VZCZCXYZ0007
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBO #1088/01 0451906
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 141906Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2728

UNCLAS BOGOTA 001088 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/AND 
DEPARTMENT FOR H 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOC ECON CO
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR CODEL BAYH 
 
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Summary 
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¶1. (SBU) Post welcomes CODEL Bayh to Colombia.  President 
Alvaro Uribe was re-elected in May, 2006; he is the first 
president to be re-elected to a second, consecutive term in 
over 100 years.  We expect close bilateral relations between 
the United States and Colombia to continue in his second 
term.  With USG help, President Uribe has made great strides 
in fighting drug trafficking and terrorism.  He recognizes 
U.S. support is key to the success of efforts to re-establish 
central authority throughout the national territory.  As a 
result of U.S.-Colombian efforts, drug eradication and 
interdiction are at record levels.  In January, the GOC 
presented a Plan Colombia consolidation phase strategy, with 
a heightened emphasis on social development.  USAID programs 
aim to strengthen democratic institutions, foster a culture 
of human rights, create alternative development 
opportunities, and assist people displaced by internal 
violence. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Colombia's human rights record, although imperfect, 
is improving.  The peace process with the United Self-Defense 
Forces of Colombia (AUC) has resulted in the demobilization 
of over 32,000 paramilitaries, but rigorous application of 
the Justice and Peace Law, the process of which is just 
beginning, is needed.  Exploratory talks with the National 
Liberation Army (ELN) are focused on establishing an agenda 
for formal negotiations and a ceasefire agreement, but the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) have yet to 
enter into discussions with the GOC.  The FARC has held three 
U.S. citizens for more than four years; their safe recovery 
is a top priority.  The economy is growing and the United 
States and Colombia signed a Free Trade Agreement in November 
¶2006.  End Summary 
 
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Internal Politics 
----------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) President Uribe is the first Colombian president to 
be re-elected to a second, consecutive term in over 100 
years.  He was re-elected on May 28, 2006 with 62 percent of 
the vote.  A coalition of pro-Uribe parties won a collective 
majority in the House and Senate on March 12.  The 
left-leaning Polo Democratico Alternativo party presidential 
candidate, Carlos Gaviria, won 22 percent of the vote, giving 
the left its best ever showing in Colombia.  The Liberal 
party received 12 percent of the vote, its poorest showing in 
more than 40 years.  In October, elections will take place 
for mayors and city council members.  Politicians are already 
positioning themselves and their parties for the 2010 
presidential elections. 
 
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U.S. Assistance Key to Security Improvements 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. In January, the GOC presented a Plan Colombia 
consolidation phase strategy.  The proposal contains a 
heightened emphasis on social development, assigning new 
resources to human rights, displaced people, and 
Afro-Colombian and indigenous communities.  It also aims to 
reintegrate 42,000 demobilized ex-combatants and deserters 
and promote Colombia's competitiveness and licit exports. 
The GOC is seeking funding from the United States and 
European countries. 
 
¶5. (SBU) USG security assistance is premised on combating the 
interrelated threats of drug trafficking and terrorism and 
includes training, material aid, and guidance to security 
forces and other institutions.  Uribe characterizes U.S. 
assistance as critical to the GOC,s "Democratic Security" 
policy - aimed at establishing a state presence throughout 
national territory - and considers the United States to be 
Colombia,s most important ally. 
 
 -- Plan Patriota: The military's multi-phased campaign to 
re-take areas dominated by the FARC is in its third year. 
The first phase, which focused on securing Cundinamarca 
Department, which surrounds Bogota, pushed the FARC away from 
the capital and resulted in the deaths of at least five 
mid-level FARC commanders.  The second, more complex phase, 
is two years old and is focused on the FARC,s traditional 
stronghold in southern Colombia.  The operation disrupted the 
FARC's hold on the region.  Sustainment of troops in this 
isolated region is difficult.  Infectious diseases - 
especially leishmaniasis, a parasitic skin infection - and 
landmines are the leading causes of military casualties. 
 
 -- Despite the Colombian's military's success, the FARC 
continues to attack isolated or smaller police and military 
targets throughout the country, while avoiding direct 
contests with larger units.  Three notable exceptions include 
the late December 2005 attack that killed 29 Colombian 
soldiers just outside of La Macarena National Park, two 
attacks on civilians, resulting in 17 dead and 14 injured, in 
southern Colombia in late February 2006, and a November 2006 
attack that killed 17 police officers and three civilians in 
northern Colombia. 
 
