VZCZCXRO7968
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHSL #0117/01 0571702
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 261702Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY BRATISLAVA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0715
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 0071
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHPS/USOFFICE PRISTINA PRIORITY 0041

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRATISLAVA 000117 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2017 
TAGS: PREL PGOV YI KO LO
SUBJECT: KUBIS LOOKING FOR DOMESTIC AGREEMENT ON KOSOVO IN 
THE FINE PRINT 
 
REF: BRATISLAVA 115 AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Rodolphe M. Vallee for reasons 1.4 b and d. 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: FM Kubis told the Ambassador February 24 that 
language in a Slovak parliamentary resolution referring to 
regional peace and security could give the GOS a way to 
support an eventual UNSCR on Kosovo, even without the 
agreement of Serbia.  Kubis and other MFA diplomats continue 
to strategize on how to persuade Slovak politicians to go 
along with international community consensus.  Kubis 
recommended that in addition to the Ambassador's meetings 
with PM Fico and President Gasparovic the week of March 5, 
NSC leadership should call Gasparovic slightly before 
Ahtisaari submits his proposal at the UN, and that a similar 
call from the Secretary to Fico in the same timeframe could 
be important.  The Ambassador stressed the importance of EU 
unity to KDH Chairman Pavol Hrusovsky, who committed to work 
within parliament's foreign affairs committee toward a 
parliamentary resolution on Kosovo that left the government 
some flexibility.  Contact Group ambassadors in Bratislava 
agreed February 26 to continue discussing the issue with 
their own political party contacts and to jointly approach 
Fico at a March 16 lunch.  The U.K. embassy has proposed a 
Blair-Dzurinda phone call, and we suggested a Merkel-Fico 
pull aside at the European Council meeting, as well as 
raising Kosovo with Gasparovic during his official visit to 
Italy February 27-28.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (C) Foreign Minister Jan Kubis told the Ambassador 
February 24 he is solidly behind the Ahtisaari plan.   He 
admitted he hates the issue and does not have a great deal of 
personal sympathy for Kosovar Albanians but understands that 
the Serbs must be forced to accept the plan: for peace and 
stability of the region, there must be European unity on 
Kosovo.  Kubis said that if his government forces him to take 
a position counter to that of the international community, he 
will resign.  He believes this is Europe,s big test.  His 
primary purpose for the meeting was to strategize on how to 
keep his own government and parliament on board. 
 
¶3. (C) Kubis was toying with whether to get Parliament to 
consider the Kosovo issue before or after the Ahtisaari plan 
is tabled at the UN.    Since the tabling could be before 
parliament resumes sessions on March 20, Kubis would have to 
ask Speaker Pavol Paska (from PM Fico's Smer party) to bring 
parliament back early.  This move would only highlight the 
issue, but it might give some cover if Ahtisaari makes some 
pro-Serbian changes  before tabling.  He fears, however, that 
a debate on a more anodyne option before tabling could be 
followed by a second assault by opposition leader Mikulas 
Dzurinda on the tabled UN motion after it is introduced. 
Kubis said that Slovakia would only abstain at the UN if the 
outcome would not be negatively affected by their vote, and 
that if Slovakia was needed he would ensure they would be 
there--if he managed his own government.  His meeting with 
Churkin suggested that the Russians were not necessarily dug 
in on a veto, he felt "good vibes." 
 
Peace and Security Can Be the Hook 
----------------------------------------- 
¶4. (C) Kubis encouraged as much engagement as possible with 
members of parliament and the government from all angles, 
especially with Prime Minister Robert Fico and President Ivan 
Gasporovic, but only at high levels for the leaders.  Kubis 
thinks (and Paska confirmed) that it is impossible to stop 
the parliamentary debate.   What Kubis is hoping for is a 
resolution with softened language, that is not binding, and 
contains a reference to regional peace and security, the hook 
he believes he needs to support EU and Ahtisaari positions. 
In a strange way, the parliamentary resolution could allow 
both Fico and Kubis to back away from their "no deal without 
Serb agreement" language.  Kubis is traveling with the PM 
February 26 in Ukraine.  He said he would get together with 
Fico, Paska, and Gasparovic next week to discuss strategy. 
HZDS leader and coalition partner Vladimir Meciar has told 
Kubis he is on board with Kubis. 
 
