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RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
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RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 2398

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 000317 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/07/2017 
TAGS: PREF PREL PGOV PHUM CH BT NP
SUBJECT: NEPAL'S PRIME MINISTER AGREES TO RESETTLE 
BHUTANESE REFUGEES, WORRIES ABOUT TERAI 
 
REF: 02/02/07 HARRIS-KAPLAN E-MAIL 
 
Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty for reasons 1.4(b/d). 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1. (C) In a February 7 meeting with Ambassador Moriarty, 
Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala agreed to allow 
third-country resettlement of Bhutanese refugees.  On the 
ongoing violence in the Terai, the Ambassador encouraged the 
Prime Minister to both initiate a dialogue with all ethnic 
minorities and provide immediate and specific offers to the 
Madhesi groups.  While stressing the need to maintain Nepal's 
"national integrity," the PM's Foreign Policy Advisor, Dr. 
Suresh Chalise, actively engaged the Ambassador on the 
specifics of a national dialogue, including the need for it 
to be an open forum for all groups, not just the Madhesis. 
The PM reiterated his position on ensuring that Maoist 
combatants' arms were locked up at cantonment sites before 
formation of an interim government.  PM Koirala denied press 
reports that he had agreed to a Maoist Deputy Prime Minister 
and said he would like to appoint two or three deputies with 
the most senior one from his own Nepali Congress party. 
 
Yes to Resettlement of Bhutanese Refugees 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) On February 7, the Ambassador delivered Assistant 
Secretary for Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM) 
 
SIPDIS 
Sauerbrey's letter (ref) to the Prime Minister requesting the 
Government of Nepal's permission to begin planning a 
large-scale U.S. resettlement program for Bhutanese refugees. 
 The Ambassador also handed over a copy of the PRM fact 
sheet.  The Prime Minister gave his assent, saying "there is 
no problem for those (refugees) that want to go (for 
resettlement)."  The Ambassador thanked the PM for moving 
forward with a solution for the refugees. 
 
Tibetan Follow-to-Join Cases 
---------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) The Ambassador raised the need to allow the 180 
Tibetan asylee follow-to-join cases to depart Nepal and 
rejoin their families in the U.S.  The PM noted he was under 
heavy pressure from the People's Republic of China (PRC) to 
prevent resettlement and suggested that perhaps small numbers 
could leave at a time.  The Prime Minister's Foreign Policy 
Advisor Dr. Chalise asked about the possibility of sending 
the Tibetans to India as currently done with new Tibetan 
arrivals and then transporting them to the U.S. from there. 
The Ambassador agreed to explore that possibility. 
 
Need To Give the Madhesis Something ... 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Discussion in the meeting centered largely around the 
ongoing violence in the Terai lowlands, and how the 
Government of Nepal (GON) should respond.  The PM admitted 
his health was poor due to sleepless nights worrying about 
the Madhesi problem.  The Ambassador sympathized with the 
difficult decisions facing the PM and described the need for 
an inclusive process.  Chalise emphasized the importance of 
maintaining Nepal's national integrity, but acknowledged that 
a federal structure and proportional electoral constituencies 
would likely address the Madhesis' demands.  The Ambassador 
replied that, if the government were only to address the 
Madhesis' demands, it would soon face a rolling series of 
demands from various marginalized groups.  The national pie 
was not large enough to meet fully all the demands of each 
minority group, he added, and compromise would be required. 
Both the Foreign Policy Advisor and the Ambassador agreed 
that the government needed to offer something immediate and 
specific to the Madhesis, such as compensation for victims 
and apologies for the shooting of protesters, in order to 
forestall continued violence. 
 
KATHMANDU 00000317  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
... But Leave Room For More Inclusive Dialogue 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶5. (C) PM Koirala said "I am ready to talk to anyone who is 
interested."  The Ambassador urged that the government should 
provide specific dates and places for these discussions and 
that the discussion should center on two issues:  how the 
Constituent Assembly (CA) would be elected and how the CA 
would work once it was established.  Chalise commented that 
the PM was thinking of addressing the nation for a second 
time and asked the Ambassador for his thoughts on how a 
national dialogue might be initiated.  The Ambassador replied 
that the PM should steer away from forming another government 
committee to examine the issues, but rather call for an open 
forum that would allow all ethnic groups a voice in 
determining the form and functioning of the CA.  Chalise 
enthusiastically endorsed this concept.  The Foreign Policy 
Advisor suggested that the government and political parties 
could nominate participants, but that the forum could remain 
open to include anyone from civil society and ethnic groups. 
 
No Interim Government Until Arms Management Is Completed 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
¶6. (C) The Ambassador stressed the importance of completing 
arms management before allowing Maoists to participate in an 
interim government.  PM Koirala voiced his agreement, as did 
Chalise, who said that the GON would not move on formation of 
an interim government until the UN had certified that arms 
management was completed and successful.  The Ambassador 
doubted that a formal UN certification would be forthcoming, 
although he believed the UN understood the need to keep the 
arms management process going until the Maoists had turned in 
the bulk of the 3,500 weapons seized from security forces. 
He urged the PM to stand firm on this issue and promised U.S. 
support. 
 
Maoist Deputy Prime Minister Will Be Junior One 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶7. (C) The Ambassador expressed serious reservations about 
the rumored appointment of a Maoist as Deputy Prime Minister. 
 If such a move allowed the Maoists to gain control of the 
Prime Minister position, they would never let it go, he 
stated.  The PM claimed that he had never agreed to having a 
Maoist as his senior-most deputy; the issue was still under 
discussion.  He said he would like to appoint two or three 
Deputy PMs, with the most senior one coming from the ranks of 
his own Nepali Congress party.  Chalise assured the 
Ambassador that the PM was aware of the dangers posed by a 
senior Maoist Deputy PM. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶8. (C) The Prime Minister's verbal commitment to allow 
third-country resettlement of Bhutanese refugees comes as a 
wonderful surprise.  Post is eager to work with the 
Department on issuing a "Request For Proposals" to establish 
an Overseas Processing Entity as soon as possible.  While 
Koirala's interest in initiating a national dialogue is 
encouraging, he seems uncertain how to proceed.  His 
challenge is to find a way that satisfies pressing Madhesi 
demands but still leaves enough political space for the 
inclusion of other ethnic and minority groups in the final 
process.  Whether the PM is ready to make a second nationwide 
address in another attempt to resolve the ongoing unrest in 
the Terai is far from clear.  Unless he moves quickly to 
offer something concrete to the Madhesis, however, the 
violence in the troubled border region will continue and 
could easily worsen and spread. 
MORIARTY