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RR RUEHBC RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHLH RUEHPA RUEHPW RUEHROV
DE RUEHNM #0076/01 0260852
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 260852Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY NIAMEY
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3209
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUCNISL/ISLAMIC COLLECTIVE
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0498
RUFGNOA/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NIAMEY 000076 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AF/W FOR BACHMAN; INR/AA FOR BOGOSIAN; PARIS FOR AFRICA 
WATCHER; PASS TO USAID FOR AMARTIN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/26/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PTER PINR EAID SOCI KDEM NG
SUBJECT: ISLAM IN NIGER (2): STUMBLING BLOCKS FOR IZALA IN 
THE "EXODE ZONE" 
 
REF: 06 NIAMEY 1193 
 
Classified By: POLITICAL OFFICER ZACH HARKENRIDER FOR REASON 1.4 (D) 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1. (C) Reftel offered several themes to be examined in a 
series of cables on Islam in Niger. In this edition, Poloff 
reports on conversations with a prominent Imam that 
illuminate the extent of fundamentalist penetration into the 
central Nigerien region of Tahoua - an area linked by 
proximity and language both to northern Nigeria's Sharia 
states and Algeria / Mali. We examine the role of Middle 
Eastern and South Asian clergy in spreading fundamentalist 
doctrine, the strength of traditional Sufi clergy, and the 
effects of economic migration on religious practice. 
Conclusions defied certain expectations. 
 
¶2. (C) Poloff discovered some very simple but effective 
barriers to the spread of foreign Islamic fundamentalism in 
Niger. While trade and economic migration transmit new 
interpretations of Islam, they do not do so consistently; 
where Nigeriens go determines what they bring back, and 
Tahoua Hausas usually give the fundamentalist zone of Nigeria 
a pass. Foreign preachers are spreading fundamentalist 
doctrines, but their influence and effectiveness are limited 
by language barriers and the reluctance of moderate 
establishment clergy to give them space. Traditional 
authorities remain strong, and their moderate, Sufi Islam is 
holding fast in this part of Hausaland. END SUMMARY 
 
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TAHOUA AND THE "EXODE:" A LEGACY 
OF ECONOMIC MIGRATION 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (U) Tahoua is an interesting test case by virtue of its 
role as a conduit for north / south trade and its peoples' 
tradition of seasonal economic migration toward coastal 
Africa. Both, presumably, would make Tahoua's Hausa villagers 
less isolated than other Nigeriens and more likely to come 
into contact with foreign theologies. The city of Tahoua sits 
on the main north / south highway that runs from Nigeria 
toward Algeria. The region of Tahoua extends from the border 
town of Birni N'Konni in the south to isolated nomadic 
communities bordering Algeria and Mali in the north. When 
people and goods move between the West African coast and the 
Mahgreb, they move through Tahoua region. Seasonal economic 
migration or "exode" by Tahoua region's mostly Hausa 
population is a phenomenon of long standing. While exode is a 
national phenomenon, Tahoua is widely acknowledged to be the 
principal source of migrants. Traditionally, the migrant 
route led to the West African coast. More recently, Libya has 
become a favored destination. These Nigeriens villagers 
return home with money and ideas from the country's near 
abroad, often building houses or improving their farms with 
their savings. The scale of exode here means that ordinary 
villagers from Tahoua spend less time at home and enjoy more 
contact with neighboring cultures than their counterparts 
from other regions. 
 
-------------------------------- 
IMAM MOUSTAPHA: SUFISM AND IZALA 
IN THE "EXODE" ZONE 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (U) Poloff examined the implications of this contact for 
the region's religious culture during a December trip there. 
Our concern was with the spread of fundamentalist Islamic 
doctrines in a cultural zone traditionally dominated by 
moderate, syncretistic Sufi theology. This can be defined 
more specifically as the challenge posed to the dominant 
Tidjaniya and Quadiriyya Sufi orders and their Maliki 
(Egyptian origin) jurisprudence by "Ihiyaus Sunnah wa 
Ikhmatul Bidi'ah," or Izala, and its Hanbali (Saudi origin) 
jurisprudence. NOTE: The foregoing translates from Hausa as 
"in favor of Sunna and against innovation." Ironically, this 
derives from the title of a book, famous in Hausaland, by the 
19th century Fulani cleric Ousmane Dan Fodio. Dan Fodio, who 
founded the Sokoto Caliphate, was a Quadiriyya Sufi. END NOTE 
 
¶5. (C) In Tahoua on December 8, Poloff met with Imam Ahmed 
Moustapha, who, at only 40 years of age, is the region's most 
 
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prominent cleric. The Imam of the city's Grand Mosque and an 
emerging leader of the moderate, GON affiliated Islamic 
Association of Niger (AIN), Moustapha has been a mission 
contact for the past few years. He preaches to a few thousand 
worshippers each Friday, and hosts a radio show through which 
he dispenses spiritual advice to a broad listenership. Like 
most Nigerien religious leaders, he can be broadly described 
as a Tidjaniya Sufi. 
 
¶6. (C) Our relationship with Imam Moustapha is a testament to 
the value of the public diplomacy (PD) efforts from which it 
derives. The Imam had participated in a PD "caravan," in 
2006, traveling to various cities for discussions on Islam 
keynoted by an American Islamic scholar. In 2005 he hosted an 
American Imam - Bachir Arafat - who lectured on Islam in the 
US, and served as his Hausa translator during a service at 
Tahoua's Grand Mosque. During his discussion with Poloff, 
Moustapha stressed the importance and desirability of further 
cultural exchanges on religion, noting that a true 
understanding of Islam was best arrived at via a discursive, 
participatory process such as that of the PD caravan lecture 
tour. 
 
