VZCZCXRO2823
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHDS #0418/01 0400924
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 090924Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4551
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 ADDIS ABABA 000418 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF AND AF/E 
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER 
CJTF-HOA FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PBTS KPKO KHDP MOPS ET ER
SUBJECT: UNMEE SRSG REPORTS ETHIOPIAN-ERITREAN BORDER 
REMAINS TENSE 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY.  In a 90-minute briefing to diplomatic 
corps representatives on February 8, Special Representative 
of the UN Secretary-General (SRSG) for Ethiopia and Eritrea, 
Ambassador Azouz Ennifar, reported that the situation along 
with the Ethiopia-Eritrea border remained "tense and 
volatile," due to the presence of 1,700 Eritrean troops and 
12-16 tanks in Sector West of the formerly demilitarized 
Temporary Security Zone (TSZ).  In addition, the UN Mission 
in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) had observed 12 Ethiopian 
tanks "in camouflaged positions" in Bure (within striking 
distance of the Eritrean port of Assab), but could not 
determine when they had been moved there.  UNMEE was unable 
to verify recent alleged cross-border incidents, Ennifar 
said, adding that Ethiopia may be intentionally suppressing 
reports of cross-border incidents involving incursions from 
Eritrea, so as not to raise public concern about Ethiopia's 
northern border when its troops are preoccupied with Somalia. 
 Ethiopian and Eritrean military commanders have not met with 
each other since July 2006, and Eritrea has refused to 
recognize Ambassador Ennifar as SRSG since November 2006. 
The UNSC's decision to downsize UNMEE from 2,300 to 1,700 
troops will lead to curtailing some humanitarian activities 
conducted by individual contingents, but will not affect the 
number of UNMEE Military Observers or demining activities. 
Visiting Norwegian deputy FM underscored the need for active 
engagement of both parties, prior to the November 2007 
deadline for demarcation by coordinates announced by the 
Ethiopia-Eritrea Boundary Commission.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Many changes had occurred over the 16 months since 
Eritrea's imposition of a flight ban on UNMEE in October 
2005, Ennifar said, recalling that Eritrea had subsequently 
expelled 170 international staff and increased restrictions 
on those remaining.  There was peace and respect for the 
ceasefire, but a deadlock in demarcation of the border. 
UNSCR 1741, adopted in January 2007, had therefore called for 
downsizing UNMEE, as well as having Eritrea lift restrictions 
imposed on UNMEE and on the SRSG.  Ennifar highlighted that 
OP 9 of UNSCR 1741 called for efforts to normalize relations 
between Ethiopia and Eritrea, "without prejudice" to border 
demarcation.  However, for Eritrea, demarcation appeared to 
be a precondition for normalization talks, he said. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
MILITARY SITUATION: "TENSE AND VOLATILE" 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) Ennifar assessed that neither party voluntarily 
sought war, and noted that recent public statements by 
Eritrea's President Isaias now emphasized "legality" rather 
than threats to take unilateral action.  However, citing the 
presence of 1,700 Eritrean troops and 16 tanks in Sector West 
of the formerly demilitarized Temporary Security Zone (TSZ), 
Ennifar said their proximity (coupled with recent alleged 
cross-border incidents) indicated possible future 
instability.  Opposing forces previously 25km apart now faced 
each other:  Eritrean tanks at Om Hajer were now only 200m 
from the Ethiopian town of Humera; and, since October, 
Eritrean forces had controlled the sole bridge linking the 
two towns, denying passage to an UNMEE contingent split 
between them.  The most recent UN SYG report (S/2007/33 of 
January 22) thus characterized the situation as "tense and 
volatile," he said. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
ETHIOPIAN TANKS ACROSS FROM PORT OF ASSAB 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) Whereas UNMEE previously had relied on eight 
helicopters, Eritrea's continued flight ban on UNMEE hampered 
UNMEE's ability to monitor the TSZ, especially Sector East, 
Ennifar said, where areas 150-200km beyond Bure remained 
inaccessible.  In recent days, UNMEE had observed 12 
Ethiopian tanks "in camouflaged positions" in Bure, but could 
not determine when they had been moved there. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
ERITREAN TROOPS IN "DEFENSIVE POSITIONS" 
---------------------------------------- 
 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00000418  002 OF 004 
 
