VZCZCXRO6500
PP RUEHPA
DE RUEHDK #0275/01 0331436
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 021436Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY DAKAR
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7484
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0803

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 DAKAR 000275 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF/W, AF/RSA, INR/AA AND PM/WRA 
ACCRA ALSO FOR USAID/WA 
PARIS FOR POL - D,ELIA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2017 
TAGS: PINS ASEC CASC SOCI PGOV PINR SG GA PU
SUBJECT: DETERIORATION IN THE CASAMANCE 
 
REF: A. 06 DAKAR 3016 
     ¶B. 06 DAKAR 2597 
 
Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROY L. WHITAKER FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) 
AND (D). 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
¶1.  (C) Senegalese Army reoccupation of the Casamance, 
initially somewhat successful, has proved unable to thwart 
rebel activity.  Violence, while still largely concentrated 
in a northern triangle bordering on The Gambia, is becoming 
increasingly significant in the key city of Bignona, and 
rebel forces in the south, once seen as moderates, have twice 
confronted Senegalese troops working with Moroccan deminers. 
The death of Father Augustin Diamacoune Senghor has further 
diminished the influence of the rebel political wing over its 
maquisards, and assassination of an elected leader has left 
the Government with even fewer means of applying leverage. 
While most Casamancais appear to want peace, the Government 
lacks a coherent strategy to achieve it, and U.S. support has 
not yet been able to move the process forward faster than 
President Wade is prepared to move ahead.  END SUMMARY. 
 
GAUGING THE DECLINE 
------------------- 
¶2.  (C) In recent weeks, the Ambassador, DCM, EmbOffs and 
PADCO representative Yinka Oyinlola have met with most of the 
government and Movement of Democratic Forces of the Casamance 
(MFDC)  officials involved in the Casamance peace process. 
When the Ambassador saw Mbaye Jacques Diop, the President of 
the Council of the Republic for Economic and Social Affairs, 
he confidently predicted that peace talks would resume in 
early 2007.  On January 24, Minister of Interior Ousmane Ngom 
told the Ambassador that the peace process &has been more 
difficult than expected.8 
 
¶3.  (C) On January 8, DCM, AGATT, AIDOff, and PADCO 
representative met with Minister of Agriculture Farba 
Senghor, the new &Mr. Casamance,8 and informed him of U.S. 
efforts to support the Casamance peace process.  Minister 
Senghor, a Serere, had clearly been in contact with many MFDC 
and Casamance leaders since President Wade asked him to 
assist in the peace process in November.  Senghor said the 
MFDC armed factions (Atika, Kassolol and the Movement for the 
Liberation of the Casamance People) are more united than they 
have been in some time.  He stressed, however, that we should 
not infer that increased banditry in the Casamance and the 
attacks on deminers or on late Ziguinchor Regional Council 
President Oumar Lamine Badji were coordinated. 
 
THE FRAGILITY OF PEACE 
---------------------- 
¶4.  (C) Senegalese Army reoccupation of the northern 
Casamance initially seemed successful, though the policy 
decision to apply force was criticized by some.  Having 
removed hard-line Salif Sadio,s Atika or MLPC faction of the 
MFDC from its Bissau-Guinean bases and driven it into Gambian 
refuge, the military appeared then to have limited Sadio's 
capacity to mount significant attacks in the northern part of 
the region as well.  As of our last visit to The Casamance in 
late October, we found that while Sadio retained the capacity 
for small-scale attacks and banditry, there was reason to 
hope that violence would decrease (Ref B). 
 
¶5.  (C) In a January 22 trip to Ziguinchor and Bignona, 
however, visiting AF/W Desk Officer Dorsey Lockhart and 
Embassy Officers found what Regional Governor Leopold Wade 
described as "a delicate period, in which we don't know the 
real causes of renewed violence and can't judge their 
significance for the peace process."  Casamancais have been 
jolted by a sequence of violence, including: 
 
-- banditry that peaked in December and may have been driven 
by the confluence of three important holidays; 
 
-- the New Year's Eve assassination of Ziguinchor Regional 
Council President Oumar Lamine Badji.  The case is still 
being investigated:  the alleged perpetrator is said to be an 
MFDC member, but even Wade has said "the theory should not be 
given precedence," that it was ordered by the MFDC or related 
to the peace process.  There are suspicions the crime was 
political. 
 
-- armed attacks on Senegalese deminers who were supporting 
500 Moroccan deminers who departed Senegal last week:  three 
Senegalese deminers were injured by a mine near Bignona on 
December 19, two Senegalese soldiers were killed and a dozen 
 
DAKAR 00000275  002 OF 004 
 
 
wounded in an ambush on a truck convoy north of Bignona on 
December 20, and there were armed attacks on January 18 and 
25 in the south of the region by the until recently moderate 
armed faction headed by Caesar Badiatte. 
 
