VZCZCXRO1308
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #0592/01 0501322
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 191322Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9738
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000592 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/19/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PREF MPREL PTER TU IZ
SUBJECT: SPECIAL ENVOY RALSTON VISITS MAKHMOUR, TALKS WITH 
KRG PRESIDENT BARZANI 
 
 
Classified by:  RRT Erbil Leader James Yellin, reasons 1.4 
(b) and (d) 
 
This is a Regional Reconstruction Team Erbil cable. 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  KRG President Barzani told Special Envoy 
Ralston that settling the PKK problem requires a political 
solution from Turkey, but that the KDP and PUK are also 
anxious to see this source of conflict between Turkey and the 
KRG resolved.  Ralston informed Barzani and other KRG 
officials that Iraqi and UNHCR steps in Makhmour refugee camp 
form the basis for discussion of refugee voluntary returns to 
Turkey.  Barzani stressed the need for amnesty and Ralston 
described initial discussion of amnesty in Turkey, but said 
the Turkish election in May could preclude any conclusion 
during the campaign period.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) U.S. Special Envoy for Countering the PKK Gen. (r) 
Joseph Ralston met Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) 
President Massoud Barzani in Salah al Din, Erbil, on January 
29 on a one-day trip to northern Iraq during which he also 
visited Makhmour refugee camp.  Kurdish participants in the 
meeting and luncheon included:  Massoud Barzani (KDP), KRG 
Vice-President Kosrat Rasool (PUK), KRG-KDP Minister of 
Interior Karim Sinjari, KRG Deputy Prime Minister Omar Fatah 
(PUK), and KRG-KDP Minister of Peshmerga Za,im Ali. 
American participants included Ralston with a Department of 
State and U.S. military delegation, U.S. Regional 
Coordinator, and RRT PolOff. 
 
-------- 
Makhmour 
-------- 
 
¶3.  (C) Ralston thanked Barzani and Sinjari for steps taken 
to restore civilian status to Makhmour refugee camp and said 
the UNHCR census of residents provides a basis for discussion 
of voluntary return of these Turkish Kurds to their homes in 
southeastern Turkey.  After seeing it with his own eyes, he 
said, he could tell Turkish authorities that the Iraqi 
Security Forces (ISF) conducted a professional operation in 
restoring the refugee camp to civilian status. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Ralston said he would tell the Turks that the many 
young people in Makhmour camp need the positive goal of 
return to Turkey, integration, and jobs, or they may turn to 
the PKK for excitement and meaning. It is to Turkey,s 
advantage, he pointed out, to have these young people settled 
back in Turkey. 
 
--------- 
Ceasefire 
--------- 
 
¶5.  (C) Ralston said PKK leaders in the Iraqi Kurdistan 
Region may still be involved in planning operations inside 
Turkey.  He called on the KRG to get the PKK to continue its 
declared ceasefire through the spring, resisting the 
traditional return to attacks during the spring snow melt and 
the March 21 Kurdish holiday of Newroz.  Barzani protested 
that the PKK cease-fire is not due to winter but is because 
the KRG and Government of Iraq asked the PKK to stop attacks. 
 
¶6.  (C) Barzani assured Ralston that the KRG has great 
influence on the PKK leadership and can maintain the 
ceasefire.  He said that if Turkey does not attack PKK areas, 
the PKK will not break its ceasefire.  However, he said, 
there are small splinter groups that may skirmish with 
Turkish forces but that is a different issue. 
 
-------------------- 
No Military Solution 
-------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) Barzani said Turkey knows a military solution will 
not succeed, but the KRG sees no signs that Turkey is working 
on a peaceful solution.  He stated that the PKK wants to be 
part of the political process.  Ralston told Barzani he 
agreed that there would be catastrophic consequences if 
Turkey were to invade the northern Iraq to attack the PKK, 
with ramifications for Iran and other important regional 
issues.  He said he would make the case to the Turkish 
government that no military solution will be successful. 
 
¶8.  (C) Kosrat Rasool said Turkey would not invade northern 
Iraq without a &green light from the Americans8 and such an 
invasion would make conditions worse for the U.S. in Iraq. 
He said the Kurds consider themselves to be &strategic 
allies8 of the U.S., but the KRG also has to consider its 
own &national interest.8  Rasool accused some Turkish 
military commanders and PKK leaders of preferring conflict 
rather than a peaceful solution.  Ralston responded that he 
 
BAGHDAD 00000592  002 OF 003 
 
 
will make it clear than an attack would not be a wise move 
for Turkey, but that all parties need to find a political 
solution. 
 
