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DE RUEHMU #0268/01 0301809
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 301809Z JAN 07 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8880
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 000268 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
WHA/CEN FOR SCHIFFER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/24/2017 
TAGS: KDEM PGOV ECON NU VE
SUBJECT: ORTEGA VICTORY CATALYST FOR CHAVEZ IN RAAN 
 
REF: A. MANAGUA 2247 
 
     ¶B. MANAGUA 2441 
     ¶C. MANAGUA 00182 
 
Classified By: Classified by Ambassador P. Trivelli for reason 1.4b/d 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: President Ortega, with backing from his Venezuelan counterpart Chavez, is consolidating power on Nicaragua's resource-rich Atlantic Coast. Miskito leaders believe Ortega and Chavez are conspiring to control the region's base of timber, minerals, and possibly oil, and that Chavez's commitment to build an oil pipeline and a highway linking the remote Atlantic Coast to the rest of Nicaragua may be connected to military interests. Since Venezuela announced a US$ 350 million road construction and airport expansion project in the region, opposition supporters have been threatened, former military personnel are being re-registered, and Ortega is attempting to halt the Miskito human rights lawsuit against him. Given that their communities are isolated and vulnerable, Miskito leaders are desperate for U.S. support to help organize and re-unify Miskito communities, and those who can afford to are seeking ways to relocate their children. Without immediate action, these leaders fear that Ortega and Chavez will "take over" the Atlantic Coast. End Summary.
 
¶2. (SBU) Ten days ago, on the heels of Daniel Ortega's presidential inauguration, the Miskito residents of Puerto Cabezas, the capital of Nicaragua's Northern Autonomous Region (RAAN), watched with a mix of curiosity and trepidation as Nicaraguan military helicopters swooped down upon this sleepy coastal town. Emerging from the helicopters was a mixed delegation of Cubans, Venezuelan military officials, and members of the new Ortega government who arrived to discuss a recently announced Venezuelan-financed $US 350 million project to expand the local airport and build a major highway connecting Puerto Cabezas with Rio Blanco, Matagalpa. With this introduction, on January 24 the Ambassador and emboffs sat back to listen as Miskito leaders Osorno Coleman, Alfonso Smith, Mateo Collins, and Felipe Mitchell described the situation unfolding in the RAAN, much of which they had predicted would happen under an Ortega Presidency.
 
Peace and Reconciliation - Empty Promises 
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¶3. (C) Within days of the Ortega's inauguration, Brooklyn Rivera, the leader of the YATAMA indigenous party - aligned with the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) since 2006 (Reftel A) - publicly announced that only FSLN-supporters would benefit from social and economic programs in the RAAN. In addition, Miskito leader Osorno Coleman, an outspoken critic of the FSLN who ran for a deputy seat in the 2006 elections on the Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance (ALN) ticket, reported that Rivera has repeatedly threatened him over the radio.
 
¶4. (C) Under the rubric of indemnification and support for veterans, the leaders reported that the FSLN has started a concerted campaign under the leadership of Rivera to register all ex-combatants in the RAAN. Suspecting nefarious motives, Coleman and the others expressed their serious concern. (Note: Several independent sources have reported similar registration campaigns throughout the country. End Comment.) 
 
¶5. (C) According to the Miskito leaders, Rivera was instrumental in blocking the oil exploration rights of two U.S. companies under the Bolanos government. However, within two weeks of his election, Ortega welcomed Venezuelan oil companies to explore the same region without protest from Rivera. This dramatic shift in position, insisted Coleman and the other leaders, has raised suspicion and doubt among Miskito residents about the new government's true intentions.
 
Venezuela - Full Court Press 
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¶6. (C) Emphasizing that Ortega cannot deliver on his campaign promises without the help of Chavez, the Miskito leaders believe that Ortega will auction off the Atlantic Coast's rich timber, mineral, and potential oil resources to Chavez in exchange for his continued assistance. In addition, they opined that Chavez will then use his grip on the Atlantic Coast to strengthen his military ties with Cuba and perhaps build an oil pipeline to facilitate oil delivery to ideological allies. (Note: Local media reported that the Venezuelan National Assembly approved an agreement between Venezuela and Nicaragua on January 25. Under the rubric of ALBA, the agreement encompasses development activities in health, education, culture, energy, food security, industry, commerce, rural development, petrochemicals, infrastructure, agriculture and livestock, science and technology, environment, and tourism. End Note.)
 
¶7. (C) Since Ortega came to power, residents in the coastal areas of the RAAN have reported seeing an influx of indigenous peoples from Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela in the region. Miskito leaders didn't know why, but fear Brooklyn Rivera and YATAMA, under orders from Ortega and Chavez, will utilize them in an attempt to manipulate the Miskito and other indigenous peoples of the RAAN who have long resisted the Sandinistas and remain a key obstacle to Ortega's designs (Reftel A,B).
 
Battle for Hearts and Minds - Miskitos are Vulnerable 
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¶8. (C) Coleman proudly pointed out that the Miskitos are one of only a few non-leftist indigenous population in Latin America, but their extreme poverty makes them vulnerable to the growing Sandinista influence. Although Liberal governments over the past sixteen years had done little to improve the Miskitos' situation, their dislike for and mistrust of the Sandinistas outweighed their disappointment in Liberal governments. Leaders warned, however, that given the importance of the Atlantic Coast to Chavez, with Ortega in power the situation will change. Ortega can now deploy State resources and use funding from Chavez to gain control. Coleman mentioned that Ortega plans to spend 500 million Cordobas (US$ 27 million) on social programs in the region, implemented, in part, through a well-established network of Sandinista-controlled NGOs. Because there are virtually no Liberal-controlled NGOs in the RAAN, the population has few alternatives for assistance.
 
