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C O N F I D E N T I A L DUBLIN 000102 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/09/2017 
TAGS: PREL PGOV EUN KPAL IE
SUBJECT: IRELAND'S VIEWS ON KOSOVO (IN ADVANCE OF THE 
FEBRUARY 12-13 GAERC) 
 
REF: A. STATE 13840 
 
     ¶B. STATE 12957 
 
Classified By: Embassy Dublin Pol/Econ Chief Joe Young 
for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  The Irish Government strongly supports 
Special Envoy Martii Ahtisaari's efforts in Kosovo and his 
recommendations for a status solution, which it sees as 
bringing peace and stability to the whole of the Balkans, 
according to the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA).  While 
the Irish Government does not want to see undue delay in the 
process of negotiating the recommendations, it thinks a short 
delay for a compelling reason would make sense.  Ireland 
believes that EU Member States wish to achieve consensus on 
their approach to Kosovo.  Ireland's bottom line: The EU must 
band together in the UNSC to produce an unequivocal UNSCR in 
support of Ahtisaari's recommendations.  End summary. 
 
¶2.  (C) POLOFF delivered reftel demarches on February 8 to 
Pat Kelly, European Correspondent, Department of Foreign 
Affairs (DFA) and Jim Kelly, Director, Europe Office, 
Political Division, DFA.  (Note: GAERC demarche items, other 
than Kosovo, are reported septel.) 
 
¶3.  (C) Jim Kelly noted that Ireland has consistently been a 
strong supporter of Special Envoy Ahtisaari's efforts in 
Kosovo and is pleased with his recommendations for a status 
solution.  Recognizing Serb sensitivities to Kosovo's 
autonomy, Kelly said he looks forward to the next few weeks 
of consultation and negotiation as a time during which the 
people in the Balkans can get used to the idea, and during 
which Ahtisaari's proposal can be fine-tuned for presentation 
to the UNSC.  He said that Ireland intends to pitch the 
coming weeks as a period of consultation -- akin to the 
process that has advanced the peace process in Northern 
Ireland in recent months.  Rather than allowing the debate to 
hinge on whether the recommendations are anti-Serb, Ireland 
will cast the debate in terms of how Ahtisaari's 
recommendations will bring peace and stability to the entire 
Balkan region. 
 
¶4.  (C) Ireland generally sees nothing to be gained by delay 
in the process of consultation and negotiation, Kelly noted. 
However, he pointed out that waiting a few additional days 
for a compelling reason -- say, for the Serbian Parliament to 
be formed so the negotiating team could be appointed by the 
Parliament -- would make sense. 
 
¶5.  (C) Kelly pointed out that the future of Kosovo is 
personal for the Irish.  Towards summer, as a Framework 
Nation, Ireland will take over leadership of a section of 
KFOR and increase its troops on the ground in Kosovo from 210 
to nearly 300. 
 
¶6.  (C) Among EU Member States, Kelly said, there exists a 
strong push for consensus on Kosovo.  Ireland, in particular, 
will insist on unity, recognizing that any split within the 
EU ranks will embolden opponents of Ahtisaari's 
recommendations, hobble the UNSC, and create dangerous 
regional uncertainty within the Balkans.  Ireland will urge 
Serbia to cooperate with the UNSC on Kosovo.  Nonetheless, 
Kelly pointed out, any sweeteners for Serbia, such as the 
resumption of the Stabilization and Association Agreement 
(SAA), would have to grounded in real Serbian commitments and 
considered within an all-Balkans context.  In the case of the 
SAA, this would include cooperation with the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and demonstrated 
respect for human rights.  Kelly indicated that Ireland would 
oppose letting Serbia off the hook in order to gain 
cooperation on Kosovo, saying that such action would only 
perpetuate destabilization in the Balkans. 
 
¶7.  (C) When asked about what shadow Russia might cast over 
the EU deliberations on Kosovo, Kelly predicted that there 
would be little effect at the GAERC, saying that the real 
showdown with Russia, if any, will be at the UNSC.  He 
discounted Russian predictions that independence for Kosovo 
would lead to a surge of independence momentum in Russian 
regions such as Chechnya.  Each conflicted region has a 
unique set of circumstances at the genesis of its problems, 
which, he said, has little connection to the difficulties of 
other regions. 
 
¶8.  (C) Ireland's Goal:  Kelly said that Ireland wants the EU 
to band together in the UNSC to produce an unequivocal UNSCR 
in support of Ahtisaari's recommendations. 
FOLEY