VZCZCXRO5244
RR RUEHDE
DE RUEHAD #0158/01 0321342
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 011342Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8159
INFO RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 6798

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ABU DHABI 000158 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR U/S FORE FROM THE AMBASSADOR AND CONSUL GENERAL 
DEPT FOR NEA/SCA/EX (ALFORD, KACZMAREK), M/SA (OFFUT) 
DEPT FOR DS/IP/NEA (LAAS), NEA/ARP 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV ETTC IR MASS AE
SUBJECT: SCENE-SETTER FOR THE VISIT OF U/S FORE TO THE UAE 
 
¶1. (SBU) U/S Fore, Mission UAE warmly welcomes you and looks 
forward to your February 13-14 visit to Dubai.  Your meeting 
with Vice President, Prime Minister and Dubai Ruler Mohammed 
bin Rashid Al-Maktoum (MbR) will allow us to make progress on 
our new consulate compound (NCC) project and request more 
robust security assistance for our current ConGen, as well as 
to discuss other bilateral issues. With increasing staff and 
security vulnerability, moving up the start date on 
construction of the NCC is post,s top security and 
management priority.  Your meeting with the Dubai Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry, and subsequent press interviews, are 
excellent outreach opportunities to review, among other 
issues, the US Open Door/Secure Borders policy and our desire 
to increase business and people-to-people linkages between 
the US and the region. At the Dubai School of 
Government(DSG)-) a relatively new institution unique in the 
region -) you will have an opportunity for professional 
outreach to peers eager for creative pubic policy thinking, 
and to provide DSG administrators and program managers 
insight into US public policy innovations like the Diplomatic 
Readiness Initiative.  We know the government, and MbR, are 
keen to enhance the professionalism and efficiency of the 
UAE's public sector.  The Mission's ELO and LES staff, who 
you will be meeting live and by DVC, are also excited by the 
opportunity to exchange thoughts and concerns. 
 
Background of Bilateral Ties 
----------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) The UAE is a close ally and an important partner 
intent on cooperating with us to create a stable economic, 
political, and security environment in the Middle East, in 
particular throughout the Gulf region.  One of the world's 
wealthiest countries on a per capita basis, the UAE has 
adopted progressive economic policies that have strengthened 
its position as a regional hub for trade, transportation, 
investment and tourism, thus contributing to regional 
economic stability.  Dubai, with far less oil wealth than its 
sister and to some extent rival emirate Abu Dhabi, has led 
this innovative approach and has become a model for private 
sector-led development that is being copied in other Gulf 
states.  However, a highly traditional governmental structure 
underlies the economic and development innovation throughout 
the country, with political and economic power concentrated 
in the hands of royal families in each of the seven emirates. 
 We are engaging the UAE on ways to create a more effective 
civil society network that could lead to a more open 
political system. 
 
Centralized Power Structure 
---------------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) The composition of federal and emirate-level 
governing bodies is generally derived from only a few Emirati 
families; the two most important are the ruling families of 
Abu Dhabi (Al-Nahyan) and Dubai (Al-Maktoum).  Mohammed bin 
Rashid Al-Maktoum (MbR) is the Vice President, Prime 
Minister, Minister of Defense and Ruler of Dubai.  MbR, in 
his capacity as Ruler of Dubai, maintains personal control 
(working through a select group of trusted deputies) over the 
bulk of Dubai's booming economic sector.  These deputies act 
much like CEOs for Dubai's large parastatal enterprises, 
competing with each other as much as with outside competition. 
 
ConGen Security and New Building Status 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) ConGen Dubai is the largest post in the NEA region 
located in commercial space; Dubai's staff will reach 129 
this Summer.  Despite wide-ranging, ongoing efforts by the 
Mission (including placement of jersey barriers and the 
provision of extra police coverage) and good cooperation from 
the Dubai government, ConGen physical and technical security 
remains wholly inadequate in almost all aspects.  This 
vulnerability will continue to increase along with the post's 
size and growing public profile, the latter largely a result 
of the presence of the Iran Regional Presence Office. The 
Mission's absolute top management and security priority is 
moving the ConGen to a secure, stand-alone structure with 
proper setback as soon as possible.  The government of Dubai 
granted a seven-acre-plus site in the diplomatic quarter for 
the express purpose of constructing a new US Consulate 
General. We are confident that the Government of Dubai, which 
badly wants a new US facility here, will facilitate its 
construction. According to the current OBO long-range 
building plan, the NCC construction is scheduled to start in 
FY-2010 with a completion date of 2013.  This is simply too 
long to leave a staff of 129 or more in vulnerable 
 
ABU DHABI 00000158  002 OF 003 
 
 
facilities.  We propose that the construction start date be 
moved forward to 2007, and the ConGen move as soon as 
possible to an interim facility with a secure perimeter and 
setback.  Dubai will be sending a cable reviewing our 
security situation with more specific proposals. 
 
