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OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV
DE RUEHFR #0363/01 0311248
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 311248Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4550
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI PRIORITY 0407
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 0740
RUEHCH/AMEMBASSY CHISINAU PRIORITY 0360
RUEHPS/USOFFICE PRISTINA PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 PARIS 000363 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2016 
TAGS: PREL KDEM EUN NATO UNO UNMIK FR KCFE RS SR
YI, AF, GG, IR, MD 
SUBJECT: A/S FRIED-POLDIR ARAUD ON IRAN, KOSOVO, GEORGIA, 
MOLDOVA/CFE, NATO MINISTERIAL 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Craig Stapleton for reasons 1.4 (B & D). 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY: French Political Director Araud informed EUR 
A/S Fried during a January 25 meeting that Russian Security 
Council Chairman Ivanov had revealed to him the previous day 
while in Paris that he would travel to Tehran February 28 at 
the behest of President Putin.  Araud said the Russians had 
promised repeatedly they would not be making any new 
proposals, and suggested they rather intended to caution the 
Iranians against overplaying their hand.  Urged not to 
emulate the Russian example, Araud said there were no plans 
for a French mission over the short term, although he 
acknowledged that some other EU countries such as Italy, as 
well as Chirac himself (as conveyed to A/S Welch by Chirac's 
Middle East advisor January 24), continued to perceive a need 
to engage Iran on regional issues. 
 
¶3.  (S) SUMMARY CONT'D:  Araud agreed with Fried that a UNSC 
Resolution on Kosovo should supersede UNSCR 1244, bless an 
international presence in Kosovo post-status, and endorse the 
substance of Ahtisaari's recommendations on minorities. 
Araud said he could agree with the U.S. approach and timing 
even though France would have preferred postponing 
Ahtisaari's presentation of his recommendations, and argued 
for tactics that would give the Serbs the burden for any 
future blockages, and give the Russians sufficient cover for 
an abstention on the UNSCR.  If necessary, Araud indicated 
that France could live without an explicit reference to 
superseding UNSCR, but that passage of a UNSCR was a sine qua 
non for any subsequent ESDP mission as well as EU consensus 
on recognizing Kosovo's independence.  Worried about the time 
required to persuade the Russians to abstain, Araud noted the 
Germans did not exclude having Kosovo on the agenda for the 
G-8 Summit (Fried cautioned against waiting so long).  Araud 
called for continuing contact group meetings, possibly at 
ministerial level, to demonstrate continuing cooperation with 
Russia and prepare the political ground for Kosovo 
independence.  He said the MFA was brainstorming on further 
steps the EU mighttake to encourage Serbia.  On an eventual 
ESDP mission to Kosovo, he asked the U.S. to consider 
participation in a first-ever U.S.-EU operation. 
 
¶3.  (C) SUMMARY CONT'D:  Both sides agreed it was difficult 
to judge at this stage whether Russia would use Kosovo as a 
precedent for Abkhazia, but they agreed that the Russians had 
recently shown themselves somewhat more cooperative on 
Georgia, with Fried adding that there was some evidence to 
suggest that the Russians might be reconsidering their 
pressure tactics.  Citing the Russian-Georgian agreement on 
basing, the French side suggested that it was perhaps time 
for Allies to "think creatively" and reconsider their 
position on the linkage between Russian fulfillment of its 
Istanbul commitments and ratification of the adapted CFE 
Treaty.  Fried countered that France and the EU would do 
better to consider the U.S. proposal for an EU multilateral 
force in Moldova/Transnistria.  On Afghanistan, Araud 
indicated that any decision to bolster the French military 
presence was probably a decision for France's next president 
and assured Fried that the French proposal for an Afghanistan 
contact group was aimed at improving strategic/political 
coordination rather than creating new institutions.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Accompanied by the Ambassador, EUR A/S Dan Fried 
met January 25 on the margins of the "Paris III" Lebanon 
donors' conference with MFA Political Director Gerard Araud 
to discuss primarily European issues (Kosovo), but also Iran. 
 Araud was accompanied by Deputy Political Director Veronique 
Bujon-Barre, A/S-equivalent for Strategic Affairs Philippe 
Carre, DAS-equivalent for CFSP Jean-Louis Falconi, 
DAS-equivalent for Russia and the former Soviet Space Aurelia 
Bouchez, DAS-equivalent for NATO Nicolas Niemtchinow, 
DAS-equivalent for the Balkans Edouard Beslay, and Araud 
staffer Gael Veyssiere.  Fried was also joined by DCM, PolMC 
and POL Deputy (notetaker). 
 
