VZCZCXRO1507
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHRA #0053/01 0181421
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 181421Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY RIGA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3707
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RIGA 000053 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
NOFORN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: (10 YEARS AFTER SIGNING OF LATVIAN/RUSSIAN BORDER TRE 
ATY) 
TAGS: PREL PBTS PGOV RS LG
SUBJECT: GOL DECIDES TO TRY AGAIN ON LATVIA-RUSSIA BORDER 
TREATY 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Catherine Todd Bailey.  Reasons: 1.4 (b & d) 
 
¶1. (C/NF) Summary:  Latvian Prime Minster Kalvitis has 
decided to renew discussion of the Latvia-Russia border 
treaty, with an aim to sign the document in the first half of 
¶2007.  He believes the political calendars in Russia and 
Latvia provide a unique window of opportunity.  In order to 
avoid the problems of May 2005, when a unilateral Latvian 
declaration on the treaty was rejected by Russia and scuttled 
a planned signing, Kalvitis is seeking a simple parliamentary 
authorization to sign the document.  However, legal arguments 
his government made two years ago are providing fodder for 
some political opposition.  Nevertheless, there is greater 
unity among key government figures than in 2005 and it 
appears the PM has the votes in parliament to get the 
authorization to sign.  There is still no guarantee, however, 
that Moscow will go along with this carefully laid out plan. 
The debate over the treaty reveals how fragile the Latvian 
national psyche remains on issues of the Soviet occupation 
and in many ways provides the best argument for signing the 
treaty and beginning to look forward rather than back in 
Latvian-Russian relations.  End summary. 
 
History 
--------- 
 
¶2. (U) Latvia's eastern border with Russia was originally 
delineated in the Latvian-Soviet treaty of peace and 
friendship in 1920.  It was moved slightly westward after 
WWII when the USSR redrew the boundaries of the Latvian SSR. 
Six counties around the town of Abrene, historically 
populated by Russians and amounting to less than two percent 
of Latvia's territory, were moved from Latvia to Russia.  In 
1997, the two countries reached agreement on the text of a 
treaty to demarcate the border, with Abrene remaining in 
Russia, but the agreement was never signed.  Plans to sign 
the treaty when President Vike-Freiberga visited Moscow in 
May 2005 were scrapped when Russia rejected a declaration 
passed by the Latvian parliament that referred back to the 
1920 peace agreement and the Soviet occupation of Latvia and 
asserted the continuity of the Latvian state since 1918. 
Russia felt that the declaration left open the possibility of 
Latvia making a future claim on Abrene and/or seeking 
monetary reparations for the loss of territory and other 
elements of the Soviet occupation.  Latvia noted that it had 
made clear in joining the EU and NATO that it had no 
outstanding territorial claims, but the treaty was left to 
the side.  In the meantime, the two countries concluded 
agreements on establishment of an intergovernmental 
commission and on economic cooperation. 
 
Current plans 
---------------- 
 
¶3. (C) Following his reelection in October, PM Kalvitis began 
working to revive the border treaty.  Building a more stable 
relationship with Russia has been a key goal for Kalvitis now 
that Latvia is securely in the EU and NATO and he sees the 
border treaty as an important step.  Determined to avoid the 
problems of 2005, the PM's office developed a short 
resolution for parliament to pass authorizing the government 
to sign the treaty.  The text refers to the August 1991 
document restoring Latvia's 1922 constitution.  As this 
document was the one used by Boris Yeltsin to recognize 
Latvian independence that same month, the Latvians believe 
Moscow cannot object.  The text also makes reference to the 
internationally recognized continuity of the Latvian state, a 
term Kalvitis believes Putin told him he could accept when 
they met in St. Petersburg in June 2006. 
 
¶4. (C) The draft resolution was endorsed by the foreign 
affairs committee of parliament January 18 by a vote of six 
to one with two abstentions.  FM Pabriks briefed Ambassadors 
of NATO and EU countries that same day and Ambassador Bailey 
attended.  Pabriks explained that the next step is for the 
parliament to consider the draft in its January 25 session 
when, for procedural reasons, it will refer it back to the 
foreign affairs committee for a second endorsement.  There 
will then be a full parliamentary debate on the issue 
February 1, when the PM, FM, and possibly even President 
Vike-Freiberga, will address the parliament.  Final passage 
is planned for February 8 and the Latvians would hope to sign 
the text later that month in Moscow.  (Comment: This is only 
the latest timeline and it is possible that the dates may 
slip, although the sequence of events should remain the same. 
 End comment.) 
 
¶5. (C/NF) The PM's office has been working to keep 
international partners abreast of the process.  We and the 
German Embassy were given advance copies of the text in the 
 
RIGA 00000053  002 OF 003 
 
 
hopes that we would be willing to endorse it publicly.  We 
declined given the internal nature of the issue.  They have 
also showed the draft to the Russian MFA, which did not 
reject it, but took a wait and see attitude, wanting to see 
what would actually emerge from parliament. 
 