¶7. (C) While our discussion was wide-ranging, the most 
important elements pertained to the Sufi / Izala dynamic in 
Tahoua. Poloff was interested to see what inroads 
fundamentalist theology was making in this famous exode 
center. Imam Moustapha argued that Izala played only a 
limited role in the spiritual life of the people, noting that 
the sect could claim only one mosque out of twelve principal 
mosques in the city. He estimated that the Izalas only 
attracted ten or twenty regular parishioners, mostly young 
people of a more absolutist disposition. He traced their 
development in Tahoua back to the late 1980s, and speculated 
that they received money from Nigeria and from their national 
association. 
 
¶8. (C) The Imam offered two explanations for Izala's limited 
role in Tahoua: that Sufi traditional chiefs still exercise a 
veto over mosque construction, sermon content, and the right 
to preach. Any foreign preacher who wishes to work in Tahoua 
must pre-clear his sermon content with traditional chiefs and 
Imam Moustapha. The Sufi orders monitor the preaching and 
will expel those who preach heresy, violence, or intolerance 
from the city's principal mosques. Moustapha also argued that 
most foreign preachers who came bearing fundamentalist 
theology were from the Middle East or South Asia, not, 
interestingly enough, from Northern Nigeria. He noted that 
the effectiveness of foreign preachers from Pakistan, Saudi 
Arabia, or India is limited by the language barrier. Able to 
communicate only in Arabic, South Asian languages, or 
possibly English, these foreign preachers depend on the good 
offices of locals for the Arabic to Hausa translation that 
would render their messages intelligible. Arabic speakers 
(like English speakers) are few and far between in Niger, and 
tend to be well educated and therefore moderate Sufi Muslims. 
Usually, such scholars hail from moderate "establishment" 
theological institutions like the Islamic University of Say 
in Niger, or Al-Azhar University in Cairo. These clerics are 
theological opponents of Izalist fundamentalism. COMMENT: 
This theory implies that the quality of Arabic language 
instruction in Niger's numerous French/Arabic medium 
high-schools is rather poor. That is an assumption that Post 
may examine at greater length as part of PD section's 
reporting on education in Niger. END COMMENT. 
 
¶9. (C) In any event, this linguistic "hedge" may constitute a 
barrier to the importation of extremist theology from the 
Middle-East and South Asia, but it would not blunt the impact 
of Izalists from Hausa speaking Northern Nigeria. This is 
where the particularities of the Tahoua exode come into play. 
While Hausas from Maradi or Zinder tend to migrate to and 
trade with Nigeria, Tahoua Hausas have traditionally been 
attracted to Cote d'Ivoire. Poloff's visit to Tahoua and some 
of its principal exode towns suggests that this tradition 
persists in spite of the troubles in Cote d'Ivoire. Missing 
the "Izala zone" by dint of historical happenstance, Tahoua's 
Hausas lack the historical, economic, and cultural contacts 
that transmit change. This strange lacuna explains the Imam's 
claim that Tahoua sees few Nigerian preachers, and qualifies 
an old axiom, which holds that Niger and Nigeria are so 
closely linked that when the latter gets a cold, the former 
sneezes. 
 
¶10. (C) Imam Moustapha capped off our discussion of Sufism by 
 
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taking Poloff to visit the city's chief Marabout, or 
religious teacher / witch-doctor, the Sarkin Malamye. In a 
testament to his popularity and political pull, the 
residential street leading to Malamye's compound was blocked 
to all but VIP vehicles. His house, like that of a 
traditional chief in Hausaland, had a small mosque at the 
front. Poloff was pleased to see a PD produced "Mosques of 
America" calendar inside, likely a gift from Imam Moustapha. 
After a brief conversation, the Sarkin blessed us with prayer 
and invited Emboffs to visit again. 
 
----------------------------- 
COMMENT: SUFISM & SYNCRETISM 
ALIVE AND WELL IN HAUSALAND 
----------------------------- 
 
¶11. (C) The Sarkin Malamye, regarded by local Sufis as rich 
in religious and magical knowledge, personifies the 
syncretism that lies at the heart of Niger's African Islam. 
Nigeriens believe in their Marabouts; in the Sufi theology 
they teach, and in the charms and amulets they bless and 
dispense. It is this fusion of Islam and traditional cultural 
practice that Izalists seek to expunge in favor of a more 
globally consistent Islamic culture grounded exclusively in 
fundamental texts. This ideological conflict has led a 
prominent academic observer of Hausaland to characterize 
Islamization as "de-Africanization." Efforts to de-Africanize 
Nigerien Islam appear to face an up-hill battle in Tahoua, 
where figures like Imam Moustapha and Sarkin Malamye enjoy a 
great following. 
 
¶12. (C) A trading town in the Hausa zone with a mobile 
population, Tahoua should be wide-open for Nigerian style 
fundamentalism. Izala's weak performance there shows how 
patchy the spread of theology from Nigeria and the Near East 
can be. Thwarted in Tahoua by circumstances of history and 
language and by the tenacity of tradition, Izala's reach 
appears limited even in Hausaland. Perhaps the example of 
Ousmane Dan Fodio, unwitting contributor of Izala's full 
name, is apposite. He too waged a "jihad" to de-Africanize 
Islamic practice, but two centuries later it is his spiritual 
legatees who keep African style syncretism alive and well in 
Niger. END COMMENT. 
ALLEN