VZCZCXRO5124
PP RUEHAG RUEHROV
DE RUEHDM #0108/01 0321443
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 011443Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2901
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCQSAB/USSOCOM INTEL MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DAMASCUS 000108 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NEA/ELA;TREASURY FOR LEBENSON/GLASER/SZUBIN; NSC FOR 
MARCHESE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2017 
TAGS: EFIN ECON ETTC SY SANC
SUBJECT: NEW TACTICS FOR APPLYING PRESSURE TO SARG REGIME 
SUPPORTERS 
 
REF: 06 DAMASCUS 276 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael Corbin, reasons 1.4 b/d 
 
¶1. (C) Summary. As the USG continues to consider strategies 
for increasing the pressure on SARG regime members and 
supporters, post solicits Washington's feedback on our below 
suggestions for expanding the use of sanctions against the 
Syrian regime.  Targeted sanctions can help to delegitimize 
corrupt and repressive elements within the SARG by reminding 
Syrians that it is the regime and regime supporters 
exploiting them, and strengthen progressive elements both 
within the regime and broader society.  And unlike the 
perception of trade sanctions under the Syrian Accountability 
Act, targeted sanctions make clear for the average Syrian 
that the USG opposes the regime and its policies, but does 
not wish to punish the Syrian people - especially when the 
sanctions target the most notorious regime elements (Ref A). 
Most Syrians, however, are unaware of U.S. financial 
sanctions against Syrian individuals and entities ) which 
means that the intended message of financial sanctions does 
not reach its critical audience.  Based on post's previous 
experience, we suggest exploring the following strategies for 
raising awareness of USG designations and reinforcing our 
message to local and international audiences on objectionable 
SARG policies: 
 
--expanding the media campaign; 
 
--redesignating recalcitrant regime elements; 
 
--leveraging the "threat" of sanctions; 
 
--utilizing alternative mechanisms to "name and shame;" 
 
--expanding the pool of designees; and 
 
--broadening the scope of designation announcements. End 
Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) EXPANDED MEDIA CAMPAIGN:  Announcements by the White 
House and Department of State and Treasury on the day of Asif 
Shawkat's designation greatly increased the local and 
regional media coverage, ensuring that a range of Syrians 
knew about the designation immediately. One area where we 
recommend more effort is reminding Syrians of designations. 
Finding opportunities to publicize the full list of Syrian 
designees to date (perhaps connected to the upcoming Syrian 
election campaigns) or making a point to release statements 
on the anniversary of specific designations, such as Shawkat, 
will help keep attention and pressure on those sanctioned, 
and will draw attention to a mechanism that both concerns 
regime insiders and responds to public unhappiness with 
corruption.  Developing backgrounders and interviews for 
mainstream Arab press, such as Al-Jazeera and al-Hayat, can 
also broaden local and regional awareness of the 
designations.  Placing stories in specialized media, such as 
blogs or Arab business magazines, can also have specific 
impact, for example discrediting ®ime financiers8 with 
international businesses.  Beyond media outreach, connecting 
the designations to specific high-profile events can also 
create media buzz.  Targeting parliamentarians, who are also 
corrupt financiers (such as Mohammad Hamsho), during the 
upcoming parliamentary elections, can reveal the real 
connection between regime supporters and the corruption and 
repression that harms average Syrians. 
 
¶3. (C) IS IT POSSIBLE TO REDESIGNATE RECALCITRANT REGIME 
ELEMENTS?:  We also suggest exploring the redesignation of 
previously sanctioned individuals under additional Executive 
Orders (E.O.).  Although this would not necessarily increase 
our ability to impose further punishments on the individual, 
it would keep the public spotlight and pressure on the 
designee, especially if the public campaign around the 
designation ties to issues of Syrian concern.  For example, 
Dhu al Himma As-Shaleesh, who was designated for support to 
Iraqi regime members under E.O. 13315 in June 2005, might now 
be redesignated under E.O. 13338 for other activities. 
 
