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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 CONAKRY 000191 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/16/2017 
TAGS: PINS PGOV PREL ASEC AEMR GV
SUBJECT: TFGV01: AMBASSADOR URGES PRESIDENTS OF NATIONAL 
ASSEMBLY AND SUPREME COURT TO REMOVE CONTE THROUGH ARTICLE 
34 
 
REF: CONAKRY 179 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Jackson McDonald, Reason 1.4(b, d) 
 
------------------------ 
SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION 
------------------------ 
 
¶1.  (C) On February 16, the Ambassador lobbied hard for 
President of the National Assembly Aboubacar Sompare and 
President of the Supreme Court Lamine Sidime to deal head on 
with Guinea's leadership vacuum by invoking Article 34 of the 
constitution to remove President Lansana Conte, who is 
objectively no longer able to govern the country. 
 
¶2.  (C) National Assembly President Sompare, who would become 
interim President of the Republic, agreed that conditions 
warranted the use of Article 34.  He is worried, however, 
about the reaction of the military, which must be brought on 
board in advance, he said.  He also doubted that Supreme 
Court President Sidime would go along, as required by the 
constitution. 
 
¶3.  (C) Supreme Court President Sidime "took note" of the 
Ambassador's advice but insisted that the answer lies, 
instead, in political dialogue leading to a new prime 
minister and a government of broad national consensus. 
Sidime is blind to the real problem.  He is a weak but 
pretentious man totally beholden to President Conte.  End 
Summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY PRESIDENT SOMPARE 80% WILLING 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶4.  (U) The Ambassador first met one-on-one with National 
Assembly President Aboubacar Sompare at the latter's office 
at the Palais du Peuple. 
 
¶5.  (C) The Ambassador repeated in extenso the same arguments 
used with Prime Minister Eugene Camara on February 14 (see 
reftel para. 4 to end).  In short, President Conte is no 
longer up to the job; Guinea is leaderless; no government has 
been able to transform Guinea's great potential wealth into a 
minimally decent standard of living for the people; the 
crisis has become untenable; the people will not accept 
deprivation anymore and have taken to the streets; the 
country is under an official "state of siege; it is teetering 
on the edge; now is the time for bold action. 
 
¶6.  (C) The Ambassador said that the objective facts now 
warrant -- and have warranted for some time already -- the 
use of Article 34 of the constitution to declare the 
President of the Republic incapable of exercising his duties. 
 Since Article 34 has not been implemented, the problem has 
festered; the people have rebelled against the government; 
and President Conte has invoked another constitutional 
provision to declare a state of siege, thereby conferring 
broad, exceptional powers on the military. 
 
¶7.  (C) The Ambassador argued that the state of siege might 
restore some public order for a brief period but it would 
undermine Guinea's fragile civilian institutions and would 
not/not resolve the underlying problem, i.e., President Conte 
is no longer up to the job and must be replaced. 
 
¶8.  (C) The Ambassador said that one way or another, 
President Conte will go:  either by death, resignation, 
Article 34, or a coup d'etat.  He said the U.S. strongly 
prefers that Conte be given a peaceful, dignified, 
constitutional way out.  He appealed to Sompare to rise to 
the occasion and to invoke Article 34.  If not, he warned, 
today's wave of popular discontent will grow into an 
insurrection of tsunami proportions, or, some colonel, 
captain, or "Sergeant Doe" will take over the country. 
 
¶9.  (C) The Ambassador said it was time for Sompare to reach 
deep down to find the political will and personal courage to 
invoke Article 34 for the good of Guinea.  He said Sompare 
and Guinea could count on the support of the U.S., most of 
its neighbors in West Africa, and much of the international 
community.  Most importantly, Sompare could count on the 
support of the majority of the Guinean people who are 
demanding change, who want Conte out, who want better 
governance, and who want hope for the future. 
 
