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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 08 PARIS 000319 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR S/CT MARC NORMAN, TED ALLEGRA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/26/2017 
TAGS: PREL PGOV ASEC OTRA PTER FR AG LY IT MT SP
TS, MO, PO 
 
SIPDIS 
SUBJECT: PARIS HOSTS INAUGURAL W. MED RSI CONFERENCE 
 
PARIS 00000319  001.2 OF 008 
 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR CRAIG STAPLETON FOR REASONS 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (S) Summary: Ambassador Stapleton hosted the inaugural 
Western Mediterranean Regional Strategic Initiative (RSI) 
Conference on December 5-6 in Paris.  U.S. Chiefs of Mission 
and Embassy representatives from France, Italy, Spain, 
Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Portugal and Malta gathered as a 
first step to develop a regional counterterrorism strategy. 
Ambassador for Counterterrorism Henry Crumpton and U.S. 
interagency representatives participated.  Meeting 
participants sought to understand how the North African and 
European dimensions of the terrorist threat interact and to 
identify possible measures to enhance both inter-USG and 
regional cooperation to address the cross-Mediterranean 
nature of the problem. 
 
¶2. (S) Summary continued:  Chiefs of Mission made several 
recommendations  on the way forward, including the need to a) 
increase MEPI funding to foster vital economic reforms in 
North Africa and boost European assistance to North African 
countries in order to improve economic and social conditions 
that stimulate illegal (and legal) migration to Europe, b) 
develop a core short- and long-term message to the EU on 
counterterrorism issues c) develop a better understanding of 
the radicalization process, d) put in place a long-term 
strategy for an effective assimilation/integration policy out 
to 2050, e) get a better understanding of the attitudes of 
North African and immigrant populations with respect to the 
U.S., f) improve information-sharing among the countries of 
the region, g) produce/codify a list of  counterterrorism and 
RSI best practices and disseminate these to posts, and h) 
continue to meet regularly to coordinate an integrated 
regional CT approach.  End summary. 
 
The Regional Picture 
-------------------- 
 
¶3. (S) Attendees began the session by briefing on the 
distinctive aspects of threats posed by specific groups or to 
specific countries. 
 
¶4. (S) Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC):  With 
500-800 operatives, the GSPC is a growing regional threat, in 
part as a result of the success of the Algerian government in 
combating the group in country.  Faced with unrelenting 
pressure from the GoA, the GSPC has made a strategic shift 
from a focus on jihad in Algeria to a more international 
approach that emphasizes outreach to other organizations 
(including al Qaida), providing training to members of other 
groups, and launching attacks outside Algeria.  For now, the 
GSPC uses Europe mostly for fund-raising and facilitation, 
but its September 2006 announcement of an open alliance with 
AQ may presage an increased threat there. 
 
¶5. (S) Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG):  Ultimate 
networkers, the LIFG serves as connective tissue for other 
groups and enjoys growing influence within AQ.  It benefits 
 
PARIS 00000319  002.2 OF 008 
 
 
from dynamic leadership with strong religious credentials. 
 
¶6. (S) MSJ:  The least known of the North African extremist 
groups, it appears to be more a movement than an 
organization.  Following the Casablanca bombings, a strong 
Moroccan government crackdown dismantled more than a dozen 
cells and has led the group to operate increasingly out of 
Spain and to engage in close cooperation with the GSPC. 
 
¶7. (S) Algeria:  The 150,000 dead in the Algerian conflict 
has lead to increasing war-weariness on the part of the 
population and made GSPC recruitment more difficult. The 
GoA,s amnesty process has been successful in bringing many 
fighters out the maquis and the government,s closer 
monitoring of mosques has also limited extremists, 
influence.  Countering these positive trends are the 
continuing difficult economic and social conditions, which 
the government has so far failed to address.  Relations 
between U.S. and Algerian services are good, especially on 
the military side, but poor Algerian absorption capacity and 
bureaucratic inertia have complicated our ability to provide 
training and other forms of CT assistance. 
 
