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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TOKYO 000374 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/25/2017 
TAGS: PREL PARM KNNP ZK IN KN KS AS CH RS JA
SUBJECT: S/P DIRECTOR KRASNER MEETS DIRECTOR GENERAL FOR 
NORTH AMERICAN AFFAIRS KAWAI 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires W. Michael Meserve for reasons 1.4(b) 
and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: During a January 12 meeting with S/P Director 
Krasner, Director General for North American Affairs Chikao 
Kawai (since elevated to Deputy Vice Minister of Foreign 
Affairs for Foreign Policy) explained that Japan cannot, for 
domestic reasons, provide humanitarian assistance to the DPRK 
and urged patience in dealing with the North through the Six 
Party Talks.  With regard to India, Kawai reiterated Prime 
Minister Abe's desire to establish a quad grouping including 
Japan, India, Australia, and the U.S., but acknowledged that 
what this group would address or do is still in the formative 
stages.  Developments in Central Asia, Russia, and China that 
are of interest to Japan were also touched upon. END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (C) MOFA North American Affairs Director General Chikao 
Kawai (who was elevated to Deputy Vice Minister and Director 
General for Foreign Policy on January 16) hosted a luncheon 
for visiting Policy Planning Director Krasner December 12. 
Dr. Krasner was accompanied by Charge Donovan, NSC Senior 
Director for Strategic Planning William Inboden, S/P Staff 
member James Green, and Embassy Tokyo Political Officer 
(notetaker).  DG Kawai was joined by Yusuke Arai and Takeomi 
Yamamoto, both of the First North American Affairs Division. 
 
--------------- 
SIX PARTY TALKS 
--------------- 
 
¶3. (C) Dr. Krasner told Kawai the U.S.-Japan-ROK trilateral 
talks just completed in Seoul had been useful.  While there, 
he also met bilaterally with Deputy Vice Minister for Foreign 
Policy Kohno to discuss a number of issues, including the way 
forward with the DPRK.  Foreign aid to the DPRK was 
mentioned, the hope being that aid offered by Seoul should be 
more tactically applied to achieve agreed upon strategic 
goals.  Kawai commented that Japan is not in a position at 
present to offer any humanitarian assistance to the DPRK. 
Such a gesture is precluded by domestic political concern 
over the abduction issue.  Kawai confirmed no progress has 
been made on this issue, and commented that the trip to 
Pyongyang by former LDP Vice President Taku Yamasaki was not 
sanctioned by the government and was viewed as unhelpful.  He 
went without consulting anyone, embarrassing the Prime 
Minister and upsetting Director General for Asian Affairs 
Sasae, who was at the moment in Washington, and drawing 
negative remarks to the press from Chief Cabinet Secretary 
Shiozaki. 
 
¶4. (C) The United States is willing to be flexible with the 
DPRK if the North abandons its nuclear program, Dr. Krasner 
explained.  A problem that remains is our lack of 
understanding about what exactly motivates Kim Jong Il, and a 
concern his motivations aren't even all that clear to the 
Chinese.  Kawai replied it is Japan's hope that China will 
exert more pressure on the DPRK, even though this might 
worsen relations between the two countries.  For example, the 
fact that China voted, along with Russia, in favor of a UNSC 
resolution aimed at the DPRK was a significant development. 
However, the possible downside is that Pyongyang will now 
fear that its two security guarantors, Beijing and Moscow, 
have become less reliable, further justifying in their own 
minds the need for nuclear weapons as a deterrent force. 
 
¶5. (C) Kawai said he is not optimistic that the North will 
make any concessions and urged maximum patience in the 
negotiating process.  Even though time is on Kim's side - he 
can continue his program and manufacture nuclear weapons - we 
should not appear too anxious to make major concessions to 
get him to stop.  As for Kim's popular support among his 
military and the public, Kawai said that Japan has no idea. 
He counseled the need for contingency plans both in case the 
North takes military action or if it collapses, unleashing a 
wave of refugees that none of the countries of the region can 
handle.  The Japanese people, Kawai added, will accept the 
need for such plans, as the recent missile and nuclear tests 
 
TOKYO 00000374  002 OF 003 
 
 
have given them a more realistic view of the North Korean 
threat. 
 
¶6. (C) When asked whether Japan would accept a Five Party 
format if the Six Party Talks were to fail, Kawai responded 
that the six party formula is the best for right now.  We all 
need to take this step by step, with the realization that 
China must play a leading role.  If China decides, Russia 
will follow, Kawai stated. 
 