IRAN 
---- 
 
¶5.  (S) Araud began the meeting by informing Fried that 
Russian Security Council Chairman Igor Ivanov, visiting Paris 
January 24, had told him he, accompanied by DFM Sergei 
Kislyak, would be traveling to Tehran February 28 for 
consultations with Iranian officials at the behest of 
President Putin.  Araud described Kislyak as going to great 
lengths to reassure the French that the Russians would abide 
by P5-plus-1 commitments, telling them several times that 
 
PARIS 00000363  002 OF 005 
 
 
Russia would be offering no new initiatives and that Russia 
remained opposed to an Iranian nuclear weapons capability. 
He had also promised that Kislyak would debrief his 
P5-plus-one counterparts following the visit. 
 
¶6.  (S) Pressed by a clearly skeptical Fried about the 
ostensible purpose of the visit, Araud judged that the 
Russians intended to warn Iran that it was on a serious 
collision course with the U.S.  Araud believed the Russians 
would urge the Iranians to be cautious and to avoid any 
miscalculations; this, he continued, corroborated what U/S 
Burns had recently told him, to the effect that Iran seemed 
to believe it had the upper hand but was in danger of 
overplaying it. 
 
¶7.  (S) Returning to Iran toward the end the meeting, Fried 
welcomed the recent EU conclusions on Iran and praised French 
Ambassador to the U.S. Levitte for providing a good 
operational channel for U.S.-French consultation on sensitive 
subjects.  Araud said Iran was a difficult issue not only for 
the EU, but increasingly in Paris, and noted that the 
February 12 EU GAERC would feature a general debate on Iran. 
The Italians, he considered, continued to insist that 
discussion of Iran should go beyond the nuclear problem. 
They -- and the French Presidency (he was careful not to 
associate himself with this view) -- perceived a need to 
engage the Iranians on regional issues such as Afghanistan, 
Iraq, and, in particular, for the French Presidency, Lebanon. 
 
¶8.  (S) Fried expressed the hope that France would not 
emulate the Russian example.  He noted that Arab countries 
were uncomfortable with outreach to Iran and that local 
Ambassadors were reporting that the Iranians were showing 
signs of nervousness and of feeling isolated.  Araud assured 
Fried that there would be no mission "in the short term." 
(Separately, Chirac's diplomatic advisor for the Middle East, 
Dominique Boche, told NEA A/S David Welch January 24 that the 
Presidency still believed a "combination of pressure and 
openness to dialogue" might work with Iran and that the 
Chirac was still considering sending a high-level envoy to 
Tehran.  He promised, however, that France would consult with 
its other partners before actually doing so.) 
 
KOSOVO 
------ 
 
¶9.  (C) Fried told Araud he had taken to heart Araud's points 
during their last meeting that a new UNSC Resolution on 
Kosovo was both "critical" and "needed to be short." 
Commenting that the recent elections had resulted in no 
surprises and left Kostunica in the position of king-maker, 
he said the U.S. approach remained to support Ahtisaari and 
his recommendations and to refrain from referring publicly 
and explicitly to independence over the coming weeks, 
although any leaks about the U.S. bottom line could 
eventually force adjustments.  Ahtisaari planned to be in the 
region in February and intended to present his proposal at 
that time.  The U.S. believed a subsequent four-to-six-week 
period of intense discussions between Ahtisaari and the 
parties made sense before going to the Security Council, and 
judged that it was important for Kosovar leader Ceku to be 
seen to be engaging Ahtisaari as well. 
 
¶10.  (C) On a UNSC Resolution, Fried noted that the U.S. had 
circulated a number of ideas but that only three were 
crucial: that a new UNSCR supersede UNSCR 1244; that it bless 
an international presence in Kosovo post-status, and that it 
endorse the substance of Ahtisaari's recommendations on 
treatment of minorities and other related issues.  A UNSCR 
need not/not explicitly affirm Kosovar independence, which 
would also help avoid a direct confrontation with Russia. 
Fried assured Araud that the U.S. shared the French view that 
a UNSCR was essential to the process and said he preferred 
not to consider fall-backs at this time.  The odds of passing 
a resolution, he continued, hinged on EU-U.S. unity; even if 
not all EU member states (Greece, for example) approved the 
UNSCR, building a critical mass of support would be essential 
to overcome Russian stalling.  Fried said he expected Kosovo 
to declare its independence immediately following passage of 
the resolution, and the U.S. likely to recognize Kosovo 
immediately thereafter.  He assured Araud that the U.S. would 
remain in KFOR. 
 