Challenges 
------------- 
 
¶6. (U) While the government has a plan, significant political 
objections have been raised.  Many of the same parties of the 
current coalition were in power in 2005 when the unilateral 
declaration was adopted.  At the time, the government, for 
domestic political reasons lined up legal scholars who 
claimed the declaration was necessary to conform to the 
constitution.  Now, however, they are stuck with this legal 
interpretation from 2005.  There are two interrelated and 
legally technical issues raised by opponents of the treaty. 
First, the 1922 constitution defines the territory of Latvia 
as comprising four regions and with borders defined in 
international agreements.  Amending this section of the 
constitution requires a referendum.  The argument is that the 
Latvia-Russian border was set by the 1920 treaty and any 
change in that border requires a referendum.  The government 
counters that the section empowers the government to modify 
borders by international agreement as needed.  The second 
issue is whether accepting the new border both legitimizes 
the occupation and denies the continuity of the Latvian 
state.  In this argument, the 1920 treaty is still in force 
since Latvia has never withdrawn from it or abrogated it. 
Since Russia feels it lapsed when Latvia "willingly" joined 
the USSR, they will not tolerate mention of it.  Therefore, 
critics argue, failure to refer to the 1920 treaty in 
addressing the current agreement amounts to validating the 
Soviet occupation.  Also, the continuity of the state is a 
key element in Latvia's politically sensitive citizenship and 
property restitution laws.  Politically, some ethnic Latvian 
parties opposed to the border treaty are also questioning the 
government's seeming rush to get this done right away. 
Despite these political challenges, key officials such as the 
President, PM, and FM appear better coordinated in their 
strategies and public comments than was the case in 2005. 
 
Why now? 
------------- 
 
¶7. (C/NF) According to Peteris Ustubs, the PM's foreign 
policy advisor, and Aivis Ronis, former Ambassador to 
Washington and NATO, who is supporting the PM's plan, the PM 
is motivated to move forward by several factors.  First, 
Kalvitis feels that he has a unique and small window of 
opportunity in the political calendar get this done.  At 
home, he is politically strong, coming off the October 
elections in which he was the first Latvian PM ever returned 
to office.  On the Russian side, after the middle of this 
year, Duma and then Presidential elections will stymie any 
ability to move forward, possibly until at least 2010, by 
which time Latvia will again be facing elections.  Second, 
the lack of the border treaty provides one more arrow in the 
quiver of Russian critics of Latvia, who keep alive the idea 
that Latvia will use NATO membership as a shield to reclaim 
Abrene by force.  Finally, the PM feels that resolving this 
issue allows him to move forward on what he feels are the 
more pressing bilateral issues, such as reducing barriers to 
Latvian-Russian trade.  For example, the lack of the border 
treaty has been cited as a reason for the slow processing of 
trucks from Latvia into Russia, often causing trucks to idle 
at a checkpoint, often for days at a time.  In public 
comments, the PM has stressed this last point as a key reason 
to move ahead quickly. 
 
Prospects 
----------- 
 
¶8. (C/NF) The question now is whether PM Kalvitis can succeed 
in this effort.  On a television program to discuss the 
issue, about 60% of the roughly 8,000 people who called to 
register their views were opposed to the PM's plan to sign 
the treaty "clean."  And while the country's senior 
leadership is relatively united, he does not have the full 
support of his governing coalition, with nationalist 
Fatherland and Freedom opposed to signing the treaty without 
the 2005 declaration and a sizable minority of the Greens and 
Farmer's party feeling the same.  So, he will have to rely on 
support from the ethnic Russian parties.  Our best guess is 
that he can probably get about 60 votes to support signing. 
However, as soon as the resolution is passed, it is expected 
that opposition center-right party New Era will file a 
challenge with the Constitutional Court, arguing that the 
legislation contradicts the Constitution absent a referendum. 
 
RIGA 00000053  003 OF 003 
 
 
 And there is still no assurance from Moscow that they will 
sign, and our contacts here all agree that Russia will not 
sign if there is a pending challenge in the Constitutional 
Court. 
 
¶9. (C/NF) Comment:  The PM is taking a risk here, no 
question, but Kalvitis has good domestic political instincts, 
so he did not rush into this without thinking it through. 
From our standpoint, what has been most interesting about 
this issue is the high level of insecurity it reveals among 
the Latvian public on its own history.  There is a genuine 
fear among a large segment of the population that signing 
this treaty would serve to legitimize the Soviet occupation 
and annexation, sixty-seven years after it occurred and 
sixteen years after Latvia regained independence.  In many 
ways, that is the best argument for signing this treaty. 
Leaving the issue out there only serves to provide a focal 
point for the past, whereas signing it helps to turn the page 
and allow Latvia to develop a more forward-looking 
relationship with Russia. 
BAILEY