VZCZCXRO7429
OO RUEHDE RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHNR #5401/01 0021022
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O 021022Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6268
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUCNSOM/SOMALIA COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA  IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NAIROBI 005401 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/E, AF/RSA, AND A/S FRAZER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/02/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER ASEC MOPS SO ET KE
SUBJECT: SOMALIA DISCUSSIONS WITH TFG FOREIGN MINISTER HURRE 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ranneberger for reasons 1.4 (b,d). 
 
¶1.  (C) As the Somalia crisis has unfolded, TFG Foreign 
Minister Hurre, who has been in Nairobi throughout, has been 
a useful source of information and insights into TFG actions. 
 While he does not have much political clout within the TFG, 
he is in close contact with Yusuf and Gedi and reliably 
passages messages.  He is also usefully frank. 
 
¶2.  (C) During a December 30 discussion with the Ambassador, 
Hurre insisted that, after some initial stumbling, Yusuf and 
Gedi have both gotten onto the right message on the need for 
dialogue with all segments of Somalia.  He correctly pointed 
out that the way in which the TFG proceeds to set up the 
local administration for Somalia will demonstrate whether the 
governing process will be inclusive.  That, in turn, will be 
key to maintaining security.   Hurre discussed the governing 
plan that the TFG Parliament adopted in April, 2006.  It 
provides for creation of a governing structure for the 18 
regions and 92 districts of Somalia.  The plan calls for 
mini-reconciliation conferences to be held in each district. 
The conferences will select (not elect) their local 
government.  There will then be a district-level 
reconciliation conference to select the district government. 
The TFG will facilitate the holding of these reconciliation 
conferences.  The conferences are supposed to use the TFG 
Charter 4.5 clan-sharing formula as their guideline in 
choosing officials.  This approach has already been carried 
out in the Bay regions, Hurre said.  He added that the 
holding of these conferences, once sufficient security has 
been established, will require appropriate resources and 
support.  He appealed for U.S. assistance. 
 
¶3.  (C) Hurre was frank in discussing PM Gedi,s limitations. 
 Hurre said that there are two problems with Gedi:  he is new 
to politics and he has his own agenda to maintain himself in 
power.  Hurre recognized that most observers see Gedi as a 
block to achieve real reconciliation.  He has no credibility 
with his own Hawiye (Habr Gedir) clan, and selection of a new 
broadly-accepted Prime Minister will be important to help 
achieve national reconciliation.  Nevertheless, Hurre said, 
the situation is too fluid and uncertain now to replace Gedi. 
 Hurre said that Gedi is likely to survive as PM for at least 
several more months, but would eventually be replaced. 
 
¶4.  (C) Hurre talked about Yusuf,s commitment to dialogue, 
but was quick to point out the tremendous challenges in 
achieving this.  The important Ayr sub-clan of the Hawiye has 
a history of opportunitistism, Hurre claimed, and helped 
serve as the militia of Aideed (the father who is not Ayr but 
Sa'ad).  (Separately, we were told that in a meeting with Ayr 
clan leaders, Yusuf emotionally asked why he should deal with 
them since they had killed his great grandfather.)  Yet 
another glimpse into the difficulties of organizing dialogue 
was provided by Hurre when he pointed out that the head of 
the ad hoc civil society/business committee formed in 
Mogadishu in recent days, a businessman named Dr. Mohammed 
Olussow, had a falling out with Yusuf over Olussow,s 
previous role as governor of the TFG central bank. 
 
¶5.  (C) While noting the very bad blood between Gedi and TFG 
Parliament Speaker Hassan, Hurre said it is nevertheless 
important to try to get Hassan to return to Somalia (he has 
refused to go back while Ethiopian forces are there because, 
he says, it precludes unfettered deliberations by the 
Parliament).  Hurre urged us to reach out to Arab countries 
to try to persuade Hassan to resume his participation in the 
TFG. 
 
¶6.  (C) Hurre said that the TFG declared martial law so that 
it could better control the movements of warlords.  He made a 
distinction between warlords like Dheere and Hirale, who 
fought with the TFG and who need to have prominent roles, and 
others like Qanyare and Qeybdid, who must be constrained. 
(Dheere, it should be remembered, vacated his seat in 
Parliament so that Gedi could assume it and then become Prime 
Minister.) 
 
¶7.  (C) Hurre said that Kenya has consistently been providing 
close support for the TFG.  Foreign Minister Tuju was 
supposed to travel to Baidoa with money for the TFG, but had 
to delay his trip given that the Kenyan treasury is closed 
for the holidays. 
 
¶8.  (U) Like Yusuf and Gedi, Hurre said that U.S. support and 
influence will be the most essential ingredient in helping to 
bring about an inclusive national government structure and 
long-term security. 
 
NAIROBI 00005401  002 OF 002 
 
 
RANNEBERGER