¶8. (S) Morocco:  Since the Casablanca bombings, some 23 cells 
have been disrupted, but concern is growing over the 
potential threat of jihadists returning from Iraq, especially 
as the GoM does not appear to have a plan to deal with such a 
threat.  The GoM,s greatest asset is, in many ways, the 
king,s position as Commander of the Faithful.  The GoM 
recognizes the need to address social and economic conditions 
and the king is pressing for reforms, particularly with 
respect to women,s and children,s rights. The GoM is also 
moving to control religious institutions and preaching with a 
view to ensuring that a tolerant form of Islam is practiced 
in Morocco.  Relations with the U.S. are good.  The 2004 Free 
Trade Agreement has increased investment and noticeably 
improved the image of the United States.  There are estimates 
of up to 3 million Moroccans living outside the country; many 
Moroccans can move easily around Europe. 
 
¶9. (S) Italy:  A likely target for AQ because of its role in 
Iraq, Afghanistan and (now) Lebanon, Italy may have some 2-3% 
of its Muslim population radicalized.  Small extremist 
communities, mostly in the north, are active, but the GoI 
devotes considerable resources to CT and is aggressive about 
using new powers to arrest and expel troublemakers.  With 
North African, Bosnian, Somali, and increasingly Pakistani 
communities to contend with, the GoI has done a poor job of 
recruiting minorities or developing language capabilities in 
its security services.  More broadly, the GoI has yet to meet 
the challenge posed by the need to integrate people of 
different ethnic origins.  Cooperation with the USG, 
extraordinary under the previous government, remains good, 
but the Milan rendition case of abu Omar poses a challenge 
and the highly independent and left-leaning judiciary has 
shown a tendency to vitiate some CT efforts. 
 
 
PARIS 00000319  003.2 OF 008 
 
 
¶10. (S) Portugal:  Portugal,s small Muslim population has 
seen minimal radicalization; the country,s CT challenge is 
mostly one of disrupting logistical support networks. 
Portugal has cooperated closely with the USG, even on 
detainee transfers through the country, although, as is the 
case in many countries, negative publicity about "rendition 
flights" poses a problem. 
 
¶11. (S) Tunisia:  The country appears on the surface to be 
stable and safe, but faces a growing threat.  G8 ambassadors 
in country have expressed concern that the domestic 
environment may be fostering extremism.  The GoT has 
repressed the terrorist threat within the country itself 
(terrorism suspects are closely monitored), but inadequate 
border security has meant Tunisian radicals can easily 
travel.  Some have turned up in Iraq and there is Tunisian 
involvement in cells in Europe.  Cooperation with the U.S. is 
good, but the GoT is more inclined to share with us 
information about external threats than it is about internal 
developments.  Cooperation with its neighbors is adequate 
with respect to repatriation, but less than warm. 
 
¶12. (S) Malta:  While there appear to be no terrorist cells 
in the country, because of its location, Malta serves as a 
transfer point and, in effect as the Southern border of 
Europe.  The GoM does a good job of monitoring its Freeport, 
but has responsibility for air and sea space some 800 times 
the size of the country itself, posing an obvious challenge 
to its limited resources.  Illegal immigration is an enormous 
and growing problem equal to some 50% of the country,s 
birthrate in 2005.  Despite increasing awareness of the 
potential for future problems, the Maltese are having trouble 
handling the influx. 
 
¶13. (S) Spain:  Some 1,000 Islamist extremists operate out of 
Spain, but the country,s long history of confronting 
terrorism has meant the GoS is very focused on the threat. 
Terrorist activity in Spain appears to be linked with 
criminal activity (especially with respect to credit card 
fraud, passport theft, and, to some degree, drug 
trafficking).  Illegal immigration is a worsening problem. 
Recruitment (of foreign fighters for Iraq and Afghanistan) 
appears to be ongoing.  USG/Embassy Madrid has excellent 
cooperation with the GOS on a range of CT issues, including 
an agreement to share terrorist watch list information 
(HSPD-6), which A/S Harty signed during her recent trip to 
Madrid and which now serves as a model for other such 
agreements. Embassy Madrid often serves as the "interagency" 
for the GOS, given poor Spanish internal coordination on CT, 
which the GoS is trying to address.  Because of the close 
ties the Embassy maintains with all of the CT actors in the 
GOS, our counterterrorism efforts remain effective. 
 
