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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 ANKARA 000219 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/31/2032 
TAGS: PTER PREL PREF MOPS TU IZ
SUBJECT: GOT REITERATES TO SPECIAL ENVOY RALSTON THE NEED FOR CONCRETE ACTION AGAINST PKK 
 
REF: 06 GENEVA 1385 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Wilson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (S) Summary: Turkey is still waiting for concrete action against the PKK, GOT leaders and officials told visiting Special Envoy Ralston Jan. 30-31.  Ralston's interlocutors acknowledged progress on the Makhmour refugee camp, but emphasized that they have higher priorities.  The GOT agreed to work with us to identify several deliverables for a trilateral meeting with the Iraqis in the relatively near 
future.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (C) FonMin Gul, CHOD Buyukanit (reported septel), 
counterpart Gen. (r) Baser, and Turkish MPs all told visiting 
Special Envoy for Countering the PKK Gen. (r) Joseph Ralston 
Jan. 30-31 that Turkey appreciates progress on closing the 
Makhmour refugee camp in northern Iraq, but is still waiting 
for concrete steps to deal with the PKK's presence in 
northern Iraq.  Gul and Baser reminded Ralston of the great 
importance that the Turkish public places on addressing the 
issue, Baser adding that many remain skeptical that the 
special envoy process will succeed.  Reading from prepared 
talking points, Baser criticized President Bush's Jan. 10 
speech on Iraq for calling out Syria and Iran on supporting 
terrorism in Iraq, but only referring indirectly to the PKK 
as an Iraq-Turkey border issue. 
 
¶3. (S) Baser asserted that public opinion on the PKK issue 
has put both him and the GOT in a difficult position.  He 
said the GOT retains the right to take action in the absence 
of evidence that the Iraqis will do so.  But, he continued, 
the GOT has charged him with seeking solutions together with 
the U.S. and Iraq.  The GOT will continue to factor in the 
effect unilateral Turkish action might have on Turkey's 
relationship with the U.S., Iraq, and the region. 
 
¶4. (S) Regarding the President's speech, Ralston explained 
that we wanted to send a positive signal to Turkey on the PKK 
issue, but as the American public neither knows nor 
understands the PKK issue, a direct reference to the group in 
the speech would have been confusing for the domestic 
audience.  Indeed, Ralston confirmed that since he and Baser 
last met on Dec. 11, he has been able to focus the attention 
of the highest levels in the USG on the problem. 
 
Makhmour: Real Progress 
----------------------- 
 
¶5. (S) Ralston briefed both Gul and Baser on his Jan. 29 
visit to the Makhmour Camp.  Ralston said he had been 
surprised by some of what he had seen: the camp is not 
isolated, but hard by Makhmour village; it is difficult to 
distinguish where the camp ends and the village begins.  The 
buildings are not in excellent condition and have no running 
water, but the people are well-fed, clean, well-clothed, and 
appear unafraid.  Ralston reported that the UN's census -- 
while not yet official -- showed that of the camp's 11,500 
residents, about 6,000 are children.  Of the remaining 5,500, 
a large majority are women.  Most men present in the camp are 
older.  He emphasized how important it is to move to close 
the camp ASAP.  The older children in the camp are a prime 
recruiting ground for the PKK, and only closing the camp will 
ensure that the PKK loses this pool of potential fighters. 
Turkey should move right away to sign the Tripartite 
Agreement with the GOI and UNHCR so the process can move 
forward. 
 
¶6. (S) The first steps have been accomplished, Ralston 
continued.  The Jan. 17 ISF operation to search for weapons 
and ensure PKK elements were removed from the camp was a 
success.  A company of U.S. soldiers monitored the operation 
and remain in place with the ISF battalion; the U.S. 
personnel told Ralston that the ISF has performed 
professionally.  It is also important that this is the first 
action ISF have taken to deal with the PKK; it sets a 
precedent for more.  Ralston also briefed on his meeting with 
KRG President Barzani.  Barzani pushed for Turkey to provide 
amnesty for PKK fighters; Ralston responded that this was not 
realistic.  Ralston told Baser that he believes Barzani is 
coming to realize that the PKK is a liability for the KRG. 
 