¶4. (C) LEVERAGING THE "THREAT" OF SANCTIONS: We would also 
like to explore the possibility of developing a mechanism by 
which we can publicly state that someone is under 
 
DAMASCUS 00000108  002 OF 003 
 
 
consideration or investigation for sanctionable acts.  We 
believe that we could gain just as much public relations 
benefit from announcing &potential sanctions8 as we do when 
we actually designate.  Additionally, we would increase 
pressure on potential designees to change their behavior (a 
benefit that outweighs the remote possibility that assets 
will be identified and seized after the designation).  For 
example, it was during the announcement of "pending" 
sanctions against the Commercial Bank of Syria, that we saw 
both heightened concern from SARG officials and some 
behavioral changes.  And although we would need to use this 
method judiciously to remain credible, we think it would work 
especially well in encouraging behavior change on the part of 
regime financiers who are also dependent on international 
business. 
 
¶5. (C) CAN WE USE ALTERNATIVE MECHANISMS TO "NAME AND 
SHAME?": We also recommend broadening the basket of tools 
being used to "name and shame" the regime and regime 
supporters.  There are other entities within the U.S. 
government structure, including the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) and Department of Commerce, which could 
potentially launch investigations against and publicly raise 
awareness of individuals and entities supporting the SARG and 
SARG policies through illicit business activities.  Media 
reports in November 2006 that the SEC was investigating 
Ford's operations in Syria prompted Ford's local 
representative, a businessman with extensive ties to regime 
insiders, to raise the issue informally with the Embassy ) 
insisting that his operations were completely legal.  A 
related mechanism could target dual-citizen Americans for 
criminal prosecution in the United States for their actions 
in support of the SARG.  Some Syrian businessmen and regime 
insiders have managed to acquire U.S. citizenship for 
convenience, which may exempt them from certain USG actions. 
Within the limits of U.S. laws, there may be actions that the 
USG can take against such Amcits.  For example, 
Syrian-American Khalid Mahjoub reportedly has close ties to 
both the regime and Iranian intelligence. 
 
¶6. (C) EXPANDING THE POOL OF DESIGNEES: We would also like to 
define further the necessary threshold for instituting 
designations under the current Executive Orders.  Designation 
cases must ultimately be proven with public documentation, 
and, in Syria's closed society, multiple open source reports 
to incriminate potential designees often don't exist.  We 
would suggest Washington look carefully at ways to expand the 
types of evidence for instituting a designation ) allowing 
us to propose individuals in a more timely and effective 
manner.  For example, SyriaTel, owned primarily by President 
Asad's first cousin Rami Mahklouf, transmitted text messages 
to all of its clients encouraging them to participate in 
pro-Hizballah demonstrations during last summer's conflict in 
Lebanon.  Do Syriatel's actions constitute indirect support 
for the SARG's policy of destabilization in Lebanon and 
thereby implicate Mahklouf by extension as the owner of 
Syriatel? 
 
¶7. (C) WHAT ARE THE PARAMETERS FOR BROADENING THE SCOPE OF 
DESIGNATION ANNOUNCEMENTS?: Designating, and publicly "naming 
and shaming," Syrian individuals and entities for actions 
sanctioned by existing E.O.s is an effective tool to pressure 
the SARG.  We would also like to explore broadening the scope 
of designation announcements so they resonate inside Syria. 
One way may be to highlight the ties of targeted figures to 
corruption and internal repression.  For example, in August 
2006, Hisham Ikhtiyar was designated for his support to 
Hizballah and other terrorist organizations.  Hizballah is 
popular in Syria and those supporting it are viewed as 
standing up for Arab dignity.  Yet, Ikhtiyar is not popular 
in Syria and has been one of the regime figures most 
prominently linked to internal repression.  Focusing our 
public comments on his active repression of civil society 
could both increase the public's interest and provide an 
additional tool for Syrian opposition members to 
de-legitimize repressive SARG elements. 
 
¶8. (C) Comment.  Sanctions in and of themselves will not be 
as effective as intended unless we can reach a broader 
domestic and regional audience with our messaging.  By 
enlarging the scope of designations and public awareness, we 
can increase pressure on the worst elements of the Syrian 
 
DAMASCUS 00000108  003 OF 003 
 
 
regime.  Additionally, by refocusing our efforts to highlight 
designees ties to corruption and internal repression that 
impact all Syrians, our message will have a greater impact in 
Syria. End Comment. 
CORBIN