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DE RUEHMU #0255/01 0292155
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 292155Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8859
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MANAGUA 000255 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR WHA/CEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/26/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PINR KDEM NU
SUBJECT: PLC DEPUTY ADMITS RIFTS IN PARTY 
 
REF: A. MANAGUA 0241 
     ¶B. MANAGUA 0181 
     ¶C. MANAGUA 0175 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Paul Trivelli for reasons 1.4 (b and d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: Liberal Constitutional Party (PLC) deputy 
Carlos Noguera recently reported considerable discontent 
within the PLC rank and file stemming from the dismal results 
of the national elections and the party's ongoing political 
pact with the Sandinista Front (FSLN).  Local party leaders 
in his home province of Jinotega told Noguera that they will 
not help PLC candidates prior to the 2008 municipal elections 
unless the party seeks unification with the Nicaraguan 
Liberal Alliance (ALN).  According to Noguera, the PLC caucus 
in the National Assembly barely maintained a unified front 
after an internal fight over the approval of Law 290 reforms 
(ref A).  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) Poloffs met with PLC deputy and former National 
Assembly president Carlos Noguera on January 25 to discuss 
the PLC's approval of controversial reforms to Law 290 
strengthening the powers of the Executive and the future 
orientation of the PLC vis-a-vis the FSLN and ALN.  The 
meeting was cordial and Noguera seemed quite pleased to have 
received our invitation to talk.  (Note: Noguera was the only 
PLC deputy to openly oppose the reforms.  End Note.) 
 
¶3. (C) Regarding the Law 290 reforms, we noted to Noguera 
that PLC caucus chief Maximino Rodriguez had assured us that 
the PLC would not agree to "fast track" the legislation that 
would give President Ortega more power (ref C).  Noguera 
responded that deputies Wilfredo Navarro and Oscar Moncada 
had "betrayed" the caucus after receiving eleventh-hour 
instructions from convicted party chief and ex-President 
Arnoldo Aleman to give the PLC's consent during a meeting 
between Ortega and Assembly representatives.  After an 
internal PLC fight in the plenary, Navarro agreed that no 
further voting decisions would be made without the consent of 
the caucus members in exchange for a unified vote on the 
reforms. 
 
¶4. (C) Noguera admitted that even in the regions of the 
country where the PLC won a majority of the vote (primarily 
in the North), the grass roots members and local leaders are 
unhappy with the national leadership -- especially the 
Ortega-Aleman political pact.  They believe, and Noguera 
agrees, that the PLC will suffer an even greater defeat in 
the 2008 municipal elections if the party does not unify with 
the ALN and other democratic parties.  Local PLC mayors and 
other leaders in Noguera's home department of Jinotega told 
him that they will not support the party if the PLC 
leadership fails to achieve Liberal unity.  Polcouns remarked 
that the municipal elections may offer the last window of 
opportunity for the democratic opposition to block Ortega's 
determination to consolidate power, change the constitution, 
and win the 2011 presidential race.  However, only a united 
opposition will be strong enough to compete in the municipal 
elections. 
 
¶5. (C) Concurring with our assessment, Noguera explained that 
some in his party have made efforts to reach out to the ALN. 
For example, he and other PLC deputies recently met with ALN 
deputy Jamileth Bonilla to discuss a common legislative 
agenda (ref B).  When asked about the future role in the PLC 
of former presidential and vice presidential candidates Jose 
Rizo and Jose Antonio Alvarado, Noguera commented that Rizo 
is essentially regarded as a "has-been," although some 
deputies still respect him and he may serve in some kind of 
advisory role.  Noguera asserted that Alvarado, who is known 
to frequently switch political affiliation according to his 
own self interests, has lost all credibility within the party 
as he could not even deliver his home municipality of Granada 
for the PLC. 
 
¶6. (C) Noguera agreed with us that the Liberals should 
refrain from attacking each other, especially in public, and 
focus instead on stopping the FSLN tsunami from wiping out 
all opposition.  He noted that he had confronted PLC 
spokesman Leonel Teller at Aleman's January 23 birthday 
party, ordering Teller to back down on his public accusations 
against ALN leader Eduardo Montealegre regarding the Cenis 
(debt bonds) banking scandal.  Noguera said that Teller is 
pursuing a personal vendetta and does not speak for the party 
(although he remains the party spokesman).  Most of the 
deputies seek reconciliation and regard the attacks on 
Montealegre as a waste of time, he claimed.  
 
¶7. (C) The PLC lawmaker was receptive to our suggestion that 
the PLC work with other opposition parties to encourage the 
strengthening of existing, and the formation of new, NGOs 
unaffiliated with the FSLN and to encourage volunteerism 
among party supporters.  He also agreed with our observation 
that donor assistance would be much more effective if 
opposition parties worked in concert, rather than at 
cross-purposes.  (Comment: The Sandinistas are known for 
their party discipline and volunteerism, while the PLC 
militants are more renowned for expecting remuneration in 
exchange for their participation.  Very few non-FSLN NGOs 
operate in Nicaragua.  End Comment.) 
 
¶8. (C) Comment: Noguera has long been uncomfortable with the 
Aleman-Ortega pact, although he refused to break with Aleman 
before the elections and join the ALN.  Now that the reality 
of the PLC's electoral defeat is sinking in, Noguera and 
others appear willing to reconsider their loyalty to Aleman, 
who has led the party down a path of ruin and subservience to 
the FSLN.  Nevertheless, continued factionalism within the 
PLC and ALN has hindered a rapprochement even while the 
FSLN's legislative barrage has scared the Liberals into 
negotiations.  We will continue to encourage Liberal 
reconciliation -- and the marginalization of Aleman -- as a 
bulwark against the FSLN's totalitarian tendencies. 
TRIVELLI