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RUEHCI/AMCONSUL CALCUTTA

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 DHAKA 000283 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/21/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEN BG
SUBJECT: BANGLADESHIS STILL UPBEAT ABOUT GOVERNMENT BUT 
CLOUDS LOOM 
 
REF: DHAKA 0144 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Patricia Butenis, reason para 1.4 d. 
 
¶1. (S) Summary. Bangladeshis remain highly supportive of 
their government's reformist agenda, but the success of its 
anti-corruption drive is critical -- if the drive falters, so 
does the rationale for delaying elections and hobbling 
political parties.  Government hints of an election in late 
2007 are unlikely to materialize, especially if a "national 
unity government" is installed as early as May.  Mixed 
popular reaction to the political trial balloon of Nobel 
Laureate Muhammad Yunus, the favorite to head a unity 
government, and the refusal of the "two ladies" to heed army 
encouragement to leave Bangladesh suggest all will not be 
smooth sailing for the government.  We continue to press for 
elections as soon as Bangladeshis can arrange them, to urge 
the government to announce an election road map and engage 
with the political parties, and to protest violations of 
human rights and due process.  We have also offered the 
government concrete help in investigating and prosecuting 
corruption cases.  End Summary. 
 
The Honeymoon Continues 
----------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Not since the collapse of the Ershad dictatorship in 
1990 has the country's mood been so strikingly upbeat. 
Having averted the disaster of a one-sided election and its 
violent aftermath, Bangladesh now has a government that 
commands high popular support for its actions and vision. 
Democracy stalwarts like Kamal Hossain, a drafter of the 
Bangladesh constitution, support the government because, 
despite its undemocratic origins, it seems to represent the 
country's best hope for genuine reform.  The government has 
stumbled in a few areas, such as the mass evacuation of slum 
dwellers, transparency in its decision-making is blurry at 
best, and there are growing signs it is not above cutting 
legal corners to get results.  However, none of this seems to 
have undermined its popularity. 
 
The Bliss Will Fade 
------------------- 
 
¶3. (S) Even matches made in heaven, though, develop strains, 
and Bangladesh is a demanding partner under the best of 
circumstances.  Within the next six months, the government 
faces several potential tests: 
 
A) Agitation. There is no chance elections will occur before 
the summer, but the Awami League has threatened to hit the 
streets if elections are not held by May 12, the date some 
constitutional analysts say marks the end of a 120-day state 
of emergency.  The Bangladesh Nationalist Party could join 
the fray to short-circuit the government's anti-corruption 
crusade, which has fractured the party's leadership and 
gutted its chances in an early election.  Seasonal power, 
fuel, fertilizer, and water shortages this summer -- along 
with rising prices of commodities due to domestic and 
regional factors -- could boost the agitation. 
 
B) Restive Political Parties.  Sheikh Hasina has begun 
attending low-key events and speaking to the media, but 
Khaleda Zia is in virtual seclusion, anxious to protect 
Tarique and her other son from arrest on corruption charges. 
Senior party figures once viewed as her inner circle now tell 
us Zia and Tarique have to go, and party Secretary General 
Mannan Bhuiyan has emerged as her likeliest successor.  If 
the parties feel threatened or deprived, they could begin 
defying bans on political activities, and demand to be 
consulted at the beginning, and not just the end, of the 
political reform process. 
 
C) Reaction to a major government misstep, such as a botched 
attempt to force Sheikh Hasina or Khaleda Zia into exile. 
 
D) Disappointment over the failure of government initiatives 
to fix long-standing problems like power shortages. 
 
E) The military changes course.  There is no sign of a Zia 
counter-reformation, and there is consensus that the military 
has gone too far to return to the barracks without ensuring 
 
DHAKA 00000283  002 OF 004 
 
 
it is protected against reprisals from the next government, 
especially if it is led by the Bangladesh Nationalist Party. 
However, some senior army officers, recollecting the Ershad 
disaster or fearing for the institution's long-term 
integrity, are already wary of the military's renewed 
involvement in politics.  If the government agenda starts to 
unravel, military divisions cannot be ruled out. 
 
¶4. (S) A failure of military nerve or unity seems remote, but 
the other potential tests all seem likely to one degree or 
another. 
 
Warning Signs 
------------- 
 
¶5. (S) As an un-elected, military-backed regime, the 
government's legitimacy hinges on its meeting Bangladeshi 
expectations for reform and timely elections.  Its coyness 
about setting an election date is partially offset by hints 
from government officials of an election in late 2007, the 
outer marker of what many political leaders seem willing to 
accept.  However, if the government's commitment to 
nonpartisan reform or timely elections appears to wobble, 
attitudes could change quickly.  Possible warning signs 
include: 
 
A) The formation of a "national unity" government since 
almost by definition it implies a longer and broader tenure 
than just a "caretaker" regime.  Its military backers 
envision a body of technocrats and a few defectors from the 
main political parties to serve as the executive body of a 
military-driven reform agenda. 
 
B) Government failure to announce an election road map by the 
end of the summer, since elections would presumably require 
at least a standard caretaker government span of 90 days to 
arrange. 
 
C) The anti-corruption drive falters.  Cleansing politics of 
"black" money is central to the government's pledge to 
rehabilitate politics and governance.  If prosecutions fail 
to materialize, suspects are tried only for relatively minor 
crimes, detainees are released without charge, and obvious 
"big fish" -- like Khaleda Zia's son Tarique or her brother, 
a former military officer who brokered military contracts and 
appointments -- continue to evade arrest, the drive would 
lose its luster and the government would lose much of its 
credibility. 
 
D) Both the Awami League and the Bangladesh Nationalist 
Party, perhaps with new leadership, transform themselves into 
constructive reform partners, but the government still 
refuses to engage with the parties or to allow them to 
operate freely. 
 