¶14. (S) France:  The GoF, well aware that France is a target, 
does an effective job of monitoring and controlling the 
problem.  French CT structures are robust and effective and 
the operational relationship with the USG is excellent. 
 
PARIS 00000319  004.2 OF 008 
 
 
Nonetheless, France is confronted with a burgeoning immigrant 
population and is doing a poor job of assimilating it, 
despite recent GoF efforts to reach out to communities in 
which immigrants predominate.  Terrorist recruitment in 
prisons and the possible threat of Iraq returnees is a 
concern, as is, increasingly, the Pakistan terrorism nexus. 
 
Specific Concerns and ideas to address them 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶15. (S) Chiefs of Mission engaged in a wide-ranging 
discussion, concluding that the regional challenge we face in 
addressing the terrorist threat manifests itself in several 
broad categories: 
 
Immigration: 
------------ 
 
¶16. (S) Underlying and contributing to the terrorist problem 
is the reality of a massive, often uncontrolled, and growing 
immigration flow across the Mediterranean: in Algeria alone, 
there were some 150,000 requests for French visas in 2006. 
Moreover, there is a growing number of young North Africans 
trying to enter Europe clandestinely or by seeking refugee 
status.  This huge migration poses a major and multi-faceted 
challenge.  Chiefs of Mission noted that the ongoing 
migration is driven by deep-seated economic and social 
conditions and is therefore likely to continue for the 
foreseeable future absent concerted efforts to address the 
conditions in North Africa (and points south) that feed a 
desire to relocate.  While steps must be taken to enhance 
maritime security, we must also devise ways to provide 
economic opportunity in host countries that can create 
disincentive for relocation. Such an effort must be done in 
conjunction with European countries.  We must seek European 
participation in and contributions to, the Broader Middle 
East and North Africa Initiative (BMENA) and encourage them 
to press North African countries on the need for economic and 
social reform.  We need more MEPI resources to augment our 
own efforts to promote vital economic and education reforms 
in North Africa. 
 
¶17. (S) At the same time, we must find ways of assisting 
partner nations on both sides of the Mediterranean to manage 
population movements of the size currently underway. 
Specifically, we must help them ensure that terrorists do not 
take advantage of this movement to travel or to exploit 
discontent associated with such dislocation.  Unfortunately, 
we and the governments in the region appear to have at best 
only a limited grasp of the nature of the migration:  for 
example, camps for immigrants, which are presumably targets 
for terrorist subversion, as well as for terrorist transit, 
are essentially closed off as neither we nor governments have 
established effective monitoring or investigative 
capabilities.  While some countries (Spain, for example) 
capture biometric data on immigrants, most do not and some 
lack the capacity to do so or to absorb the technology.  We 
 
PARIS 00000319  005.2 OF 008 
 
 
need to find ways to address this information gap. 
 
¶18. (S) Libya in particular appears to be indifferent to the 
immigration problem.  There may be more non-Libyans than 
Libyans living in the country, which serves as a launching 
pad for population movement from countries to its south. 
Chiefs of Mission noted that we must address Libyan inability 
(or unwillingness) to deal with the issue and agreed that 
Embassy Tripoli participation in the next RSI would be useful. 
 
Integration/Assimilation 
------------------------ 
 
¶19. (S) Chiefs of Mission noted that European partners will 
be faced with a growing need to develop effective programs to 
assimilate and/or integrate new residents of their countries. 
 This will require a shift in mindset, as many receiving 
countries have yet to deal with (or in some cases even 
acknowledge) the scope of the problem.  It has proven 
difficult to integrate even legal migrants; terrorist plots 
in recent years have involved wealthy students and spouses of 
airplane pilots, for example.  The Internet and continuing 
links with migrants, "home countries" pose additional and 
poorly understood challenges for governments seeking to 
grapple with the imperative of integrating new populations. 
Chiefs of Mission concluded that we need to raise the profile 
of radicalization/immigration issue in the ongoing U.S.-EU 
dialogue on terrorism and explore the possibility of 
involving the North African leadership in European efforts at 
integration. 
 
