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FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4396
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNSOM/SOMALIA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
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RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ADDIS ABABA 000311 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF AND AF/E 
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER 
CJTF-HOA FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2017 
TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV MOPS KPKO ET SO YE
SUBJECT: SOMALIA: PM MELES HIGHLIGHTS LAND REFORM AS KEY TO 
CLAN RECONCILIATION AND POLITICAL STABILITY IN SOMALIA 
 
REF: ADDIS ABABA 40 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR DONALD YAMAMOTO.  REASONS: 1.4 (B), (D). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY.  In a 90-minute meeting on January 27 with 
A/S Frazer, Prime Minister Meles highlighted that Somalia's 
primary clans generally supported the Transitional Federal 
Government (TFG).  Only the Hawiye/Habr-Gedir/Ayr sub-clan, 
the primary political base of the deposed Council of Islamic 
Courts (CIC), posed a potential challenge to political 
reconciliation.  While the TFG was engaging the other clans, 
land ownership was the main stumbling block to 
reconciliation.  The Ayr, the most critical clan to 
reconciliation in Mogadishu, had confiscated land during the 
Siad Barre regime, and feared initiatives to strip them of 
this property, Meles said.  Ethiopia considered such 
restitution "counter-productive," and advocated compensation 
of former owners instead, despite opposition from President 
Yusuf who believed it would signal tacit approval of Hawiye 
confiscation of other clan's land-holdings.  Due to their 
clan affiliations, political engagement of either impeached 
Parliamentary Speaker Sharif Hassan Sheikh Adan (a 
Rahanweyne) or CIC Executive Council Chairman Sheikh Sharif 
Sheikh Ahmed (an Abgaal) would not have addressed the key 
challenge of accommodating the Ayr.  Meles hailed Yemen as 
the "only Arab country we can broadly trust," and identified 
Rwanda, Uganda, and Nigeria as the most critical potential 
troop contributors for an international peacekeeping mission 
in Somalia.  While hailing the effectiveness of 
U.S.-Ethiopian counter-terrorism cooperation, Meles said 
political fallout from publicity surrounding leaked U.S. 
military strikes required that certain operations be "wound 
down."  Calling for strengthening of intelligence operations 
in Somalia, Meles said deployment of HUMINT assets would help 
the long-term tracking of terrorist cells and high-value 
targets.  (PM Meles's comments on Sudan will be reported 
septel.)  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (U) AF A/S Jendayi Frazer met January 27 with Prime 
Minister Meles Zenawi, who was accompanied by Personal 
Assistant to the PM, Gebretensai Gebremichael, and MFA acting 
Director General for Europe and America Almaz Ameha. 
Ambassador and deputy pol-econ counselor (note-taker) 
accompanied A/S Frazer. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
EXCEPT FOR AYR SUB-CLAN, GENERAL SUPPORT FOR TFG 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶3. (C) Underscoring the central role of clans to politics and 
economics of Somalia, PM Meles assessed that of the three 
major clans who dominated Somalia (as opposed to Somaliland), 
only the Hawiye/Habr-Gedir/Ayr sub-clan posed a problem: 
 
-- The Darod (of President Abdullahi Yusuf) generally 
supported Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (TFG). 
 
-- The Rahanweyn (or Digle-Mirifle) were pastoralists who, 
not being militarily disposed, were often subjugated by other 
clans, and whose farmlands had been confiscated.  The 
Rahanweyn were thus a "swing factor" in Somali politics, 
allying themselves with either the Darod or Hawiye, but were 
not a politically significant force by themselves.  No 
terrorists were believed to have infiltrated Rahanweyn 
territory around Baidoa, Meles added. 
 
-- The Hawiye: the Hawiye's largest sub-clan, the Abgaal, 
were "more or less firmly behind the TFG."  The Abgaal had 
been "instrumental" in effecting the collapse of the CIC in 
Mogadishu: by not only coordinating with the Ethiopian 
military (ENDF) and the TFG to clear CIC forces from northern 
Mogadishu three days prior to the Ethiopian army's advance, 
but also giving a political ultimatum to CIC leaders and 
establishing the council of 15 Mogadishu community leaders. 
TFG Prime Minister Ghedi was Abgaal, but was not influential, 
Meles said.  Former warlord Mohamed Dheere's fighting against 
the CIC also showed evidence of Abgaal support for the TFG, 
he added. 
 