------------------------- 
An Increase in Terrorism? 
------------------------ 
 
¶9.  (C) Rasool told Ralston that Syria and Iran have ceased 
support for the PKK but warned that a Turkish attack could 
reconnect the PKK with those sources of funding and support. 
Omar Fatah said Turkish military action on Iraqi soil against 
the PKK would destabilize Iraq and enhance terrorism in the 
region as a whole by encouraging PKK affiliation with 
transnational terrorist organizations.  The Iraqi government, 
he warned, cannot handle more pressure. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
KRG Reactions to Turkish ) PKK Clashes 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (C) If Turkey attacks the PKK, Barzani said, the KRG 
will not join Turkey against the PKK.  He stated that if a 
peaceful and democratic solution is offered and the PKK 
refuses, then a Turkish military intervention will ¬ be 
much of a problem for us, because the PKK will lose popular 
support.8  In that case, he said, the Turks know where the 
PKK is in the mountains but the Turks must do it by 
themselves, without KRG support.  Rasool told Ralston that 
both the PUK and KDP had fought the PKK. 
 
¶11.  (C) Comment:  Barzani,s statement is consistent with 
earlier comments that the KRG would stay neutral in a 
conflict between Turkey and the PKK if the PKK openly broke 
the KRG-brokered cease-fire.  However, the neutrality arises 
more from resistance to renewing conflict between the KRG 
parties and the PKK than from KRG agreement with Turkish 
military action.  End Comment. 
 
-------------------- 
A Political Solution 
-------------------- 
 
¶12.  (C) Barzani reported a significant movement among PKK 
leaders toward participation in a democratic process.  He 
said that a Turkish effort to resolve Kurdish concerns inside 
Turkey would effectively undermine support for the PKK, 
especially if the PKK is allowed a role in the political 
process.  Ralston agreed that there are steps Turkey must 
take other than military action.  He commented that Turkish 
politicians are beginning to discuss some form of amnesty. 
However, during the Turkish election year it is difficult for 
politicians to take this difficult position openly. 
 
¶13.  (C) Barzani called on the Turkish government to look at 
its policies toward Kurds within Turkey, saying that if the 
&existential denials8 by Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria of 
Kurdish national identity had been effective, Kurdish 
identity would already be lost.  He said Turkey has room to 
revise its policies and thereby gain Kurdish support, without 
any security risk, because Kurds in Turkey seek neither 
partition nor secession.  He stressed that neither compulsory 
unity nor compulsory partition can be successful.  Any sign 
of Turkish flexibility would cost the PKK significant 
grass-roots support, and Turkish acceptance of a Kurdish 
nation within Turkey would do much to resolve the conflict, 
he concluded. 
 
------------------------------------ 
Relations Between Turkey and the KRG 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶14.  (C) Ralston pointed out that the economic growth and 
political stability of the KRG would be jeopardized by 
military conflict with Turkey, and it is not to the KRG,s 
advantage to risk this by allowing a small group of radicals 
to use Iraqi territory. 
 
¶15.  (C) Rasool noted that Turkey is an important country in 
the region and a neighbor, and both the KRG and Turkey are 
allies of the U.S.  He noted that the KRG and Turkey cannot 
change their geographical locations, and so they should solve 
conflicts by meetings rather than military action.  Barzani 
said Turkish trade and investment amounts to one billion U.S. 
dollars in the KRG and there is room to double this amount. 
He stressed that Turkey and Iraqi Kurds are &neighbors and 
friends,8 and the KRG has no bad intentions toward Turkey 
but rather wants good relations between the government of 
Turkey and the KRG. 
 
------ 
Kirkuk 
 
BAGHDAD 00000592  003 OF 003 
 
 
------ 
 
¶16.  (C) Rasool accused Turkey of mixing the issues of the 
PKK and Kirkuk, and he said Turkey has no voice in the 
internal Iraqi issue of Kirkuk,s future.  Barzani added that 
control of Kirkuk will be determined constitutionally. 
Regional Coordinator confirmed that there are mechanisms in 
the Iraqi constitution for dealing with the issue of Kirkuk. 
Ralston said he will urge Turkey to avoid media comment on 
Kirkuk but rather to talk to the Iraqi government and the KRG. 
 
¶17.  (U) Special Envoy Ralston did not have an opportunity to 
clear this cable before departing Erbil. 
KHALILZAD