¶6.  (C) Beyond these high-profile events, we found concern 
about a generalized climate of uncertainty.  The Military 
Zone Commander, Colonel Sow, stressed to us that he was 
successful in keeping Ziguinchor and major routes open and 
safe.  Human rights activist Emile Dieme and developmental 
worker Abdoulaye Diallo, in contrast, told us army troops in 
the region's second city, Bignona, declined to patrol at 
night, and that the city was completely open to rebel 
activity after dark.  They said Salif Sadio had recently 
appointed younger fighters to replace older commanders whom 
Dakar had targeted as possibly open to compromise, and that 
he had redeployed into relatively remote forest areas for 
safe refuge. 
 
ABBE'S DEATH LEAVES LEADERSHIP VACUUM 
------------------------------------- 
¶7.  (C) We called separately on Catholic Bishop Maixent Coly 
and Bertrand Diamacoune to deliver our condolences on the 
recent death of the aged MFDC leader, Father Diamacoune.  The 
Bishop reminded us that the Catholic Church had not agreed 
with the Abbe on regional independence.  Bertrand told us the 
MFDC would now adopt a collegial leadership rather than 
replace his brother with a single individual.  Others doubt 
the feasibility of any leadership containing four or five 
competitors, including: 
 
-- Bertrand himself, a master politician known for his 
appreciation of government generosity but who apparently has 
little or no support among the MFDC maquisards; 
 
-- Ansoumana Badji, who was once enlisted and failed as the 
GOS' liaison with the maquisards and is seen as a 
Dakar-sponsored interloper; 
 
-- Jean Marie Francois Biagui, once the Abbe's most trusted 
deputy, retains the image of a young Parisian civil servant, 
though he did adopt a much more radical tone with us than he 
has ever done before; 
 
-- Separate from the first three, who form something of an 
alliance of convenience, is the Paris exile Nkrumah Sane, who 
has benefited in recent days after the incident with 
deminers, when Caesar Badiatte defended him as the Abbe's 
legitimate successor; and 
 
-- A dark horse, Abdoulaye Diedhiou, who despite or because 
of his fascist thug persona has managed to maintain links 
with both the diplomatic community and the maquisards.  He is 
in The Gambia, by various accounts either taking refuge or 
seeking the release from jail of another moderate leader, 
Magne Dieme, who has been imprisoned by the Gambian 
Government. 
 
WHO CAN MEDIATE THIS CONFLICT? 
------------------------------ 
¶8.  (C) None of President Wade's designated negotiators, most 
recently Agriculture Minister and Senegalese Democratic Party 
(PDS) apparatchik Senghor, has succeeded in establishing any 
personal influence in the Casamance.  Bignona Mayor and 
ex-Minister of Defense Youba Sambou, believes the "Cadres 
Casamancais," a group of Casamance "executives" encouraged by 
Wade, and especially Cadres member Badji before his 
assassination, have been filling this gap to a limited 
degree.  Sambou told Desk Officer Lockhart, though, that 
there is an "absence of clarity on the government's points of 
negotiation ... no precise mandate to carry out these 
negotiations and no roadmap (balisage) for proceeding."  He 
said "negotiators have failed because working with the MFDC 
requires a sophisticated and deep knowledge of ethnic Diola 
sociology.  The 'northerners' never talk to those with real 
power." 
 
¶9.  (C) The Government must, Sambou insists, do several 
things to achieve peace.  First, Wade must abandon the notion 
that he can "force capitulation ... that shows he just 
doesn't understand the Jola."  Wade and the Army must 
understand that operations such as the Moroccan-assisted 
demining are forcing moderates such as Caesar Badiatte to 
seek new accords with hardliner Sadio; future demining 
operations must be undertaken if at all only after 
consultations with the MFDC.  Third, the best way to lower 
tensions is by building road infrastructure such as a new 
road to Cape Skirring or a ring road around Bignona. 
 
DAKAR 00000275  003 OF 004 
 
 
Finally, Wade must turn to a Casamancais as mediator and 
negotiator, including especially Ziguinchor Mayor Robert 
Sagna, or Sambou himself. 
 
