VZCZCXRO6343
PP RUEHMA RUEHPA
DE RUEHRY #0129/01 0331135
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 021135Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY CONAKRY
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0592
INFO RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE//POLAD J2/J5//

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 CONAKRY 000129 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR AF/W, AF/EX, DS/IP/AF, CA/OCS 
TREASURY FOR OFFICE OF AFRICAN NATIONS 
PLEASE PASS ALSO TO PEACE CORPS, ALSO FOR AID/AA 
 
E.O. 12598:  N/A 
TAGS: ECON PREL PGOV ELAB ASEC PINS EAID GV
SUBJECT: GUINEA: FINANCIALLY UNFEASIBLE RICE AND FUEL CONCESSIONS 
UNDERPIN STRIKE DEAL 
 
REFS: (A) Conakry 118 and previous, 
      (B) Conakry 84 
 
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Summary 
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¶1. (SBU) In brokering a suspension of the general strike that 
crippled Guinea for almost three weeks (Ref A), the Government of 
Guinea agreed to economic concessions that may prove untenable. 
Fuel and rice, which are already heavily subsidized, will be further 
subsidized with tax benefits for suppliers.  According to the 
accord, the price of rice will be halved, and the price of fuel 
reduced more than 10%; the concessions are to last for the rest of 
the calendar year.  The government also banned export of 
agricultural, forestry and petroleum products for the rest of the 
calendar year in hopes that food prices will stabilize if there is 
abundance in the market.  The suspension of exports is interpreted 
by some as a breach of Guinea's obligations under ECOWAS trade 
agreements and with its neighbors in the Mano River Union. 
 
¶2. (SBU) The government of Guinea plans to finance the new subsidies 
through a tax suspension and credit program that will not require 
any dispersal of cash to the participating suppliers in the fuel and 
rice sectors.  If the two plans are fully enacted, the government of 
Guinea will lose an estimated 444 billion GNF (some 7.3 million USD) 
in tax revenue this quarter.  This projected loss combined with the 
5,360,000 GNF (900,000 USD) in tax revenue the government of Guinea 
lost during the strike (Ref B), will strain the government's coffers 
and ultimately may lead to an even more tenuous economic situation. 
End summary. 
 
----------------- 
Let's Make A Deal 
----------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) Among the concessions the government of Guinea negotiated 
to end the general strike were subsidies on rice and fuel (Ref A). 
In its accord with labor unions, the government agreed to lower the 
price of a 50 kg sack of rice from an average market price of 
175,000 Guinean Francs (GNF) to 87,500 GNF, or 31 USD to 15.25 USD. 
The government and the unions agreed to reduce the price of fuel 
from 5000 GNF to 4300 GNF per liter, or 0.85 USD to 0.70 USD per 
liter.  To finance these subsidies, the government plans to suspend 
a percentage of taxes with the savings to be passed on to the 
consumer.  The projected lost tax revenue for the first fiscal 
quarter is 279 billion GNF (4.6 million USD) for the gas subsidy, 
and 165 billion GNF (2.7 million USD) for the rice subsidy. 
 
-------------------- 
A Sticky Rice Accord 
-------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) On January 30, EconOff met with Djbril Barry, proprietor of 
Barry et Fils, one of Guinea's two major rice importers.  Barry 
doubted the government of Guinea's ability and commitment to 
reimburse his company for rice subsidies.  In 2004, the government 
failed to honor its commitment to reimburse importers after obliging 
rice importers to sell below market value.  Barry said the 
government of Guinea still owes his company nearly 500,000 USD from 
¶2004.  In June 2006, the government ordered that rice be sold at 
85,000 GNF (14 USD) per 50 kg bag vice the market price of 130,000 
GNF (23 USD).  These efforts resulted in only limited amounts of 
rice reaching the marketplace at the subsidized price and the 
overall average price of rice increasing. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Under the 2006 subsidy plan, the government of Guinea 
promised rice importers they would be reimbursed in cash on a 
monthly or quarterly basis.  In the end, the government paid for its 
subsidy through exoneration of customs taxes.  Barry said his 
company made subsidized rice available when the government of Guinea 
made payment, but when the government fell behind in payments, his 
company sold rice at the retail price out of economic necessity.  In 
2006, the company provided 8,000 tons of rice at the subsidized 
price for three months, directly to the unions.  They received 
customs exoneration for that quantity.  Barry said his company plans 
to make an initial 1,000 tons of rice available at 87,500 GNF per 
bag and wait for reimbursement, i.e., tax credits, after which the 
company will release another 1,000 tons of rice. 
 
