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PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHNC #0021/01 0051625
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 051625Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7399
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0742

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 000021 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/05/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PREL UNFICYP EUN MOPS TU CY
SUBJECT: TALAT'S SHOWDOWN WITH TURKISH ARMY OVER LEDRA 
STREET CROSSING 
 
REF: 05 NICOSIA 1883 
 
Classified By: CDA Jane B. Zimmerman, reasons 1.4 (b/d). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY. "TRNC President" Mehmet Ali Talat's public 
promise to remove the controversial pedestrian bridge at the 
Green Line on Ledra Street has put him on a collision course 
with the Turkish military.  The bridge, which crosses over a 
Turkish army patrol track along the north edge of the Buffer 
Zone, precipitated a deadlock over a year ago in preparations 
to open an economically and symbolically important crossing 
point in the heart of Old Nicosia (reftel).  Hoping to prove 
himself master of his own domain -- and wrongfoot 
Papadopoulos at the same time -- Talat announced December 28 
that he would take down the bridge immediately in order to 
signal his New Year commitment to making progress toward 
solving the Cyprus problem.  A week later, however, Turkish 
military resistance has blocked plans to remove the 
structure, prompting Talat to travel to Turkey to try to 
break the deadlock in talks with the AKP government and the 
TGS.  Talat has taken a significant political gamble in 
trying to force the issue over Turkish military objections; 
his credibility as the leader of his community may be at 
stake.  According to "PM" Ferdi Soyer, Talat has threatened 
to resign if he cannot make good on his promise to remove the 
bridge.  Soyer told Charge that if Talat is unsuccessful in 
Ankara, the ruling CTP may well call its supporters onto the 
streets for protests, which would reflect Turkish Cypriot 
resentment at the reach of the military and "Deep State" in 
Cyprus.  END SUMMARY. 
 
MR. TALAT, TEAR DOWN THIS BRIDGE 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) On December 28 "President" Talat announced he would 
remove the controversial pedestrian bridge the Turkish 
Cypriots installed on Ledra Street in 2005 (reftel).  Talat's 
"government," which had scored a propaganda coup by 
unilaterally opening a checkpoint at Astromeritis/Bostanci 
earlier that summer, had hoped to pull off a similar stunt on 
Ledra Street -- the north-south pedestrian/shopping avenue 
that forms the central artery of Old Nicosia, but has been 
cut in two since 1974.  Most observers agree that an open 
Ledra Street would provide a real boost to Nicosia's Turkish 
Cypriot merchants (while some Greek Cypriot shopkeepers are 
openly concerned about the prospect of low cost competitors, 
who stay open on Sunday).  More importantly, any move toward 
reopening Ledra Street would signal a renewed commitment to 
reuniting the island and Europe's last divided capital. 
 
¶3. (C) Unlike other checkpoints already in operation, 
however, Ledra Street crosses through an east-west patrol 
track used by the Turkish army (at Ermou/Hermes Street) -- 
and Talat's decision to open a crossing there alarmed the 
local force commanders, who take their orders from Ankara and 
not from the "TRNC."  The pedestrian bridge, which would have 
carried civilian pedestrians over the heads of patrolling 
Turkish troops, was viewed by "TRNC" officials as a 
compromise solution that could have allowed the military to 
enjoy unfettered access to the area even after the checkpoint 
opened. 
 
¶4. (C) Although the Embassy (together with the UK and the 
French missions here) warned Talat at the time that putting 
up a bridge on the site was politically unwise, Talat 
nonetheless authorized its construction.  This drew the 
predictable howls of protest from the Greek Cypriots who 
claimed (falsely, according to the UN) that the bridge 
intruded into the Buffer Zone and (correctly) that the 
building of a structure for military purposes along the Green 
Line was a violation of the spirit of the cease-fire 
agreement. 
 
MR. PAPADOPOULOS, TEAR DOWN THAT PLATFORM 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) In the year that followed, the Turkish Cypriots tried 
-- unsuccessfully -- to draw attention away from their 
decision to build the bridge and shift blame for the 
checkpoint deadlock on Papadopoulos.  The Turkish Cypriots 
suggested they would take down the bridge in exchange for the 
removal of a wall and viewing platform (complete with 
dramatic pictures of "victims of the occupation") erected by 
the Greek Cypriot National Guard on the southern end of the 
Buffer Zone at Ledra Street.  The GOC replied, however, that 
no movement on the checkpoint was possible until the status 
quo ante was restored and the bridge removed. 
 
¶6. (C) UN sources tell us that although they occasionally 
raised the subject in their meetings with both sides, 
diplomacy on the matter has consisted mainly of nasty 
 
NICOSIA 00000021  002 OF 003 
 
 
sound-bites exchanged through the media over the past year. 
Informal discussions regarding the checkpoint between the two 
mayors of Nicosia and party leaders from both communities 
were similarly futile. 
 