 
Radicalization 
-------------- 
 
¶20. (S) The phenomenon of radicalization appears to affect 
1-3 percent of Muslim populations across the board, with 
violent extremists seeking to exploit the discontent of 
underprivileged, disadvantaged communities.  Chiefs of 
Mission determined that we need to develop a better 
understanding of the nature of the threat terrain, especially 
with regard to radicalization.  To this end, we should 
commission additional studies on how radicalization takes 
place, look closely at de-radicalization efforts around the 
world (e.g., in Morocco); and encourage countries to share 
successes in countering radicalization.  Of particular 
concern is prison radicalization, about which little is yet 
known; this issue should be made a priority. 
 
Information and Outreach 
------------------------ 
 
¶21. (S) Chiefs of Mission noted that we often lack a clear 
picture of many aspects of the challenges we face in the 
region.  Over the long term to address this shortfall, we 
need to make a serious investment in counterterrorism 
expertise, train a cadre of CT experts, and ensure that 
 
PARIS 00000319  006.2 OF 008 
 
 
information regarding challenges and best practices is widely 
disseminated. 
 
¶22. (S) More specifically, we need to get a handle on the 
nature of the immigration wave.  For example, the practice 
engaged in by some migrants of destroying identity papers 
before arrival at their destination countries not only 
assures that they cannot be returned to their countries of 
origin but also makes it close to impossible to identify new 
arrivals.  We need to help partner countries find ways to 
monitor migrants and to discern terrorists and criminals that 
may be in their midst. 
 
¶23. (S) We lack as well a good sense of the nature and 
thinking of existing Muslim communities in Europe.  To 
address this shortfall, Chiefs of Mission concluded that we 
need to devote additional resources to polling immigrant 
communities, as well as local populations in North Africa, 
with a view to determining their concerns and attitudes 
towards the U.S. and its policies. 
 
¶24. (S) Chiefs of Mission noted that efforts to engage with 
Muslim populations and share information about USG assistance 
programs have a significantly positive impact on those 
communities, perceptions of the United States.   We must do 
a better job of getting out such information.  Chiefs of 
Mission therefore strongly urged additional resources be 
devoted to outreach and information efforts.  Programs 
connecting such communities with U.S. Muslims and other 
moderates are vital and need to be better funded. 
Non-government organizations are also active on this front 
and we need to have to a better understanding of their 
activities and how we can leverage them. 
 
¶25. (S) The recent Algerian amnesty for "repentant" 
terrorists provides yet another illustration of the need for 
better sharing of information.  The lengthy delay (some 10 
months) between the actual amnesty and GoA,s provision of 
the names of those pardoned is unacceptable; we need to 
ensure such lists are quickly provided and disseminated. 
 
Conclusions 
----------- 
 
¶26. (S) Chiefs of Mission propose a strategy that 
simultaneously examines and addresses the various stages of 
the interrelated immigration, integration, and radicalization 
challenges:  mass movement, lack of connection to new homes, 
efforts by terrorists and radicals to exploit discontent and 
dislocation.  By viewing the challenge holistically, and 
concurrently, we can begin to grapple with what will clearly 
be a long-term effort that will require a highly coordinated 
and flexible response across the government.  Thus, CoMs 
propose a continuing series of discussions as part of an 
effort to bring to bear all instruments of national power. 
In light of these considerations, Chiefs of Mission made the 
following specific proposals: 
 
PARIS 00000319  007.2 OF 008 
 
 
 
¶A. Boost MEPI funding for programs to improve economic and 
social conditions in North Africa that stimulate illegal (and 
legal) immigration.  Encourage European participation in 
BMENA and in efforts to enhance economic and social reforms 
in North Africa.  Focus additional attention on the role of 
Libya with respect to immigration and population movement. 
 