-- Center for Coordinated Integral Action: With U.S. support, 
the GOC formed in 2005 an interagency center to facilitate 
delivery of social services in seven areas that have 
traditionally lacked state presence and been controlled by 
illegal armed groups.  The Center focuses on providing 
immediate social services, including documentation and 
medical care, and longer-term economic development projects. 
More than 40,000 individuals have been enrolled in state 
health care.  Judges, investigators, and public defenders 
have been placed in all 16 municipalities of the Plan 
Patriota area.  A public library was opened in early 2006 in 
the town of San Vicente del Caguan, which had long been 
dominated by the FARC. 
 
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Drug Eradication and Interdiction 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) Eradication and interdiction are at record levels. 
The aerial eradication program exceeded the mid-year revised 
bilateral spray goals of 160,000 hectares of coca with a 2006 
year-end total of 169,399 hectares sprayed.  This was the 
sixth straight record spray year and 24 percent more than the 
2005 total.  In interdiction programs, National Police and 
military forces seized over 203 metric tons of cocaine (HC1) 
and coca base in 2006, a near record quantity, and destroyed 
200 HC1 laboratories, also a record. 
 
¶7. (SBU) The GOC reported the manual eradication of over 
43,808 hectares of ilicit crops in 2006 (including 42,111 
hectares of coca and 1,697 hectares of opium poppy).  Manual 
eradication remains costly in terms of human and mechanical 
resources: 41 security force personnel and civilian 
eradicators were killed in 2006 by improvised explosive 
devices (IEDs) and narcoterrorist attacks; Manual eradication 
projects placed a heavy burden on the National Police to 
provide security for eradicators. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
U.S. Assistance to Development and Democracy Building 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶8. (U) The USAID Mission in Colombia funds programs in three 
key strategic sectors.  USAID,s Democratic Governance 
programs aim to improve the transparency of the justice 
system, assist the peace process, promote respect for human 
rights, support democratic processes and foster efficiency 
and accountability.  USAID programs also promote legal 
alternative development opportunities through increased 
competitiveness, improved local government infrastructure and 
management, and a more favorable environment for investment 
and trade.  Colombia has the second largest population of 
internally displaced persons, behind only Sudan.  USAID has 
provided support to nearly 2.7 million Colombians displaced 
by internal violence.  USAID also helps children who have 
been forced to serve as child combatants. 
 
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Military Justice and Improved Human Rights Record 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶9. (SBU) The Uribe Administration continues to make progress 
on human rights cases involving military abuse or 
collaboration with paramilitaries.  We continually stress the 
importance of creating a legal system that delivers credible, 
timely results.  MOD Santos has identified reform of the 
military justice system as one of five key provisions of his 
proposed overhaul of the military; in October, he named the 
first civilian - and the first woman - as director the 
Military Penal Justice System. 
 
¶10. (U) Human rights training is mandatory for all members of 
the military and police.  Less than two percent of human 
rights violations are attributable to government security 
forces, according to GOC statistics.  Homicides fell by 5 
percent - to the lowest level in 20 years - kidnappings by 12 
percent, and forced displacements by 20 percent in 2006, 
building on trends from previous years.  The GOC has a 
difficult but active dialogue with NGOs, the United Nations, 
and foreign governments. 
 
¶11. (U) On May 22, 2006, Colombian army soldiers gunned down 
10 members of an elite judicial police squadron in Jamundi, 
Valle Department.  These police officers had received DEA 
training and support and were part of a successful counter 
narcotics unit. Some 15 soldiers, including the battalion 
commander, are on trial.  In June, the military and civilian 
justice systems signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) 
that provided the Prosecutor General's office with the power 
to investigate and make jurisdictional recommendations in all 
criminal cases against military defendants, to ensure 
transparency in human rights cases.  In the case of Jamundi, 
for example, civilian courts have jurisdiction. 
 
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Extradition 
----------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) President Uribe is a strong supporter of the 
U.S.-Colombia extradition relationship.  Since taking office, 
he has approved 426 extraditions to the United States. 
President Uribe has approved but suspended the extradition of 
four AUC leaders to ensure their continued cooperation in the 
AUC demobilization process. 
 
-------------------------------- 
Demobilization and Peace Process 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) The GOC began negotiations with the United 
Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) in 2002.  The AUC 
demobilization process drew to a close in 2006, and nearly 
all AUC members (more than 32,000) have demobilized.  Some 
former AUC members have not participated in the 
demobilization or are forming new criminal groups.  Over 
10,000 illegal armed group members (from the FARC, ELN and 
AUC) have individually deserted and entered the government's 
reinsertion program since 2002. 
 