THE MILITARY ASSESSMENT 
----------------------- 
¶10.  (C) Two days after MFDC President Diamacoune,s death in 
Paris on January 14, DCM, DATT and PADCO representative met 
with Armed Forces Chief of Staff (CHOD) Major General 
Abdoulaye Fall.  We brought Fall up to date on U.S. efforts 
to promote peace, urged the Government to seize the 
opportunity presented by Diamacoune,s passing, and sought 
Fall,s views.  Fall was frank with us in acknowledging that 
the GOS lacks a coherent Casamance strategy and that 
President Wade has a proclivity for assigning a new &Mr. 
Casamance8 every few months while delegating very little 
authority.  Fall disagreed with Minister Senghor,s analysis 
and stressed that the MFDC is very factionalized at present, 
adding it would be easier to work with a unified movement. 
Fall asserted that even as The Gambia detains key MFDC 
Kassolol leaders, it says it is encouraging unity.  Fall 
alleged that President Yahya Jammeh is also providing arms. 
As for recent attacks, with the exceptions of the ambushes of 
deminers and with the possible exception of the Badji 
assassination, the rebels have been committing economic 
rather than political crimes. 
 
¶11.  (C) We went straight from the CHOD,s office to Gendarme 
Commander Major General Abdoulaye Fall,s office.  This 
General Abdoulaye Fall used to be &Mr. Casamance,8 but he 
was relieved of those duties when President Wade decided to 
stop providing the MFDC with monetary payments in favor of 
some food and medicine channeled through the Senegalese Red 
Cross/Red Crescent and then nothing in recent months, except 
provision of housing for a few MFDC leaders and very limited 
funds for Father Diamacoune,s funeral.  This Fall echoed the 
other General Fall,s analysis.  He said Diamacoune leaves no 
obvious successor.  His brother, Bertrand, lacks his stature; 
after all his years in Paris, Nkrumah Sane is &French;8 
former Secretary General Badji is &Portuguese8 after all 
his time in Portugal; and current Secretary General 
Jean-Marie Badji is not up to the task.  Fall thought 
demining at this juncture could be a mistake, but his greater 
concern is the flow of arms through Guinea-Bissau.  Both 
General Falls fear that if President Joao Bernardo &Nino8 
Vieira is not vigilant, his former party, the African Party 
for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde (PAIGC), 
could resume its historical support for the MFDC. 
 
¶12.  (C) Last but not least, we met with Brigadier General 
Ibrahima Gabar Diop, President Wade's personal military 
advisor and his intelligence chief.  Diop, who graduated from 
the U.S. Army War College and retired from the military on 
January 25, agreed with our analysis that Father 
Diamacoune,s death could lead to either a protracted 
leadership battle or be an opportunity.  Like every other GOS 
leader with whom we have met, Diop insisted that most 
Casamancais now want peace rather than independence.  He said 
that the CHOD has been following through on the President,s 
desire to reestablish state authority and to end the MFDC,s 
narcotics growing and trafficking.  He also underscored that 
The Gambia and Guinea-Bissau must be involved in the peace 
process for it to succeed. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
¶13.  (C) The government's decision to reoccupy demilitarized 
zones of the Casamance, after some initial success, has 
failed to eliminate violence and in some cases may have 
provoked it.  The effort to demine some areas with Moroccan 
assistance, undertaken without informing the MFDC in advance, 
seems to be driving a moderate faction of the maquisards into 
renewed communication with hardliners.  The MFDC seems to 
have free rein of Bignona city by night, when army troops 
tend to hunker down, and the feeling of insecurity is 
deepening. 
 
¶14.  (C) At the same time, leadership on Casamance issues is 
in disarray at all levels.  President Wade is accused of 
having abandoned the peace process in favor of pushing for 
rebel capitulation.  Whether true or not, it is evident that 
none of his series of chief advisors and negotiators has 
achieved any real breakthrough.  On the MFDC side, Abbe 
Diamacoune's death has left the civilian wing leaderless, and 
his would-be replacements are jockeying to replace him. 
Whoever succeeds will exercise even less influence than the 
Abbe over the several factions of MFDC maquisards.  In the 
absence of leadership, real negotiations or investment, there 
 
DAKAR 00000275  004 OF 004 
 
 
has been a rise in MFDC recruitment, banditry and general 
disenchantment with the peace process. 
 
¶15.  (C) President Wade probably had a brief window of 
opportunity some months ago, as hardliners were squeezed 
geographically and moderates seemed open to negotiation.  The 
window was partially closed by the Abbe's death and by 
moderate maquisards' reaction to Moroccan deminers.  It is 
also true, though, that Wade has been almost totally 
concentrated on re-election, and therefore appeared focused 
on achieving a military solution rather than on investing 
political and economic efforts in the region.  The result is 
a return to violence and disarray approaching if not equal to 
that which preceded the beginning of the peace process in 
late 2003.  END COMMENT. 
 
¶16.  (U) AF/W Desk Officer Lockhart did not have an 
opportunity to clear this cable prior to her departure. 
 
¶17.  (U) Visit Embassy Dakar's classified website at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/af/dakar. 
JACOBS