VZCZCXYZ0017
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUP #0266/01 0541000
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 231000Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0807

C O N F I D E N T I A L BUDAPEST 000266 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR DAS DICARLO AND EUR/SCE JOSHUA BLACK 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/15/2017 
TAGS: PREL PGOV HU
SUBJECT: SCENE-SETTER FOR DAS DI CARLO'S VISIT TO BUDAPEST 
 
REF: A) BUDAPEST 175 B) BUDAPEST 76 
 
Classified By: POL/C ERIC V. GAUDIOSI 
 
¶1.  (C) The integration of the Balkans into the Euro-Atlantic 
community remains an issue of bipartisan consensus despite 
Hungary,s fractious domestic political dynamic.  All parties 
supported NATO and EU accession and see the International 
Community's presence as key to stability in the Balkans and 
thus to their own long-term security.  You should hear a 
consistent message of support for our engagement from 
officials in the government and in the opposition, who may 
agree about little else. 
 
¶2.  (C) Translating Hungary,s interest into constructive 
engagement is the key.  Pressing for activism remains an 
uphill battle in a country where interest in foreign policy 
is neither broad nor deep, but the former Yugoslavia remains 
an area of vital national interest.  Hungary,s first real 
foray into Balkan policy in 2005, on behalf of Croatia,s EU 
accession, ended in a stinging rebuke from London (and from 
Washington) over ICTY conditionality.  Although most of its 
attention is still very much focused on internal politics, 
Budapest is beginning to seek a diplomatic role commensurate 
with its troop deployments in the region.  (Note: Hungary has 
approximately 500 troops throughout the Balkans - half their 
legally mandated limit - with a commitment made to increase 
their contribution to EU missions.  End note.) 
 
¶3.  (C) Kosovo status will be the first real test of their 
readiness to do so.  Though the impact of any settlement on 
the ethnic Hungarian community in the Vojvodina (a key issue 
and potential political weapon for the opposition) will 
remain of paramount importance to Budapest, the GoH 
recognizes that the costs of inaction outweigh the 
consequences of a decision now. 
 
¶4.  (C) They will want to proceed in a way that integrates 
rather than isolates Serbia.  NATO's decision on PfP was 
widely hailed here and privately acknowleged as a decision 
"made in America ... and announced in Riga."  We suspect they 
also see our decision as one influenced by their engagement. 
We are working hard to identify synergies between the Ohio 
National Guard's State Partnership Program with Hungary and 
their new relationship with Serbia.  This will help Budapest 
take on a supportive role and potentially give Serbia 
selective access to more engagement opportunities.  As 
Hungarian officials have pointed out, one potential advantage 
to this relationship may come in Afghanistan, as Hungary is 
encouraging neighboring states to contribute to its 
Provincial Reconstruction Team in Baghlan Province.  Croatia 
is already doing so, and the GoH has also had informal 
discussions with Belgrade (and we suspect Podgorica) 
regarding further contributions. 
 
¶5.  (C) In a recent letter circulated within the EU, Prime 
Minister Gyurcsany underscored the importance of Serbia's 
full integration into Euro-Atlantic structures and emphasized 
Budapest's two redlines re future status (ref a): 
 
- That the timing of the decision allow for a "reasonable 
period" to pass following the Serbian elections (based on FM 
Goncz's comments to Ambassador Foley, the GoH seems to regard 
the convention of the Parliament - rather than the formation 
of a new government - to suffice in this regard); and, 
 
- That the IC pursue a Security Council Resolution to endorse 
status arrangements. 
 
Hungarian officials have privately signaled to us their 
eagerness to serve as a channel of communication to Belgrade 
and their expressed willingness to underscore our points with 
the Russians, with whom PM Gyurcsany maintains a close 
relationship.   We have encouraged the GoH to represent its 
views actively within the EU, and to seek out opportunities 
to expand its commitment to the EU's civilian efforts on the 
ground, and your visit can help provide them with specific 
recommendations.   We have also laid down our informal marker 
re Hungary's occasional expressions of interest in applying 
any provisions for the protection of the Serbian minority in 
Kosovo to Hungarian minorities in Serbia proper.  Although 
this suggestion has not reared its head of late, you may need 
to tamp down any expectations as one variable too many in any 
already complex equation. 
 
¶6.  (C) We are developing your schedule to maximize 
opportunities to promote Hungary's support for the way 
forward in Kosovo.  We have requested the following meetings: 
 
MFA State Secretary Laszlo Szoke: Although division of 
responsibility for the Balkans is not always precise, and 
Szoke's responsibility for European Affairs (including 
International Organizations and Human Rights) make him one of 
the Ministry's key players on the issue.  A former Ambassador 
to Sweden with prior service in Washington and Baghdad, Szoke 
will warmly welcome your visit as a chance to hear our latest 
thinking.  MFA officials will likely underscore Hungarian 
concerns regarding a "perfect storm" that leaves Serbia 
"without Kosovo and the chance of European integration" and 
may reiterate concerns re Russia.  They may also repeat their 
private assessment opinion that Ahtisaari missed an 
opportunity by declining offers of support from Hungary and 
other new Allies (ref b). 
 
The Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee: Chaired by 
opposition MP Zsolt Nemeth, with whom you met in Washington 
last year, the committee is working to maintain the spirit of 
bipartisanship as it establishes an independent voice on 
foreign policy issues.  Although Zsolt will be at a political 
event in Romania, we are putting together a session with 
other committee members and staff.  We have also contacted 
Parliamentary Speaker Katalin Szili's office about a meeting, 
given her interest in the region.  Szili has also worked to 
raise her profile in foreign affairs through frequent travel, 
and has invited Speaker Pelosi to attend a meeting of Balkan 
parliamentarians in Budapest in June. 
 
The Ministry of Defense: Time permitting, we will work to set 
an appointment with MOD officials interested in our views 
regarding the long-term international presence in the region. 
 This will also present an opportunity to discuss ways to use 
the State Partnership Program as a vehicle to promote reform 
in the Serbian military. 
 
Lunch: Ambassador Foley will host a lunch at the residence in 
your honor, with invitees including MFA and MOD 
representatives, foreign policy and security experts, and 
parliamentarians.  All will welcome our assessment on Kosovo 
and also news from your meetings in Brussels. 
 
Dinner: DCM Reeker and Political Counselor Gaudiosi would be 
delighted to arrange an informal dinner, potentially to 
include opinion leaders for an off-the record discussion. 
 
¶7.  (C) We look forward to welcoming you in person. 
 
REEKER