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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 000624 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/30/2017 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM UNSC BM TH
SUBJECT: HOW THE THAI FORMULATE POLICY TOWARD BURMA 
 
 
Classified By: Political Officer J.R. Littlejohn, reason: 1.4 (b) and ( 
d). 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. (C) The Thai MFA has a lead role in drafting policy toward 
Burma and normally clears its drafts through an interagency 
body that includes the National Security Council (NSC) and 
the Army.  When the RTG formulated its position on the UNSC 
resolution on Burma, however, the MFA had full control of the 
process and did not seek outside clearances.  The key MFA 
official responsible for Burma explained to us the details of 
Thai policy formulation.  Despite a change of 
administrations, it appears the MFA retains a leading role in 
charting the course of Thai policy toward Burma.  End Summary. 
 
GENERAL POLICY TOWARD BURMA 
--------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) In a January 30 conversation, MFA East Asian Affairs 
Division I Acting Director, Kallayana Vipattipumiprates 
described to us how the MFA formulates Thailand's general 
approach toward Burma.  The East Asia Department's Division I 
(responsible for Burma, Philippines, Singapore, and Brunei) 
formulates a policy, and then passes it up to the Permanent 
Secretary for review.  After the PermSec clears, the document 
 
SIPDIS 
is sent to the Foreign Minister for use in cabinet level 
interagency discussion.  Principal participants in all 
interagency discussions on Burma include the National 
Security Council (NSC) and the Army.  Other groups in the 
business sector may be encouraged to weigh in.  For example, 
if an issue pertains to the security of the Thai-Burma 
border, discussion with the private sector would be 
warranted.  Kallayana said this group might include members 
of the Chamber of Commerce, the Thai Bankers Association and 
the Federation of Thai Industry. 
 
¶3. (C) Kallayana told us that Thai policy toward Burma 
post-coup will remain essentially the same as pre-coup.  He 
said the Thai would continue to honor past commitments with 
Burma, but full transparency would be a prerequisite for 
future deals. 
 
THAILAND'S POSITION ON THE UNSC RESOLUTION ON BURMA 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶4. (C) Kallayana said that the Foreign Ministry developed its 
stance on the UN Security Council resolution on Burma 
internally.  According to Kallayana, the RTG's position paper 
on the draft resolution on Burma was prepared in Division I, 
under his supervision.  The document was vetted by Permanent 
Secretary Krit Garnjana-Goonchorn and forwarded to Foreign 
 
SIPDIS 
Minister Nitya Pibulsonggram.  Kallayana said that the FM and 
Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont tend to "see eye-to-eye" on 
most foreign policy issues, including Burma.  However, he 
said, they do not always agree on Malaysian issues, and when 
there is disagreement, the PM does not hesitate to assert his 
views on Malaysia, because he feels "he is quite 
knowledgeable in this area." 
 
ASEAN 
----- 
 
¶5. (C) Kallayana said his office has a say in policy planning 
regarding the formulation of Thai views on ASEAN's position 
toward Burma, but the bulk of the work in this area is 
handled by the MFA Secretariat, which drafts position papers 
used by MFA officials for ASEAN meetings.  Foreign policy 
issues are covered at meetings and final authority on formal 
Thai positions rests with the Foreign Minister, the NSC and 
the Army. 
 
¶6. (C) When asked if international concerns relating to Burma 
are most appropriately dealt with in the context of ASEAN, 
Kallayana said that Thailand and more broadly ASEAN cannot go 
it alone.  He said that Thailand and ASEAN need the United 
States and the European Union to continue applying pressure 
on Burma.  He noted that the Thai are also talking to the 
Russians and the Chinese inside Burma.  The Thai hope these 
two countries will encourage Burma to step up efforts toward 
democratization and reconciliation. Specifically, he said 
they would like the Russians to communicate that they cannot 
continuously exercise the veto in defense of a Burma that is 
non-responsive to the will of the international community. 
 
BANGKOK 00000624  002 OF 002 
 
 
Kallayana emphasized that Thailand still wants Burma to move 
toward democratization. 
 
THE TRANSPARENCY STANDARD 
------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) When asked about the impact of the PM's use of 
transparency as a keystone of Thai foreign engagement, 
Kallayana said that it was no secret that ousted PM Thaksin 
was believed to have had significant business interests in 
Burma.  He said this government does not have the same 
interests.  According to Kallayana, Surayud himself came up 
with the idea of using "transparency" as a buzzword 
associated with good governance. 
 
¶8. (C) Kallayana also said that PM Surayud would not plan to 
visit Burma again during his time in office.  Kallayana noted 
that in the lead up to tabling the UNSC resolution, PM 
Surayud specifically told the generals in Burma that the 
Thais and the ASEAN community are looking to Burma to deliver 
"credible" results.  Kallayana said that the Thai never heard 
back from the Burmese government on this request. (When asked 
to define a credible result, Kallayana said the Thai would 
like to see progress on the five issues UN Under Secretary 
General Gambari mentioned during his November trip to Burma: 
the release of political prisoners; humanitarian access; a 
more inclusive political process; the need to work with the 
ILO; and the need for a cessation of hostilities against 
ethnic minorities.) 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶9. (C) Despite a change in Thai administrations, and a 
widespread belief that PM Surayud personally has little 
affinity for Burma, the Foreign Ministry appears to have 
ceded little influence over formulation of Thai policy toward 
its neighbor.  In fact, the wider involvement of the military 
and the private sector in policy formulation could mean that 
the PM's personal view will have less of an impact, given 
that Burmese affairs are not a top priority for him. 
BOYCE