¶12. (SBU) The reinsertion program has limited funding and 
logistical problems, but is slowly improving.  Colombia has 
requested U.S. aid for the demobilization and reinsertion 
process.  In FY06, Congress approved up to USD 20 million in 
demobilization assistance, subject to certification. 
Consultations continue with the Congress regarding the U.S. 
intention to spend USD 15.5 million in FY06.  The USG has 
also demarched numerous allies, with some success, to 
financially support these processes.  The GOC currently pays 
96 percent of the Reintegration Program's budget, while the 
international community pays 4 percent.  Reintegration 
Commissioner Frank Pearl, who has been in charge of the 
Reintegration Program since September 2006, will launch a 
Capital Investment Fund with the support of Bill Gates on 
March 19 in Cartagena to raise funds for reintegration. 
Pearl has warned, however, completely abolishing former 
paramilitary networks will be more complex and take longer 
than anticipated. 
 
¶13. (SBU) President Uribe signed the Law of Justice and 
Peace, which governs demobilization for ex-paramilitaries, in 
July 2005.  The Law offers demobilized terrorists a five- to 
eight-year alternate sentence, followed by a two-and-a-half 
to four-year parole period, but only if they fully 
demobilize, completely confess to all crimes, turn over all 
assets, release all hostages and child soldiers, and give 
reparations (actual or symbolic) to victims.  Individuals or 
groups organized for drug trafficking or illicit enrichment 
are not eligible for reduced sentences, and only crimes 
committed during membership in the illegal armed group are 
covered.  The confessions (version libres) of ex-paramilitary 
chiefs began in December, with ex-chief Salvatore Mancuso 
beginning his version libre process.  Rigorous implementation 
of the law and ensuring the safety of witnesses and victims 
are key to ensuring peace and justice in Colombia. 
 
¶14. (SBU) The ELN has been negotiating with the GOC for over 
a year, but it is unclear whether it is ready to implement a 
cease-fire; the U.S. supports a process that leads to ELN 
cease-fire, disarmament, and demobilization.  The GOC and ELN 
are discussing ceasefire terms, but progress is slow.  While 
the FARC and the GOC had publicly announced their willingness 
to enter into talks, an October 19 car bomb attack that left 
17 injured led President Uribe to revoke outreach efforts as 
long as the FARC continued to commit terrorist acts. 
 
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U.S. Hostages 
------------- 
 
¶15. (SBU) The three U.S. contractors captured by the FARC in 
February 2003 are the longest held U.S. hostages in the 
world.  Their safe release continues to be a top priority. 
The Colombians are providing full assistance.  Uribe has 
assured us that the U.S. hostages will be included in any 
humanitarian exchange.  The Embassy held a commemoration 
ceremony on February 13, marking the fourth anniversary of 
their capture.  In January, former Development Minister 
Fernando Araujo escaped from six years of FARC captivity 
after an army rescue attempt.  In February, a military 
operation resulted in the rescue an army captain whom the ELN 
had kidnapped in 2003. 
 
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Positive Economic Outlook 
------------------------- 
 
¶16. (U) Significant gains in security have helped boost the 
Colombian economy.  In the third quarter of 2006, Colombia's 
gross domestic product (GDP) increased by 7.7 percent. 
Inflation in 2006 was 4.5 percent, the lowest rate in 50 
years.  The GDP growth has been fueled by a 30 percent 
increase in the construction sector and robust consumer 
spending.  2005 Foreign Direct Investment increased to USD 
5.6 billion, an increase of 50 percent over 2004, and first 
quarter 2006 FDI totaled USD 978 million, which is an 
increase of 6.8 percent over the same period in 2005.  The 
largest U.S. investors - Drummond (coal), ChevronTexaco and 
ExxonMobil - are planning considerable expansion due to the 
improved investment climate.  Colombia,s exports and imports 
each increased more than 20 percent in 2005, and the U.S. is 
Colombia,s largest trade partner (approximately 40 percent 
of exports and 28 percent of imports).  Colombian exports to 
the U.S. have grown USD 1 billion per year since ATPDEA's 
inception in late 2002, while U.S. exports to Colombia 
increased approximately USD 2 billion.  Unemployment fell 
from 18 percent when President Uribe took office to a little 
more than 11 percent in October 2006. 
 
¶17. (SBU) On November 22, 2006 Colombia and the U.S. signed a 
Trade Promotion Agreement (TPA).  The agreement will provide 
stronger IP protection and give increased market access to 
key U.S. industrial and agricultural exports.  For Colombia, 
the agreement will create a more attractive investment 
climate, lock in ATPDEA benefits, and expand employment 
opportunities for small and medium-sized business.  The U.S. 
Congress recently approved a six month extension of the 
ATPTDEA to promote tariff relief for Colombian businesses as 
ratification on the TPA moves forward. 
 
DRUCKER