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DE RUEHSL #0102/01 0511324
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P 201324Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY BRATISLAVA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0696
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 0067
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHPS/USOFFICE PRISTINA PRIORITY 0037

C O N F I D E N T I A L BRATISLAVA 000102 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/22/2017 
TAGS: PREL PGOV YI KOC LO
SUBJECT: SLOVAKIA'S DEBATE ON KOSOVO STILL SIMMERING 
 
REF: A. BRATISLAVA 87 
 
     ¶B. FEB 17 HOH-VALLEE EMAIL 
 
Classified By: CDA Lawrence Silverman for reasons 1.4 b and d. 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: Kosovo remains a delicate topic in Slovak 
politics, with both opposition and government parties vying 
to show the strongest support for Serbia, and the MFA 
struggling to maintain room to maneuver. The final say on 
Slovakia's position will come from PM Fico. Key will be 
whether he can be persuaded to look beyond his normal 
political horizon -- somewhere within Slovakia's borders -- 
and instead defer to the need to help the international 
community settle this problem now and to avoid damage to 
Slovakia's image abroad. End summary. 
 
President Gasparovic Cools Tempers 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C)  After both the Slovak Democratic and Christian Union 
(SDKU) and the Slovak National Party (SNS) submitted 
resolutions for parliamentary approval 2/12 that called for 
the rejection of any final status for Kosovo to which Serbia 
did not agree (ref A), President Ivan Gasparovic summoned 
political party leaders to the presidential palace to discuss 
the issue.  Although Gasparovic himself has a pro-Serb bias 
and personally opposes independence for Kosovo, his 
intervention served to calm heads and buy time.  The 
political parties decided to wait until parliament resumes 
its regular session March 20, rather than calling for an 
extraordinary session on Kosovo.  In public statements, party 
leaders stressed the need for a united Slovak position, and 
voiced support for the continuation of negotiations led by 
S/E Martti Ahtisaari.  MFA PolDir Miroslav Lajcak told DCM 
2/15 that Gasparovic had been quite helpful. 
 
Opposition Leader Dzurinda Still Won't Budge 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) The Ambassador explained U.S. views on Kosovo to SDKU 
Chair (and former PM) Mikulas Dzurinda 2/14, arguing that a 
binding parliamentary resolution requiring Slovakia to vote 
against independence for Kosovo at the UNSC would alienate 
Slovakia from its transatlantic partners and further 
destabilize the Balkans.  Dzurinda argued emotionally that he 
felt in his heart Ahtisaari's plan would not work, and would 
radicalize the region.  Dzurinda clearly relished an upcoming 
fight in Parliament that would give him the chance to take on 
the Fico government.  He admitted that perhaps the language 
of his draft resolution was too strong and could be modified, 
but would not agree to withdraw it.  In a subsequent 
conversation with EUR A/S Fried, Dzurinda expressed concern 
about use of Kosovo as a precedent in other conflicts, 
humiliating treatment of Serbia, and implications for the 
Hungarian minority in Slovakia (ref B).  Lajcak told us 2/15 
that he had spoken to both former FM Eduard Kukan and former 
advisor to the PM Milan Jezovica, and that Jezovica was very 
stubborn.  Strong collaborators in the past, they had 
exchanged sharp words over this issue.  We also heard that 
Kubis had tried talking to Dzurinda directly, but made no 
progress. 
 
MFA Working Hard to Persuade Public and Politicians 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶4. (U) Meanwhile, Foreign Minister Jan Kubis continued his 
diplomatic efforts on the homefront.  In a 2/13 op-ed in 
daily "Pravda," he argued that Slovakia must be a responsible 
international partner.  At a pre-scheduled 2/13 talk on 
Slovakia's foreign policy priorities hosted by think tank 
Slovak Foreign Policy Association (SFPA), he asked 
rhetorically why Slovak politicians were so worked up about 
Kosovo?  He recognized the high level of empathy and 
friendship toward Serbia, but also urged that Slovaks not 
make decisions based on speculation about the end result of 
status negotiations.  He railed against politicians who would 
"tie the government's hands."  He frankly said that it 
reflected a tremendous lack of self-confidence on the part of 
Slovaks to have an irrational fear of some "precedent" for 
the Hungarian minority.  He added that Slovaks had no reason 
to be insecure, and it was time Slovaks "got over it."  The 
unique circumstances of the Serb government's massive 
violation of human rights that led to NATO intervention could 
never be applied in Slovakia.  EU unity is crucial. 
 
¶5. (C) Lajcak said that Slovak Ambassador to Washington 
Rastislav Kacer had written a very good, strong cable home 
after his 2/13 meeting with DASes Pekala and DiCarlo, and had 
also called Kukan and Jezovica.  The message of the MFA to 
SDKU leaders has been consistent: "Do not tie our hands."  On 
the cocktail circuit, MFA officials are telling concerned 
diplomats that FM Kubis is working on the domestic situation 
and that everything is in control and will work out fine. 
Privately, however, Lajcak admitted that Kubis is a diplomat, 
not a politician, and he underestimated the domestic 
difficulties.  Lajcak said the MFA does not know what to 
expect, including from PM Fico himself, and that the 
situation is NOT under control.  He expressed gratitude for 
U.S. support and intervention with the politicians. 
 
¶6. (C) Lajcak was also glad that respected leaders of the NGO 
community, such as (former ambassador to the U.S.) Martin 
Butora of the Institute for Public Affairs (IVO) and Milan 
Nic of Pontis Foundation, had given helpful media interviews. 
 Lajcak expressed frustration that in the furor over Kosovo, 
no one speaks about Slovak interests ("we're more Serbian 
than the Serbs"); no one speaks about Slovakia's 
duties/responsibilities as EU, NATO, UNSC members, and its 
relations with the most important strategic partners; and 
that a complete lack of self-confidence still exists 
regarding Hungarians. 
 
¶7. (C) Following up on Lajcak's earlier message to us that 
Serbia's bottom line was "No UN membership for Kosovo and no 
change in Serbia's borders," he suggested that UN membership 
is symbolic for Kosovo, but not really necessary.  More 
important is membership in other international organization 
and international financial institutions.  Perhaps there was 
room for flexibility on the timing of such memberships that 
would undermine the Slovak political parties' argument that 
Serbs were being "humiliated."  On borders, Lajcak firmly 
believes that smart lawyers should be able to find the right 
language to solve this issue. 
 
Concerned Diplomats 
-------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) Both the German Ambassador and the UK Charge d'Affairs 
consulted us 2/16 on next steps.  They agree that demarching 
the MFA on Kosovo is not what is needed.  The question is how 
to influence PM Fico, who in the end can make or break the 
MFA's position on Kosovo at the UNSC.  The UK embassy is 
recommending a Blair-Fico pull-aside at the March 8-9 meeting 
of the EU Council (prime minister's meeting) but only if 
Merkel will do it first.  Both Blair and Merkel, we have 
heard from diplomats here, have been loathe to meet 
bilaterally with Fico.  In addition, the UK embassy is 
recommending a senior-level call (FCO) to Dzurinda to 
reinforce U.S. efforts. Our British colleagues here have 
begun to engage with relevant politicians, and the German 
Ambassador is hosting a local meeting of the Quint 2/26 to 
discuss strategy. 
VALLEE