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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KUALA LUMPUR 000263 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EAP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/13/2027 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR MOPS ASEC TH MY
SUBJECT: HONORARY CONSUL NOTES MALAYSIA AS SAFE HAVEN FOR 
THAI INSURGENCY, RELEVANCE OF OLD GUARD 
 
REF: A. 06 KUALA LUMPUR 1764 - NO TEARS FOR THAKSIN 
     ¶B. 06 KUALA LUMPUR 1976 - SURAYUD'S VISIT 
 
Classified By: Political Section Chief Mark D. Clark for reasons 1.4 (b 
 and d). 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1.  (S) The Honorary Thai Consul in Langkawi, Malaysian 
businessman Shazryl Eskay Abdullah (protect throughout), 
described Thai Malay separatist use of Malaysian territory as 
a safe haven and insurgents' views of the conflict during a 
February 5 meeting with polchief.  Eskay, who was a leading 
Malaysian facilitator of the dialogue with Thai insurgents 
hosted by former Prime Minister Mahathir, argued that the 
older generation insurgency leaders, mostly resident in 
Malaysia, remained relevant as they provided needed support 
services and safe haven to younger leaders.  He identified 
only one old guard leader as actively ordering attacks, and 
estimated that criminal gangs and Thai security services were 
responsible for 70 percent of the recent violence.  He said 
he did not see links yet between the Thai insurgents and 
regional or international terrorists, but recognized the 
potential and encouraged the U.S. to keep a close watch.  He 
also noted, however, that the insurgents received financial 
assistance via Singapore from unknown sources.  The now-ended 
peace initiative by Mahathir produced a ten-page "peace 
proposal" signed by old guard leaders, but which failed to 
gain much response from Bangkok.  Eskay believed that the 
February 11-12 visit to Thailand by Prime Minister Abdullah 
would result in the Malaysian external intelligence 
organization (MEIO) taking up a "facilitation" role in 
discussions between Thai intelligence and southern 
insurgents, though Eskay was pessimistic as to the prospects. 
 Eskay shared a 12-page paper on the insurgency and Thai 
Malay views, resulting from his interviews with numerous 
separatist leaders, which he had submitted to MEIO February 
¶1.  End Summary. 
 
Honorary Consul as Mediator with Separatists 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶2.  (S) Polchief called on the Honorary Thai Consul in 
Langkawi, Shazryl Eskay Abdullah, on February 5 as part of a 
February 5-9 visit to Malaysian states along the border with 
Thailand (septel).  Eskay, a Malaysian businessman of mixed 
Malaysian-Thai parentage, described his significant 
"mediator" role in the 2005-2006 dialogue with Thai Malay 
insurgents, which featured former Prime Minister Mahathir 
Mohamad, and his frequent interaction with separatists on 
both sides of the border.  Eskay said he carried out his work 
on the Thai insurgency largely independent of the Thai and 
Malaysian governments, and maintained direct links with most 
known Malay separatist leaders resident in Malaysia.  To 
bolster his credentials, he showed polchief video footage he 
had recorded of various meetings with men he described as 
elder separatist leaders and younger operators. 
 
Old Guard Not Calling the Shots, but Still Relevant 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶3.  (S) Eskay noted that most of the older generation of 
Malay separatist leaders lived in Malaysia with the Malaysian 
Government's knowledge and acquiescence.  The older 
generation included those affiliated with the United Pattani 
Freedom Front (BERSATU), and the constituent groups the 
National Revolutionary Front (BRN-Congress), the Pattani 
Mujahiddin Movement (GMP), and the Pattani United Liberation 
Organization (PULO).  In addition, Eskay confirmed that 
younger generation separatists, including those involved in 
recent attacks in southern Thailand, frequently entered 
Malaysia, particularly when the situation became "too hot" 
and they required safe haven.  The GOM was not always aware 
of the identity and travel of younger separatists.  With some 
exceptions, the older generation did not direct the actions 
of the younger insurgents.  However, Eskay argued that the 
relevance of the "old guard" should not be underestimated. 
The older leaders, with well-established networks in 
Malaysia, constituted the support service for the insurgents, 
providing shelter and transportation, and arranging jobs, 
including in Thai restaurants and on rubber estates.  Because 
the older generation provided needed safe haven services, 
 
KUALA LUMP 00000263  002 OF 003 
 
 
they remained influential and relevant to a potential peace 
dialogue with Thailand's Malay south.  (Comment:  Many of our 
other interlocutors dismissed the Mahathir-led dialogue 
because it focused on the older Malaysia-based separatists 
who no longer represent the insurgency on the ground.  End 
Comment.) 
 
