VZCZCXRO9039
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHUP #0226 0461516
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 151516Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0780
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L BUDAPEST 000226 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO NSC FOR ADAM STERLING 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/13/2017 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM ASEC HU
SUBJECT: BEWARE THE IDES OF MARCH 
 
REF: A) BUDAPEST 199 AND PREVIOUS B) BUDAPEST DAILY 
 
     2/14 C) 06 BUDAPEST 2531 
 
Classified By: POL/C ERIC V. GAUDIOSI; REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) 
 
¶1.  (C) Never at a loss for a national holiday fraught with 
historical significance, Hungary approaches the March 15 
anniversary of its 1848 Revolution with many in the 
opposition eager to cast their own confrontational policies 
as resistance to an unjust government.  Although PM Gyurcsany 
has assured the public that there is light at the end of the 
tunnel on his austerity measures (ref a), a record 72% of 
Hungarians remain pessimistic about the future. 
 
THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS? 
 
¶2.  (C) Beyond this general sense of negativity, there is 
heightened concern regarding press reports and internet 
messages regarding extremist groups acquiring weapons.  The 
authorities are investigating a February 13 incident during 
which automatic weapons fire was directed at a Pest police 
station, and have increased security around selected 
government buildings.  As they did with the recent attempt by 
opposition MPs to dismantle the security fence around 
Parliament, the government has characterized this incident as 
"an attack on the fundamental institutions of the Republic" 
(ref b).  Much as the government may perceive political 
advantage in heightening public concerns - and implicitly 
tarring political opposition in the process, the far right 
may seek to inflate the threat in order to make itself appear 
more than an extremist fringe.  FIDESZ spokesmen have 
disavowed violence, suggesting in Parliament's opening 
session that the Gyurcsany government is using the pretext of 
security concerns to create an "imperial executive" (ref a). 
 
¶3.  (C) Whatever the political calculation, moderates like 
Ambassador Istvan Gyarmati, Director of the International 
Center for Democratic Transition (ICDT), are concerned. 
Expressing alarm over the prospect of a far right both 
inclined and equipped for violent actions, Gyarmati has also 
criticized "our stupid Prime Minister" and questioned the 
authorities' preparedness for renewed demonstrations in the 
weeks ahead.  MDF party leader Ibolya David has long warned 
that "the spring will be worse than the fall," predicting 
demonstrations across the nation rather than just in 
Budapest.  Our other contacts point out that the mild winter 
and early thaw that helped the government by keeping heating 
costs down may now hurt them by encouraging larger crowds at 
upcoming events. Although the government is now indicating 
that the PM may not officiate at any major commemorations on 
March 15 - likely in hopes of depriving the opposition of an 
event to protest - this may not deter either legitimate 
demonstrators or the smaller, more violent fringe. 
 
ALONE IN THE CROWD? 
 
¶4.  (C) FIDESZ's evening rally at Budapest's Millenium Park 
February 16 may serve as a dress rehearsal for March.  The 
party is billing the event as Orban's "state of the nation" 
address, and rumors have rental buses bringing their 
supporters in from their provincial strongholds to attend. 
 
5..  (C) Orban's ultimate intentions remain unclear even to 
many within the party.  Moderate FIDESZ members are disturbed 
by his repeated brinksmanship; MP Gabor Tamas Nagy, for 
example, could only smile ruefully as foreign ambassadors 
discussed the opposition's continued "excommunication" policy 
at a recent dinner hosted by Ambassador Foley.  By contrast, 
more extreme members of FIDESZ are discontented with Orban's 
seeming unwillingness to go beyond the point of no return. 
One right-wing figure recently commented that the party 
should "just change its name to the party of traitors."  As 
some within the party have pointed out, Orban's last major 
public address failed to draw a significant crowd ... or 
please those who did show (ref c). 
 
¶6. (C) Comment: Both the February 16 event and the party's 
strategy for March highlight Orban's fundamental dilemma: his 
uncertainty regarding his continued appeal to draw large 
crowds out into the streets ... and his ability to send the 
faithful and fringe home if they do turn out.  End Comment. 
FOLEY