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DE RUEHMK #0022/01 0091347
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 091347Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY MANAMA
TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6274
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHDC PRIORITY
RHBVAKS/COMUSNAVCENT  PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MANAMA 000022 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/08/2017 
TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS BA IZ IR BILAT OFFICIALS
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE GATES' 
JANUARY 17-19 VISIT TO BAHRAIN 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William T. Monroe for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
. 
 
¶1.  (C) Mr. Secretary, we warmly welcome your January 17-19 
visit to Bahrain.  The fifty-year U.S. Navy presence in 
Bahrain is the centerpiece of the U.S.-Bahrain bilateral 
relationship.  Bahrain considers the Navy to be its defense 
against external threats, starting with Iran, and has 
recently taken important steps to enhance bilateral relations 
further.  Bahrain generally supports our Iraq policy but 
believes we should draw down our forces, leaving only a 
rapid-reaction force in country.  The GOB wants the Iraqi 
government to shoulder the bulk of the security 
responsibilities and work more closely with its Arab 
neighbors.  The Bahraini government hopes the U.S. Navy will 
initiate a process allowing for the return of dependents to 
the country, citing the deterioration in the everyday, 
people-to-people contact that family members previously had 
with Bahrainis.  Your trip closely follows Secretary of the 
Navy Winter's late November visit and Chief of Naval 
Operations Mullen's late December visit. 
 
---------- 
Objectives 
---------- 
 
¶2.  (C) What we want from the visit: 
 
-- Public expression of support for U.S. policy in Iraq and a 
commitment, along with that of its fellow GCC member states, 
for pro-active Bahraini engagement with Iraq's leadership. 
 
-- Close coordination on Iran policy and development of 
strategies that go beyond sanctions contained in UNSCR 1737. 
 
-- Continued cooperation on regional maritime operations, 
including in Combined Task Forces (CTF) 150 and 152 in and 
around the Gulf. 
 
----------------------------- 
Issues of Interest to Bahrain 
----------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) The Bahrainis will want to hear from you on: 
 
-- A reaffirmation of the Navy's long-term commitment to 
Bahrain and a status update on the possible return of Navy 
dependents. 
 
-- A briefing on the way forward in Iraq, with particular 
emphasis on the Iraqi government's responsibilities and ways 
the GCC can engage and assist. 
 
-- Strategies to contain Iran while avoiding a military 
confrontation. 
 
------------------- 
Key Issues to Raise 
------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) We suggest you raise the following points: 
 
-- Recognize the long history of mil-mil cooperation with 
Bahrain, most notably through hosting NAVCENT.  Reaffirm the 
commitment of the U.S. Navy in Bahrain. 
 
-- Praise Bahrain's support for OEF, OIF, and U.S. policy on 
Iraq and Iran.  Commend Bahrain for sending its Special 
Forces contingent to Afghanistan in support of OEF, hosting 
and participating in Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) 
exercise Leading Edge in October, and formally joining the 
regional coalition naval task forces. 
 
-- Identify steps Bahrain can take to support our Iraq 
policy, both politically and in practical terms. 
 
-- Pledge to continue the close coordination between our two 
countries on Iran. 
 
-- Congratulate Bahrain for holding parliamentary and 
municipal elections in November/December and for the 
participation of all registered political societies, 
including oppositionists, in the elections. 
 
------------------------ 
Issues Background Briefs 
------------------------ 
 
 
MANAMA 00000022  002 OF 003 
 
 
------------------ 
Military Relations 
------------------ 
 
¶5.  (SBU) The U.S. Navy has worked closely with Bahrain for 
more than 50 years. When the U.S. Fifth Fleet was 
re-commissioned in 1995, Bahrain took the then-controversial 
step of being the first Gulf state to provide host government 
support for regionally "home-ported" U.S. Navy forces, and 
Bahrain remains the only country in the region which hosts a 
permanent component command headquarters.  NAVCENT directs 
naval operations in the Arabian Gulf, Arabian Sea, and Gulf 
of Aden in support of Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi 
Freedom, CJTF Horn of Africa, as well as Maritime 
Interception Operations to enable freedom of navigation and 
to prevent oil smuggling, piracy and various other operations 
in support of the Global War on Terrorism. 
 
¶6.  (C) Bahrain's relatively stable and secure political 
environment allows deployed U.S. Navy ships to stop, 
replenish supplies, and provide crews much needed onshore 
rest and recreation opportunities.  Bahrain is currently one 
of the U.S. Navy's busiest overseas ports. In direct support 
of OEF and OIF, Bahrain in 2003 deployed 1,500 troops, a tank 
battalion task force, and its frigate the RNBS Sabha to 
defend Kuwait. Bahrain also flew combat air patrols over 
Kuwait and Bahrain and continues to keep F-16s on 24-7 strip 
alert.  A special operations unit embedded in a UAE 
contingent deployed to Afghanistan in 2005.  Bahrain assigned 
three shore-based naval officers to work in the command post 
for maritime task force CTF-150, which covers the Strait of 
Hormuz to the Sea of Aden.  For CTF-152, which covers central 
Gulf waters, Bahrain has provided one frigate and two 
corvettes.  Bahrain is the only GCC country to participate in 
the CTFs. 
 
