VZCZCXRO0745
RR RUEHDE RUEHDIR
DE RUEHMS #0083/01 0281058
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 281058Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY MUSCAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7712
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MUSCAT 000083 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2017 
TAGS: PARM PREL PHUM MOPS ETTC MNUC SO YE MU
SUBJECT: SOMALI MIGRANTS ENTER OMAN THROUGH OPEN BORDER 
WITH YEMEN 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Gary A. Grappo, reasons 1.4 b/d. 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  Emboffs recently visited sections of Oman's 
border with Yemen, observing that much of the border lacks 
fencing and generally is open to illegal traffic. Somali 
immigrants continue to enter Oman along well-traveled 
smuggling routes, though not in large numbers.  Many of the 
Somalis allegedly enter or transit Oman in search of 
employment, and contacts say their presence is having a 
negative effect on local security.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (C) During the week of January 15, poloff and the 
Embassy's Defense Attache (DATT) conducted an unofficial tour 
of the Oman-Yemen border between the ports of entry (POE) at 
Sarfayt, located on Oman's coast, and al-Mazyunah, 
approximately 140 kilometers inland.  Emboffs carried out the 
inspection to support a project of the Department's Export 
Control and Related Border Security Assistance (EXBS) 
program, which will provide the Royal Oman Police (ROP) with 
ground sensor equipment to monitor cross-border traffic and 
help secure Oman's southeastern border.  (Note: Post and EXBS 
intend to hand over the equipment during an official ceremony 
in Muscat in February.  The equipment, which includes sensors 
that detect heat, vibration, motion and magnetic fields, 
forms one component of a broad package of assistance to help 
Oman implement effective export control systems and prevent 
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and 
conventional weapons.  End note.) 
 
¶3. (C) In the course of discussions with ROP interlocutors in 
Salalah and at the POEs, a mid-ranking police officer based 
in Salalah informed emboffs that illegal migrants from 
Somalia continue to enter Oman regularly.  The officer told 
emboffs that since the last quarter of 2006, the ROP has been 
assisting in the deportation of approximately 150 Somalis per 
month as part of an ongoing operation.  He stated that on 
January 14, for example, the ROP transferred 74 Somalis from 
Arzaat prison near Salalah, where the ROP maintains a 
detention center for illegal immigrants, into the custody of 
Yemeni authorities.  The officer added, however, that many of 
the Somalis are repeat offenders, which makes it difficult to 
assess the actual number of Somalis trying to enter Oman. 
The source said that many of the deportees candidly tell him 
that they are not detained by Yemeni authorities after their 
return to Yemen, and therefore attempt to reenter Oman as 
early as two days after their deportation. 
 
¶4. (C) The officer told emboffs that he has been able to 
determine two of the main routes for entry into Oman through 
his conversations with Somali detainees.  One is by sea, in 
which Somalis travel by boat from Yemen to the secluded 
beaches near the Omani towns of Dhalqut and Rakhyut.  The 
other is by land, moving from the Yemeni town of al-Gaydah up 
through the relatively flat and open terrain near the Omani 
town of al-Mazyunah.  The source continued that once the 
Somalis enter Oman, they use phone numbers passed through a 
network of family and friends in Somalia to contact Omani 
citizens, who drive them to onward destinations inside Oman 
and elsewhere in the Gulf region. 
 
¶5. (C) The officer added that while units from the ROP and 
army collaborate to secure the border area, large stretches 
of the border are wide open and difficult to patrol.  The 
border area north of the ROP-manned POE at Sarfayt is 
mountainous with deep wadis (valleys), and largely 
inaccessible by vehicle.  He estimated that there are only 
five kilometers of fencing along the approximately 
140-kilometer border between Sarfayt and the POE at 
al-Mazyunah.  Emboffs confirmed that at present there is no 
fencing or other barrier to stop cross-border traffic along 
vast stretches of territory south of al-Mazyunah.  Emboffs 
saw evidence of frequent vehicular traffic across the desert 
between Oman and Yemen within five kilometers of the POE at 
al-Mazyunah, particularly through wadis that offer 
substantial cover from ground-based observation.  The ROP 
officer stated that most Somalis enter Oman under the cover 
of darkness, which, combined with the terrain, makes it 
difficult to interdict them. 
 
¶6. (C) The same source told emboffs that most of the Somalis 
who enter Oman are very poor.  He further stated that many 
enter Oman in bad physical condition; some of the Somalis 
taken into custody are without shoes.  The source described 
one detainee who had crossed the mountainous and desert 
terrain of the border region with a broken leg, using 
homemade crutches.  ROP contacts at Salalah's Arzaat Prison 
informed poloff on a previous trip to the region that many of 
the Somalis who enter Oman have UN refugee status in Yemen. 
They described the Somalis as primarily economic migrants 
 
MUSCAT 00000083  002 OF 002 
 
 
looking for work in Oman, or transiting the country for 
employment in the UAE.  All of emboff's ROP interlocutors 
said that the influx of impoverished Somalis is having a 
negative effect on the region's economy and security.  The 
ROP officer who spoke to emboffs on their trip to the border 
claimed that some are involved in petty theft, likely 
stealing from local households to help meet their basic 
needs, and are denuding the area's frankincense trees in 
order to harvest and sell the trees' sap.  While he 
acknowledged that some Somalis have had violent encounters 
with police and army units, the officer said that the vast 
majority appear to be unarmed and non-violent. 
 
¶7. (C) The ROP officer added that the paths Somalis use to 
enter Oman follow well-known smuggling routes for the 
transporting of guns and cars between Yemen, Oman and the 
UAE.  The officer told emboffs that he is aware of at least 
three instances during the past year in which the ROP has 
interdicted Toyota Land Cruisers loaded with handguns and 
other weapons of Russian and Chinese origin, entering Oman 
from Yemen near al-Mazyunha.  He and his colleagues believe 
that many more such vehicles pass police and army checkpoints 
undeterred, and that most of the smugglers head toward 
lucrative markets in the UAE via Oman's section of the Empty 
Quarter and the city of Ibri.  While the source did not make 
a direct connection between Somali immigrants and the gun 
trade, he said that the combination of weapons, smugglers, 
and poor and desperate people make the border region around 
al-Mazyunha a dangerous and volatile area. 
 
¶8. (C) Comment: Based on emboffs' observations and the 
comments of ROP interlocutors, much of Oman's border with 
Yemen is either unpatrolled or unprotected, and people and 
goods appear to move freely across it.  Contacts anticipate 
that the instability in Somalia likely will lead to an 
increase in the number of Somalis making their way overland 
or by sea to Oman.  The USG offer of ground sensors through 
EXBS should help Oman strengthen its border security in this 
area, though significant gaps likely will remain.  End 
comment. 
GRAPPO