VZCZCXRO1447
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHNJ #0085/01 0291530
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 291530Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4856
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 NDJAMENA 000085 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AIDAC 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF/C, AF/SPG, PRM, AND ALSO PASS USAID/W 
USAID/DCHA FOR MHESS, WGARVELINK, LROGERS 
DCHA/OFDA   FOR  KLUU,  GGOTTLIEB,  AFERRARA,   ACONVERY, 
AMALLEY 
DCHA/FFP FOR WHAMMINK, JDWORKEN, MLOUSTAUNOU 
DCHA/OTI FOR HUBER 
USAID/AFR/WA FOR CGARRET 
STATE/AF/C FOR MASHRAF 
STATE/S/CRS FOR PNELSON-DOUVELIS/JVANCE/JBEIK 
STATE/PRM FOR GPARKER 
GENEVA FOR NKYLOH 
USEUCOM FOR USAID WANDERSON 
NSC FOR TSHORTLEY 
USUN FOR TMALY 
BRUSSELS FOR PLERNER 
KHARTOUM FOR KALMQUIST, KLAUER 
USMISSION UN ROME FOR RNEWBERG, HSPANOS 
NAIROBI FOR JMYER 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: EAID PREF PGOV PHUM SOCI KCRS
SUBJECT:  Eastern Chad: USAID Assessment of Internally 
Displaced Communities, Findings and Recommendations 
 
Ref:  A) Ndjamena 50   B) Ndjamena 65  (C) Ndjamena 75 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1.  Summary: A USG humanitarian assessment team spent two 
weeks in Chad, including ten days in the East, 
investigating reports of internal displacement and 
assessing humanitarian conditions and response for the 
affected communities.  This is the fourth and final cable 
from the team and includes key findings and 
recommendations. The full report with discussion of the 
findings, along with a debriefing from the team, will be 
submitted shortly to USAID in Washington, DC. 
 
¶2.  At present, there is no definitive agreement on the 
number of internally displaced persons (IDPs), with 
estimates ranging from 75,000 to 112,000.  The team 
recommends that a profile of the affected communities be 
prepared, ideally lead by the U.N. Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). 
Coordination among humanitarian agencies should be 
enhanced with OCHA taking a stronger lead in analyzing 
the needs of the IDPs, as well as the causes of 
displacement and potential for returns. 
 
¶3.  Insecurity and U.N. Phase IV security measures have 
limited humanitarian presence and capacity in the field. 
A U.N. multidimensional force could increase humanitarian 
space, at a minimum through route security, allowing 
humanitarian assistance to reach those most in need. 
 
¶4.  Key response priorities include water, food, and food 
security as IDPs rapidly exhaust coping mechanisms and 
deplete resources already stretched by the presence of 
220,000 Sudanese refugees.  Stocks must be pre-positioned 
prior to the start of the rainy season in July.  Air 
operations should be enhanced, both in terms of air 
capacity and coordination, in order to boost humanitarian 
presence, increase mobility, and assist in the evacuation 
of humanitarian personnel in the event of an emergency. 
 
¶5.  The causes of displacement are complex and vary from 
location to location.  An enhanced understanding of the 
sources of instability is necessary to better provide 
assistance to the affected population.  In addition, an 
effort should be made to tap into local civil society 
groups and traditional mechanisms to strengthen conflict 
mitigation among all parties in the east.  End Summary. 
 
USG Assessment Team 
------------------- 
 
¶6.  A USG humanitarian assessment team traveled to Chad 
from January 14 to 27, 2007.  Team members represented 
USAID's Office of  Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), 
Office of Food for Peace (FFP), and Office of Transition 
Initiatives (OTI), as well as the U.S. Department of 
State's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and 
Stabilization (S/CRS) and the Department of Defense's 
European Command (EUCOM). 
 