¶9. (SBU) In addition, Orlando Nunez, the director of the newly created "Program for Zero Hunger," recently announced the 2007 plan to provide 15,000 families with vouchers consisting of a "packet" of goods valued at US$ 2,000 (36,000 Cordobas). The packets include livestock, seeds, and other basic supplies. Although the government has not identified the 15,000 families, Miskito leaders believe many will be in the RAAN and could further chip away at the Miskito's historical resistance.
 
¶10. (C) These leaders expect to see more Cubans and Venezuelans in the RAAN. They commented that the Cubans and Venezuelans are masters of propaganda and will maximize the publicity of the smallest projects to gain political influence. While the leaders readily admitted that the people desperately need assistance, they fear the ideological consequences.
 
¶11. (C) In the face of so many sudden changes, lamented the Miskito leaders, the Miskito people are confused and increasingly fearful of what Ortega's Administration may bring to the RAAN. Coleman reported that families that can afford to are already seeking ways to get their children out of the region.
 
Human Right's Lawsuit - Abandonment Would be Further Blow 
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¶12. (C) The Miskito leaders believe that Ortega will endeavor to halt the lawsuits filed against him and other Sandinista leaders for alleged human rights violations in the 1980s. With the help of a Nicaraguan NGO, the Nicaraguan Permanent Commission for Human Rights (CPDH), the Miskito population is pursuing cases in both the Nicaraguan court system and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) (Reftel C). CPDH reported to Coleman its fear that Ortega will try to block external cooperation for CPDH and that Rivera will attempt to obstruct CPDH's work in the RAAN in any way possible. CPDH, Colemen reported, is also apprehensive because Ortega, again through Rivera, is trying to buy the silence of the victims and their families. The Miskito leaders insisted that CPDH cases must continue because they are a major unifying force in the Miskito community. Coleman reported that Miskitos are traveling from the remotest corners of the RAAN to inquire about the cases and to seek assurances that the cases will continue. Were CPDH forced to drop their cases, noted Coleman, it would be a major blow to the remaining unity of the Miskito community and play into the Sandinistas' assertions that the filing of these cases was a political ploy to discredit Ortega during the election campaign.
 
¶13.  (C) Comment:  CPDH has reported that they and their 
families have received repeated death threats because of its 
involvement in the Miskito cases.  Thus far, the police have 
failed to investigate despite specific evidence.  Further, 
CPDH has alleged discrimination by the Supreme Court (CSJ) 
and the Supreme Electoral Council (CSE).  In October, the CSJ 
refused to certify the testimonies of Miskito witnesses to be 
used in the IACHR case and the CSE refused to accredit CPDH's 
electoral observers for the November presidential elections. 
End Comment. 
 
ALN Alliance or Independence? 
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¶14.  (C) Miskito leaders admitted that their experience with 
the ALN has been disappointing and they may form their own 
party for the 2008 municipal elections.  On a previous 
occasion, Coleman admitted to poloff that the ALN had not 
supported him during a contentious fight for the 3rd deputy 
slot in the RAAN and he told the Ambassador that the ALN has 
failed to take action against the growing presence of the 
FSLN in the RAAN.  Coleman stressed that Miskito leaders 
still prefer an alliance with the ALN, but one that 
recognizes their indigenous identity. 
 
Fighting Back - Opportunities for Assistance 
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¶15.  (C) The Miskito leaders insist that they will continue 
their struggle to maintain their Miskito identity and to 
preserve their past, but admitted that they have virtually no 
resources and cannot compete with the mounting Sandinista 
campaign.  The leaders urged the U.S. to take action before 
it is too late and stressed that the Miskitos are loyal to 
the memory of past USG programs and are yearning for any sign 
of support.  Of paramount importance, they pointed out, is 
organizing and uniting the Miskito communities to re-enforce 
the importance of democracy and remind them of the 
Sandinista's past atrocities.  Other ideas discussed during 
the meeting included: 
 
- Creating a war memorial to honor those who died during the 
Miskito resistance against the Sandinistas in the 1980s 
 
- Offering medical services in Puerto Cabezas and more remote 
areas of the RAAN.  Ambassador suggested using the medical 
ship (USNS Comfort), or reprogramming a MEDRETE mission to 
the RAAN. 
 
- Providing basic equipment and technical support to the 
fishing, agriculture, and livestock sectors using available 
programs and organizations (AID, CAFTA, NGOs, etc.) 
 
- Funding the few established liberal NGOs in the RAAN (such 
as FURCA) and assisting in the creation of additional NGOs to 
support veterans and other influential groups 
 
- Encouraging participation in exchange programs, such as the 
CASS-Georgetown program and the Wisconsin Partners Program 
 
- Facilitating contact with international organizations, such 
as the Inter-American and Pan-American Foundations 
 
Comment 
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¶16. (C) Nicaragua's strategically important and vulnerable Atlantic Coast merits our immediate attention and resources to counter-balance the growing influence of the Sandinistas and Chavez. In repeated meetings with the Miskito leaders during the months leading up to the November 5 national elections, we were warned of the FSLN's activities and their potential consequences (Reftels), but our ability to support their needs was minimal and inadequate to counter the FSLN's increasing domination of the RAAN. The indigenous population, despite years of neglect by the Liberal governments, has long resisted the Sandinistas, but it will be sorely pressed to do so under an Ortega administration backed by Chavez. Gaining control over the Miskito and other indigenous groups would remove the last obstacle from Ortega's path and accord him and Chavez complete control over the RAAN and much of the Atlantic Coast's rich resource base.
 
TRIVELLI