VZCZCXRO0388
RR RUEHCHI
DE RUEHVN #0006/01 0050833
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 050833Z JAN 07 ZDS
FM AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0740
INFO RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 7059
RUEHHI/AMEMBASSY HANOI 2793
RUEHPF/AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH 1869
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 0528
RUEHUM/AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR 0078
RUEHCHI/AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI 0496
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 VIENTIANE 000006 
 
SIPDIS 
 
C O R R E C T E D  C O P Y - CHANGED QUOTATION MARKS AND DASHES IN 
PARA 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 12, 13, 14, AND 15 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/MLS, EAP/K, DRL/SENK, PRM, DRL, IO 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/04/2017 
TAGS: LA PHUM PREF PREL SMIG TH
SUBJECT: MANAGING POSSIBLE DPRK REFUGEES IN VIENTIANE 
 
REF: 06 STATE 203879 
 
VIENTIANE 00000006  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR PATRICIA M. HASLACH FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND ( 
D) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  Following receipt of reftel, which outlines 
steps Embassy Vientiane should take if approached by a North 
Korean asylum seeker, DCM and Pol/Econ Chief met with 
Republic of Korea (ROK) Embassy Counsellor Miyon Lee.  Ms. 
Lee provided updates on recent cases of North Korean asylum 
seekers in Laos as follows: 1) there is no news on three 
girls who are reportedly being detained in Laos, 2) the five 
people who were arrested and facing deportation to China are 
still in Laos, and 3) a total of ten people, including the 
two children reported in the press to have sought refuge in 
the South Korean embassy, are all in Thailand now.  Ms. Lee 
expects that more North Koreans will surface in Laos soon. 
She said that her embassy is able to handle the current 
volume of asylum seekers by dealing discreetly with private 
individuals who are assisting them but will face problems if 
the numbers increase.  The Ambassador plans to follow up with 
a meeting with the ROK ambassador to enhance cooperation 
between the two embassies. 
 
¶2. (C) In a subsequent meeting, the Ambassador briefed 
newly-arrived UN Resrep Rana, the UNDP representative in 
Laos, on the recent North Korean cases as well as on a 
January 2005 incident in which a North Korean who had sought 
asylum at the U.S. Embassy was eventually allowed - 
on a one-time basis - by the Lao and Thai governments to 
depart Laos for Thailand where UNHCR met him and facilitiated 
his travel to Seoul with the ROK Embassy in Bangkok.  Both 
the Ambassador and Ms. Rana agreed the new Thai government 
was less likely to offer such support.  Ms. Rana, who serves 
as the UNHCR representative in Laos, is planning to meet with 
the UNHCR/Bangkok to discuss how the UN would handle a North 
Korean asylum case in Vientiane.  At present she sees working 
discreetly with the ROK Embassy in Vientiane as the best 
option.  End Summary. 
 
ROK Embassy Official Updates on Recent Cases 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) The DCM and P/E Chief met January 3 with ROK Embassy 
Counsellor Miyon Lee to discuss handling DPRK refugees.  Ms. 
Lee complained at the outset about the burden placed on the 
small staff of the ROK Embassy because of DPRK refugees.  She 
expects the flow of DPRK refugees to increase, noting that 
some "activists" had moved to Vientiane from Bangkok after 
having been expelled from Thailand. 
 
¶4. (C) Reviewing recent cases of North Korean asylum seekers 
in Laos, Ms. Lee said that a total of ten DPRK refugees, 
including two who had entered the ROK Embassy last month, had 
now made their way to Bangkok.  There was no new information 
on the three teenagers who have been detained for an extended 
period, reportedly at Vientiane Municipality headquarters. 
The five who have been formally arrested remain "on hold;" 
she added it remains unclear whether the five in this group 
are really North Koreans or Chinese. 
 