¶11.  (C) Araud expressed general agreement with the U.S. 
approach, including the timing, even if France would have 
preferred postponing Ahtisaari's presentation of his 
recommendations.  He said it was essential that the Serbs be 
 
PARIS 00000363  003 OF 005 
 
 
perceived as responsible for any blocages that followed; this 
was also desirable from the point of view of avoiding a 
Russian veto.  Araud indicated that Ivanov had reiterated 
standard Russian talking points about mutually agreed 
solutions in his consultations of the previous day, while 
acknowledging that the Serbs had accepted independence for 
Montenegro, and argued for more time.  On a UNSCR, Araud said 
it would be a "miracle" if it included the three elements 
identified by Fried, suggesting that it might be necessary to 
drop the explicit reference to superseding UNSCR 1444 and to 
argue after the fact that any new UNSCR automatically 
superseded what preceded it.  But having a UNSCR was 
absolutely essential, Araud argued, if not for France, then 
for the EU.  Failure to pass a resolution would be a disaster 
for the EU: Spain had already indicated that it would not 
recognize Kosovo without one, a position likely shared by 
Romania and Hungary; moreover, a resolution was a key 
precondition for deployment of an EU ESDP mission. 
 
¶12.  (C) For all those reasons, Araud argued, it would be 
necessary to do the utmost to obtain a Russian abstention. 
Fried responded that FM Lavrov had promised the Secretary 
about a year ago that Russia would not veto.  This was not a 
guarantee, he quickly added, but suggested that it was still 
possible to persuade Russia to abstain.  Araud suggested that 
it working the Russians would take time and wondered when 
would be the right moment to move to a vote, and whether this 
would involve calling their bluff.  He said the Germans 
believed Kosovo could end up on the agenda for the G-8 summit 
in June.  Fried cautioned against waiting this long, adding 
that raising the stakes might in the end prove necessary, but 
we should seek earlier resolution.  It also ran the risk of 
undermining the G-8 as an institution. 
 
¶13.  (C) On Serbia, Araud doubted that the EU would take a 
decision at its February 12 GAERC on next steps, but 
suggested that decisions would be needed in March.  The MFA 
was brainstorming on the Stabilization and Association 
Agreement (SAA) and considering what might be done in the 
face of a continuing lack of cooperation on ICTY.  He said 
there was a clean division within the EU between the UK and 
the Netherlands on one hand, and Hungary and unspecified 
other member states on the other.  Fried responded that the 
U.S. supported EU outreach to Serbia so that Serbia should 
think about a future in the EU rather than the past as 
represented by Kosovo. 
 
CONTACT GROUP AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL? 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶14.  (C) Araud said it would be important to maintain the 
Contact Group as a way of demonstrating that close 
coordination with Russia was continuing.  He proposed, at the 
end of February, a possible Contact Group meeting at 
political director or even ministerial level, noting that it 
might appear to some as "paradoxical" that "dramatic" 
decisions would be taken at any other level.  Fried responded 
that the Secretary would be raising Kosovo soon with FM 
Lavrov and that he would keep this proposal in mind.  He said 
it would be necessary to find the right combination of 
pushing and embracing Russia for them to justify an 
abstention, and then to act quickly thereafter. 
 
U.S.-EU ESDP MiSSION? 
--------------------- 
 
¶15.  (C) Returning to a possible ESDP mission to Kosovo, 
Araud expressed the hope the U.S. would consider 
participating, saying that this would be the first time the 
U.S. and EU cooperated in an operation.  Fried did not rule 
out the possibility, noting that the U.S. would have 
something to contribute and that this would demonstrate 
U.S.-European unity.  But issues of NATO equities would have 
to be considered carefully.  Carre said that France would 
await an indication of USG interest before pursuing the idea 
any further, at which time further bilateral exchanges would 
no doubt prove necessary in order to get the details right. 
 
GEORGIA 
------- 
 
¶16.  (C) Bujon-Barre asked for Fried's assessment as to 
whether Kosovo would impinge negatively on the April renewal 
of the UNOMIG mandate for Georgia.  Fried responded that he 
would have responded in the affirmative a week earlier, but 
that the Russians had shown a more cooperative side during a 
recent meeting of the Friends Group in Berlin, by showing 
 
PARIS 00000363  004 OF 005 
 
 
interest in CBMs for Abkhazia.  This trend was further 
reinforced during recent U.S.-Russian discussions in Moscow 
on Nagorno-Karabakh.  That said, it was essential to be firm 
with Russia against Kosovo trade-offs; the Secretary, he 
said, had made clear to the Russians that unilateral Russian 
recognition of Abkhazia would constitute a major problem, 
including in U.S.-Russian relations.  Fried said he felt 
somewhat encouraged by a recent article in the Russian 
newspaper Kommersant which judged that Russian pressure 
tactics on Georgia had failed, which suggested that the 
Russians were perhaps preparing to reconsider some aspects of 
their policies.  He hoped this was the case, and that they 
would be less tempted now to try to hold Georgia hostage. 
 
