VZCZCXYZ0024
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBU #0205/01 0332015
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 022015Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7148
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/FBI WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L BUENOS AIRES 000205 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
WHA FOR A/S SHANNON, DAS DUDDY, AND DMCCARTHY 
WHA/BSC FOR BARNES, FRIEDMAN, AND BLAKENEY 
NEA/IR FOR HWOOSTER 
P FOR HEIDI BRONKE 
S/CT FOR VIRGINIA PALMER AND ARNOLD SIERRA 
NSC FOR JUAN ZARATE AND JOSE CARDENAS 
FBI FOR CTD IRAN-HIZBALLAH UNIT AND OIO AMERICAS UNIT 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2017 
TAGS: PTER PREL PGOV KJUS AR FBI
SUBJECT: AMIA UPDATE: ARGENTINA LIKELY TO REQUEST QUIET USG 
SUPPORT IN LEAD-UP TO INTERPOL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING 
 
REF: 1. BUENOS AIRES 182 2. BUENOS AIRES 93 3. BUENOS 
     AIRES 43 
 
Classified By: DCM Michael Matera for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY.  DCM met February 1 with MFA Ambassador 
Guillermo Gonzalez (who has the lead on the AMIA case) to 
discuss GOA strategy to prepare for the March Interpol 
Executive Committee meeting that will likely decide whether 
Red Notices will be issued for the arrest of the nine 
suspects in the July 1994 AMIA bombing.  Gonzalez 
communicated his shock at the GOI threats delivered at the 
January 22 meeting in Lyon (Ref 1) and noted that the GOA 
would need and appreciate the quiet, closely coordinated 
support of the USG as it prepares for the March 13-15 
meeting.  GOA strategy and plans for the March meeting remain 
undetermined but are being discussed already with the Foreign 
Minister; however, Gonzalez mentioned that U.S. support in 
lobbying Executive Committee members prior to the meeting 
would be important given very weak links between Argentina 
and a number of the countries represented on the Executive 
Committee.  He asked however that we await an official 
communication from the MFA on this, as the final GOA position 
has not been decided.  DCM was non-committal on USG 
willingness to play an active role with Interpol Executive 
Committee members but suggested that the visit of Attorney 
General Gonzales and Under Secretary Burns and Assistant 
Secretary Shannon to Buenos Aires next week was the perfect 
 
SIPDIS 
opportunity to discuss these issues.  Embassy expects that 
the GOA will take advantage of these visits for this purpose. 
 END SUMMARY. 
 
----------------------------- 
Revisiting the Lyon Encounter 
----------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) On February 1, DCM and POLOFF met with MFA Ambassador 
Guillermo Gonzalez, leader of the GOA delegation to the 
January 22 Interpol meeting in Lyon, France (Refs 1, 2) and 
lead official at the MFA on the AMIA issue.  Gonzalez relayed 
his impression that the Interpol 
meeting was "complicated" and "difficult".  He stated that he 
was "astonished" by the GOI reaction to the GOA's 
presentation, which included personal threats against the 
Argentine special prosecutors.  Gonzalez characterized the 
Iranian response as "undiplomatic" and conveyed that he was 
taken aback by the actions of the otherwise formal and 
well-structured GOI delegation.  It was surprising to him, he 
said, that the Iranian delegation made the threats not once, 
but three times. 
 
----------------------------- 
GOA to Provide Supplemental Information to Interpol 
----------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) According to Ambassador Gonzalez, Argentine special 
prosecutor Nisman had presented an 8-9 page written memo to 
Interpol during the January 22 presentation in Lyon, and he 
indicated that amplifying details would be provided to 
Interpol on February 2, upon completion of their translation 
into English.  This supplemental information will serve to 
bolster the GOA's initial submission to Interpol in November 
2006 that was judged to be very weak by Interpol authorities. 
 The details include arguments against each of the 9 AMIA 
suspects and will be transmitted directly from Interpol 
Buenos Aires to Interpol Lyon.  Upon evaluating this and the 
information presented on January 22, Interpol's legal affairs 
office will craft and present a recommendation to its 
Executive Committee on whether to issue Red Notices for the 
arrest of each of the AMIA bombing suspects. 
 
----------------------------- 
Interpol Executive Committee Meeting Scheduled 
----------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) Ambassador Gonzalez confirmed that the Interpol 
Executive Committee meeting has been firmly scheduled for 
March 13-15.  However, no decision has yet been made 
 
regarding where the AMIA Red Notice issue will fall on the 
agenda.  In addition to the Interpol Executive Committee 
members, delegations from the GOA and GOI are expected to 
attend.  Gonzalez noted that the GOA has not yet decided as 
to the make-up of the delegation for the March meeting; 
however, the political importance of the meeting and the need 
for a positive outcome for the GOA are clearly recognized by 
the MFA and the GOA. 
 
------------------------------ 
Argentina Formulating Strategy, Expects a Positive Outcome 
------------------------------ 
 
¶5.  (C) MFA Ambassador Gonzalez conveyed to DCM that while 
several proposals on how the GOA will prepare for the 
Interpol Executive Committee meeting have been forwarded to 
Foreign Minister Taiana, Gonzalez has not yet received 
instructions on how to proceed.  However, Gonzalez expressed 
cautious optimism that six of the nine Red Notice requests 
would likely be approved by the Interpol Executive Committee. 
 However, he said he doubts whether Interpol will approve 
those for former Iranian President Rafsanjani and former 
Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs Velayati.  Gonzalez also 
noted that because Argentina's previous efforts in 2005 to 
extradite former Iranian Ambassador to Argentina Soleimanpour 
had been unsuccessful, Interpol will likely handle the Red 
Notice request on Soleimanpour very carefully this time 
around and that this is the third request that may not be 
finally approved by the Executive Committee. 
 
------------------------------ 
GOA Likely to Request "Quiet," Coordinated Assistance 
------------------------------ 
 
¶6.  (C) Ambassador Gonzalez expressed the need for Argentina 
to remain out in front of this issue, and requested the 
"subtle, quiet, coordinated support" of the United States. 
He asked that we await an official request from the GOA, 
since the final GOA strategy had not yet been blessed by the 
Foreign Minister and other senior GOA officials.  While the 
GOA continues to formulate its strategy for moving forward, 
and it does not expect to have any specific requests of the 
USG prior to next Monday, Gonzalez did express concerns that 
it does not have any mechanism to reach out to several 
members of the Interpol Executive 
Committee prior to the March 13-15 meeting.  Gonzalez 
suggested to DCM that the GOA would very likely need and soon 
request assistance in reaching out to "hard-to-reach" 
members, including the representatives of Russia, Korea, 
India, Italy, and the South African President of the 
Executive Committee.  The GOA has very limited relations with 
Korea and India and with others (Italy, South Africa, Russia) 
its relations in law enforcement are not deep.  Gonzalez also 
indicated that the GOA would likely want to meet in 
Washington with Tom Fuentes, USG representative to the 
Interpol Executive Committee and Special Agent in Charge of 
the FBI's Office of International Relations.  DCM was 
non-committal as to the ultimate willingness of the USG to 
actively engage with other Executive Committee members but 
noted that next week's visits by Attorney General Gonzales 
and U/S Burns and A/S Shannon would be opportune times for 
the GOA to engage senior USG officials in discussion on these 
matters. 
WAYNE