VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKG #0271 0571413
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 261413Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY KINGSTON
TO RUEHFSI/DIR FSINFATC  PRIORITY
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4381

UNCLAS KINGSTON 000271 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FSINFATC FOR FSI/LMS/CMT - JOHN HARALSON 
STATE FOR S/ES-O/CMS 
WHA/EX 
WHA/CAR 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: AMER CASC ASEC AFSI KCOM OTRA KESS JM
SUBJECT: KINGSTON: LESSONS LEARNED - CRISIS MANAGEMENT 
EXERCISE (CME) 
 
REF: DIR FSINFATC 2/7/2007 
 
¶1.  The following is keyed to Para 2, A-H, Reftel: 
 
(A)  Almost all participants consider the form and conduct of 
the exercise to have been outstanding, and four hours to have 
been sufficient to meet the objectives.  Understandably, some 
participants (RSO and CONS) would have welcomed the 
opportunity to fully play out in detail post's responses in 
certain of the scenarios, e.g., to have staged real time 
simulations involving family members actually conducting 
evacuation drills or working with offices of the Government 
of Jamaica (GoJ) in responding to an aircraft crash. 
However, post recognizes that the CME is designed as a 
table-top exercise. 
 
(B)  Without exception, participants consider all of the 
scenarios played during the exercise to have been extremely 
 
valuable.  Some participants believe that the number and 
rapidity of scenarios might be reduced to more realistic 
dimensions; however, all the scenarios were entirely 
plausible and quite useful. 
 
(C)  Participants consider the intervention by the controller 
to have been just about right*- limited in frequency and 
duration, but insightful and quite useful. 
 
(D)  The CME did not lead to any radical changes in post's 
approach or overall ability to deal with various possible 
crises; however, as a result of CME post would be better 
prepared, in general. 
 
(E)  Post has taken a number of lessons and best practices 
for crisis management from the CME: 
 
--  Having recently moved to its New Embassy Compound (NEC), 
post now needs to move forward as expeditiously as feasible 
with plans to install computers, telephones, and audio-visual 
equipment in the multi-purpose room in which the CME was 
staged, so that it can function effectively as a crisis 
control room.  Post also must address questions about 
possible alternate crisis control centers. 
 
--  Post should establish a mobile communications system as 
soon as feasible. 
 
-- Tripwires and policy on allowing AmCits inside chancery 
walls in emergency scenarios must be more clearly defined. 
 
(F)  All participants found the stand-alone CMT Overview to 
have been extremely useful; indeed, some considered it the 
most valuable portion of the entire CME.  CONS/ACS would have 
preferred a lengthier stand-alone session more closely 
resembling the CME, while RSO would have preferred several 
mini-stand-alone sessions with actual simulations of crisis 
scenarios.  However, post recognizes that the CME is designed 
as a table-top exercise with constraints on time and 
resources. 
 
(G)  Most participants considered the optimal frequency of 
CMEs for Kingston to be once every two years (present 
schedule).  One participant suggested that, to allow for 
variations in personnel rotations, changing threat levels, 
and/or specific events, CMEs be held at post's request; 
another suggested multiple mini-CMEs held quarterly. 
However, post recognizes the constraints of time, funding, 
and resources. 
 
(H)  Without exception, participants felt that the CME had 
been a valuable and instructive experience.  Post appreciates 
CMT's detailed planning and professional conduct of a highly 
successful CME in Kingston. 
JOHNSON