VZCZCXRO7431
OO RUEHDE RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHNR #5403 0021024
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 021024Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6271
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUCNSOM/SOMALIA COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA  IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T NAIROBI 005403 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/E, AF/RSA, AND A/S FRAZER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/02/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER ASEC MOPS SO ET KE
SUBJECT: SOMALIA - SHEIKH SHARIF AND THE FUTURE ROLE OF 
ISLAMIC COURTS MODERATES 
 
Classified By: Ambassador ranneberger for reasons 1.4 (b,d) 
 
 ¶1. Although Sheikh Sharif, the head of the Islamic Courts, 
executive branch has sometimes made harsh public statements, 
he is considered by most knowledgeable observers to be a 
moderate (the Ambassador took away that impression from his 
late August 2006 meeting with Sharif).  Sharif is a respected 
and influential figure within Somalia and someone who could 
presumably contribute to dialogue and support for a 
broad-based national government.  Sharif,s close 
relationship with TFG Parliament Speaker Hassan could be 
helpful in that context.  (Interestingly, Hassan said that 
TFG PM Gedi and Sharif are close relatives, although this was 
probably metaphorical since they are of different clans.) 
 
¶2. While the Ambassador had made clear that channels were 
open for future contact, Sharif never followed up on the 
August meeting.  The reason is likely that he lacked the 
authority to produce from the Islamic Courts, radicals what 
we requested in terms of action against terrorists. 
 
¶3. After consultation with Washington, the Ambassador managed 
to reach Sharif by phone in Kismayo on December 31.  Islamic 
Courts, Foreign Minister Addow participated in the call from 
the Ambassador,s residence.  The Ambassador told Sharif that 
it was the U.S. view that he could play an important role in 
helping to promote peace and stability in Somalia.  He 
indicated that the U.S. was prepared to recommend that Kenya 
help bring him to Nairobi if he were prepared to give his 
commitment that he was willing to work to support peace and 
stability in Somalia based on the TFG Charter and the TFIs 
and to reject terrorism (he had already made the latter 
position clear in his August discussion with the Ambassador). 
 Sharif expressed appreciation for the Ambassador,s efforts. 
 Sharif said that he wanted to be part of the future of 
Somalia, but said that he could not leave Kismayo given that 
fighting had already begun. 
 
¶4. Interestingly, TFG Speaker Hassan told the Ambassador 
January 1 that he spoke with Sharif following the 
Ambassador,s conversation with Sharif.  Sharif told Hassan 
that he wanted to accept the offer to come to Nairobi, but 
that he could not.  The presence of hardline members of the 
Islamic Courts in the room when Sharif was speaking to the 
Ambassador prevented him from having a frank discussion. 
Sharif later told Hassan that he used the U.S. discussion 
with him to argue that the possibility was still open for the 
Courts to play a role in the future of Somalia, but that 
further violence would have to be avoided, and that this 
accounted for the only very limited resistence in the Kismayo 
area.  (Trying to turn what was a rout into political capital 
with us certainly calls into question Sharif,s credibility.) 
 
¶5. Sharif is presumably now in flight somewhere in southern 
Somalia near the Kenyan border.  It remains to be seen 
whether he will try to disengage himself from likely hardline 
elements he is with, seek to get across the border, and seek 
to play a constructive role in building Somalia,s future. 
Hassan said that he is trying to get into contact with Sharif 
via a Thuraya phone.  The Ambassador told Hassan that, while 
Sharif,s failure to seize the opportunity on the 31st 
smacked of deliberate obfuscation, the channels are still 
open for discussion with him on the same terms. 
RANNEBERGER