The Murky Business of Violence 
------------------------------ 
 
¶4.  (S) Like many other Malaysians we interviewed during our 
trip to northern Malaysia, Eskay described the Malay 
insurgency as splintered, with operations currently carried 
out by very small cells, comprised of two or three persons. 
"Brokers" would task the cells with orders and money.  Often 
times the affiliation of the brokers would not be clear to 
the cells, opening the possibility that they represented 
other parties, but cells would carry out "orders" nonetheless 
both for monetary gain and for fear that they otherwise would 
run afoul of other insurgents.  The cell members generally 
were technically unsophisticated and the brokers often 
provided the improvised explosive devices to be planted and 
detonated by the cells.  Eskay crudely estimated that Malay 
separatists accounted for only 30 percent of attacks in the 
south with Thai army, policy and intelligence agency 
factions, along with criminal gangs, responsible for the 
balance.  Eskay relayed that many insurgent leaders believed 
deposed Prime Minister Thaksin and Thai Rak Thai party 
advisor General Chavalit were funding much of the recent 
violence.  Insurgent members had denied association with New 
Year's Eve bombings in Bangkok.  They also disassociated 
themselves from many of the attacks on schools.  The 
fracturing of the separatist movement and use of small cells 
added to the complexity and the difficulty in identifying any 
leaders for dialogue.  Eskay named only one old guard leader, 
BRN-Congress Vice President Abdullah bin Idris, as 
responsible for ordering some of the ongoing attacks in 
southern Thailand. 
 
Safe Passage 
------------ 
 
¶5.  (S) In addition to the Mahathir-led dialogue and frequent 
informal meetings with Thai separatists, Eskay said he had 
arranged meetings between Malaysian intelligence and various 
insurgents operating in Thailand, meetings which included an 
understanding of safe passage within Malaysia.  Even on 
Malaysian soil, Thai Malay militants did not feel safe from 
possible assassination or kidnapping.  On at least one 
occasion, a Thai bounty hunter had bribed local Malaysian 
police to abduct a separatist who was in Malaysia.  Eskay had 
intervened to release the target, whom the Malaysian police 
officer had locked in trunk of his police car. 
 
No International Terror Links...Yet 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (S) Eskay stated that he had seen no evidence the Malay 
separatists had linked up with external terrorist groups such 
as Al Qaeda or Jemaah Islamiyah.  He noted, however, that 
some insurgents received funds from a bank in Singapore 
(NFI), which passed through money changers in the Malaysian 
border town of Padang Besar, Perlis state.  Eskay did not 
know the origin of the funds.  Though there was in his view a 
clear potential for a link-up with terrorist groups, Eskay 
commented that Malaysian intelligence did not pay adequate 
attention to this risk and he encouraged the U.S. to keep a 
close watch on developments. 
 
February 2006 "Peace Proposal" 
------------------------------ 
 
¶7.  (S) The Mahathir-led dialogue had resulted in a "peace 
proposal" in February 2006, signed by old guard leaders of 
BERSATU, BRN-Congress, GMP, and PULO, Eskay noted.  This had 
met with no substantive response from the Thai Government, 
but might constitute a good starting point for future 
dialogue.  Eskay provided us with a copy of the ten-page 
document, which demanded Thai Government actions in eight 
areas, namely: 
 
-- Improvements in "leadership," through appointment of a 
Muslim Affairs Minister and a Muslim affairs coordinating 
 
KUALA LUMP 00000263  003 OF 003 
 
 
body. 
 
-- Improved government communication and networking with 
Malay Muslim communities. 
 
-- Confidence-building measures, including establishing 
ethnic Malay quotas for government service and security 
forces in the south. 
 
-- Steps to promote investment and economic development. 
 
-- Improvements in the education infrastructure. 
 
-- Amnesty, with individual cases approved by a Board of 
Review. 
 
-- Establishment of a tribunal to investigate and try cases 
of human rights violations. 
 
-- Establishment of a monitoring committee to ensure 
implementation of the above steps. 
 
Malaysian External Intelligence May Take the Lead 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶8.  (S) Eskay said the Mahathir initiative was now over, and 
the Malaysian Government had made clear that the phase of 
"NGO involvement" in dialogue with Thai Malay separatists had 
come to an end.  The February 11-12 visit to Thailand by 
Prime Minister Abdullah likely would confirm a role for the 
Malaysian External Intelligence Organization (MEIO) as a 
"facilitator" for  future informal talks between Malay 
separatists and Thai Government intelligence.  Eskay 
supported a Malaysian Government mediation role, but he was 
pessimistic MEIO and its Thai counterparts would make 
progress.  Instead, Eskay anticipated continued violence. 
The Honorary Thai Consul shared a 12-page "confidential" 
paper on the insurgency and Thai Malay views, resulting from 
his interviews with numerous separatist leaders, which he had 
submitted to MEIO February 1.  Eskay requested that we not 
share the paper and February 2006 "peace proposal" with 
others (we have forwarded the documents via classified email 
to EAP/MTS and Embassy Bangkok). 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶9.  (S) Eskay credibly appeared to have contacts with a large 
pool of old guard leaders, insurgents, and sympathizers from 
Thailand's Malay south.  His views on the insurgency were the 
most detailed we heard during five days of travel in northern 
Malaysia and tracked well in many respects with information 
and opinions from others.  His belief in the usefulness of 
engaging the old guard, however, contradicted the opinion of 
Malaysian politicians, officials and police who generally 
dismissed the old timers as irrelevant.  Several Malaysians 
volunteered they were suspicious of Eskay's contacts with 
Malay separatists and alleged Eskay had been involved in 
controversial business deals in the past (unrelated to 
Thailand).  Eskay informed us that he had lived some ten 
years in the United States circa the 1980s. 
LAFLEUR