¶10. (C) Sompare agreed with the Ambassador's description of 
the situation and recognized that, objectively, President 
Conte is no longer up to the job.  Sompare said that he has 
not invoked Article 34 for two reasons:  he is concerned 
 
CONAKRY 00000191  002 OF 004 
 
 
about the reaction of the army, and he has doubts that 
Supreme Court President Sidime will go along, as required by 
the constitution. 
 
¶11. (C) The Ambassador acknowledged that these were real 
problems.  Sompare said the army will have to be "in on this" 
before it can happen. 
 
¶12. (C) The Ambassador recognized that the military is used 
to preferential treatment by a president who is also a 
general.  He said that a Guinean colonel once told him that 
the military is afraid that they will be "thrown in the 
garbage" if there is a civilian president.  Moreover, 
President Conte, who was raised in the military and remains 
intensely loyal to his "military family," also favors a 
military successor.  Thus, it is necessary to find ways to 
reassure the military that Guinea will always need a strong, 
professional, well-paid, well-equipped army, even under a 
civilian president. 
 
¶13. (C) The Ambassador said he was willing to consider 
raising the matter with General Kerfalla Camara, Chief of 
Defense Staff.  Sompare commented that it would be necessary 
to convince the whole general staff.  The Ambassador took the 
point. 
 
¶14. (C) The Ambassador added, however, that the real problem 
was not that the armed forces are afraid of receiving fewer 
resources.  Instead, senior officers are afraid that, under a 
civilian president, they will not be able to perpetuate their 
highly lucrative sweetheart deals on the side.  Sompare 
agreed that many senior officers were motivated more by greed 
than by duty. 
 
------------------- 
A POSSIBLE SCENARIO 
------------------- 
 
¶15. (C) Since Sompare did not reject out of hand the idea of 
invoking Article 34, the Ambassador outlined a possible 
scenario:  President Conte is declared incapable of 
fulfilling his constitutional duties as head of state and 
head of government; Sompare, as President of the National 
Assembly, becomes interim President of the Republic, as 
provided by Article 34; Sompare immediately (simultaneously) 
confirms the recent presidential decree delegating 
substantial executive powers to a prime minister/head of 
government; Sompare and the prime minister, who must be a 
genuinely consensual figure, work expeditiously to form a 
transitional government of broad national consensus to 
administer the country until a presidential election is held, 
after which a permanent government could be formed. 
 
¶16. (C) Sompare himself remarked that a transitional 
government should include members of the opposition political 
parties, labor unions, and civil society.  The Ambassador 
concurred, adding that these groups should be given some 
important ministries in order to involve them deeply in the 
affairs of state, to make them partly responsible for 
administering the country, and to make them accountable for 
their performance. 
 
¶17. (C) Warming the idea, Sompare recommended that the 
Ambassador also meet with Supreme Court President Sidime, 
without whose assent Article 34 is impossible to implement. 
 
¶18. (C) The Ambassador said he planned to meet with Sidime as 
soon as possible.  Sompare said he expected Sidime and 
President of the Economic and Social Council Michel Kamano to 
arrive any minute for a pre-arranged meeting about how to 
restart the political dialogue with the labor unions, 
political parties, civil society, religious leaders, etc. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
SUPREME COURT PRESIDENT SIDIME:  THE WEAKEST LINK 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶19. (C) Supreme Court President Lamine Sidime and Economic 
and Social Council President Michel Kamano soon arrived at 
Sompare's office. 
 
¶20. (C) The Ambassador then repeated at length the same 
arguments he had made to Sompare.  He said it was time to 
face reality.  Objectively, President Conte is no longer up 
to the job.  There is a leadership vacuum at the very top. 
This dysfunctional state of affairs has been allowed to 
continue for so long that it is now endangering Guinea,s 
very existence as a bulwark of stability in West Africa. 
Guinea is already experiencing unprecedented civil strife; 
the crisis will worsen unless bold steps are taken now to 
 
CONAKRY 00000191  003 OF 004 
 
 
stop it. 
 