¶7. (S) In the Baser meeting, MFA Director General for 
Security Affairs (S/CT-equivalent) Guven complained that 
under the terms of UNHCR's operation plan, Turkish officials 
were to be granted access to the camp following the expulsion 
of PKK elements.  Thus, Guven went on, Turkey still has 
"question marks" about whether the civilian nature of the 
camp has indeed been restored.  Baser added that there are 
intelligence reports indicating that the PKK-front Kurdistan 
Democratic Solutions Party still maintains an office in the 
camp.  Ralston emphasized that the ISF, MNF-I, and UN were 
satisfied that the camp has been cleared of terrorist 
elements, and that ISF will continue to surround the camp to 
ensure PKK elements do not slip back in. 
 
¶8. (S) Baser underscored that the ISF search was a good step. 
 He noted intelligence reports that Abdullah Ocalan may have 
instructed PKK fighters to leave the camp in advance of the 
ISF operation, but conceded that whatever the reason may have 
been for the absence of fighters in the camp, the important 
thing is that they are not there now. 
 
¶9. (C) Gul stated that the camp is not Turkey's top 
counter-PKK priority, but it is important.  He understood the 
need to make progress on the Tripartite Agreement, but argued 
that Turkey must proceed carefully.  Turkey will receive its 
citizens "as agreed," but must also take steps to ensure they 
will be loyal citizens.  Noting the census numbers, he 
wondered openly where the children's fathers might be.  Gul 
also emphasized the importance of ensuring that the 
facilities in the camp will not be available for the PKK's 
use after it closes.  Ralston responded that this is an Iraqi 
decision, but given the camp's proximity to the village of 
Makhmour, perhaps the facilities could simply be turned over 
to the mayor there. 
 
The Search for Deliverables 
--------------------------- 
 
¶10. (S) The non-paper conveyed by the Turkish embassy in 
Washington to the Ralston on January 10 (full text in para. 
18) was reviewed during the Ralston-Baser meeting.  EUR/SE 
Deputy Director Hunt reported that we have raised many of the 
items it identifies with GOI and KRG authorities.  While they 
have shown a willingness to assist on some of them, many are 
simply not possible to accomplish.  Hunt noted that an Iraqi 
court has ruled that the Kurdistan Democratic Solutions Party 
is a legal political party, and ordered that its offices be 
allowed to re-open.  Unfortunately, the PKK has used this 
ruling to re-open many of the front offices that the Iraqis 
had shut down. 
 
¶11. (S) Despite these difficulties, Ralston suggested that 
Turkey and the U.S. move toward a trilateral discussion with 
the GOI.  It would be useful first to have identified several 
items that we can be assured all three sides would agree to 
as concrete deliverables.  He underscored the need to elicit 
concrete, verifiable actions from the Iraqis, and added that 
we well understand that a trilateral meeting that produces no 
result is worse than not having one at all.  Gul and Baser 
agreed to this. 
 
Gul: Action Necessary 
--------------------- 
 
¶12. (C) In his meeting with Ralston, FonMin Gul reiterated a 
number of the same points he made in their Oct. 12 meeting: 
While the GOT is still waiting for concrete results from the 
process, it views Ralston's appointment and subsequent work 
as a sign of U.S. determination to deal with the issue.  He 
understood that while the PKK may be the GOT's number one 
issue, it is only one of "thousands" of issues the U.S. must 
deal with.  The dramatic political reforms that have opened 
up Turkish society mean that the PKK has no basis for 
continuing its terrorist acts.  GOT efforts to develop the 
southeast economically continue: In Diyarbakir province four 
years ago, only 150 villages had running water, while now 
over 1,000 do. 
 