 
¶5. (SBU) While expressing concern about the increasing number 
of Eritrean troops in Sectors West and Center of the TSZ, 
Ennifar said UNMEE assessed they were in "defensive 
positions."  Aged 20-22 years old, the Eritrean forces were 
assessed to be army troops, not older militia, but often 
carried multiple identification indicating they were police, 
militia, and Eritrean Defense Forces.  When challenged by 
UNMEE MILOBs to present identification, the suspected troops 
often demanded to see UNMEE peacekeepers' identification, to 
determine whether they belonged to western nationalities that 
Eritrea had expelled, Ennifar said. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Movements of Eritrean troops were difficult to 
monitor, due to Eritrean restrictions on UNMEE's freedom of 
movement, Ennifar said.  Citing Eritrean harassment of UNMEE 
peacekeepers, including an incident in which peacekeepers 
were temporarily held at gunpoint and their vehicle 
impounded, he noted that UNMEE's Chapter VI mandate rendered 
resistance futile. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
ETHIOPIA DOWNPLAYING TENSIONS WITH ERITREA 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶7. (SBU) UNMEE had been unable to verify recent alleged 
cross-border incidents, Ennifar explained, due to 
contradictory statements by Ethiopian and Eritrean 
authorities.  For example, Ethiopian officials had denied 
that Eritrean forces had crossed the TSZ and fired at them, 
despite reports to the contrary.  Ennifar postulated that 
whereas Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles had publicly cited the 
threat of 10,000 Eritrean troops in the TSZ during a November 
2006 address to parliament, Ethiopia intentionally sought to 
downplay tensions with Eritrea (and suppress reports of 
cross-border incidents) so as not to raise public concern 
when Ethiopian troops were preoccupied with Somalia, in 
December 2006. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
ETHIOPIA-ERITREA MEETINGS SUSPENDED SINCE JULY 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶8. (SBU) Meetings between Ethiopian and Eritrean military 
commanders, chaired by UNMEE under the auspices of the 
Military Coordination Committee (MCC), had been suspended 
since July 29, 2006, when both parties last met in Nairobi, 
Ennifar said.  As Eritrea had cited the expense of meeting in 
Nairobi, Ethiopia had proposed alternating between Addis 
Ababa and Asmara.  Rejecting meetings in capitals, Eritrea 
counter-proposed meeting at the border, but Ethiopia had 
objected.  UNMEE proposals to meet in Sanaa, Djibouti, 
Khartoum, or Dubai had also been rejected.  Ethiopia had then 
protested that the October 16, 2006, introduction of Eritrea 
troops and tanks into the TSZ had violated the sanctity of 
the TSZ, and that MCC meetings were not possible so long as 
Eritrean tanks remained in the TSZ.  Eritrea had also decided 
to suspend participation in the MCC, Ennifar said. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Questioned about UNMEE's interaction with Eritrean 
officials, Ennifar said the Force Commander and Asmara-based 
Deputy SRSG met regularly with Eritrea's Commissioner to 
discuss operational details, but that raising political 
developments was limited to Amb. Girma, of the Eritrean MFA's 
North America and International Organizations department. 
Ennifar noted that, ironically, Girma had been a former 
roommate of Ethiopia State Minister of Foreign Affairs Tekeda 
Alemu, and had been one of Ethiopia's foremost soccer 
players, prior to Eritrea's independence. 
 
--------------------------- 
GSE FAILS TO RECOGNIZE SRSG 
--------------------------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) Discussing Eritrea's refusal to recognize him as 
SRSG since November 2006, Ennifar explained that he had been 
proposed as SRSG in May 2006, two weeks after Ethiopia had 
rejected the previous candidate to replace outgoing SRSG 
Legwaila.  Following Eritrea's subsequent refusal to approve 
Ennifar as SRSG, he was appointed interim "acting" SRSG. 
However, Eritrea had informed Ennifar in November 2006 that 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00000418  003 OF 004 
 
 
he would no longer be recognized as a member of UNMEE, and 
protested Ennifar's attendance of meetings at The Hague. 
Eritrea had subsequently protested UNSCR 1741's call to lift 
restrictions on the SRSG, via a February 1, 2007, letter to 
the UN SYG and the UNSC President.  Ennifar noted that 
Eritrea had stated that it found the January 2007 UN SYG's 
report "unbalanced"--despite the report's explicit reference 
to Ethiopia's failure to observe the final and binding 
decision of the Ethiopia-Eritrea Boundary Commission (EEBC). 
 
