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RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA IMMEDIATE 1329
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ JAN 0362
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RUEHGL/AMCONSUL GUAYAQUIL IMMEDIATE 1750
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RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL

C O N F I D E N T I A L QUITO 000175 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/06/2014 	
TAGS: PREL MARR MASS MOPS SNAR PTER EC CO
SUBJECT: NEW MINDEF EMPHASIZES SOCIAL MISSION 
 
 
Classified By: PolOff Jarahn Hillsman, Reasons 1.4 (b&d) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  In her initial call on Minister of Defense 
Guadalupe Larriva on January 18, the Ambassador expressed USG 
willingness to deepen security cooperation, and highlighted 
successful U.S. led development projects and military 
humanitarian exercises.  Larriva welcomed USG support for 
civil defense preparedness and other related training. 
Larriva explained her vision for increasing the Ecuadorian 
military's social involvement, also lamenting the 
"disproportionate" affects of Plan Colombia on Ecuador.  In a 
January 19 meeting with the Ambassador, former Defense 
Minister Oswaldo Jarrin warned of a Chavez-style conversion 
of the Ecuadorian military, but encouraged USG engagement 
with the new MinDef in areas of mutual benefit.  End Summary. 
 
Background 
---------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) The Ambassador paid a courtesy call on Defense 
Minister Guadalupe Larriva on January 18 in her office.  She 
was accompanied by the MILGP Commander and the Defense 
Attache.  Larriva was joined by Ecuadorian Air Force 
Commander Brigadier General Gabela, representing the Chairman 
of the Joint Staff, and her military staff planner Colonel 
Vasconez.  The introductory meeting was cordial, with both 
the Ambassador and Larriva agreeing to continue mutually 
beneficial cooperation. 
 
Larriva: Military to Increase Social Role 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) Larriva told the Ambassador that the Ecuadorian 
military's new defense agenda will incorporate greater social 
investments in vulnerable communities - particularly in the 
Ecuador-Colombia border area. She lamented the region's 
socioeconomic despair and said that the military, as the only 
significant GOE entity in many communities, should expand its 
role.  Greater development will help foster security, she 
affirmed.  Larriva said that Ecuador is unjustly suffering 
the negative affects of Plan Colombia and asked for greater 
USG support. 
 
¶4.  (C) The Ambassador, noting Larriva's concerns, said that 
USG bilateral assistance programs in Ecuador seek to help 
Ecuador secure and develop the border region.  She explained 
that through USAID the U.S. had invested tens of millions of 
dollars in basic infrastructure projects to improve the lives 
of northern border residents, and would continue such 
investments.  The Ambassador also highlighted successful U.S. 
military medical readiness exercises and civilian-military 
training programs. 
 
Larriva: There is No Coca in Ecuador! 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) Larriva conveyed strong GOE discontent with Colombia 
over the resumption of aerial coca eradication within 10 
kilometers of the Ecuadorian border.  She explained that the 
spraying was harming residents' health and was causing 
significant damage to the region's water, soil, and 
vegetation.  Larriva emphatically denied the production of 
coca in Ecuadorian territory.  The Ambassador expressed USG 
hope that Ecuador and Colombia could reach a practical 
agreement on the fumigations issue, and noted that while coca 
production in Ecuador was negligible, the U.S. had, in fact, 
worked with the GOE on numerous occasions to eradicate coca 
plantations in Ecuador.  "Yes, but they are all gone now," 
Larriva replied. 
 
Larriva: Civil Defense Systems Unprepared 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) Larriva admitted Ecuador's disaster relief 
preparedness was "poor," and said she would move to increase 
prevention and response training.  The MILGP Commander noted 
U.S. military assistance programs, both in the areas of 
response and preparedness/mitigation, and offered to continue 
work with the GOE.  Larriva was very receptive to the idea, 
agreeing to discuss it further at a later date. 
 
Jarrin: The Venezuelans are Coming! 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) The Ambassador met with former MinDef Oswaldo Jarrin 
at her residence on January 19 to learn his views on Larriva, 
new military appointments, and avenues for continued security 
cooperation.  Jarrin remains close to current military 
leaders, providing well-informed insight on the institution. 
 
¶8.  (C) Jarrin warned the Ambassador of what he called a 
"Venezuelan-style takeover" of the military by President 
Correa.  Jarrin said that the Ecuadorian military would 
likely soon be inundated by Venezuelan and Cuban officers, 
likely at the brigade level.  He noted that Larriva's choice 
for chief of defense, General Hector Hugo Camacho Pauta, has 
a well-known record of disregard for ethics, which Correa 
could easily manipulate to control Camacho's actions.  Jarrin 
advised the Ambassador to listen closely to the Correa 
administration's rhetoric, adding that when Larriva speaks of 
a greater "social role" for the military she is 
inappropriately advocating military support for Correa's 
domestic political agenda, including the proposed national 
constituent assembly. 
 
¶9.  (C) Jarrin expressed dismay over what he characterized as 
the "lies" by the new government about the non-existence of 
coca production in Ecuador.  He highlighted improvement in 
cross-border communication under his leadership, noting the 
reduction in Colombian military incursion flare-ups in late 
¶2006.  The relationship with Colombia is broader and more 
important than just aerial fumigations, he said, differing 
with the Correa government's current fixation on the issue of 
spraying.  Far worse health and environmental damage is 
caused by the chemical byproducts of coca processing in the 
region, he affirmed. 
 
¶10.  (C) Jarrin also shared the reason why he resigned from 
the Palacio government, a matter of much speculation here. 
After a series of disagreements with President Palacio, 
Jarrin finally resigned over a dispute with Palacio over how 
to handle the Puerto Nuevo mortar incident in August 2006, in 
which an errant GOC grenade injured three civilians in the 
Ecuadorian border community.  Jarrin said he was ordered by 
President Palacio to downplay the incident, to prevent 
strained relations with Colombia (and thereby maximize 
Palacio's chances of winning the Director Generalship of the 
World Health Organization that he was seeking at that time, 
Jarrin suspects).  Jarrin refused to do so, publicly alleging 
that the grenade fragments were of Colombian military origin, 
and then resigned. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶11.  (C) Larriva is new to the military establishment and 
clearly still learning about her portfolio.  She clearly 
hopes to make a mark as the first civilian defense minister 
by increasing military social outreach and promoting civil 
defense preparedness, but appears unaware of current efforts, 
some supported by the USG.  Perhaps also as a result of her 
inexperience, Larriva ironically appears less sensitive than 
past ministers to restrictions on political involvement by 
the military.  The possible selection of a civilian vice 
minister (rumored to be her colleague in the Socialist party 
and former member of Congress Rafael Quintero), will not add 
any military institutional memory to Larriva's inner circle. 
Jarrin is a hard-line conservative and prone to alarmist 
analysis, but his fears of a Chavez-style takeover of the 
Ecuadorian military and increased Venezuelan and Cuban 
advisors here are concerns we take seriously and will 
continue to monitor closely. 
JEWELL 

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