ARMY TO TALAT: YA FEELIN' LUCKY, PUNK? 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Talat's December 28 announcement that he would take 
down the bridge caught most observers by surprise.  Although 
the Embassy (as well as the UK, UN and others) have 
consistently prodded Talat to make a move on Ledra Street for 
over a year, his response has been generally tepid; Talat 
aides have repeatedly said that a simultaneous reciprocal 
gesture from the GOC would be needed before they could 
politically afford to back down from their decision to build 
"the bridge of peace."  Talat's personal secretary told us, 
however, that Talat's change of heart sprung from a series of 
factors including: 1) the new lull in Turkey-EU tensions, 2) 
increasing domestic political pressure for the pro-solution 
Talat to "do something" that might change the parameters of 
the Cyprus problem and give an economic boost to his voters, 
and 3) the new AKEL mayor in the south, who might be an 
easier interlocutor on municipal issues like Ledra because of 
her long ties to Talat's CTP and her support for the Annan 
Plan. 
 
¶8. (C) In a private meeting with the Charge, "PM" Ferdi Soyer 
told us that Talat thought he had reached consensus with the 
Turkish ambassador and army on the matter just before making 
his announcement.  Subsequently, however, local Turkish force 
commander Kivrikoglu put his foot down, refused to agree to 
the dismantling of the bridge, and began "working against 
Talat" with the TGS in Ankara.  Talat, feeling that his 
credibility as a leader and fully-competent interlocutor was 
at stake, made the announcement anyway. 
 
¶9. (C) In the subsequent week -- despite encouraging 
statements from the Embassy, UK High Commission, and UNFICYP 
-- the Turkish Cypriots have not made any visible progress 
removing the bridge.  "TRNC" leaders publicly blame the delay 
on "agitation" by local nationalist opposition forces, led by 
Serdar Denktash, who categorize the unilateral demolition of 
the bridge as a "concession" to Papadopoulos.  The GOC, 
meanwhile, has alternated between dismissing Talat's bridge 
announcement as a "ruse" and claiming that, in any case, 
Talat is a puppet who lacks the authority to act without 
Turkish direction.  President Papadopoulos stated that the 
removal of the bridge would not be enough for the GOC to 
agree to the opening of the checkpoint, and has dusted off a 
series of additional demands including the demilitarization 
of the Old City and the removal of flags and symbols in the 
area -- despite their presence at currently-existing crossing 
points. 
 
¶10. (C) Turkish Cypriot officials have criticized 
Papadopoulos's "bullying provocation" and promised us that 
the bridge "would definitely come down soon."  They insist 
that as the "sovereign president of he TRNC", this is Talat's 
call to make.  Off the record, however, "PM" Soyer and 
Talat's private Secretary Asim Akansoy confess that it is not 
a done deal.  According to them, Talat's January 4 visit to 
Istanbul was an "emergency consultation" with Turkish PM 
Erdogan and FM Gul.  They reportedly offered their quiet 
support to the removal of the bridge as a way to stay "on 
step ahead" of Papadopoulos, but gave no hint of sticking 
their necks out for Talat with regard to TGS Chief Buyukanit 
or the military.  Talat's January 5 meeting with Buyukanit 
is, they say, likely to be more difficult -- and constitutes 
a last-ditch attempt to win military approval to take down 
the bridge. 
 
COMMENT: TALAT'S CREDIBILITY ON THE LINE 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶11. (C) A fully-functional Ledra Street crossing seems 
unlikely any time soon, even if the bridge comes down. 
Although the bridge has distracted attention from this fact 
for over a year, the GOC remains ambivalent (to say the 
least) about the wisdom of opening a checkpoint that would be 
politically and economically very beneficial to the Turkish 
Cypriots.  Papadopoulos's decision to attach additional 
conditions could easily be viewed as attempt to create 
fall-back pretexts to delay the checkpoint further. 
 
¶12. (C) The current Ledra Street situation is about more than 
just another checkpoint.  What started as an apparently 
honest (if clumsy and uncoordinated) attempt by Talat to 
seize the initiative in the Cyprus problem has quickly 
lurched into a crisis. After seeking and receiving public 
messages of support for his decision from us, the UK, and 
 
NICOSIA 00000021  003 OF 003 
 
 
UNFICYP, Talat has yet to deliver.  More ominously, Talat has 
challenged the army in the arena of security, where the 
Turkish Cypriots have traditionally held very little sway. 
If he cannot prevail upon them to accept his right to decide 
in this matter, his legitimacy as a leader, both in the eyes 
of the international community and here on the island, will 
be in tatters.  Talat could conceivably make good on his (so 
far private) threat to resign if this episode proves that he 
is, indeed, merely a Turkish puppet.  Even if the talk of 
resignation is just a bluff, however, a humiliating defeat 
would severely limit Talat's leeway to engage constructively 
in the Gambari process.  END COMMENT. 
ZIMMERMAN