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Viewing cable 07CONAKRY235, TFGV01: NATIONAL ASSEMBLY DISAVOWS PRESIDENT CONTE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07CONAKRY235 2007-02-24 10:44 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Conakry
VZCZCXRO6896
OO RUEHPA
DE RUEHRY #0235/01 0551044
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 241044Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY CONAKRY
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0729
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHFT/GOLFCO MSGBN AMCONGEN FRANKFURT GE IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE//POLAD/J2/J5// IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CONAKRY 000235 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR GUINEA TASK FORCE, AF/W, AF/EX, CA/OCS, DS/IP/AF 
PLEASE ALSO PASS TO AID/AFR, PEACE CORPS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/23/2017 
TAGS: PGOV ELAB PINS ASEC CASC AEMR GV
SUBJECT: TFGV01: NATIONAL ASSEMBLY DISAVOWS PRESIDENT CONTE 
 
REF: CONAKRY 229 AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified By: DCM Julie Winn, Reason 1.4 (b,d) 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1.  (C) Guinea is in flux politically as key players struggle 
to absorb the implications of several developments February 
23.  The National Assembly, for the first time ever, 
unanimously defeated a Conte initiative by rejecting 
extension of the state of siege.  Chief of Defense Staff 
General Kerfalla Camara did not permit this check to prevent 
a preplanned demand that all workers return to their jobs 
February 26.  These two acts took place as a high-level 
ECOWAS delegation pursued an intensive round of discussions, 
begun the day before, with the government, labor unions, 
political parties, civil society, and the military.  For the 
moment, the streets are peaceful and busier than they have 
been for some time.  The legislature's rejection of the state 
of siege is a significant, perhaps even lethal, blow to the 
Conte regime, but it is not immediately mortal.  End Summary. 
 
 
--------------------------- 
National Assembly Says "No" 
--------------------------- 
 
2.  (C) The National Assembly dealt a firm and unprecedented 
rebuke to President Lansana Conte February 23.  Called into 
special session to extend the state of siege in effect since 
February 12, they refused  -- unanimously -- to do so.  This 
marks the first time the National Assembly has ever rejected 
a proposal by Conte.   All observers expected the 
legislature, hitherto a bastion of Conte support through its 
majority PUP membership, to rubber-stamp the extension. 
Instead, leaders of both PUP and UPR, the Assembly's only 
opposition party, gave declarations supporting an end to the 
state of siege. 
 
3.  (C) After a delayed opening of the session and an 
immediate suspension for consultations, UPR chair Ousmane Bah 
led off with a fiery but anticipated speech in which he 
denounced the government's role in the crisis, saluted the 
popular will and rejected any extension of the state of siege. 
 
4.  (C) PUP parliamentary chief Banire Diallo also opened as 
expected, with a denunciation of the vandalism during the 
strike, and homage to President Conte and the security forces 
for restoring order and peace.  He closed, however, by 
suggesting that "he did not think it good to continue the 
state of siege."  To the surprise of most Guineans, other PUP 
deputies immediately stepped forward to decry his final 
statement -- because it was too weak.  They declared angrily 
that the caucus had agreed PUP would "demand" a rejection of 
the extension request.  The ensuing celebratory pandemonium 
made clear that the Assembly's refusal to vote an extension 
was unanimous.  (Comment: Opposition leader Sidya Toure told 
Ambassador late February 23 that PUP deputies had been 
inundated by text messages from their districts suggesting 
that if they did not reject the state of siege, they should 
not bother coming home.  In some cases the message was 
expanded to include the threat that their homes would no 
longer exist, a reference to crowd action two weeks ago 
targeting properties belonging to officials of the Conte 
government.) 
 
5.  (C) The deputies, at the behest of Assembly President 
Aboubacar Sompare, decided to vote on an affirmative 
resolution before closing the session.  In that bill, which 
reflects some compromises, they recommended against a 
continued state of siege, complimented the head of state for 
his wise handling of the crisis, complimented Sompare and 
others for their role in facilitating dialogue, condemned the 
violence and vandalism committed on all sides, thanked the 
population for respecting the state of siege while it was in 
effect, and invited the unions to consider lifting the 
general strike. 
 
------------------------------------- 
MEANWHILE DIALOGUE AND TALKS CONTINUE 
------------------------------------- 
 
6.  (C) As the National Assembly pursued its special session, 
the ECOWAS delegation, led by former Nigerian President 
Babingida accompanied by ECOWAS Executive Secretary Chambas, 
 
CONAKRY 00000235  002 OF 003 
 
 
met with key actors.  An ECOWAS rep sat in on the National 
Assembly session.  Meanwhile, Babangida and his delegation 
met with the Prime Minister, key ministers, the labor unions, 
political parties (both majority and opposition), civil 
society, and the military. 
 
