VZCZCXRO8338
RR RUEHBC RUEHCHI RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHKUK RUEHLH RUEHPW
RUEHROV
DE RUEHBD #0072/01 0580341
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 270341Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY BANDAR SERI BEGAWAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3733
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
RUCNISL/ISLAMIC CONFERENCE COLLECTIVE
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANDAR SERI BEGAWAN 000072 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/27/2022 
TAGS: PREL BX IR IZ
SUBJECT: BRUNEI VIEWS ON MIDEAST ISSUES 
 
REF: A. STATE 3592 
     ¶B. STATE 19372 
     ¶C. STATE 14071 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Emil Skodon for reasons 1.4 (B,D) 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  The Government of Brunei (GOB) appears to 
be viewing Mideast issues increasingly through the prism of a 
broader Sunni-Shia divide.  Over the course of a long 
conversation with Dato Shofry, the Acting Head of the GOB 
external intelligence service, Shofry expressed concern about 
increasing Iranian influence reaching as far as Southeast 
Asia.  He said the GOB was worried about prospects for Iraq 
becoming a training ground for international terrorists, and 
warned that if the USG pulls out of Iraq it will likely be 
abandoned by the rest of the international community as well. 
 The GOB is encouraged by the Secretary's active engagement 
in the Middle East Peace Process, which besides advancing the 
cause of peace helps to counter negative views of the U.S. 
among the world's Muslims.  Shofry made a strong pitch for 
encouraging more students from Muslim-majority countries to 
study in the U.S., as the best long-term investment we could 
make in the future of U.S. relations with the Islamic world. 
End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) A range of Mideast-related issues were among the 
topics I covered in a February 13 one-on-one lunch with 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) Permanent 
Secretary Dato Shofry bin Abd Ghafor.  Shofry, who spent many 
 
SIPDIS 
years in New York as Brunei's UN Permrep, is currently 
dual-hatted as the Acting Head of the GOB external 
intelligence service, the MFAT External Research Bureau.  In 
that role he is responsible for overseeing the preparation of 
briefings on foreign policy issues for the Sultan, Crown 
Prince, Foreign Minister, and other top GOB officials. 
 
---- 
IRAQ 
---- 
 
¶3.  (C) Drawing on ref A and other sources, I summarized for 
Shofry the new Iraq strategy announced by the President in 
January and its progress to date.  He commented that the GOB 
understood the rationale behind the "surge strategy," 
particularly its non-military elements of bolstering moderate 
political leaders and improving economic conditions.  Brunei 
hoped our new approach would be successful, as the GOB was 
worried about Iraq becoming a training ground for terrorists 
who would eventually expand their operations beyond its 
borders.  Shofry was, however, unsure whether depending on 
the Iraqis to take responsibility for their own future 
constituted "a policy or a hope," given that the divisions 
within Iraqi society appeared increasingly intractable and 
its leaders incapable of bridging those differences. 
 
¶4.  (C) Shofry quizzed me about the likelihood that calls 
from the U.S. Congress for a phased troop withdrawal would 
result in the adoption of a mandatory timetable.  After I 
explained why the President was averse to announcing a 
definitive pre-determined drawdown schedule, Shofry warned 
"If you go, everyone goes."  He doubted that any members of 
the coalition would remain committed to Iraq in a meaningful 
way absent a strong U.S. military presence, and commented 
"They are there because they care about the U.S., not because 
they care about Iraq."  Shofry also implied that prospects 
were dim for a multinational force drawn from Muslim 
countries to take the place of the current coalition, given 
widespread pessimism about Iraq's internal security.  In 
short, Shofry said, once the U.S. was gone from Iraq the 
world would no longer care about the Iraqis -- not 
necessarily a bad thing, he mused, since it might force the 
Iraqis to face up to their problems and take action to find 
solutions. 
 
---- 
IRAN 
---- 
 
¶5.  (C) I told Shofry that there was at least one country 
that would not lose interest in Iraq and would, in fact, seek 
to fill the void if the international community pulled out. 
That country was Iran.  Shofry acknowledged the threat of 
more Iranian intervention in Iraq, and said Teheran's 
apparent drive to play more of a leadership role in the 
Muslim world was deeply worrying for Brunei.  He was 
concerned that an increasingly hostile divide between Sunnis 
and Shia in the Middle East could spill over into Southeast 
Asia and lead to instability here. 
 