¶6. (SBU) On January 31, EconOff spoke with Alpha Diallo, owner of 
Societe de Commerce et de Financement, Guinea's leading rice 
importer. Diallo and Barry control more than 90 percent of Guinea's 
rice imports, and both are aware that together they constitute a 
monopoly.  Diallo mirrored Barry's comments saying his company would 
 
CONAKRY 00000129  002 OF 002 
 
 
also release an initial 1,000-ton stock of rice but would make no 
more available until the government applied the promised tax 
credits.  Like Barry, Diallo claims the government of Guinea still 
owes him from subsidy initiatives in 2004 and 2006.  In 2006, Diallo 
supplied the military with its subsidized rice and received partial 
cash payment for the subsidy. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Diallo said he and Barry refuse to enter into any long 
term agreements with the government of Guinea until a new Prime 
Minister is appointed.  Both men fear a tax credit contract might be 
annulled or disregarded by members of a new government.  They agreed 
they could best protect their investments and stay in good graces 
with the government by releasing small amounts of rice at a time, 
rather than contractually binding themselves to produce tens of 
thousands of tons of rice at deeply subsidized prices. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Note: At current exchange rates, a 50 kg sack of rice 
costs the importer 116,000 GNF (20.50 USD) before transport or 
storage expenses.  The government's tax credit of 28,500 GNF (4.75 
USD) does reduce the sack of rice to 87,500.  However, this new cost 
structure does not factor in profit margin for the importer or 
subsequent distributors.  End Note. 
 
----------------- 
Fuel for the Fire 
----------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) On January 31, EconOff met with Alpha Yaya Diallo, chief of 
the National Customs Directorate responsible for petroleum products. 
 Diallo was critical of the tripartite accord and said the 
government of Guinea did not consult the petroleum companies prior 
to agreeing to lower the price of fuel (unleaded gas, diesel and 
kerosene) to 4300 GNF per liter (vice 5000 for unleaded gas and 5200 
for diesel).  Diallo said the subsidy will make unleaded fuel more 
affordable to consumers, but gas station owners will not realize a 
profit because, after transport expenses, the subsidy only puts the 
product at cost.  Diallo argued that only the diesel subsidy allows 
gas station owners to make a profit. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Gas stations were closed most of the day on February 1. 
Long lines of waiting vehicles slowed passing traffic, which was 
lighter than usual because taxis had no fuel.  Especially early in 
the day, large numbers of would-be taxi commuters clustered at key 
intersections hoping vainly for transport to work.  At the end of 
the day, some stations opened and began selling at the new price. 
As of February 2, there are plentiful taxis.  The problem may in 
part have been due to logistic obstacles to getting the cheaper gas 
delivered, according to contacts at Total and Shell. 
 
¶11.  (SBU) Diallo told us he was "discouraged" that the government 
of Guinea decided to ban exports of agricultural products, and said 
he interpreted the decree as contrary to WTO, ECOWAS and Mano River 
Union protocols relating to free movement of persons and goods. 
Diallo expressed concern that the policy could "only lead to" more 
smuggling of food and petroleum products to neighboring countries as 
now gas and food will be significantly cheaper in Guinea.  Diallo 
said it would be impossible to patrol Guinea's borders not only 
because they are porous, but because increased smuggling will tempt 
even the most upstanding Customs officers to accept bribes.  Even if 
it were possible to completely patrol the borders to enforce the 
policy, it is still "doomed" to fail because the government of 
Guinea is incapable of providing the subsidies in the long term, he 
concluded. 
 
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COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶12.  (SBU) In its desire to end the recent strike, the government of 
Guinea made a series of promises that are economically untenable and 
virtually impossible to deliver in the medium to long term.  So far, 
very little rice is available at the subsidized price, and even that 
can only be obtained through local officials, generally after paying 
a bribe.  As gas station owners fail to realize profits, they may 
refuse to sell, claiming lack of supply, despite a communique 
requiring that they do so.  The most serious issue, however, is the 
cessation of exports.  In the short term, Guinea's markets may see 
an increase in goods and prices will likely fall.  However, the 
subsequent lost tax revenue, lower amounts of incoming hard 
currency, and the cessation of a lively regional trade will only 
further damage Guinea's already frail economy. 
 
MCDONALD