¶13. (C) Gul understood that the GOI faces many significant 
challenges, but emphasized that Barzani and Talabani must 
understand that the PKK will be a threat to them as well.  He 
said he cannot explain to the Turkish people that while Syria 
half-heartedly attempted to hide Ocalan's presence there in 
the 1990s, PKK leader Murat Karayilan is allowed to appear on 
Iraqi Kurdish television. 
 
Gul on Kirkuk: Message Received 
------------------------------- 
 
¶14. (S) Ralston requested Gul to cool GOT public rhetoric on 
the Kirkuk issue.  He encouraged the GOT to express its 
concerns on this issue with the GOI in a private setting 
rather than through the press.  We have observed that Turkish 
rhetoric has caused a backlash in Iraq.  Gul responded that 
he understood that the PKK and Kirkuk are different issues, 
but that Turkish commentators and politicians tend to mix 
them.  He agreed that recent rhetoric has been 
counterproductive, and he had warned people about this.  Gul 
recited Turkey's concerns about Kirkuk at length.  He 
asserted that Saddam eventually fell because he pursued 
"maximalist" policies, and worried that the Iraqi Kurds were 
pursuing the same maximalist approach vis-a-vis Kirkuk. 
These demands could expand the ongoing violence in Iraq from 
a sectarian basis to an ethnic one as well.  A referendum on 
a territorial issue such as this is fine if 90% of the 
population agrees on a certain item.  But if the vote is only 
55-60% in favor, this will force the losers to resist the 
outcome.  Violence will follow. 
 
¶15. (C) Despite its concerns, Gul continued, Turkey wants to 
do more for Iraq.  Thousands of Turks work there, and Turkey 
is working to change its laws so it can export even more 
electricity to Iraq.  The two nations need each other, but 
the PKK and Kirkuk issues get in the way of improving our 
relations. 
 
Kurdish MP Emphasizes Dialogue 
------------------------------ 
 
¶16. (C) Ralston also met with MPs Mehmet Dulger and Turhan 
Comez (ruling Justice and Development Party--AKP) as well as 
Onur Oymen and Esat Canan (opposition Republican People's 
Party--CHP).  All except Canan followed the GOT's line of 
urging action ASAP against the PKK.  Canan, a Kurd from the 
far southeastern province of Hakkari, emphasized the need for 
dialogue with the GOI and the KRG.  Why, he asked, will 
Turkey invite Iranians and Syrians here, but not Iraqi 
President Talabani?  He asserted that 20 years of military 
action against the PKK has not solved the problem, only 
dialogue will. 
 
¶17. (S) Comment: Ralston's meetings here moved the ball 
forward, but his conversations were testy and reconfirmed 
Turkish impatience on the PKK.  Turkish officials 
acknowledged our progress -- in particular on Makhmour -- but 
still want to see direct action to deal with the PKK's 
continued presence in northern Iraq.  The next steps are to 
finalize Makhmour's closure and to work out a small package 
of achievable deliverables that could come from a trilateral 
that should occur by late March.  End comment. 
 
¶18. (S) Text of GOT non-paper of Jan. 10 on PKK (as received): 
 
BEGIN TEXT 
 
January 10, 2007 
 
ANKARA 00000219  004 OF 005 
 
 
 
MEASURES TO BE ADOPTED TO COUNTER THE PKK/KONGRA-GEL 
ACTIVITIES IN NORTHERN IRAQ 
 
The PKK/KONGRA-GEL terrorists are deployed in northern Iraq. 
The terrorists reside in the camps that are located in 
northern Iraq and they supply their logistic needs, arms and 
ammunition, generate financial support and find the 
opportunity to do propaganda in this region without any 
difficulties.  The threat of terror against Turkey can not be 
eliminated unless PKK presence in northern Iraq is cut off. 
 
Turkey and the US have discussed the steps to be taken on 
this matter in two bilateral meetings as well as two 
trilateral meetings with the participation of Iraq, but 
achieved no results. 
 