ROK Embassy Official Urges Discretion 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Ms. Lee indicated that press reports about the group 
of five who have been arrested (or about any refugee group) 
would be not helpful.  Nor did she believe that a demarche by 
the ROK or another country such as Australia on behalf of the 
imprisoned individuals threatened with deportation to China 
would be helpful.  She said that only low-key approaches had 
the potential for being effective.  She commented that, once 
an issue moves to a formal level such as a demarche, the 
efforts of Lao officials who want to be helpful (such as 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials) are inevitably 
thwarted by hard-liners within the government. 
 
¶6. (C) Although Ms. Lee indicated that a group which is 
formally arrested is almost inevitably returned to China, in 
this case she still saw a small possibility that relatives or 
others might be able to persuade the GOL against sending the 
group members back to China.  If they really wanted to go to 
South Korea, they would just try another way.  On the other 
hand, Ms. Lee told the DCM that the DPRK has asked the GOL to 
follow its own rules and return this group of five to China. 
 
VIENTIANE 00000006  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
If the formal process to return them begins, it will require 
consultations and other legal steps which may take a long 
time.  During this time, the case may become public, she 
opined. 
 
¶7. (C) When asked about the use of publicity by activists to 
support the refugee process, Ms. Lee suggested that over-use 
of the media had caused journalists to lose interest in the 
story.  She also noted that the ROK Embassy in Vientiane had 
persuaded MFA Seoul that publicity about any refugee case 
would not be beneficial (suggesting that MFA had passed that 
message on to South Korea,s media organizations). 
Nonetheless, Ms. Lee noted that ROK journalists had visited 
northern Laos (to see trafficking routes) and Vientiane (to 
look at "hideaways") and had written stories about the 
process in South Korean newspapers (which had apparently 
never come to the attention of the Lao Embassy in Seoul). 
 
Procedural Issues Related to Asylum Seekers 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶8. (C) In response to a question from the DCM, Ms. Lee 
indicated that, if a possible DRPK refugee were to enter the 
U.S. Embassy, someone from the ROK Embassy such as herself 
could be invited to come to the U.S. Embassy to "informally 
chat with the person."  She added that, if a DRPK citizen 
really wants to go to the ROK, the ROK Government would not 
refuse.  As long as refugees are not arrested, there are ways 
to move them eventually to Seoul, she said. 
 
¶9. (C) Ms. Lee said that she does not believe UNDP has a 
useful role to play with regard to asylum seekers (even in 
its role as UN Resrep).  The ROK experience is that any 
negotiations with the GOL regarding DPRK refugees have to be 
done informally, and "the UNDP does not have an informal 
level."  She noted that the ROK embassy had asked UNICEF for 
assistance regarding the three detained girls.  UNICEF tried 
to help, suggesting that the girls be moved to a children,s 
center supported by UNICEF, but its intervention was 
unsuccessful.  The GOL apparently denied having any 
information about the three.  Asked what UNDP could do to 
help, Ms. Lee said that it might be good if UNDP were able to 
issue transit passes on behalf of UNHCR to allow refugees to 
travel to the UNHCR Bangkok office.  (Comment: we doubt the 
Lao Government would actually accept "transit passes" from 
UNHCR for travel.) 
 
¶10. (C) Ms. Lee expressed some frustration with UNHCR 
Bangkok, noting that when the ROK Embassy called for 
assistance with the two children who had entered the ROK 
Embassy last month, UNHCR was not willing to pick up the 
children in the Thai city of Nong Khai, directly across the 
Mekong River from Vientiane.  The ROK Embassy had to find 
another way to get them to Bangkok.  This involved using 
activists or handlers, but Ms. Lee made clear the ROK Embassy 
did not pay the activist or handlers directly for their 
assistance.  She indicated, though, that the families of the 
refugees wound up paying. 
 
Discussion on Asylum Seekers with UN Resrep 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶11. (C) On January 4, the Ambassador and DCM met with UN 
Resrep Sonam Yangchen Rana, who heads the UNDP office here. 
Ms. Rana arrived in Vientiane in November 2006.  The 
Ambassador briefed Ms. Rana on the recent North Korean cases. 
 Ms. Rana said that the UN had tried to track the three 
detained girls through the UN trafficking project and the Lao 
Women,s Union but was not successful. 
 