----- 
INDIA 
----- 
 
¶7. (C) Dr. Krasner asked DG Kawai about Japan-India 
relations, and specifically about the proposal by Prime 
Minister Abe to establish a quadrilateral relationship 
between Japan, India, the United States, and Australia. 
Kawai explained that PM Abe has a strong interest in such a 
grouping of powerful Asian/Pacific democracies.  The Japanese 
understanding is that the Secretary supports this concept, 
but is urging that it be developed slowly so as not to give 
concern to China.  Kawai maintained that the quad grouping is 
not meant to isolate China, but rather to bring them more 
into the process.  When asked what the quad's role would be, 
or what issues it would address, Kawai admitted that the 
GOJ's thoughts on this are still in the formative stages. 
Cooperation in "non-threatening" activities such as disaster 
relief or maritime security come immediately to mind.  Kawai 
also acknowledged that before any type of multilateral 
grouping can be set up, it is critical that Japanese-Indian 
relations be further developed.  While Japan and India are 
very different in many ways, they also share many of the same 
values.  Both peoples have a positive image of each other and 
there is a desire to increase economic and, with it, 
political cooperation. 
 
¶8. (C) In addition, said Kawai, India, as a strong and 
thriving multi-ethnic democracy working with Japan, the 
United States, and Australia, can also play a major role in 
Foreign Minister Aso's vision for an "Arc of Prosperity." 
While these four countries share core values, they are still 
very different in many ways, and these differences can be 
used to an advantage when dealing with and helping young and 
struggling democracies.  For example, India may be able to 
relate better to some countries that do not wish to be openly 
tied to the United States.  India can no longer be viewed as 
simply a strong regional player, but rather as a growing 
global power, said Kawai.  He continued that India seems more 
interested in further exploring a four-way grouping than 
Japan had expected, and this is something that should 
continue to be thought about. 
 
------------ 
CENTRAL ASIA 
------------ 
 
¶9. (C) Japan is very interested in furthering bilateral and 
multilateral relations with the countries of Central Asia, 
and was very encouraged by SCA DAS Evan Feigenbaum's recent 
visit to Tokyo, said Kawai.  He recalled former Prime 
Minister Koizumi's visits in August to both Kazakhstan and 
Uzbekistan, which Japan considers the key countries of the 
region.  In Uzbekistan, in particular, Koizumi had urged his 
hosts of the need to develop democratic institutions that 
would acknowledge, observe, and protect human rights.  One 
hindrance to developing further relations with Central Asia 
is increased competition for diminishing ODA resources.  The 
"Arc of Prosperity" concept enunciated by FM Aso foresees 
closer cooperation with the countries of Central Asia, among 
others, but remains more of an "umbrella" concept that seeks 
to coordinate existing assistance programs and add new ones. 
Kawai explained that FM Aso also believes that each Central 
Asian country must develop their own initiatives and that a 
key goal of development assistance must be aimed at 
developing a middle class. 
 
 
TOKYO 00000374  003 OF 003 
 
 
------ 
RUSSIA 
------ 
 
¶10. (C) Kawai touched briefly on Japanese relations with 
Russia, explaining that Japan is not all that upset by recent 
developments involving the Sakhalin 2 energy project.  Tokyo 
realizes that the original agreement was made at a time when 
Russia was weak and accepts the fact Moscow is trying to 
renegotiate to its benefit.  That said, Japan believes it 
would be helpful for consumers of Russian oil to coordinate 
better to make it more difficult for Russia to put pressure 
on other countries that are too overdependent on Moscow for 
their energy needs.  With regard to territorial issues, Japan 
will continue to press its position.  Tokyo believes that 
President Putin is strong enough to withstand domestic 
pressures were he to decide to make concessions on such 
issues. 
 
----- 
CHINA 
----- 
 
¶11. (C) References to China permeated the wider discussion. 
But with regard to its thriving economy, Kawai said he 
believes the Chinese government is becoming concerned about 
too much growth, too fast.  Much of China's economy depends 
on foreign factors such as trade and investment, making the 
country potentially vulnerable to external threats.  And as 
the economy grows, issues such as income disparity and 
corruption might threaten the political order from within. 
In addition, Kawai said, the Chinese are not unaware of what 
happened to the Japanese economy in the 1990's.  So while the 
businessmen in Shanghai are smiling, government officials are 
more wary.  It is therefore perhaps premature to conclude 
that rapid economic growth will lead to more political 
liberalization. 
 
¶12. (C) Kawai concluded that it is inevitable that China and 
Japan will continue to strongly influence each other and that 
their economies will continue to interact, particularly in 
southern Japan where, he noted, Nagasaki is closer to 
Shanghai than it is to Tokyo.  And while Japan will cease its 
ODA program to China in 2008, assistance will continue in 
some sectors, including the environment, in which actions or 
events in China have direct impacts on Japan, for example 
pollution and shifting sands borne aloft. 
 
¶13. (U) This cable was cleared by S/P Director Krasner. 
MESERVE