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C O N F I D E N T I A L BRATISLAVA 000115 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/23/2017 
TAGS: PREL PGOV YI KOC LO
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: SLOVAK MFA STILL TRYING TO PERSUADE GOS, 
BUT WORRYING POLITICAL SIGNS CONTINUE 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Rodolphe M. Vallee, for reasons 
1.4(b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY. MFA Political Director Miroslav Lajcak 
indicated to us Feb. 23 that the MFA is continuing its 
efforts to prevent Slovak politicians from passing the point 
of no return on the Kosovo issue.  Lajcak, who considers this 
goal feasible, is busy orchestrating meetings or phonecalls 
with Slovak governing coalition and opposition politicians to 
shape the parliamentary debate.  Lajcak is looking forward to 
PDAS DiCarlo's Feb. 28 visit as a significant part of this 
process, and is trying to enlist UK and German leaders in the 
effort.  He offered advice on arguments he thought would work 
best to convince Slovak politicians not to risk a split with 
the EU and a blow to the UN's handling of the issue. Another 
Embassy source close to former PM Dzurinda paints a more 
troubling picture of PM Fico's support for a tough Serbian 
line. END SUMMARY. 
 
DOMESTIC PERSUASION 
------------------- 
¶2. (C) Following on FM Kubis's meetings in New York and 
Washington, PolDir Lajcak continues his attempts to persuade 
Slovak coalition and opposition officials not to tie the 
MFA's hands on Kosovo.  He views a Slovak National Party 
draft resolution as largely hortatory and vastly better that 
former PM Dzurinda's resolution, although SNS may be revising 
it.  (Note: Parliamentary Speaker Pavol Paska told Ambassador 
2/22 that he would do all he could to block Dzurinda's 
proposal.) In speaking with Smer and SDKU representatives, 
Lajcak is using the following arguments: 
- Restricting the MFA's maneuverability with a binding 
parliamentary resolution on Kosovo will only take Slovakia 
out of the process at the international diplomatic level. 
Slovakia would no longer have a voice at the EU table, and 
thus would not be able to do anything to help the Serbs with 
whom they sympathize.  Slovakia showed it could have an 
impact on the EU voice (referencing the last GAERC meeting). 
If Slovakia wants to be part of drafting the EU statement, 
the MFA must have a free range of dialogue. 
- It's time to demonstrate that Slovakia can be a responsible 
member of the EU; 
- Slovak politicians must stop thinking about what's best for 
Serbia and start thinking about what's best for Slovakia; 
- To politicians of the ruling SMER, Lajcak plans to argue 
that a binding resolution would do little harm to Mr. 
Dzurinda as an opposition MP, but long-lasting damage to the 
Fico government internationally; 
- In Serbia, rather than thanking their Slavic brothers in 
Slovakia, the Serbs are laughing at the Slovak domestic 
uproar over the Kosovo issue. 
 
INTERNATIONAL MEETINGS 
---------------------- 
¶3. (C) Lajcak emphasized the need to use a variety of EU and 
US overtures to Slovak MPs and leaders prior to the 
parliamentary session beginning March 20.  He has helped 
arranged the following meetings: 
- 2/26 Boris Zala, Smer MP and Chairman of the Foreign 
Affairs Committee, will see Ahtisaari in Berlin (DAS DiCarlo 
will meet with Zala and other Smer MPs on 2/28); 
- 3/2  FM Kubis will meet Ahtisaari in Vienna 
- Hopefully, a meeting next week between Albert Rohan and 
former PM Dzurinda, SDKU Chairman and MP.  Miro was meeting 
with Dzurinda foreign policy advisor Milan Jezovica just 
after he met with us to pitch the meeting; 
- Lajcak asked his British and German Political Director 
counterparts to weigh in with Blair and Merkel to raise 
Kosovo directly with Fico and perhaps Dzurinda. 
- Lajcak noted that DiCarlo's visit is well-timed; but one 
expert visit is enough.  After DiCarlo, any contacts, 
including from the Brits or others, would need to be at a 
higher political level to have an impact. 
 
 
SLOVAK STATESMANSHIP 
-------------------- 
¶4. (C)  Lajcak reiterated that Fico had previously agreed to 
respect the MFA's position on Kosovo, but this changed after 
Dzurinda pushed him domestically.  In Lajcak's opinion, we 
should continue to keep in contact with President Gasparovic 
since the President understands the need to act as a member 
of the EU and NATO.  The question between Fico and Dzurinda 
now is who will become the responsible international 
statesman and who will be left in the role of fuming 
nationalist. 
 
AT THE UN 
--------- 
¶5. (C) UN Secretary General Ban ki Moon had impressed FM 
Kubis on Kosovo at their meeting in NY.  The SYG made it very 
clear that he fully supported the Ahtisaari plan and wanted 
UNSC endorsement of it soon. The UNSC could not lose this 
opportunity. Kubis would try to use the UNSYG's strong line 
in his arguments back here. Lajcak explained that Slovakia 
does not intend to follow the Russians in a UN vote.  He 
clarified that certain wording would, because of the domestic 
political situation, move Slovakia closer to voting with the 
Russians.  Lajcak found it significant that Russian 
Ambassador to the UN Vituly Churkin had said it would be 
unacceptable to see an "independent Kosovo" gain membership 
to the UN or World Bank, implying that there might be 
flexibility in the Russian position.  Previously very worried 
about a Russian veto, Lajcak sees a greater prospect for an 
abstention.  He noted, however, that Churkin had objected to 
even World Bank membership for Kosovo, a tougher position 
than that of Belgrade. 
 
THE LATEST IN VIENNA 
-------------------- 
¶6. (C)  Just prior to meeting the DCM, Lajcak had finished a 
phone call with Albert Rohan.  Rohan had said that no real 
progress was being made at the discussions in Vienna.  Rohan 
expects nothing more than a few minor points to be resolved 
as a face-saving gesture before the talks conclude next week. 
Incidentally, Lajcak was fully aware that the Serbs cited the 
Slovaks in the Vienna talks.  He said he had received a text 
message almost immediately after it happened. 
 
A TROUBLING CLAIM 
----------------- 
 
¶7. (C) In a Feb. 23 luncheon with the Ambassador, Martin 
Bruncko (strictly protect), former advisor to then-FM Miklos, 
current advisor to former PM Dzurinda and personal friend of 
Serbian President Tadic, said that: 
 
-- Fico and Kubis had called Tadic after Kubis's recent faux 
pas with Vuk Draskovic and pledged to "carry Serbia's water," 
(NOTE: Without revealing this claim, we queried PolDir Lajcak 
about the Draskovic incident.  He claimed that Kubis had met 
quietly with Draskovic last week and patched things up, and 
that Kubis did not feel under pressure to be more supportive 
of the Serbs to make up for the incident.  End note.); 
-- Dzurinda was not freelancing in his tough pro-Serb stance, 
but was only part of a larger European People's Party effort 
to back Belgrade that included "the current holder of the EU 
Presidency"; and 
-- President Tadic accepts Kosovo independence but believes 
it would be more palatable to have the issue come to a head 
after formation of a new Serbian government. 
(Comment: We cannot vouch for the accuracy of Bruncko's 
statements.  Even if that were just a perception, it would 
reinforce the value of a Merkel call to Dzurinda as part of 
the effort to get the former PM to back off.  End comment) 
 
VALLEE