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DE RUEHBJ #0972/01 0401253
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 091253Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4647
INFO RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE
RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0960
RUEHROV/AMEMBASSY VATICAN 0084

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIJING 000972 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/09/2032 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM CH VN
SUBJECT: DID HU JINTAO ASSESS VIETNAM'S POLITICAL REFORMS 
AS NON-SOCIALIST? 
 
REF: A. 06 BEIJING 03852 
     ¶B. 06 BEIJING 22131 
 
BEIJING 00000972  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Daniel Shields. 
Reasons 1.4 (b/d). 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1.  (C) An officer at the Vietnamese Embassy said he finds 
credible reports circulating among ASEAN diplomats in Beijing 
that President Hu Jintao wrote the phrase "this is not 
Socialism" on a document Hu was given describing political 
reforms at Vietnam's April 2006 10th Party Congress.  The 
question of what Vietnam's political reforms might mean for 
China attracted new attention after the reform-minded 
publication Southern Weekend listed 70-year-old reformer Zhou 
Ruijin as the first among its 12 candidates for person of the 
year in December.  In July Zhou had pointed publicly to 
Vietnam's 2006 10th Party Congress's electoral reforms and 
solicitation of public opinion as ideas that China should 
emulate.  Chinese scholars were skeptical about the 
leadership in Beijing moving ahead on such reforms now and in 
general were dismissive of the notion that China should 
emulate Vietnam.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) Vietnamese Embassy Political Officer Tranh Viet Thai 
stated, in response to questions from Poloff, that he finds 
credible reports circulating among ASEAN diplomats in Beijing 
that President Hu Jintao wrote the phrase "this is not 
Socialism" on a document Hu was given describing political 
reforms at Vietnam's April 2006 10th Party Congress.  Embassy 
of Singapore DCM Yip Weikiat separately told Polmincouns that 
he had heard, but could not confirm, that Party guidance was 
circulated under instructions from Hu saying that while 
Vietnam's early political reforms were good, subsequent 
political reforms have gone too far and are not consistent 
with Socialism. 
 
¶3. (C) The question of what Vietnam's political reforms might 
mean for China attracted new attention after the 
reform-minded publication Southern Weekend listed 70-year-old 
reformer Zhou Ruijin as the first among its 12 candidates for 
person of the year in December.  The issue was a hot topic of 
discussion among Chinese intellectuals prior to the Chinese 
Communist Party's Sixth Plenum in September, when 
intellectual debates over reform were raging (Ref A).  In 
July, Zhou, a former top editor of the Party flagship paper 
The People's Daily, had publicly challenged China's leaders 
to emulate Vietnam's example on political reform.  In a 
sharply worded article posted on the Internet, Zhou (also 
known by the pen name "Huangfu Ping," which he used with 
others to defend Deng Xiaoping-era reforms) said that Vietnam 
had learned much from China's economic reforms but that the 
"student has now surpassed the teacher" demonstrating that 
accelerating political reform "is the correct way to go." 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Zhou complained that China was "bogged down in 
wrangling" over reforms, urging in particular that China 
learn from Vietnam in five areas: 
 
--strengthening the role of the Party Central Committee in 
supervising the Politburo, including Central Committee 
approval by secret ballot of major policy proposals, 
personnel decisions and large engineering projects; 
 
--establishing a system whereby Central Committee members may 
ask Party leaders, including the General Secretary, for 
explanations of pending decisions at plenums "until the 
answers are satisfactory"; 
 
--making public in advance a draft of the political report of 
Party Congresses in order to solicit the views of both Party 
members and the public at large; 
 
--holding indirect Party elections with more candidates than 
posts, by secret ballot, and providing background information 
on candidates in advance of the elections and; 
 
--raising the ratio of full-time representatives in the 
country's national legislature to 25 percent and allowing the 
legislature to question Government policies before live 
broadcast media. 
 
¶5.  (C) While Zhou's July article inspired some optimism 
among Chinese reformers about the possibility that real 
political reform would be included in the agenda for China's 
17th Party Congress in fall 2007, contacts subsequently 
indicated that significant reforms were most likely not in 
 
BEIJING 00000972  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
the cards (Ref B).  A well-connected former People's Daily 
editorial writer claimed that Hu Jintao came under pressure 
from pro- and anti-reform forces, but heeded the consensus 
among senior leaders against pursuing political reform. 
 
¶6. (C) Several academics dismissed Zhou's suggestion that 
Vietnam could be a model for China's political reform, noting 
the differences between the two countries and expressing 
annoyance at the comparison.  Director of People's University 
Contemporary Political Parties Institute Zhou Shuzhen 
(protect) told Poloff that any comparison between China's and 
Vietnam's political reforms is "misguided," noting that China 
is "more developed" than Vietnam and has little to learn from 
it.  Cai Dingjian (protect), Professor at China University of 
Politics and Law and outspoken constitutional scholar and 
legal reformer, told poloff that Hu Jintao might endorse some 
inner-Party reforms, such as allowing more candidates than 
positions in some internal Party elections, but that 
emulating Vietnam's reforms was "out of the question." 
 
¶7. (C) Separately, Beijing University's Faculty of Law 
Professor He Weifang (protect) said he had heard nothing 
about Hu's reported comments that Vietnam's reforms are "not 
Socialist" but acknowledged that "some elements" within the 
Party wish to use Vietnam's example to promote reform within 
the Chinese Communist Party.  In general, reformists within 
the Party believe that internal democratic reforms can 
eventually lead to political reforms outside the Party. 
After all, how can China ever be democratic if its ruling 
Party is completely undemocratic, He asked rhetorically. 
Regardless of where it ends up on the question of political 
reform, however, the direction in which China needs to go is 
"fairly obvious," and Beijing "doesn't need to learn 
anything" from Hanoi, He concluded. 
 
¶8. (C) China Institute for Contemporary International 
Relations Southeast Asia scholar Zhai Kun (protect) asserted 
that China continues to research Vietnam's reforms and share 
experiences with Vietnam through a vibrant exchange between 
the Communist Party Schools in Beijing and Hanoi.  Zhai, who 
stated he has no knowledge of Hu's reported negative 
assessment of Vietnam's political reforms, said China 
recognizes that Vietnam's reforms are quicker than its own. 
Vietnam's reforms can move faster, he claimed, because 
Vietnam does not face the same stability risks as China.  For 
example, Vietnam can pursue relations with the Vatican 
because of its greater social and religious harmony and the 
absence of the Taiwan issue, he said. 
 
¶9. (C) The Vietnamese Embassy's Thai acknowledged that 
exchanges between the Vietnam and Chinese Central Party 
Schools were strengthened during Nong Duc Manh's August 2006 
visit to China.  Thai stated, however, that Party School 
exchanges are focused more on theory and less on practical 
reforms.  He commented that Chinese who write about Vietnam's 
reforms as a possible model for China to follow are using 
Vietnam's reforms to justify their own political positions. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶10.  (C) Hu's reported dismissal of Vietnam's reforms as "not 
Socialist" is not likely to stand in the way of continued 
experiments with local Party elections and other ongoing 
governance experiments condoned by the Center.  It is likely 
to be effective, however, in cutting off discussion in China 
of whether China can learn from Vietnam in the area of 
political reform. 
RANDT