist groups, despite their poverty.  They 
 
KUWAIT 00000221  003 OF 003 
 
 
attributed this to a sense of loyalty to their country, 
perhaps earned in the 1980s and earlier when Bidoon enjoyed 
substantial civil benefits.  The group gathered at the 
diwaniyya worried that the younger generation, many of whom 
have little or no schooling as a result of GOK policies, does 
not have the same loyalty and has been drifting toward crime, 
drugs, and extremism.  They agreed that a failure to make 
concrete steps on the Bidoon issue soon would create a 
security threat for Kuwait.  They urged a strong U.S. stand 
in favor of the Bidoon.  They claimed that the USG actively 
speaks out on other human rights issues in Kuwait, but has 
kept silent on Kuwait's most prominent problem: treatment of 
the Bidoon (Note:  the Bidoon issue features prominently in 
State Department's annual human rights report and Embassy 
officials have raised it with Kuwaiti officials recently). 
 
The Bidoon Issue Takes on a Life of its Own 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C)  Many close observers of Kuwaiti politics note that 
the momentum given to the Bidoon issue by MPs, various civil 
society groups, and several ruling family members who have 
championed their cause will make it hard for the Government 
to continue ignoring the problem.  According to Mubarak 
Al-Shimmary, the leader of the Popular Committee to Support 
the Bidooon, the gathering honoring Bidoon veterans on 
February 12 managed to extract a commitment from several MPs 
to work for naturalizing Bidoon veterans and survivors of 
those killed in action.  The Government is in a difficult 
position, however.  Ideally, it would settle the issue soon, 
since the problem will only get worse if it takes no action. 
However, announcing a final decision on the matter will 
involve definitively declaring some Bidoon permanently 
ineligible for citizenship.  For instance, Shaykh Ahmad 
Nawwaf told PolCounselor and PolOff on February 4 that the 
Government has records proving that only about 5,000 of the 
91,000 Bidoon registered with the Executive Committee 
actually deserve citizenship.  The Shia Bidoon at the 
diwaniyya asserted that the Government has evidence that 
5,000 families, which translates into 37,000 people, have 
legitimate claims to Bidoon citizenship.  Indeed, the 
Government has said that approximately 40,000 of the 91,000 
Bidoon have pre-1965 residency ties, which would entitle them 
to citizenship if they do not have security violations on 
their record.  However, if Shaykh Ahmad's statement reflects 
the GOK's intentions, the exclusion of 85,000 Bidoon will 
create a major problem.  Whereas Bidoon now fear running 
afoul of the law because the GOK could use that against them 
in determining their citizenship, those who are declared 
ineligible will have nothing left to lose. 
 
GOK Declares it Will Act Soon 
----------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (C)  Shaykh Ahmad Nawwaf recently announced that within 
two months he would deliver the citizenship files of all the 
Bidoon to the cabinet (which has the legal power to grant 
citizenship).  The Minister of Interior also reportedly told 
the parliamentary Bidoon Committee that a solution would be 
presented within several months.  The GOK has made many such 
promises before, so many Bidoon are skeptical.  But never 
before has there been such an active parliamentary and civil 
society effort to keep the Bidoon issue on the frontburner. 
Perhaps the GOK's best solution would be to relieve the 
immediate pressure on the Bidoon by granting them the civil 
documents they need, allowing them to work, and admitting 
their children to government schools.  Another step would be 
to grant citizenship to the Bidoon veterans of Kuwait's 
military campaigns, since it would be politically difficult 
to question the citizenship credentials of those who fought 
for the country.  Either way, the Government could then claim 
significant progress while it decided what to do with the 
Bidoon over the long term.  If left to fester, the problem 
will grow exponentially as generations of Bidoon reach 
adulthood with few prospects and a growing sense of anger and 
frustration. 
 
********************************************* * 
For more reporting from Embassy Kuwait, visit: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/?cable s 
 
Visit Kuwait's Classified Website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/ 
********************************************* * 
TUELLER