¶7.  (C) Bahrain has the smallest economy in the GCC and is 
quickly depleting a very limited petroleum reserve.  We have 
had active FMF and IMET programs in Bahrain for several years 
but the FMF program in particular has declined precipitously 
in recent years, from $90 million in 2003 to a budgeted $15 
million for FY 2007.  We are working closely with the 
Bahrainis to upgrade their early warning and air defense 
radar systems, an initiative that has been promoted in the 
USG-led interagency Gulf Security Dialogue.  Future programs 
include the sale of nine Blackhawk helicopters to the 
Bahraini Air Force ($200 million) and six Bell helicopters to 
the Ministry of Interior ($50 million). 
 
------------------ 
Next Steps on Iraq 
------------------ 
 
¶8.  (C) The GOB publicly supports U.S. operations in Iraq, 
but as King Hamad and Crown Prince Salman have told several 
recent U.S. delegations, it believes Iraqi forces should be 
moving to the front lines in place of coalition forces.  This 
would force Iraqis to take responsibility for their own 
security and put the GOI into the position of requesting 
assistance from its Arab neighbors, which the Bahrainis feel 
it has not yet done in a meaningful way.  The Crown Prince 
has recommended that the U.S. draw down and consolidate its 
military footprint in Iraq to a 50,000-member rapid-reaction 
force based outside of major population centers.  The GOB's 
greatest concern related to Iraq is that sectarian violence 
could spill over into Bahrain, which has a Shia-majority 
population ruled by a Sunni-controlled government.  The 
timing and manner of Saddam's execution exacerbated sectarian 
tensions in Bahrain.  GOB officials will support long-term 
measures to reduce sectarian violence while recognizing that 
the near-term situation in Iraq is extremely difficult. 
 
----------------- 
Dealing With Iran 
----------------- 
 
¶9.  (C) The Bahraini leadership is greatly concerned about 
the threat posed by Iran and increased tensions between Iran 
and the international community.  Crown Prince Salman has 
suggested several times that the U.S. and GCC countries hold 
a significant military exercise in the Gulf, which would send 
a strong signal to Iran.  Bahrain hosted and participated in 
PSI exercise Leading Edge in October, and the 
boarding/interrogation portion took place just outside its 
territorial waters. NAVCENT personnel were impressed with the 
Bahraini Navy's professionalism and aggressiveness during the 
exercise.  Bahrain has been an enthusiastic partner in the 
Gulf Security Dialogue initiative. 
 
MANAMA 00000022  003 OF 003 
 
 
 
¶10.  (C) Bahrain's relationship with Iran is complex.  The 
Bahraini leadership is united in its suspicion of Iranian 
intentions regarding Bahrain and often sees an Iranian hand 
in incidents involving Bahrain's Shia community, which 
comprises some two-thirds of the country's citizens.  They 
are convinced Iran seeks to develop nuclear weapons and 
assert its influence around the region.  At the same time, 
Bahrain faces the reality that it must live with its large 
neighbor across the Gulf.  Bahrain maintains "correct" but 
not warm diplomatic relations with Iran, with Bahraini 
leaders meeting with Iranian officials when they visit. 
Bahraini officials repeatedly assert their strong view that 
the international community should engage in diplomacy to 
deal with Iran, and not resort to a military solution.  They 
recognize, however, that a robust military posture can 
facilitate diplomacy.  Bahrain supports UNSCR 1737 but may be 
wary of implementing additional sanctions that go beyond the 
language of the resolution.  It is not clear that the 
Bahraini leadership has come to grips with how it will handle 
efforts to ratchet up the pressure on Iran if that includes 
cutbacks in trade and engagement. 
 
-------------------------- 
Return of U.S. Dependents 
-------------------------- 
 
¶11.  (C) Bahraini officials often reiterate their request 
that the U.S. Navy permit dependents to return to Bahrain. 
Crown Prince Salman, who is a graduate of the DOD Bahrain 
School and whose children now attend the school, is a 
particularly strong advocate for the everyday, 
people-to-people contact that is fostered by the presence of 
dependents.  Bahraini officials may urge that you reconsider 
the Navy's 2004 decision removing dependents from Bahrain. 
 
--------- 
Elections 
--------- 
 
¶12.  (C) Bahrain in November/December conducted its second 
set of parliamentary and municipal elections since the 
adoption of the 2002 constitution.  Some 70 percent of 
registered voters and all political societies participated in 
the elections, with oppositionists winning 18 of 40 seats in 
the elected lower house Council of Representatives. 
Thirty-five of the 40 seats are held by Islamists (Sunni and 
Shia) and membership is marked by a stark Sunni-Shia divide. 
One woman, Lateefa Al Qaoud, ran unopposed and is Bahrain's 
first female elected member of parliament.  Local election 
monitors have not yet released their findings, but the 
elections are seen as a major step forward in the King's 
democratic reform program. 
 
 
********************************************* ******** 
Visit Embassy Manama's Classified Website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/manama/ 
********************************************* ******** 
MONROE