¶6.  (C) I expressed some surprise at this, given the 
preponderance of moderate Sunnis among Southeast Asian 
 
BANDAR SER 00000072  002 OF 002 
 
 
Muslims.  Shofry maintained that Shia influence (a term he 
used interchangeably with "Iranian influence") was growing in 
the region.  This was due to Teheran's sponsorship of study 
by young Southeast Asians in Qom and other Iranian religious 
centers, its backing for Iranian-trained Islamic teachers in 
Southeast Asia, and its appeal to young Muslims who admired 
the outspoken way Iran unabashedly championed the cause of 
Islam and "stood up" to the West.  Shofry said there were no 
practicing Shia among Bruneians, but the growing number in 
neighboring countries was a worry to the GOB.  He claimed 
that 15 million Indonesians were either Shiites or close 
Iranian sympathizers.  When I asked where he had gotten that 
number, Shofry replied that this was what the GOB had been 
told by "our friends" (a reference to the external services 
of other ASEAN countries). 
 
¶7.  (C)  Drawing on refs B and C and other sources, I briefed 
Shofry on USG policy toward Iran and urged the GOB to ensure 
that it was adhering to the terms of UNSCR 1737.  He replied 
that the GOB took seriously its responsibility to adhere to 
UNSCR decisions, including this one, and would take the 
necessary steps to enforce its applicable provisions.  Shofry 
urged the USG to calibrate carefully its strategy regarding 
Iran's nuclear program.  He warned that the Iranian 
population would "circle the wagons" and rally around its 
leaders if it came to believe that western powers were only 
interested in placing pressure on the regime and were not 
offering constructive alternatives to Iran's current, suspect 
nuclear energy program. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
MEPP AND U.S. RELATIONS WITH ISLAMIC WORLD 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶8.  (C) Shofry said the GOB was encouraged by Secretary 
Rice's active personal reengagement in the Middle East peace 
process.  Besides the obvious advantage of raising hopes for 
a lasting settlement between the Palestinians and Israelis, 
public engagement in the peace process was the single most 
important step the USG could take to improve its popular 
standing in the Islamic world and counter the widespread view 
that the Global War on Terror was a cover for a Global War on 
Muslims. 
 
¶9.  (C) In reply to my question about other measures the USG 
could take to improve relations with Muslim-majority 
countries, Shofry commented that much of the problem was due 
to Muslims identifying America only with the policies of the 
current Administration; rightly or wrongly, most Muslims saw 
those policies in a negative light, and from there it was 
only a short intellectual leap to being negative about 
America itself.  In his view, the USG should offer vastly 
more support for people-to-people exchanges, so Muslims could 
learn first-hand that there was much more to the U.S. than 
the policies of any given Administration. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) I pointed out that in the last year the USG had 
sponsored nearly fifty Bruneians for foreign trips to 
interact with American counterparts, either to the U.S. or to 
the International Law Enforcement Academy in Bangkok.  Shofry 
acknowledged the usefulness of such short-term programs, but 
thought the real bang-for-the-buck lie in encouraging more 
Muslim students to pursue higher education in the U.S.  He 
made a strong pitch for education fairs and other promotional 
activities by American universities to attract Bruneian 
students, arguing that anyone who lived among the warm and 
generous population of the United States for a period of 
years might continue to oppose USG policies, but would e 
highly unlikely to harbor hatred for the county itself. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶11.  (C)  The normally soft-spoken Shofry's visceral concern 
about the implications of a growing and increasingly violent 
Sunni-Shia divide was striking, especially given that Brunei 
appears so far removed from the effects of this schism (the 
constitution of Brunei defines its state religion as "Islam 
according to the Shafeite sect," i.e., one of the main Sunni 
schools of Islamic law).  Equally striking was the manner in 
which he used the terms "Shia" and "Iranian" interchangeably, 
leaving little doubt that he saw Teheran as the aspiring head 
of the Shia world.  The GOB's traditional preference for 
conciliation and the need to avoid any appearance of taking 
sides against a fellow Muslim country will preclude it from 
taking an active role in pressuring Iran, but Shofry's 
comments leave little doubt that the GOB is concerned about 
the potential spread of Iranian prestige and influence.  End 
Comment. 
SKODON