¶7.  The primary objective of the mission was to 
investigate reports of rising numbers of IDPs in eastern 
Chad, determine where they are, who is responding to 
their needs and the adequacy of that response.  According 
to the U.N., IDP figures grew steadily in spring of 2006, 
leveled off during the rainy season of July to mid- 
September, and then nearly doubled by the end of 
 
NDJAMENA 00000085  002 OF 006 
 
 
December.  The team also paid particular attention to the 
needs of Chadian local communities struggling to share 
already stretched resources with the growing IDP 
population. 
 
¶8.  During its time in Chad, the team met with a range of 
actors, including Chadian officials and representatives 
of the French Military, U.N. agencies, non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), and donor agencies.  The team spent 
nine days in eastern Chad, visiting Abeche, Farchana, 
Bahai, and Iriba.  The team visited Gaga, Farchana, Oure 
Cassoni, and Iridimi refugee camps and IDP congregation 
sites in and around Goz Bagar and Goundiang.  Due to 
insecurity, the team was unable to travel to Goz Beida as 
desired. 
 
IDP Figures 
----------- 
 
¶9.  Finding:  There is no definitive agreement on IDP 
numbers, with a range of 75,000-110,000 estimated by 
various organizations.  The USG team believes the reality 
is somewhere in between, due to secondary displacement 
making  double counting possible .  The team found that a 
system for updating and tracking numbers, including 
accounting for second and even third wave displacement, 
was lacking.  An actual count of IDPs has not been 
conducted to date.  Further, no humanitarian profile has 
been undertaken to ascertain the age distribution (number 
of adults, children) gender, or socio-economic level of 
the IDP population. 
 
Recommendation: 
 
-- Conduct a profile of IDPs and their areas of origin. 
The U.N. system does not have a handle on the problem, 
but understands a study needs to be done in order to 
better  plan  and assist affected populations.  A single 
database should be designed by a lead organization and 
used by partner organizations to collect information that 
can guide the relief effort.  While an IDP survey would 
be beneficial, the team does not recommend officially 
registering IDPs as this is likely to contribute to 
dependency and prevent them from seizing the option to 
return home. 
 
Humanitarian Situation 
---------------------- 
 
¶10.  Finding:  The needs of the IDPs in eastern Chad vary 
greatly, with some requiring immediate assistance and 
others able to cope only for a short period of time.  As 
coping mechanisms become exhausted in the coming weeks 
and as the rainy season approaches, a comprehensive 
strategy will be required to appropriately assist the 
IDPs.  To date, the humanitarian community has not 
accurately or consistently measured the greatly varying 
needs of the IDPs and response has been based on rapid 
assessments and one-off distributions.  The three 
priority humanitarian needs are water, food, and food 
security, followed by non-food items and health. 
Humanitarian protection assistance must be integrated 
into each of these sectors and monitored closely. 
 
Recommendations: 
 
-- Boost USAID presence in eastern Chad.  Deploy a USAID 
field officer during the critical period before the rainy 
season to follow up on these recommendations and continue 
 
NDJAMENA 00000085  003 OF 006 
 
 
monitoring and reporting. 
 
-- Pre-position essential relief stocks.  U.N. agencies 
must pre-position essential relief stock by June before 
the rains begin in order to avert pipeline blockages from 
impassable roads.   USAID should be prepared to make 
immediate contributions to the U.N. World Food Program 
(WFP), the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR), and possibly the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and NGOs for food and 
non-food items (NFIs). 
 
-- Prioritize water and food security and maintain access 
to health care.  USAID should provide additional funding 
to existing (and potentially new) partners for 
humanitarian assistance activities focused on addressing 
IDP and host community needs, particularly on increasing 
potable water supply, distributing food rations, and 
providing agricultural inputs where IDPs have access to 
land. 
 
-- Target locations for immediate food distribution. 
Request WFP finalize assessments of IDP sites and provide 
food to NGO partners immediately in Dogdore and Goz Beida 
to prevent declining nutrition and ward off conflict. 
 
-- Assess and document vulnerability of IDP populations. 
USAID should encourage the U.N. to  implement a 
systematic methodology of assessing and documenting 
vulnerability of IDP populations.  Short- to medium-term 
implementation recommendations should derive from this 
process.  USAID should be prepared to provide additional 
financial support to the U.N. in this effort. 
 