CFE AND MOLDOVA/TRANSNISTRIA 
---------------------------- 
 
¶17.  (C) Carre worried that the Allied position on the link 
between Russian fulfillment of its Istanbul commitments and 
ratification of the adapted CFE Treaty was reaching its 
limits and was not sustainable over the longer term.  Now 
that the Russians and Georgians had reached an agreement on 
basing, it was hard to justify the Allied position on the 
basis of a few stockpiles of munitions in Transnistria. 
There was a risk of killing the adapted Treaty, which argued 
for seeking a way to decouple the Istanbul commitments from 
CFE.  It was now time for creative thinking; mentioning the 
issue once a year at the OSCE ministerial was insufficient. 
 
¶18.  (C) Fried asked rhetorically why Allies felt a need to 
respond to Russian refusal to fulfill its commitments.  What 
was wrong with asking Russia to do what it had committed to 
do?  Fried cited the recent U.S. suggestion that the EU 
consider a multilateral mission to Transnistria (that would 
include Russians) as a more appropriate example of creative 
thinking, adding that it could be tailored in such a way as 
to proceed in parallel with further steps toward a political 
settlement.  This, he suggested, made more sense than backing 
away from existing commitments. 
 
¶19.  (C) Carre agreed that the Russian position on stockpiles 
was ridiculous, but continued to argue that the basing 
agreement with Georgia should make it possible to solve other 
issues in a reasonable way.  He did not wish to give credence 
to the view that Allies were prepared to abandon the adapted 
CFE treaty or were linking it to a complete solution of 
Russia's "post-colonial" baggage.  Carre also worried that an 
EU mission to Transnistria could put the EU "between" Russia 
and the Moldovans and create problems.  Fried responded that 
any solution would no doubt involve a package arrangement, 
but should not be one of surrender. 
 
NATO INFORMAL MINISTERIAL ON AFGHANISTAN/KOSOVO 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶20.  (C) Carre recalled French satisfaction with the Riga 
summit and reminded Fried that France had done what it could. 
 He asked Fried for confirmation that the January 26 
ministerial was aimed at renewing NATO's purpose and general 
commitment and was not intended to provoke dramatic new 
commitments.  Fried assured him that this was the case, 
adding that it should be seen in the context of a series of 
meetings on Afghanistan aimed at demonstrating the need for a 
comprehensive approach to Afghanistan that included civilian 
as well as military elements and for bolstering Afghanistan 
in anticipation of a spring Taliban offensive.  That said, we 
sought and needed required forces, more resources, and an end 
to caveats on this issue.  Fried asked if it was correct that 
France might be prepared to provide significant additional 
military resources to Afghanistan.  Araud responded that such 
a decision would probably have to be taken by the next 
president. 
 
¶21.  (C) Carre assured Fried that the French proposal for a 
contact group on Afghanistan was aimed at enhancing political 
coordination and guidance rather than creating a new 
institution, with Araud adding that the French saw a need for 
more political/strategic dialogue among key players.  Fried 
assured them that the U.S. had considered the French proposal 
in that same spirit in looking at ways to broaden cooperation 
beyond the purely military aspect. 
 
¶22.  (C) Carre announced that, contrary to indications 
earlier in the week, FM Douste-Blazy would now participate in 
the morning session of the Ministerial; he would depart 
before lunch in order to return to Paris for Abbe Pierre's 
funeral.  (Note:  Douste-Blazy originally indicated that he 
 
PARIS 00000363  005 OF 005 
 
 
would attend the entire ministerial.  Subsequently, Embassy 
was told January 23 that, for domestic political reasons 
related to the ongoing presidential campaigns and prior to 
Abbe Pierre's passing, Douste-Blazy would not be able to 
attend the Ministerial.) 
 
SUDAN 
----- 
 
¶23.  (C) Araud, noting ongoing debate in the U.S. Congress on 
Sudan, asked to be informed in advance of any evolution in 
U.S. policy, given the repercussions this could have for 
French interests in Chad and the C.A.R. 
 
¶24.  (U) A/S Fried cleared this message. 
 
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm 
 
STAPLETON