E) Tarique Rahman somehow survives as a force in his party. 
Given his resources and ruthlessness, anything short of 
imprisonment, death, or exile would leave him as a constant 
threat to the new political landscape. 
 
F) The government starts to lose the support of liberal civil 
society and thus a key part of its legitimacy. 
 
The Power Behind the Shrinking Screen 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (S) Ironically, 17 years after the Ershad debacle a 
dysfunctional political process gave the army an opportunity, 
even an obligation, according to many Bangladeshis, to return 
to political power and become the savior of democracy by 
pulling the plug on an election.  Bangladeshis seem ready to 
accept the sleight of hand that leaves the military 
discreetly positioned behind the screen so long as military 
influence becomes neither too overt or overbearing. 
 
¶7. (S) Whether the military has the patience and commitment 
to remain behind the screen is another matter.  Chief of Army 
Staff General Moeen insists he has no political aspirations, 
but he is acting more and more like a politician, meeting 
cross-sections of society, handing out relief materials to 
poor people, and summoning President Ahmed for a meeting with 
service chiefs at Army Headquarters.  Retired generals 
 
DHAKA 00000283  003 OF 004 
 
 
already hold two of the 10 government advisor positions, a 
retired general has been sworn in as an Election 
Commissioner, and military representation is expected on the 
Anti-Corruption Commission and the powerful Public Service 
Commission when they are reconstituted.  Also, there appear 
to be limits to the army's commitment to reform; of the 
hundreds of notable persons fingered thus far in the 
anti-corruption drive, not one is known to be active or 
retired military. 
 
The Yunus Factor 
---------------- 
 
¶8. (S) Military officers have identified Nobel Laureate 
Muhammad Yunus as the ideal consensus leader for a national 
unity government, but some are reportedly having second 
thoughts after the mixed reaction to his plan to float a 
political party.  The negative reaction of political leaders 
was unsurprising since he projects himself as an alternative 
to their failed leadership, but popular reaction did not 
mirror the national rapture that greeted his Nobel Peace 
Prize.  Invited to address Dhaka University's commencement 
ceremony, academics have demanded he withdraw because of his 
new political profile.  He is, therefore, losing his stature 
as a national treasure, and his political party risks being 
labeled a "king's" party, particularly if it gets privileges 
denied to other parties.  To succeed against the two major 
parties, his party would need massive financial and 
logistical support. 
 
The Fork in the Road 
-------------------- 
 
¶9. (S) At the end of the year, Bangladesh faces two 
scenarios: The government has held free, fair, and credible 
elections; or it has delayed elections until a national unity 
government has completed a long list of reforms.  A 2007 
election looks increasingly remote since no concrete action 
appears to be underway to meet such a timeframe, including 
the Election Commission, which says it is methodically 
studying reform options before reaching out to political 
parties.  And on February 15, General Moeen told DATT 
(septel) that it would take at least a year just to produce a 
good voter list, a project the army itself is now proposing 
to undertake.  Popular reaction to delayed elections would 
likely be negative but would be affected by perceptions of 
government performance, such as the impact of the 
anti-corruption drive and whether a credible electoral 
road-map were in place and whether the government was acting 
in an authoritarian or partisan manner. 
 
The USG Message 
--------------- 
 
¶10. (S) Our message needs to strike a balance between key 
areas where we have some potential for influence, like human 
rights, and areas where our room for maneuver is less but it 
is still important to be on record. 
 
A) Elections: Bangladeshis are prepared to put up with a 
constitutionally ambiguous government in the hope they get 
long-needed reforms no political party was even willing to 
contemplate.  Even senior leaders in both major parties are 
happy to wait in order to create conditions for replacing the 
"two ladies" or to improve their electoral prospects.  Thus, 
while we need to call for elections as soon as possible to 
keep the focus on the importance of elections and to 
encourage the government to move forward, we also need to 
continue to leave it to Bangladeshis to determine the timing, 
and modalities, of their election. 
 
B) Road Map: Failure to release an election road map by May 
12 will fuel apprehensions about the government's intentions 
and play into any political party effort to foment agitation 
in support of elections.  Thus, it is important to keep 
pressing the government for a road map 
 
C) Political Party Engagement: It is counterproductive to 
ignore the parties because they retain formidable 
organizations and popular support.  Both parties have an 
incentive to engage constructively with the government, the 
Bangladesh Nationalist Party to temper the anti-corruption 
 
DHAKA 00000283  004.3 OF 004 
 
 
drive and the Awami League to lock in its current political 
advantages over its long-time rival.  And no matter how 
discredited they now are, both parties will eventually have 
to be engaged to support, or to reveal their aversion, for 
the new political process. 
 
D) Human Rights: In the way it has arrested and kept 
corruption suspects, the government has shown it is willing 
to cut legal corners to get the job done.  Where existing 
laws are inadequate, ordinances are being issued to increase 
government leverage on, for example, property seizure. 
Pressure from the USG and others seems to have ended the 
custodial deaths that plagued the early rounds of arrests, 
and the government is also sensitive to allegations of 
torture.  We need to continue to urge the government to 
respect human rights and ensure due process for all persons. 
 
E) The Military: We should reiterate our support for 
democratic, civilian rule, our opposition to military 
governments, and our commitment to monitor government actions 
to see if they are consistent with international standards of 
due process and democratic practice. 
 
F) Corruption: Anti-corruption is a long-standing USG 
priority around the world, and in Bangladesh we welcome the 
government's pledge to combat corruption in all walks of 
life.  We have offered to discuss with the government ways to 
support the investigation and prosecution of corruption cases 
to promote justice and support due process. 
BUTENIS