7.  (C) CNTG president Rabiatou Serah Diallo told us she felt 
for the first time, following a long meeting with the ECOWAS 
group, that there was a way out of the current crisis. 
Talking through Guinea's plight with the ECOWAS delegation 
had provided a sense of progress.  These parties are 
scheduled to meet again February 24.  Rabiatou Diallo is 
somewhat concerned that ECOWAS may press for an acceptance of 
Eugene Camara as Prime Minister, since they have had 
impressed on them that Conte will not back down on this 
point.  She notes that the unions will not back down either. 
Another union representative, Taibou Diallo, told us that the 
leadership has been informed by its membership (including 
through threats) that this is a redline. 
 
8.  (C) Union leaders are continuing their dialogue with 
Sompare, religious leaders, and regional representatives from 
all parts of the country, including traditional local leaders 
and wise men 
 
------------------------------- 
KERFALLA SHOOTS ACROSS THE BOW 
------------------------------- 
 
9.  (C) With one big exception, little has trickled out on 
the government's reaction, or that of President Conte, to the 
National Assembly action.  Calls Friday afternoon to military 
sources yielded uncertainty at the higher levels and a "it's 
a political matter" shrug at some lower levels.  There did 
not appear to be a "Plan B" with regard to the state of 
siege. 
 
10.  (C) Nonetheless, as deputies, unions and civil society 
celebrated an historic break with the past, the old school 
fired a shot across their bow.  On the evening radio and 
television news, Chief of Defense Staff General Kerfalla 
Camara issued a demand that all workers, public and private, 
return to work Monday, February 26. 
 
11.  (C) Kerfalla read a declaration, in his own name, that 
cited without comment the fact that the state of siege 
expired by its terms February 23.  He made no mention of the 
National Assembly's refusal to extend it.  He listed events 
and acts since the January 10 start of the current strike, 
including the January 27 tripartite agreement.  He concluded 
that since President Conte had appointed a Prime Minister who 
met union demands, there remained no basis for a general 
strike.  Accordingly, he invited all workers to return to 
their jobs Monday.  He emphasized in particular the need for 
the education sector to be up and running in time for 
students to resume class on Thursday March 1.  He concluded 
by stressing the military's commitment to provide security 
for the people. 
 
12.  (C) Although the operative paragraph used the word 
"invite," Kerfalla prefaced this by using the term 
"requisition," with the connotation "commandeer."  Kerfala 
apparently read a text prepared before the National Assembly 
vote, although it was tweaked thereafter to note the end of 
the state of siege.  We had heard about it early February 23. 
 It is being treated by the unions and other actors as a 
deliberate provocation and an act without legal authority. 
Union sources (supported by other contacts who have weighed 
in) tell us no one will return to work on Monday.  Labor 
leadership is worried that Kerfalla's declaration may be 
intended to provoke unrest, giving an excuse for another 
crackdown. 
 
13.  (C) Kerfalla's declaration was carried on both radio and 
television.  The National Assembly's resolution was read on 
television, but not on any national radio broadcast.  Few 
Guineans have access to television, but most have radio 
available. 
 
14.  (C) The military put up its usual checkpoints around 
Conakry at 1800 February 23; presumably the state of siege 
lasted until midnight.  Despite the nominal curfew, however, 
there was noticeably more traffic, vehicular and pedestrian, 
into the mid-evening.  Traffic February 24 is close to normal 
for a Saturday morning, with no extraordinary security 
visible. 
 
 
CONAKRY 00000235  003 OF 003 
 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
15.  (C) The surprise action by the National Assembly 
constitutes a serious blow to the Conte regime.  While not 
immediately mortal, it is yet another signal that Conte has 
lost the population --- and now even the support of his own 
party.  We do not believe that it was only fear of the local 
consequences that prompted PUP members of parliament to 
reject the state of siege unanimously, although that might 
have been a motivating factor for some.  More, it was the 
unanimity of the population itself across the country that 
demanded a similar unanimity in the legislature.  We do not 
believe, however, (and our conclusion is supported by 
Kerfalla's decree the night of February 23) that the regime 
will concede to the people and the legislature.  We are not 
even sure that they recognize the severity of the blow. 
MCDONALD