¶4. (C) The Hawiye/Habr-Gedir sub-clan, not Abgaal and other 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00000311  002 OF 004 
 
 
Hawiye sub-clans such as the Hawadle or Murusade, posed the 
main problem, Meles said.  Originally from central Somalia, 
the Habr-Gedir were not indigenous to Mogadishu, but had 
occupied property belonging to Darod and Abgaal, as well as 
prime land near the Shebelle River.  Citing the role of TFG 
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior Hussein 
Mohammed Aideed, Meles said the Hawiye/Habr-Gedir/ Saad 
sub-clan generally supported the TFG, but that the 
Hawiye/Habr-Gedir/Ayr sub-clan served as the social base of 
the CIC.  Political reconciliation ultimately was a question 
of how to accommodate the Ayr sub-clan, Meles concluded. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
OPPOSING PROPERTY RESTITUTION IS AYR'S MAIN CONCERN 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶5. (C) According to Meles, Ayr leaders in Mogadishu had told 
Ethiopian Foreign Minister Seyoum "in no uncertain terms" 
that addressing the issue of property claims was critical to 
stability in Mogadishu and throughout Somalia.  Seyoum had 
found the Ayr's principal concern to be fear of losing 
property (in southern Mogadishu and the Juba and Shebelle 
valleys) that the Ayr had occupied from others, principally 
businessmen from Somaliland, during the end of the Siad Barre 
regime.  The Ayr were concerned about a provision in the 
Transitional Federal Charter calling for a commission to 
examine claims of land appropriation.  Meles noted that CIC 
security chief Yusuf Siad Inda'ade had principally been a 
farmer/landowner controlling banana plantations with 
commercial ties to Italy, rather than an ideologically 
motivated Islamicist.  Meles cited Osman Atto's (Habr-Gedir) 
occupation of former Aideed rival Ali Mahdi's (Abgaal) former 
house in southern Mogadishu as a prime example of the 
confiscated property that Ayr were afraid to lose. 
 
¶6. (C)  While Abgaal felt "robbed" by Habr-Gedir, especially 
by the Ayr sub-clan, Ethiopia believed restitution, although 
just, would be counter-productive, Meles said.  Instead, the 
GOE supported tenants retaining control of their property, 
and providing compensation to former owners, particularly in 
urban areas.  In rural areas, many occupants had since fled 
Somalia, so farmland could be restored to original owners. 
Meles appealed for international financial assistance to 
provide such compensation and allow Ayr to retain their 
property.  Meles acknowledged, however, opposition from TFG 
President Yusuf, who believed compensation indicated tacit 
approval of Hawiye confiscation of land.  Accommodating the 
Habr-Gedir would help weaken support for CIC Islamicists and 
marginalize extremists, Meles countered, who said he would 
discuss the issue with Yusuf on the margins of the African 
Union Summit.  A/S Frazer responded that a formula for 
compensation, differentiating between urban and rural areas, 
appeared fair, and suggested Meles exercise his leverage over 
Yusuf. 
 
¶7. (C) Another Ayr concern was poor political representation 
within the TFG, Meles said.  While President Yusuf agreed 
that individual Ayr reps now in the TFG may not be 
"adequate," Yusuf did not accept the Ayr's argument that they 
constituted the largest sub-group within the 
Hawiye/Habr-Gedir, and believed representation was an issue 
the Habr-Gedir had to address internally.  Ethiopia had 
invited Ayr leaders to consultations in Addis Ababa after the 
AU Summit, Meles added. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
NEED TO ACCOMMODATE AYR, NOT TFG SPEAKER OR CIC CHAIR 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶8. (C) Ethiopia had unsuccessfully pushed TFG President 
Abdullahi Yusuf to delay the impeachment of Parliamentary 
Speaker Sharif Hassan Sheikh Adan, Meles said, adding that 
even Ethiopia sometimes found Yusuf "difficult" to deal with. 
 Meles noted, however that as the Speaker was Rahanweyn but 
did not represent majority Rahanweyn interests, he had little 
political influence; his inclusion would not have 
significantly promoted reconciliation within Somalia. 
Similarly, Meles argued, engaging CIC Executive Council 
Chairman Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, an Abgaal, would have 
been fruitless, as Abgaal already supported the TFG, and he 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00000311  003 OF 004 
 
 
would not have brought any other clans on board. 
 
¶9. (C) A/S Frazer responded that as some CIC leaders appeared 
to be "devoted to chaos," it was preferable to co-opt a weak 
Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, to prevent hard-liners from 
rallying around him.  Ambassador Ranneberger had met him in 
Nairobi to urge him to renounce violence and participate in 
reconciliation.  A/S Frazer expressed concern about 
reconstitution of the CIC, were Sheikh Sharif to leave Kenya 
for asylum in Yemen, and join CIC foreign secretary Ibrahim 
Addow.  Political dialogue among multiple parties, within 
Somalia, not in Yemen or Sudan, was key.  Ex-CIC leaders 
could participate as individuals, but not as any 
reconstituted form of the CIC, she said. 
 
¶10. (C) Meles noted that EU Development Commissioner Louis 
Michel continued to consider inclusion of Sheikh Sharif 
crucial.  However, while Sheikh Sharif (a 
Hawiye/Habr-Gedir/Abgaal) was perceived as more important 
than Addow, as an Ayr, Addow was more influential.  Meles 
observed that political dialogue required participation by 
power-brokers such as the Ayr and traditional business 
leaders, not by "a front" just as the CIC.  Meles noted that 
whereas the international community considered Sheikh Sharif 
a CIC leader, Somalis considered him an ex-associate of 
Mohammed Dheere, who had fought against the CIC.  Asserting 
Ayr responsibility for the January 19 mortar attack on the 
TFG presidential villa, Meles said accommodating the Ayr 
would result in a "dramatic reduction" of instability within 
Somalia.  Instability would not be eliminated, but would 
remain at a tolerable level. 
 