-- Continue joint U.N./NGO assessments.  The 
international community must make rapid headway in 
assessing the needs of IDPs in the various sites 
(currently at least 25 distinct locations).  The U.N., 
ideally OCHA, should take the lead in coordinating this 
effort including the integration of other relief 
agencies' assessments into a common database. 
 
-- Provide assistance on a community-based approach. 
Additional support to NGOs and the U.N. should be 
consistent with a global strategy for eastern Chad that 
recognizes assistance should be based on vulnerability 
criteria and not IDP status exclusively.  The team 
recommends a holistic approach to provide relief in 
catchment areas so as not to contribute to IDP 
concentrations. 
 
-- Support protection surveys and mainstream protection 
assistance.  The vast majority of IDPs are women and 
children, and efforts should be made to support their 
livelihoods and need for mobility.  In addition, 
humanitarian agencies should monitor the threat of forced 
recruitment of children into armed factions. 
 
-- Utilize USAID-supported Internews to enhance 
humanitarian messaging.  Tailored information for IDPs 
should be developed to lessen anxieties and to improve 
their ability to make well-informed decisions. 
 
Impact of U.N. Phase IV Security 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶11.  Finding:  The precarious security situation and U.N. 
Phase IV security measures are limiting humanitarian 
presence and consequently constraining humanitarian 
 
NDJAMENA 00000085  004 OF 006 
 
 
activities in eastern Chad.  The Phase IV security level 
has resulted in a dramatic reduction of humanitarian 
presence, with U.N. agencies and NGOs withdrawing 
approximately 50 percent of staff from field locations in 
the East.  With reduced staff and increased security 
restrictions, humanitarian agencies are able to provide 
only the most essential services to beneficiaries and 
often prioritize refugee assistance over host community 
or IDP programs.  Despite varying threat levels 
throughout the East, a constant concern of the 
humanitarian community is the limited capacity of the 
U.N. to evacuate humanitarian workers in the event of an 
emergency. 
 
Recommendations: 
 
-- Secure humanitarian space.  The deployment of a U.N. 
multidimensional force should include a mandate to secure 
and potentially increase humanitarian space.   The 
mission should secure humanitarian corridors to ensure 
safe and regular access to vulnerable populations. 
 
-- Increase air capacity in the east.  Additional 
aircraft, particularly during the rainy season, are 
essential not only to enhance evacuation capacity, but 
also to increase humanitarian access and mobility. 
 
-- Augment field security capacity within U.N. agencies. 
The U.N. should be encouraged to increase  capacity to 
better analyze threats and risks to humanitarian workers 
and activities.  In addition, the U.N. Department of 
Safety and Security (UNDSS) should deploy 
security/analytical officers to field locations in the 
East.  This enhanced understanding and presence would 
allow for more frequent and localized evaluations of 
security, which may allow for some areas to downgrade to 
Phase III. 
 
Coordination and Response Capacity 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶12.  Finding:  The present level of coordination among 
humanitarian agencies is insufficient to address the 
complex IDP situation in eastern Chad.  The team noted 
significant goodwill toward having OCHA take the lead 
coordination role for IDPs in eastern Chad.  Further, 
U.N. agencies and NGOs currently lack the capacity to 
adequately plan and implement activities to address the 
immediate needs of the growing IDP population.  While the 
need exists for leadership in the coordination of 
assessments and generally defining geographical and 
sectoral scopes for implementing agencies, pressure is 
mounting daily for tangible results to be evident on the 
ground.  If implementation of activities is not increased 
immediately, there is a fear that tensions will rise 
between the displaced, the local population, and the 
humanitarian community. 
 
Recommendations: 
 
-- Press for enhanced coordination capacity.  OCHA must 
enhance its capacity immediately.  USAID should encourage 
OCHA in New York to assign a seasoned and well-respected 
senior-level coordinator for eastern Chad, to be based in 
Abeche for the coming pre-rainy season period.  OCHA 
might tap into its agreements with the U.K. Department 
for International Development (DFID) and Swedish Rescue 
Services Agency, to deploy experienced personnel and 
support equipment in eastern Chad. 
 
