VZCZCXRO0455
PP RUEHDE RUEHDIR
DE RUEHKU #0177/01 0381157
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 071157Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8223
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KUWAIT 000177 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR JESSEE; DOE FOR KOLEVAR; STATE FOR PM/PPA, S/CT, 
NEA/ARP, EB/ESC 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/05/2017 
TAGS: EPET PTER ASEC KU OIL SECTOR
SUBJECT: CENTCOM TEAM ASSESSES SECURITY OF CRITICAL ENERGY 
INFRASTRUCTURE 
 
REF: KUWAIT 00150 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Matt Tueller for reasons 1.4 (b, d, g) 
 
 ¶1.  (C/NF)  Summary:  At the invitation of Kuwait National 
Petroleum Company (KNPC), the Kuwait Petroleum Corporation 
subsidiary responsible for all downstream oil operations, the 
U.S. Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) facilitated 
a CENTCOM-led multi-disciplinary vulnerability assessment of 
the area in and around Kuwait's refineries and export 
terminals in the Shuaiba-Ahmadi industrial zone from 1-4 
February.  (Comment:  CENTCOM has significant assets and 
personnel located in the port area, and any industrial or 
terrorist incident at the refineries or port would directly 
impact DOD forces in the surrounding area.  End comment.) 
The CENTCOM (CCJ3) team's preliminary findings indicate that 
while Kuwait has made noteworthy improvements in the security 
of its critical energy infrastructure, there are still 
significant areas of concern that need to be addressed.  The 
assessment team noted recent improvements implemented by KNPC 
including: construction of robust three-layer perimeter 
fencing, installation of a comprehensive CCTV system, 
utilization of thorough employee background checks, and 
development of comprehensive emergency response plans. 
 
¶2.  (C/NF)  Remaining deficiencies include:  lack of 
explosive detection equipment at gates, no armed quick 
reaction force on site, inadequate employee access control 
systems, insufficient detection and interdiction capability 
in the maritime security zone, inadequate protection for 
offshore facilities, and a lack of unified command. (Note: 
Security responsibilities are divided between Interior 
Ministry and KNPC security personnel who each report through 
distinct chains of command.  End note.)  The team briefed its 
preliminary findings to KNPC Deputy Managing Director Hussain 
Ismail, his security managers, and his private security 
consultant, after providing a separate brief to Embassy 
personnel.  Ismail was deeply engaged in the discussion of 
the team's findings.  He recognized that more work needs to 
be done and seemed to take the team's major recommendations 
on board, although he noted that some recommendations, such 
as arming his private security personnel, were beyond his 
area of control.  Ismail requested a copy of the team's final 
report, which should be completed by mid-March.  End summary. 
 
CENTCOM Invited to Assess Security of Refineries, Terminals 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
 
¶3.  (C/NF)  A team from CENTCOM's Joint Security Office 
Forward (CCJ3) was scheduled to visit Kuwait for a regular 
country-wide force protection assessment in early February to 
include the area around Shuaiba Navy Base (the U.S. sea port 
of debarkation).  Global Village Strategies Executive 
Director John Bodinnar, the primary security consultant to 
the Kuwait oil companies, persuaded Hussain Ismail, Deputy 
Managing Director of KNPC, to request through Post NCIS 
Resident Agency that the CENTCOM team also assess the 
security in and around Kuwait's refineries and export 
terminals in the Shuaiba-Ahmadi industrial zone.  This zone 
contains all three of Kuwait's refineries as well as its 
primary export terminals for both crude and refined products. 
 Kuwait produces about 915,000 bpd of refined products 
(750,000 bpd for export) and approximately 2.5 million bpd of 
crude (1.7 million bpd for export).  Bodinnar explained that 
he hoped to use the CENTCOM assessment as leverage to 
reinforce his security recommendations to KNPC.  Since any 
major incident at the refinery and/or export terminals would 
likely have a direct impact on DOD forces and facilities at 
Shuaiba Navy Base, CENTCOM agreed to conduct the assessment. 
(Note: Because the request for this assessment went from KNPC 
through its consultant to DOD, Kuwait Petroleum Corporation 
Security Manager Ali Al-Obaid was not directly involved in 
the assessment or the outbrief.) 
 
