VZCZCXRO7902
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHKU #0172/01 0361252
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 051252Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8214
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KUWAIT 000172 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NEA/ARP, LONDON FOR TSOU, PARIS FOR WALLER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/05/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM KU FREEDOM AGENDA
SUBJECT: MIXED REVIEWS ON SHAYKH SABAH'S FIRST YEAR AS AMIR 
 
REF: A. KUWAIT 56 - PARLIAMENT TO GRILL RULING FAMILY 
        MINISTER 
     ¶B. KUWAIT 32 - OPPOSITION ALLIANCE CRACKS 
     ¶C. 06 KUWAIT 4665 - INFORMATION MINISTER RESIGNS 
     ¶D. 06 KUWAIT 4430 - RUMBLINGS OF ANOTHER DISSOLUTION 
     ¶E. 06 KUWAIT 2971 - PARLIAMENT APPROVES FIVE 
        DISTRICTS 
     ¶F. 06 KUWAIT 1529 - COURT REVOKES FREEDOM 
        RESTRICTING GATHERINGS LAW 
     ¶G. 06 KUWAIT 768 - PARLIAMENT PASSES NEW PRESS AND 
        PUBLICATIONS LAW 
     ¶H. 06 KUWAIT 259 - EXPECTED SUCCESSION TIMELINE 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Matt Tueller for reason 1.4 (d) 
 
¶1.  (C/NF) Summary: January 29 marked Shaykh Sabah's first 
anniversary as Amir.  He has presided over an historic year 
during which Kuwait experienced several significant 
developments, including the constitutional dissolution of 
Parliament and new elections in which women participated both 
as voters and candidates for the first time in Kuwait's 
history.  However, changes over the past year have been 
driven primarily by pro-reform, opposition elements, not the 
Al-Sabah leadership.  The Government poorly handled several 
confrontations with Parliament, which it ultimately lost, 
tarnishing its reputation and emboldening opposition 
elements.  In addition, the ruling family's reputation was 
sullied when its internal conflicts were aired publicly 
during last January's succession crisis, and members of the 
Al-Sabah family were the target of harsh criticism during the 
election campaigns last June.  There is a prevailing sense 
here that Kuwait is falling behind other Gulf countries, 
something most Kuwaitis blame on their leadership for failing 
to wisely invest the country's oil revenues, stem rampant 
corruption, implement much-needed reforms, and outline a 
clear vision for the country's future.  Some, however, argue 
that Parliament is at fault and suggest privately that an 
unconstitutional dissolution would free the Government to 
address the country's problems.  Despite their criticisms, 
few Kuwaitis openly advocate any major change in the 
Al-Sabah's leadership role in the country.  Shaykh Sabah's 
challenge now is clear: to present a broadly appealing vision 
for Kuwait's future and sell it to an increasingly assertive 
and uncooperative Parliament while at the same time 
navigating through regional tensions.  End summary. 
 
¶2.  (C/NF) January 29 marked the first anniversary of Shaykh 
Sabah Al-Ahmed Al-Jaber Al-Sabah's ascension to the emirate. 
Although media reports on the occasion were predictably 
laudatory, in private Kuwaitis expressed mixed opinions about 
his performance.  While praising Kuwait's current economic 
prosperity, driven largely by high oil prices, they 
criticized the leadership for failing to use these resources 
wisely, curb rampant government corruption, institute 
much-needed administrative reforms, and outline a clear 
vision for the country's future.  As one prominent liberal 
remarked to Poloffs, "There is someone driving, but they are 
careening all over the road." 
 
A Year of Rapid Change, Mounting Frustration 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C/NF) It has been an historic year in Kuwait.  In 
January 2006, former Prime Minister Shaykh Sabah became Amir 
after a two-week long succession controversy between the two 
main branches of the Al-Sabah family: the Al-Jabers and the 
Al-Salems, which have traditionally alternated in holding the 
country's top leadership position.  When then Crown Prince 
Shaykh Saad (Al-Salem), who was seriously ill, refused to 
abdicate, Shaykh Sabah (Al-Jaber) took the issue to 
Parliament, which per constitutional procedures voted that 
Shaykh Saad was medically incapable of holding the position 
of Amir.  On becoming Amir, Shaykh Sabah further marginalized 
the Al-Salem branch by appointing his half-brother Shaykh 
Nawaf as Crown Prince and his nephew Shaykh Nasser Mohammed 
as Prime Minister, giving the Al-Jaber branch control of the 
country's top three posts for the first time in Kuwait's 
history.  While the controversy was resolved peacefully, it 
seriously tarnished the reputation of the ruling family whose 
usually private internal rifts were starkly exposed in public. 
 
¶4.  (C/NF) Many Kuwaitis were hopeful Shaykh Sabah would 
usher in much-needed reforms.  Parliament's passage of a new 
press and publications law in March and the Constitutional 
Court's revocation of a law restricting public gatherings in 
May were seen as positive steps in this direction.  Buoyed by 
these developments, pro-reform parliamentarians and activists 
began demanding electoral reforms to reduce corruption and 
ruling family meddling in elections.  The Government handled 
this challenge poorly, changing its position on the issue 
 
KUWAIT 00000172  002 OF 003 
 
 
several times before finally referring its own draft 
electoral reform bill to the Constitutional Court.  This 
mismanagement drove disparate opposition elements together 
and added fuel to the popular drive for electoral reform. 
When forced to make a decision, the Amir exercised his 
constitutional right to dissolve Parliament and called for 
new elections in June.  Observers noted wryly that this was 
his Parliament: the one he ran as Prime Minister from 2003 to 
2006 and the one that nominally handed him the position of 
Amir. 
 