¶B. Develop a core message for our engagement with the EU on 
counterterrorism issues, including specific actions we want 
host governments to take, and areas where the U.S. is willing 
to provide assistance.  We should focus on short-term 
specific goals, as well as longer term policy objectives. 
 
¶C. Better map the environment and develop a greater 
understanding of the radicalization process through increased 
study of the phenomenon, and better sharing of successes in 
countering it.  Increase the focus on the threat of prison 
radicalization.  Raise the profile of integration and 
radicalization issues in discussions with the EU.  Also, 
increase polling to better understand local views and how 
people acquire information, particularly in North Africa. 
 
¶D. Put in place a long-term strategy to develop the necessary 
groundwork for an effective assimilation/integration policy 
out to 2050.  Explore the utility and feasibility of 
encouraging North African governments to engage with the 
Europeans with a view to fostering integration of immigrant 
communities.  Seek to leverage NGO activities. 
 
¶E. Develop a better understanding of the attitudes of North 
African and immigrant populations with respect to the U.S. 
and key terrorism-related issues through more accurate and 
detailed polling. The USG needs to exponentially and rapidly 
expand successful people-to-people programs that create 
lasting favorable impressions of the U.S. and undermine the 
attractiveness of extremist ideologies as a key long-term 
instrument to counter extremism.  One focus of these programs 
should be expanding local contacts with U.S. Muslims. 
 
¶F. Improve information-sharing among the countries of the 
region, specifically with regard to lists of persons freed in 
amnesties. 
 
¶G.  To devise a more effective strategy to address the 
threat, we should produce/codify a list of counterterrorism 
and RSI best practices and disseminate these to posts, with a 
view to having them updated periodically.  Make a long-term 
investment in developing CT expertise and a cadre of experts. 
 
¶H. To maintain the momentum generated by this meeting, 
embassies intend to meet regularly to coordinate an 
integrated regional CT approach, based on a network of 
country teams and developed through face-to-face contact and 
video and telephone conferences.  Chiefs of Mission agreed to 
continue the RSI process in the future and request assistance 
from Washington in obtaining and obligating significant 
 
PARIS 00000319  008.2 OF 008 
 
 
additional funding necessary to undertake this regional CT 
strategy and increase understanding among decision-makers and 
budget analysts of the CT challenges in our region. 
 
Meeting Participants 
-------------------- 
 
¶27. (S) The meeting consisted of USG Ambassadors (and 
political and intel staffs) in the field as well as several 
Washington agencies.  Principals from the field were: Craig 
Stapleton, Ambassador to France; Ronald Spogli, Ambassador to 
Italy; Eduardo Aguirre, Jr, Ambassador to Spain; Al Hoffman, 
Ambassador to Portugal; Robert Ford, Ambassador to Algeria; 
Bob Godec, Ambassador to Tunisia; Molly Bordonaro, Ambassador 
to Malta; Wayne Bush, DCM to Morocco. 
 
¶28. (S) Principals from Washington included: Hank Crumpton, 
Ambassador-at-Large for Counterterrorism; EUR A/S Dan Fried; 
NEA DAS Gordon Gray; Ambassador Brian Carlson, R; Nerissa 
Cook, Office Director EUR/PGI; Rollie Burans, NCTC; Bruce 
Swartz, U.S. DOJ Assistant Attorney General; GEN Mark 
Schissler, Joint Staff, Deputy Director for the War on 
Terror, MG Robertus C.N. Remkes, US EUCOM Director for 
Strategy, Policy, and Assessments; MG David Scott, US SOCOM, 
Deputy Director SCO. 
 
 
¶29. (U) This cable was drafted by S/CT and cleared by all 
participating Chiefs of Mission and Ambassador-at-Large, Hank 
Crumpton. 
 
 
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm 
 
STAPLETON