¶21. (C) He said it was time -- perhaps even past time -- for 
Sompare and Sidime to fulfill their constitutional duties by 
invoking Article 34, which represents the best way to remove 
President Conte in a peaceful, civilian, constitutional 
manner. 
 
¶22. (C) Sidime replied that he would "take note" of the 
Ambassador's advice but that the government was now trying to 
restart the political dialogue in order to resolve the 
crisis.  He asked the Ambassador to help convince the labor 
unions to end the strike. 
 
¶23. (C) The Ambassador said that the U.S. supports political 
dialogue.  He said the U.S. Embassy had worked hard and 
successfully to convince the union leaders to participate in 
the previous day's meeting aimed at resuming the political 
dialogue.  He said he personally had requested General 
Kerfalla to guarantee the safety of the participants in the 
political dialogue. 
 
¶24. (C) The Ambassador stressed, however, that the labor 
unions are not the problem.  The general strike reflects much 
broader popular discontent.  Even if the unions announced an 
end to the strike today, it is unlikely that the population 
would follow.  The unions do not control the people, and the 
people want change. 
 
¶25. (C) Comment:  Sidime, like many senior government 
officials, seemed obsessed with the labor unions and 
oblivious to the real nature of the crisis.  End comment. 
 
¶26. (C) The Ambassador argued that political dialogue and 
Article 34 are not mutually exclusive.  To the contrary, they 
are complementary.  He said that political dialogue would be 
required to produce a consensual prime minister and a 
broad-based transitional government, both of which would be 
necessary during the period from Conte's removal under 
Article 34 until a new president could be elected. 
 
¶27. (C) Sidime seemed unconvinced, unwilling or both. 
 
¶28. (C) Economic and Social Council President Michel Kamano 
predicted that if Article 34 were invoked, there would be a 
coup d'etat. 
 
¶29. (C) The Ambassador replied that one could not rule out 
that eventuality, but that if Article 34 was not invoked, 
there would also be a coup d'etat, a mass insurrection, or 
some other form of violent upheaval that would depose 
President Conte through extra-constitutional means. 
Moreover, he warned, Conte would not be the only person 
removed. 
 
¶30. (C) At the end of the meeting, the Ambassador reiterated 
that the time has come for Sompare and Sidime to fulfill 
their constitutional responsibilities.  He said that the fate 
of Guinea was, to a very large extent, in their hands. 
 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶31. (C) We have now explicitly urged both Sompare and Sidime 
to address Guinea's leadership problem head on.  We have 
emphasized that half measures and partial solutions will no 
longer suffice.  We have made clear that Conte is the problem 
and that he must go.  We have argued that Conte should be 
removed constitutionally.  We have warned that if Conte is 
not removed constitutionally, then he will almost certainly 
be removed through violent, extra-constitutional means that 
will sweep away Conte and many others, including perhaps 
Sompare and Sidime themselves. 
 
¶32. (C) National Assembly President Sompare is concerned 
about the reaction of the military.  He could be risking his 
life by invoking Article 34.  He will only invoke Article 34 
if the military has been brought on board beforehand and if 
he thinks Sidime will go along. 
 
¶33. (C) Supreme Court President Sidime is a weak but 
pretentious man.  He is subservient to President Conte.  (For 
example, he validated Conte's crooked election in 1993.) 
Without Conte, Sidime is nothing.  Moreover, he, too, 
probably fears the reaction of the military.  If somehow 
General Kerfalla and the military command can be convinced 
that it is in Guinea's interest to facilitate Conte's exit 
through Article 34, and that their private financial 
 
CONAKRY 00000191  004 OF 004 
 
 
interests will not be trampled, then they could prevail on 
Sidime to concur.  Sidime, who comes from a lower caste, 
would ultimately comply under such pressure. 
 
¶34. (C) In sum, Sompare and Sidime will not use Article 34 
unless the military is on board in advance. 
MCDONALD