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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KATHMANDU 000402 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/21/2017 
TAGS: PREF PGOV PTER BT IN CA NP
SUBJECT: CANADIAN AMBASSADOR PLEASED BY PROGRESS ON 
BHUTANESE REFUGEES 
 
REF: KATHMANDU 317 
 
KATHMANDU 00000402  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty.  Reasons 1.4 (b/d) 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1. (C) Canada's New Delhi-based Ambassador to Nepal David 
Malone told the Ambassador recently he was pleased to hear of 
Prime Minister Koirala's recent decision to approve 
third-country resettlement of Bhutanese refugees.  He 
indicated that the Government of Canada had not yet decided 
how many refugees it might take, but he expected it would be 
around 10 percent of the U.S. number.  Malone warned, 
however, that in order to make it politically possible for 
Canada to take any, senior Canadian politicians had to feel 
they were consulted on the process.  The Canadian Ambassador 
expressed appreciation for the Ambassador's comments on 
political developments in Nepal and said they tracked with 
what he was hearing in New Delhi from Indian officials.  He 
also promised to speak frankly to Maoist leaders about their 
need to end violence and intimidation. 
 
New Canadian Ambassador Makes First Visit to Nepal 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶2. (C) David Malone, a former Canadian Ambassador to the 
United Nations, who started his duties as High Commissioner 
in New Delhi in August 2006, and is accredited to Nepal and 
Bhutan, met with the Ambassador on February 15 during his 
first official visit to Kathmandu.  He noted that he had been 
to Nepal privately 17 years earlier and had begun to take an 
interest in the country while in New York.  Malone, who was 
accompanied by Canadian Counsellor and Consul Ed Doe, implied 
he had his hands full running Canada's largest foreign 
mission in the world.  He remarked that the Government of 
Canada had few interests in Nepal, but that he was interested 
in the Bhutanese refugees as well as political developments. 
The Canadian Ambassador expressed his gratitude to the Nepali 
Foreign Ministry for allowing him to hold meetings during his 
visit even though he had not yet presented his credentials. 
Malone stated that he did not expect new Ambassadors to begin 
presenting their credentials in Kathmandu until an interim 
government was formed with Maoist participation. 
 
So the Nepalis Have Approved Resettlement, Eh? 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶3. (C) The Canadian Ambassador informed the Ambassador that 
he was hearing two different stories from Nepalis on a 
third-country resettlement program for Bhutanese refugees. 
Acting Foreign Secretary Basnet had told him that the Foreign 
Minister would need to make one more trip to Thimpu in an 
attempt to resolve the impasse with Bhutan over the refugees' 
future.  That trip was on hold until the interim government 
was formed because the current Foreign Minister, KP Oli, had 
no guarantee he would keep his seat.  On the other hand, 
Prime Minister Koirala's Foreign Policy Advisor, Dr. Suresh 
Chalise, had indicated that the Prime Minister had given 
resettlement a green light at a February 7 meeting with the 
Ambassador (reftel).  To add to his confusion, Malone claimed 
that UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Country 
Representative Abraham Abraham did not seem to be in the loop 
-- although the Canadian Ambassador conceded he had not asked 
Abraham a point-blank question. 
 
Resettlement Approved; U.S. Plans Detailed 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶4. (C) The Ambassador assured his Canadian counterpart that 
PM Koirala had indeed approved third-country resettlement of 
Bhutanese refugees.  On that basis, the United States was 
moving ahead with planning for a resettlement program.  The 
U.S. intention, the Ambassador said, was to issue a request 
for proposals to set up an overseas processing entity in 
Kathmandu to handle the program (Note: PRM posted this on 
February 13.).  Our goal was for the first refugees to be 
 
KATHMANDU 00000402  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
processed by September 1.  The Ambassador voiced his concern 
the Maoists might attempt to delay resettlement.  Their goal 
was to keep the refugees in camps so they could be used to 
export the "revolution" to Bhutan.  The Ambassador stated 
that he had shared the news of the PM's agreement and U.S. 
plans with the Core Group on February 9 and that he hoped to 
meet individually the week of February 19 with the Home and 
Foreign Ministers respectively to discuss the PM's decision 
and next steps.  He added that he supported the idea of the 
Core Group then having a meeting as a group with the same 
ministers to discuss the modalities of a resettlement program. 
 
Canada's Plans Not Yet Clear 
---------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Ambassador Malone indicated he was pleased to hear the 
news of the PM's decision.  He said that, based on his 
discussions with the former King of Bhutan, the Royal 
Government of Bhutan had no intention to take any refugees 
back.  On resettlement, he remarked that senior Canadian 
officials had not focused on the issue yet.  The lower levels 
of the bureaucracy were still haggling over the issue, but he 
thought that the Government of Canada would ultimately agree 
to a resettlement program.  He could not give any exact 
numbers, but expected that it would be in the range of 10 
percent of the U.S. figure (which corresponded to Canada's 
overall population relative to the U.S.).  Malone, warned, 
however, that it was crucial that Canadian politicians be 
consulted before the U.S. announced a resettlement program. 
Politically, they needed to be able to say they were part of 
the decision making process to sell the program to the 
Canadian public.  Otherwise, they might not be able to accept 
any.  He suggested a demarche in capitals or in Washington at 
a senior level.  He also advised the U.S. to work closely 
with the UNHCR in developing the resettlement program.  The 
Ambassador assured his Canadian counterpart that the U.S. had 
every intention of working closely with UNHCR and with our 
Core Group partners, including Canada. 
 
In Rough Agreement on Nepali Politics 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) At Ambassador Malone's request the Ambassador 
summarized the current political situation, including the 
role of the Maoists, the UN arms management process, the 
recent Madhesi unrest in the Terai, and the planned election. 
 Malone indicated that the Ambassador's views generally 
tracked with what he was hearing from his Indian 
interlocutors in New Delhi.  Malone agreed that it was almost 
impossible to imagine the Maoists going back to the jungle. 
Certainly, their friends among the Indian Communists would, 
he said, be extremely disappointed if the Maoists went back 
to fighting.   The Canadian envoy noted that the Ministry of 
External Affairs held India's Ambassador to Nepal Shiv 
Shankar Mukherjee in high regard.  The Ambassador pointed 
that he worked very closely with his Indian counterpart.  In 
closing, Ambassador Malone volunteered that he planned to 
raise the issue of continuing Maoist extortion and 
intimidation with senior Maoist leaders when he met them 
later in his visit to Nepal.  He was well aware of a recent 
notorious case in Kathmandu where Maoists threatened to kill 
a Canadian computer company entrepreneur if he failed to 
provide funds to support their planned political rally. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶7. (C) The Prime Minister's February 7 decision to permit us 
-- and by extension other countries -- to begin a refugee 
resettlement program for Bhutanese refugees has caught 
several of our Core Group partners flat-footed.  They appear 
to have assumed the long-standing stalemate would continue. 
As Human Rights Watch recently noted in Congressional 
testimony, we need to move quickly while we have the 
opportunity to get a resettlement program set up.  At the 
same time, we strongly support the request by Canada, and we 
suspect, by other partners as well, to ensure as much 
 
KATHMANDU 00000402  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
consultation as possible.  A demarche request to Core Group 
capitals (and New Delhi) at a senior level would reinforce 
the work already being done in Geneva and here in Kathmandu 
to create a united front and collect additional promises of 
refugee resettlement numbers. 
MORIARTY