¶5.  (C/NF) The elections saw unprecedented criticism of the 
ruling family and resulted in a sweeping victory for 
pro-reform, opposition candidates.  The pro-Government bloc 
in Parliament shrunk from 18 to 12 MPs, despite the ruling 
family's widely alleged efforts to manipulate the outcome of 
the elections.  As a result, the Prime Minister was forced to 
exclude two controversial ministers, including the Amir's 
nephew, Shaykh Ahmed Al-Fahd, from the new Cabinet and 
support the passage of the electoral reform legislation the 
Government originally opposed, two major victories for 
pro-reform parliamentarians.  This made the Government look 
weak and incompetent, and emboldened opposition groups, who 
became more assertive in Parliament.  A loose alliance of 
opposition MPs formed a majority in Parliament, making it 
difficult for the Government to pass legislation it 
introduced.  With the opposition alliance now fracturing, 
Kuwaitis have increasingly blamed both the Government and 
Parliament for this political deadlock. 
 
¶6.  (C/NF) In November, rumors surfaced that the Amir had 
openly discussed dissolving Parliament unconstitutionally for 
a period of up to three years, an indication of the 
leadership's frustration with the lack of political 
cooperation.  Opposition parliamentarians backed down some, 
but not much: one month later they forced the Minister of 
Information to resign rather than undergo an intense 
parliamentary questioning session, a constitutional measure 
commonly referred to here as a "grilling."  Several 
opposition MPs are now planning to grill the Amir's nephew, 
the Minister of Health, and even more grillings are 
threatened.  One Kuwaiti political observer told Poloff that 
some ruling family members, particularly from the Al-Salem 
branch, were behind these grillings and were using them as a 
way of getting back at Shaykh Sabah.  At the very least, the 
constant threats of grillings are distracting the Government 
from other, more important issues. 
 
¶7.  (C/NF) In this context, a few liberal contacts have 
suggested that an unconstitutional dissolution might be 
exactly what the country needs and the only way to break the 
current political impasse.  Recent front-page editorials in 
two leading newspapers seemed to imply as much.  While 
admitting that an unconstitutional dissolution would be 
unpopular, those supporting such a step claim the Amir would 
be given a year-long grace period in which to implement 
reforms.  They acknowledge, however, that an unconstitutional 
dissolution would only improve the situation if - and it is a 
big if - the Government can deliver on much-needed reforms, 
something it has so far failed to do. 
 
Where Are We Going? 
------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C/NF) Kuwaitis' main criticism of the Amir, expressed in 
private, is that he has so far failed to outline a clear 
vision for the country's future.  While Kuwait's economy 
continues to be buoyed by strong oil revenues, Kuwaitis feel 
vulnerable to regional security pressures, and often have the 
sense that Kuwait is falling behind other Gulf countries. 
Kuwaitis largely blame these problems on the Government's 
failure to take serious steps to address rampant corruption 
and implement much-needed institutional and administrative 
reforms to increase transparency and efficiency in providing 
government services.  These failures, coupled with the 
Government's mismanagement of several political crises, have 
opened the door for opposition elements, most notably 
Islamists, to step in and outline their own vision for Kuwait 
that addresses these issues in some ways.  Some Kuwaitis are 
starting to argue more vocally for the legalization of 
political parties and for Parliament to be allowed to choose 
the Prime Minister, reforms which could impinge on the 
Al-Sabah's leadership role in Kuwait.  It is important to 
note, though, that few, if any, Kuwaitis support a major 
change in the Al-Sabah's leadership role and their criticism 
is directed primarily at the Al-Sabah's mismanagement of the 
country's resources. 
 
¶9.  (C/NF) Shaykh Sabah's challenge now is to outline and 
implement a broadly appealing strategy for the country and 
 
KUWAIT 00000172  003 OF 003 
 
 
sell it to an increasingly assertive and uncooperative 
Parliament while at the same time navigating through regional 
tensions.  In an address to Parliament on January 29, the 
Amir called on Kuwaitis to avoid sectarianism, work as a 
team, and practice "good citizenship."  He also expressed his 
desire to improve the educational system and transform Kuwait 
into "a distinguished regional financial center," but did not 
explain how he hoped to achieve these goals.  If the Amir 
does lay out a clear vision and moves to reign in government 
excesses, most parliamentarians and political groups are 
likely to lend their support to him.  Kuwait's society is 
fundamentally conservative, and the majority of Kuwaitis 
understand the connection between stability and the 
extraordinary economic success they have enjoyed.  Above all 
else, our contacts stress, Kuwaitis want a steady hand at the 
wheel. 
 
********************************************* * 
For more reporting from Embassy Kuwait, visit: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/?cable s 
 
Visit Kuwait's Classified Website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/ 
********************************************* * 
TUELLER