¶12. (C) The Ambassador also described the January 2005 
incident in which a North Korean citizen named Mr. Anh jumped 
over the wall of the U.S. Embassy in Vientiane and sought 
asylum.  That case, she said, was eventually resolved when a 
World Food Program employee in Vientiane (the UN Resrep was 
not in country at that time) interviewed Mr. Anh on behalf of 
UNHCR and determined he was a legitimate asylum seeker.  ROK 
officials from Seoul also interviewed Mr. Anh to verify that 
he was a legitimate refugee and that he wanted to go to South 
Korea.  In the end, the Lao and Thai governments agreed to 
allow him to depart Laos for Thailand, and UNHCR met him at 
the border with South Korean documents.  However, both the 
Lao and Thai governments said that they would not agree to 
this type of arrangement in future cases.  The Ambassador 
 
VIENTIANE 00000006  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
said that coordinating with the Thais might be particularly 
challenging under the new government, which has taken a 
hard-line stance on refugee issues.  Ms. Rana agreed, saying 
that the Thai government has been "very heavy-handed" with 
UNHCR. 
 
¶13. (C) The Ambassador asked Ms. Rana for confirmation of the 
USG's understanding that, in her capacity as UN Resrep, she 
serves as the UNHCR representative in Laos.  Ms. Rana 
confirmed this and told the Ambassador that she was planning 
to meet with the UNHCR representative in Bangkok in a few 
days.  She would discuss with him how the UN would handle a 
North Korean asylum case in Vientiane.  Ms. Rana said that 
the UN attaches particular importance to the coordinating 
role of the Resrep under the current "one UN" policy. 
However, she added, UNHCR's mandate is quite distinct.  "My 
jobs is to liaise closely" with UNHCR officials and be 
guided by them.  "I don't take decisions on their behalf." 
 
 
¶14. (C) The Ambassador asked Ms. Rana what, in practical 
terms, the UN saw as the modalities for dealing with a North 
Korean asylum seeker in Laos.  Ms. Rana responded that 
"there should be ways to do it discreetly."  She commented 
that the South Korean embassy would not close its doors to a 
North Korean.  "That's the only way I see it (managing a 
North Korean refugee) happening."  Her interest as UN 
Resrep, she told the Ambassador, is to see that the person,s 
rights are not being violated.  "It will be hard to come up 
with a strategy in advance - it will have to be handled on a 
case by case basis."  (Note: During the conversation, the 
Ambassador pointed out to Ms. Rana that the United States has 
legislation -- the North Korea Human Rights Act (NKHRA) -- 
which requires the State Department to facilitate 
applications from North Koreans for entrance to the United 
States as refugees.  Ms. Rana continued, however, to focus 
only on South Korea as a final destination when discussing 
this issue.) 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
¶15. (C) Neither the South Koreans nor the UN Resrep believe 
North Korean refugees in Vientiane can be managed other than 
via the good offices of the ROK Embassy here (and its shadowy 
group of handlers).  The ROK Embassy appears to be willing to 
continue to help with this ongoing refugee flow - as long as 
the numbers do not overwhelm its limited staff.  The only 
major requirement is that the process remain discreet.  Any 
formal intervention by the U.S. Embassy here - or by any of 
the other like-minded Embassies such as Australia - is seen 
as only locking the Lao Government into a corner from which 
its only option is to return the refugee(s) to China as 
required by GOL rules.  The Ambassador plans to follow up 
with UN Resrep Rana, after her Bangkok meeting, and then meet 
with the ROK Ambassador to increase coordination between our 
two embassies on dealing with this issue.  We will continue 
to emphasize, in these conversations, the requirements of the 
NKHRA that the United States be available as a destination 
for North Korean refugees.  Nonetheless, given the ROK's 
informal system for moving refugees to Bangkok, UN officials 
are most likely to look to South Korea first if they are 
asked to help with North Korean refugees here. 
 
HASLACH