¶11. (C) Meles affirmed the strength of bilateral ties between 
Ethiopia and Yemen, noting that their security chiefs had met 
recently in Sanaa:  "The only Arab country we can broadly 
trust is Yemen."  In contrast, while Kenyan leaders showed 
political will to cooperate with Ethiopia, their "capacity to 
deliver is unreliable."  Meles stated that he was more 
comfortable with Sheikh Sharif going to Yemen than remaining 
in Kenya, where he might be released without warning or 
surveillance. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
SOMALIA NEEDS SECURITY ASSISTANCE, ROADS, AND CAPACITY 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶12. (C) Deployment of AU peacekeepers had value and was 
needed "to give space and time to the TFG to sort out its 
political and security problems," Meles said.  Ethiopia was 
helping the TFG train its police and reorganize its military. 
 The police had sufficient small arms: "Weaponry is not the 
main problem; it's organization and skills."  Even after the 
ENDF's withdrawal, Ethiopia would embed troops in Somali 
brigades now being organized, in order to build their 
capacity, Meles said. 
 
¶13. (U) Meles also appealed for emergency assistance to 
repair roads in Somalia, to reduce time needed to travel the 
350km distance to the Ethiopian border from several days to 
4-6 hours, and thus spur commerce and economic stability. 
Ethiopia was providing technical experts to Somalia but 
lacked the necessary machinery. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
RWANDA, UGANDA, NIGERIA: KEY TROOP CONTRIBUTORS FOR AMISOM 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
¶14. (C) Citing USD 19 million in support for international 
peacekeeping in Somalia (AMISOM), A/S Frazer noted Malawi had 
agreed to contribute troops, and Rwanda would provide 
training.  USG planners were working with Uganda to help it 
deploy immediately after the anticipated January 30 
parliamentary approval.  The USG had discussed possible 
transition to a UN peacekeeping operation with Germany, as EU 
president, but recognized reluctance by an overstretched UN 
DPKO.  If political progress were sufficient, a UN mission 
could focus on reconstruction and development, rather than 
peace-making.  With the UK, Norway, and Sweden, the USG was 
also pushing the EU to release African Peace Facility funds 
earmarked for peacekeeping in Somalia, despite opposition 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00000311  004 OF 004 
 
 
from Italy. 
 
¶15. (C) A minimum of two to four thousand troops would be 
needed, Meles said, citing Rwanda, Uganda, and Nigeria as 
key troop contributors.  Meles expressed great confidence in 
the Rwandan military, and said he would discuss the GOE's 
request for Rwanda to deploy with President Kagame, although 
President Yusuf had recently traveled to Kigali.  Having a 
Ugandan battalion was "critical."  As for Nigeria, Meles said 
President Obasanjo supported deployment, but his military 
staff did not.  Asked whether Ethiopia could assist the AU 
Commission with mission planning, Meles said planning by 
individual TCCs was preferable to planning by the AU, whose 
role could be coordination.  Uganda's military chief of staff 
was coordinating with the ENDF, he said. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
MEDIA LEAKS REQUIRE CURTAILING USG MILITARY STRIKES 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶16. (S) Despite the effectiveness of U.S.-Ethiopian 
counter-terrorism cooperation, political fallout from 
publicity surrounding leaked U.S. military strikes required 
that certain operations be "wound down," Meles said.  The 
diplomatic costs of leaks to the media required that Ethiopia 
"forgo" the benefits of such cooperation.  Deployment of 
HUMINT assets on the ground would compensate for the 
resulting lack of precision, and would also help the 
long-term tracking of terrorist cells, he said.  Engagement 
of high-value targets may require waiting until "clutter" had 
been removed.   Intelligence operations in Somalia needed to 
be strengthened:  Sudan had sought greater intelligence 
cooperation with Somalia, but had been told to focus on 
provision of equipment, Meles added.  A/S Frazer concluded by 
noting that the USG was reviewing the PM's January 4 request 
for food aid (reftel), and had made it a priority. 
 
¶17. (U) PM Meles's observations on Darfur, the prospects for 
southern Sudan, and President Bashir's candidacy for AU 
Assembly Chair will be reported septel. 
 
¶18. (C) COMMENT: Prime Minister Meles's extensive remarks on 
clan dynamics and land reform issues highlight the 
significance Ethiopia accords to ensuring that the TFG 
accommodate Ayr interests, which it views as necessary to 
undermine the political base of the Council of Islamic 
Courts.  Addressing land issues comprehensively now will 
ensure a stable and united Somalia, thus denying a foothold 
by extremist elements.  Foreign Minister Seyoum's 
consultations  with Ayr sub-clan representatives in 
Mogadishu, and the subsequent invitation of Ayr leaders to 
come to Addis Ababa for further consultations, indicate the 
GOE's high level of political engagement to ensure that its 
military operation in support of the TFG, launched just one 
month ago, succeeds in bringing long-term political stability 
to Somalia.  END COMMENT. 
 
¶19. (U) A/S Frazer cleared this cable. 
YAMAMOTO