NDJAMENA 00000085  005 OF 006 
 
 
 
-- Request a coordinated strategy from the U.N.  In 
coordination with other major donors, USAID should 
propose a firm deadline for the U.N. to present a 
coordinated strategy for addressing the IDP situation. 
The strategy should demonstrate an understanding of the 
root causes of displacement as well as an action plan for 
meeting the unique needs of a highly divergent and mobile 
IDP population. 
 
-- Fund air operations support mechanisms to increase 
response capacity.  At least one more plane to the Abeche 
hub for locations in the East and ideally a larger long- 
haul aircraft to facilitate movement from Ndjamena to 
Abeche should be added to the fleet. The services of a 
helicopter during the rainy season to access remote IDP 
areas should be considered. 
 
-- Designate a lead NGO for each of the five IDP zones. 
OCHA should identify and select NGOs with demonstrated 
experience in each of the five geographic zones with IDP 
populations. 
 
-- Increase donor coordination to focus on priority 
actions to include cost sharing on increasing critical 
operational activities such as air and security support. 
USAID should reach out to ECHO and DFID in particular to 
discuss the recommendations of this report. 
 
Sources of Instability 
---------------------- 
 
¶13.  Finding:  The conflict in eastern Chad is multi- 
layered with displacement caused by local ethnic 
conflicts sparked by the spillover of the Darfur crisis, 
as well as by movements of Chadian rebel groups against 
the Chadian government (GOC) and the GOC government 
arming of local self-defense forces.  The exact 
manifestation of the conflict takes on unique 
characteristics and dynamics in the northern, central, 
and southern zones of eastern Chad.  In all of eastern 
Chad, banditry and impunity for perpetrators threaten 
humanitarian operations.  In areas along the border, the 
GOC is largely absent, contributing to instability and 
ensuring that IDPs will not return in the near future. 
In the North, the key issues are the presence of armed 
elements in refugee camps, attracting the attention of 
the Government of Sudan and exposing the area to bombing 
raids.  In the South, the situation is more complex, with 
the interlocking concerns of Chadian rebel movements, 
cross-border raids, and inter-communal tensions. 
 
Recommendations: 
 
-- Increase humanitarian space.  Humanitarian space can 
be created by a forceful U.N. peacekeeping operation that 
will concentrate efforts on route security, and providing 
a significant presence in refugee and IDP areas. 
 
-- Bolster advocacy on the issue of insecurity.  The U.N. 
and donor agencies should increase advocacy within the 
international community on the issue of security in the 
East. 
 
-- Enhance understanding of the causes of instability. 
USAID, through the Embassy and USAID representatives in 
Ndjamena, should identify civil society groups and engage 
them in discussions on opportunities for grass-roots 
peace processes.  U.N. coordination should carry out more 
 
NDJAMENA 00000085  006 OF 006 
 
 
extensive research on the conflict, consulting with 
knowledgeable individuals in the Chadian and 
international community.  USAID should contract Tufts 
University to undertake a study on the underlying 
economic and ethnic issues that are driving instability 
in the East.   An approach similar to that taken in 
Darfur in 2005 might be considered. 
 
Conflict Prevention, Mitigation, and Resolution 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶14.  Finding:  Multiple forces have contributed to the 
displacements in eastern Chad, but relatively little is 
understood about the dynamics that would enable 
reconciliation.  Traditional means of conflict resolution 
at the village level are proving inadequate to address 
the current situation; voices in defense of human rights 
are either not present or ineffective to help resolve 
these issues. 
 
Recommendation: 
 
-- Enhance analysis of conflict and develop mitigation 
strategies.  USAID should analyze how best to approach 
the issue of understanding the conflict dynamics in 
eastern Chad.  Options include organizing a study 
conference to determine next steps, engaging academia 
with experience in this arena (such as Tufts University 
mentioned above) to recommend an advocacy program, or 
encouraging local civic society groups to start working 
now on conflict prevention. 
 
WALL