The expectations of the Turkish public from the trilateral 
negotiations process have further increased especially after 
the level of this platform has been elevated.  For this 
reason, if a new tour of trilateral meeting is going to be 
held, subsequently certain decisions must be taken with a 
view to implementing and sharing them with the public opinion. 
 
To this effect this list of Measures to be adopted to 
terminate PKK/KONGRA-GEL activities in northern Iraq was 
submitted to the US authorities on August 1, 2006.  This list 
is still valid. 
 
The special Envoys who were appointed have already met four 
times and consulted with each other. 
 
We believe that in the period ahead, a trilateral meeting 
which could be held should result in a common understanding 
regarding the following measures at least as a first step: 
 
a)    Declaration by the US and Iraqi Government to the 
effect that the PKK/KONGRA-GEL not only poses a threat to the 
future security of Iraq, but will also seriously jeopardize 
Iraq's bilateral relations with its neighbors as well as 
regional peace and stability and that all measures, including 
military ones, will be taken to eliminate this threat. 
 
b)     Proclamation of the PKK/KONGRA-GEL as a terrorist 
organization by the Iraqi Government. 
 
c)     Joint declaration defining the objective of the 
trilateral talks as "terminating the terrorist activities and 
presence of the PKK/KONGRA-GEL in northern Iraq". 
 
d)   Avoiding a language by US and Iraqi authorities which 
excludes military measures while publicly referring to the 
steps that are considered to be taken against the 
PKK/KONGRA-GEL presence in Iraq. 
 
e)   Conclusion of the draft Agreement on Combating Terrorism 
submitted to the Iraqi Government. 
 
f)   Full implementation of the pledge made by President 
Talabani regarding the PKK. 
 
Accordingly: 
i. The KDP and the PUK will issue a warning to the PKK 
calling on it to disarm itself immediately, 
ii.  The PKK's ability to mobilize itself in northern Iraq 
will be curtailed, 
iii.  Security forces will be deployed to the areas of  PKK 
activity, 
iv.  PKK affiliated parties and other such formations as the 
PCDK (Kurdistan Democratic Solutions Party), DCP (Democratic 
Construction Party), HAW-PAR will be shut down. 
 
g)   Elimination of PKK/KONGRA-GEL camps starting with Sinath- 
Haftanin region, in the direction from West to the East along 
the areas adjacent to the Turkish-Iraqi border, and joint 
verification afterwards. 
 
h)   Destruction of the ammunition storage facilities at 
Mergasish and Nazdur camps from which the PKK/KONGRA-GEL 
provides its explosive materials. 
 
i)   Capturing and extradition to Turkey of the PKK leaders 
in northern Iraq, in particular Murat Karayilan, Duran 
Kalkan, Mustafa Karasu, Cemil Bayik and Fehman Huseyin, about 
whom detailed information was submitted to the Iraqi 
authorities together with copies of INTERPOL arrest warrants. 
 
j)   Control of all routes of access to the PKK camps by the 
Iraqi security forces. 
 
k)   Effective control of the Iraqi side of the Turkish-Iraqi 
border by the Iraqi security forces. 
 
l)   Timely and relevant intelligence sharing by the US and 
Iraqi authorities. 
 
m)   Prevention of the Kurdish regional authorities from 
making provocative, inflammatory and pro-PKK statements. 
 
n)   Revocation of all travel passes and other identification 
documents issued by the Kurdish groups to the members of the 
PKK. 
 
o)   Detention of individuals entering Iraq, by legal or 
illegal means, to enlist in the PKK and the enforcement of 
strict border controls at Erbil Airport to prevent traveling 
of PKK elements from Iraq to Europe or vice versa. 
 
p)   Prohibition of the PKK's media activities for propaganda 
purposes in northern Iraq, in particular prevention of the 
broadcast by the Roj Radio located at Qandil. 
 
q)   Effective termination of the logistic support from which 
PKK elements benefit in Iraq. 
 
END TEXT 
 
¶19. (U) Gen. Ralston did not have an opportunity to clear 
this message before departing Ankara. 
 
Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/ 
 
WILSON