¶4.  (C/NF)  The areas assessed by the 18-person CENTCOM team 
from 1-4 February included:  physical security, 
communications and sensors, infrastructure and logistics, 
safety and hazardous materials, medical response, plans and 
training, and construction of facilities.  The team noted a 
number of recent improvements implemented by KNPC including: 
construction of robust three-layer perimeter fencing, 
installation of a comprehensive CCTV system, utilization of 
thorough employee background checks, and development of 
comprehensive emergency response plans.  The team also noted 
that KNPC was taking initial steps to create a more robust 
 
KUWAIT 00000177  002 OF 002 
 
 
maritime security force to complement the limited coverage 
currently provided by the Kuwait Coast Guard. 
 
Several Vulnerabilities Identified, Recommendations Made 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
¶5.  (C/NF) The team highlighted the following areas of 
concern: 
- No explosive detection measures employed at vehicle entry 
gates 
- No armed quick reaction force on site (By regulation, only 
Ministry of Interior (MOI) personnel can be armed.  Armed MOI 
personnel are currently responsible for perimeter security, 
but unarmed private security personnel cover security within 
the facilities.  In responding to any major security incident 
inside the perimeter, KNPC security would have to call MOI 
and wait for them to arrive on the scene.) 
- Inadequate employee area access control (Once inside the 
perimeter, all employees have unfettered access to all areas.) 
- No designation of critical assets within the facilities 
- Inadequate vehicle standoff around vital assets 
- Not enough personnel trained in first aid 
- No chemical/biological drills conducted since 2003 
- Access badges easy to duplicate/counterfeit 
- Only four boats to cover a maritime exclusion zone of 120 
sq. miles 
- No armed guards on sea isles and loading piers 
- Limited capability to detect and interdict small boats and 
other waterborne threats 
- Divided security responsibilities, poor integration, and 
separate chains of command and communication between KNPC and 
MOI 
 
¶6.  (C/NF)  The key recommendations were to: 
- Expand the internal security force to include perimeter and 
access control and give it lethal force capability 
- Station armed personnel at sea isles and piers 
- Identify and restrict access to critical areas 
- Increase the number and frequency of maritime patrols 
- Construct barrier systems to protect exposed pipelines 
- Employ more trained medical personnel 
 
Kuwait Petroleum Receptive, Eager for Final Report 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶7.  (C/NF)  At the KNPC outbrief on 4 February, Hussain 
Ismail thanked the team for its work and engaged in active 
discussion with both the team leader and team members about 
specific points.  He demonstrated awareness of many of the 
deficiencies identified and seemed eager to take most of the 
recommendations on board.  Ismail noted, however, that he has 
little control over the Ministry of Interior, and that there 
was nothing he could do about arming KNPC security personnel 
without authorization from the MOI.  Ismail pointedly asked 
the team leader if he thought that the waterside and offshore 
facilities were the most critical area of vulnerability.  The 
team leader acknowledged this, but suggested that the sonar 
system KNPC was considering would be ineffective due to water 
depth and salinity.  He said that KNPC should focus on 
combating the threat from small boats rather than the threat 
from swimmers.  Ismail seemed surprised at the recommendation 
that the two security forces be merged, believing that one 
should serve as a deterrent and the other should respond to 
incidents, but he accepted the team's arguments regarding the 
importance of unified command and control.  Ismail said he 
looked forward to reading the team's final report in detail. 
The team expects to deliver this report to the Embassy in 4-6 
weeks.  The Embassy will then determine the appropriate 
deliverables to KNPC. 
 
********************************************* * 
For more reporting from Embassy Kuwait, visit: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/?cable s 
 
Visit Kuwait's Classified Website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/ 
********************************************* * 
TUELLER