¶5. (C) In order to give Kubis political cover domestically, 
he seeks four things that he claims the Ahtisaari plan still 
does not still have: 
i) the Kosovars must offer to delay any UN membership request 
until after progress with the elements of the plan are well 
advanced; 
ii) the new UN resolution should follow the framework of the 
existing one; 
iii) the resolution should contain more explicit language on 
"no partition of Kosovo;" 
iv) the resolution should contain explicit language in a "no 
 
BRATISLAVA 00000117  002 OF 002 
 
 
merger with Kosovo" provision. 
Strategically, given Fico,s political aversion to military 
casualties, Kubis is making the point that Slovakia,s 135 
Kosovo peacekeepers would likely be sucked into the conflict 
if violence erupts if the UN plan falls apart. 
 
¶6. (C) On Dzurinda, Kubis said Dzurinda had specifically told 
him that his discussions with Merkel were Dzurinda,s 
initiative, counter to what Dzurinda told the Ambassador and 
at odds with the common EPP strategy suggested by another 
Dzurinda advisor (reftel).   Nonetheless, Kubis did not 
discount the idea that there is a split between Merkel and 
the German Foreign Ministry on Kosovo.  Kubis claimed Merkel 
is playing coy with Fico and no bilateral meeting has been 
scheduled in Germany.  Kubis asked if we could be helpful in 
suggesting a 20 minute pull-aside between Merkel and Fico at 
the Council of Ministers to talk about Kosovo.  In addition, 
any German approach to Dzurinda would be important given how 
Dzurinda, to the irritation of German diplomats in 
Bratislava, is advertising around town his special 
relationship with Merkel. 
 
Top-Level Engagement 
------------------------- 
¶7. (C) Kubis recommended that the Ambassador meet the week of 
March 5 with both Fico and Gasparovic next week.  He said an 
NSC (Hadley/Crouch) call to Gasporovic should occur slightly 
before Ahtisaari places the proposal before the UN, but no 
later.  A similar call from the Secretary to Fico at the same 
time could be important.  He promised constant communication 
in the run-up to the parliamentary discussion and appreciated 
our efforts with the opposition parties.  However, he is not 
entirely confident he can deliver Fico in the end if Fico is 
attacked by Dzurinda. 
 
KDH: Caught Off-Guard by Dzurinda's About-Face 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
¶8. (C) In our continuing effort to persuade Slovak 
politicians not to derail the Kosovo status process, the 
Ambassador stressed the importance of EU unity to Christian 
Democratic Movement (KDH) Chairman Pavol Hrusovsky February 
¶26.   Hrusovsky said that Dzurinda's position when he was PM 
was completely different; Dzurinda never promoted any idea 
that was against the position of the U.S. and the 
international community.  KDH had been much more cautious on 
Kosovo.  When Dzurinda spoke out against a Kosovo resolution 
that didn't have Serbian agreement, KDH felt the need to make 
similar statements.  Hrusovsky listened carefully to the 
Ambassador's arguments, and said that he would work within 
Parliament's foreign affairs committee the week of March 12 
to build consensus on a Kosovo-related resolution that would 
give the government flexibility. 
 
Contact Group Ambassadors Will Approach Fico March 16 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
¶9. (C) The ambassadors from Italy, Germany, UK, France, and 
U.S. met informally February 26 to discuss how to influence 
Slovakia's political decision on Kosovo.  They reached a 
consensus that joint approaches to the highest levels of 
government would not be helpful.  The MFA doesn't need to be 
demarched, and an overly-aggressive approach to Fico could be 
counter-productive.  The ambassadors agreed to continue 
talking to their individual contacts in government and 
political parties, and that the EU contact group ambassadors 
would pull Fico aside at a March 16 EU Presidency lunch 
hosted by the German Embassy to discuss Kosovo.  The U.K. 
Charge also suggested PM Blair might reach out to Dzurinda. 
We encouraged the Italians to raise the issue with Gasparovic 
during his February 27-28 official visit to Italy, and urged 
the Germans to have a Merkel-Fico pull-aside during the 
European Council meeting, as requested by Kubis.  The German 
Ambassador thought a Merkel-Dzurinda phone call would be 
difficult to arrange since Slovak isolation was Dzurinda's 
primary political goal.  The Ambassador suggested that 
Dzurinda's potential isolation from his center-right contacts 
in and out of government is an equally useful lever. 
 
 
 
 
VALLEE