Consular Affairs 
----------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) In FY 2006, Dubai processed approximately 36,000 NIV 
applications.  It is the major adjudicating post for Iranian 
NIV applications (45 percent of its NIV workload involves 
Iranian applicants) and it provides services to an estimated 
17,000 resident American citizens in Dubai and the Northern 
Emirates.  According to the Dubai Board of Tourism, over 
200,000 US citizens transit and/or visit Dubai annually.  As 
a result of military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
thousands of US military personnel and Department of Defense 
civilians and contractors either transit Dubai to other 
locations or visit for rest and recreation.  Dubai remains 
the number-one overseas liberty port -- hosting 77,000 
service-men and women annually. 
 
Defense Cooperation 
-------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) The UAE's contribution to U.S. defense interests in 
the region has been extensive and enduring.  The ports of 
Jebel Ali and Fujairah are vital to U.S. Navy interdiction 
operations, re-supply and sustainment, and combat support 
efforts across the region*Dubai's large and impressive Jebel 
Ali port is the number one port outside of the US for US 
warship visits (492 in 2006), and has been for the last three 
years; it hosts a sizable permanent USO operation. 
 
Iraq 
----- 
 
¶7. (SBU) The UAE offers political support for Iraq but is 
careful not to get out in front of the GCC and Arab League, 
having hosted a July visit by Iraqi PM Maliki and the 
September 10 Iraq Compact Preparatory Group meeting.  However 
the UAE has no diplomatic staff at its embassy in Baghdad and 
UAE officials avoid travel there (particularly since the 
April 2006 attacks on its mission and kidnapping of the 
Deputy Charge d'Affaires in May).  The UAE is engaged in 
regional efforts to facilitate reconciliation between Sunni 
and Shi'a forces. 
 
Iran 
----- 
 
¶8. (SBU) The UAE's political relations with Iran are strained 
over Iran's 35-year occupation of three disputed islands in 
the Gulf, Iran's nuclear aspirations, and Iran's support for 
Shi'a factions in Iraq. The UAE has been careful to adopt a 
non-confrontational stance to avoid jeopardizing its 
substantial trade and business interests with Iran. The UAEG 
has no export control law, in spite of long-standing U.S. 
urging.  Given the targeted nature of UNSCR 1737 on Iran, the 
direct impact on the UAE is likely to be minor. UAE officials 
have expressed concern on several occasions to US officials 
about the US decision to open an Iran-focused office in 
Dubai. Their comments, however, have expressed a desire for 
less publicity and have not included a request to close the 
office. 
 
Lebanon 
------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) The UAE was very active throughout 2006 in providing 
humanitarian and security assistance to Lebanon.  Significant 
donations of supplies transited the UAE "air bridge" 
established for that purpose.  In the post-conflict phase, 
the UAE has been at the forefront of reconstruction efforts, 
continuing a long-standing de-mining effort and contributing 
resources for school construction, hospitals, humanitarian 
meals, etc. 
 
Reform Agenda 
------------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) The UAEG's continued commitment (and ability) to 
use its sizeable wealth to satisfy the needs of its small 
citizenry constitutes the "ruling bargain" and explains the 
absence to date of significant pressure from the indigenous 
-- albeit minority )- UAE national population for change. 
Our democratic reform strategy aims to encourage the ruling 
 
ABU DHABI 00000158  003 OF 003 
 
 
families to introduce fully-representative 
government/elections.  In December 2006, for the first time 
in the country's history, a designated group of six thousand 
"electors" selected one-half of the 40-member Federal 
National Council (FNC), an advisory body with no real 
legislative power.  The electors were directly appointed by 
the rulers of each emirate, and could only vote for one of 
the other electors.  To the surprise of many, only one woman 
was elected to the FNC; several emirate rulers have 
subsequently named other women among their appointees to the 
remaining half of the FNC.  We are advocating progress toward 
an open and independent operating environment for civil 
society, a free and independent media, and greater 
transparency and public participation in legislative and 
regulatory processes.  The UAE has neither public elections 
nor political parties and does not recognize rights of 
association or authorize trade unions. 
SISON