VZCZCXRO3355
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHCP #0167 0521511
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 211511Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3225
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L COPENHAGEN 000167 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/21/2017 
TAGS: PREL MOPS MARR PGOV NATO IZ DA
SUBJECT: DANISH PM ANNOUNCES IRAQ WITHDRAWAL, INCREASE IN 
AFGHANISTAN 
 
REF: COPENHAGEN 63 
 
Classified By: Ambassador James Cain, reasons 1.4b,d 
 
¶1. (SBU) Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen 
announced February 21 that Denmark will radically scale down 
its presence in Iraq in August 2007 and will then deploy 
additional forces -- perhaps as many as the net 400 soldiers 
to be pulled from Iraq -- to join the Danish battalion in 
Afghanistan.  Rasmussen stressed that the decision was based 
on expectations that Iraqi forces will be able to assume full 
responsibility for security this summer; in keeping with 
long-standing Coalition policy, he said, British and Danish 
forces will reduce their forces as the Iraqis take control. 
The Prime Minister also emphasized that the decision had been 
coordinated with Coalition partners -- mentioning his 
conversations the previous day with President Bush and PM 
Blair, as well as with Iraqi PM Maliki -- and that Denmark 
will remain engaged in Iraq as part of the Coalition, 
providing additional resources (four observation 
helicopters), training support, ten new advisors to Iraqi 
ministries and approximately $17 million in new refugee 
assistance. 
 
¶2. (C) The prime minister's announcement tracked closely with 
the outline that Danish national security advisor Bo 
Lidegaard provided the Ambassador and DCM earlier that day, 
in which Lidegaard described a withdrawal of Denmark's 
400-man mechanized battalion in Basrah at the end of the 
current rotation in August.  Lidegaard reported that the PM 
will seek extension of the current parliamentary mandate at 
least to the end of 2007 to cover remaining forces involved 
in the NATO and Coalition training missions and support for 
the four helicopters (some fifty to sixty soldiers).  In his 
address, PM Rasmussen indicated that his government has the 
support of the Danish Peoples' Party (DF) for the mandate 
extension, virtually assuring its passage, but expressed hope 
that his plan will receive broader backing within the 
parliament (initial reactions from the opposition suggest 
that it will not).  Lidegaard said the PM is cautious about 
portraying the plan as a simple transfer of forces from Iraq 
to Afghanistan.  Because of the corrosive political rancor 
over the Iraq deployment, the government wants to keep its 
proposal to expand Danish troop numbers in Afghanistan 
separate, in hopes of broader parliamentary support. 
 
¶3. (C/NF) While indicating understanding for the Danish 
decision, the Ambassador and DCM conveyed to Lidegaard our 
disappointment with the way this decision had been reached, 
with little advance notice.  Such an approach is inconsistent 
with the policy of "no surprises" the Danes have long 
advocated and to which we have fully adhered.  Lidegaard 
apologized, explaining that the timing of the decision was 
forced upon them by the British, and that PM Rasmussen was 
determined that the news not leak and force him into a corner 
(especially since the Danes could not be certain that the 
British wouldn't reverse course at the last minute; as if to 
drive that point home, Lidegaard took a call from his UK 
counterpart during our meeting, in which Nigel Sheinwald 
reportedly gave him the "final go").  Lidegaard noted that 
the Danes are very dependent on the British in Iraq, just as 
the Lithuanians, in turn, are dependent on the Danes for 
their own Iraq deployment (Lidegaard said that Rasmussen was 
at that moment speaking with the Lithuanian PM). 
 
¶4. (C) Comment: Shifting Danish forces from Iraq to 
Afghanistan may allow Rasmussen to extricate himself from the 
unpopular Iraq deployment with some measure of honor, while 
maintaining his credentials as an ally.  Even if the 
opposition doesn't give him any credit (arguing that Denmark 
should withdraw entirely), the move should help neutralize 
the Iraq issue here and give the government greater leeway to 
pursue deployments elsewhere.  There is broad backing here 
for Danish and NATO engagement in Afghanistan, including from 
the main center-left opposition parties.  Our immediate focus 
will be to nail down the Afghanistan deployment and encourage 
the Danes to look at increasing their engagement in 
Afghanistan even before forces are freed up in Iraq. 
CAIN