 
¶11. (SBU) Ennifar noted that with the exception of visits to 
Libya and Cairo, Isaias had little interaction with the 
international community; until his farewell call, previous 
SRSG Ambassador Legwaila had not seen Isaias for three years. 
 Italian PM Prodi had characterized President Isaias's trip 
two months earlier to Italy as "difficult," Ennifar said.  He 
said he had not received a readout of EC Development 
Commissioner Louis Michel's recent meeting with Isaias in 
Asmara. 
 
¶12. (SBU) Visiting Norwegian Deputy Foreign Minister Jonas 
Store stressed the importance on engaging both parties, 
particularly as MCC meetings had been suspended, and the 
United States had "stopped its initiative."  He advocated 
stronger engagement by UN Headquarters, and the need for 
prompt action prior to July. 
 
------------------------------------- 
UNMEE'S FUTURE: END IN NOVEMBER 2007? 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶13. (SBU) Questioned by the French Ambassador about the 
EEBC's recent decision to declare the boundary demarcated by 
coordinates, if not by physically pillar, Ennifar responded 
that the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) 
regarded the EEBC as an independent body.  Since April 2002, 
the EEBC had stated it could not wait forever for physical 
demarcation.  However, a decision to demarcate could only be 
taken by the two parties.  Ethiopian Foreign Minister Seyoum 
had protested the EEBC's announcement of demarcation by 
coordinates; Eritrea had also rejected it.  Whether UNMEE had 
any reason to remain in place after the EEBC's November 2007 
deadline would be a political decision of the UNSC, Ennifar 
said. 
 
¶14. (SBU) Asked by Algerian poloff about the parties' 
reactions to the most recent UN SYG report, Ennifar responded 
that Ethiopia likely wanted UNMEE to remain, noting that 
prior to the latest UNSCR, Ethiopian PM Meles had called for 
the UNSC to convince Eritrea to withdraw troops from the TSZ. 
 Eritrea had consistently asserted it was indifferent to 
UNMEE's size and composition, Ennifar said. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
DOWNSIZING TO AFFECT HUMANITARIAN ACTIVITIES 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶15. (SBU) Reviewing UNMEE's mandate, Ennifar noted that the 
UNSC had cut UNMEE's force strength by nearly one-half: from 
a high of 4,000, UNMEE had been reduced from 3,200 to 2,300 
in May 2006; and most recently to 1,700 in January 2007, 
through the adoption of UNSCR 1741.  Troop contingents, not 
the 230 military observers (MILOBs), would be downsized. 
February 7 consultations with the UNMEE Force Commander had 
resulted in the decision to cut 200 troops each from the 
Indian and Jordanian contingents (currently at 850 and 750 
troops, respectively) by mid-March, when rotations postponed 
from January would occur.  The Force Commander was committed 
to maintaining existing military group and team sites, 
Ennifar added. 
 
¶16. (SBU) Downsizing would affect some humanitarian 
activities conducted by UNMEE, Ennifar said, including road 
construction by Indian and Bangladeshi engineers, and "quick 
impact" medical and veterinary projects.  Eritrean 
restrictions (such as suspending the Indians' distribution of 
medicine) had already made such projects difficult to 
implement and monitor, he added.  UNMEE had no independent 
budget for continuing humanitarian activities conducted by 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00000418  004 OF 004 
 
 
individual contingents, he added. 
 
¶17. (SBU) Demining, currently conducted by MACC contractors 
in limited areas, would not be affected by downsizing, 
Ennifar said.  He noted that new landmines had been placed in 
Sector Center of the TSZ and near Badme; civilian vehicles 
had struck several mines recently. 
 
¶18. (SBU) COMMENT:  SRSG Ennifar's observations on Eritrea, 
made in a separate meeting with U.S. officials, will be 
reported septel.  END COMMENT. 
YAMAMOTO