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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MANAGUA 000242 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/CEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/26/2017 
TAGS: PHUM PGOV PINR KDEM NU PREL
SUBJECT: MARTINEZ CUENCA LAUDS U.S. POLICY TOWARDS ORTEGA 
GOVERNMENT 
 
REF: 2006 MANAGUA 2077 AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Paul A. Trivelli. Reasons 1.4 (B,D). 
 
¶1.  (C) In Sandinista-dissident Alejandro Martinez Cuenca's 
recent meeting with the Ambassador, he applauded President 
Bush's "magnificent" decision to call Ortega before the 
inauguration, terming the gesture the "best antidote to keep 
Ortega from straying" and to check Venezuelan President Hugo 
Chavez' influence.  Martinez Cuenca characterized Ortega as 
chaotic, anarchic, divisive, and adverse to the "carpentry of 
government," while Ortega's wife Rosario is totally obsessed 
with control.  He believes that President Ortega's 
"disastrous" inauguration and his government's efforts to 
consolidate power through emergency legislation have cost 
Ortega much of the political capitol he acquired following 
the November election.  He is confident that Chavez' ALBA 
will not complicate CAFTA as it is not a trade agreement at 
all.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (C) On January 24, the Ambassador, DCM, and PolCouns met 
with Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) dissident 
Alejandro Martinez Cuenca, who applauded President Bush's 
"magnificent decision" to call Ortega a few days before the 
Sandinista leader's inauguration.  Terming the U.S. approach 
"the best antidote to keep Ortega from straying" and to check 
Chavez' influence, Martinez Cuenca added that Foreign 
Minister Samuel Santos and Ambassador-designate Arturo Cruz 
have told him that they and President Ortega are very pleased 
with our positive overtures thus far, including President 
Bush's phone call, the bilateral meetings held with Ortega in 
Managua and Quito, and Assistant Secretary Shannon's skillful 
and constructive public remarks on the bilateral 
relationship.  Martinez Cuenca commented that additional 
meetings, including an eventual meeting between the two 
presidents in Washington would contribute greatly to the 
positive bilateral relationship thus far.  The Ambassador 
thanked Martinez Cuenca for 
his suggestions and assured him that we will seek other 
opportunities for engagement. 
 
Kafka Comes to Managua 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶3.  (C) Sharing his views on Ortega's inaugural ceremonies, 
Martinez Cuenca opined that the events were "something out of 
a Kafka novel."  He was uncertain whether the numerous 
protocol faux pas and delays were intentional, or rather, 
part of the FSLN's proclivity for improvisation, disorder, 
and informality, but clearly the outcome was disastrous. 
Allowing Chavez to steal the show and to attack the United 
States sent all the wrong signals, while inviting Iranian 
President Ahmadinejad to visit Nicaragua on the heels of 
Ortega's inauguration heightened anxiety, opined Martinez 
Cuenca.  Even though Ortega's remarks were measured and he 
refrained from attacking the United States directly, Chavez' 
intervention sparked alarm.  Martinez Cuenca also criticized 
Ortega for hosting Ahmadinejad, a leader of the Islamic 
world's extreme right whose regime discriminates against 
women and even makes them take separate elevators.  As a 
leftist, Martinez Cuenca was "insulted" by Ortega's honoring 
the Iranian. 
 
¶4.  (C) Martinez Cuenca remarked that before the 
inauguration, Ortega had taken the right course: 
conciliatory messages and engagement with the international 
community and domestic and foreign private sectors that 
assuaged fears Ortega would reinvent the undemocratic 
Sandinista model of the 1980s.  However, between President 
Ortega's inaugural fiasco and his government's efforts to 
quickly consolidate power through emergency legislation, 
Ortega has lost much of the political capital he acquired 
after his election, observed Martinez Cuenca. 
He attributed another mistake -- the decision to move the 
Presidency to the Olaf Palme (whose refurbishment will 
probably raise government costs rather than reduce them) -- 
to Rosario's affinity for symbolism.  In sum, the Nicaraguan 
government's (GON) only positive measure thus far is its 
decision to cut the salaries of the Executive's senior 
officials -- that and the appointment of Arturo Cruz 
(Reftels) to represent Nicaragua in Washington. 
 
Confirming Libyan Influence 
 
MANAGUA 00000242  002 OF 003 
 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶5.  (C) As for Ortega's cabinet choices and other 
appointments, Martinez Cuenca agreed that many of the new 
ministers are not particularly qualified or experienced, but 
they were selected for their loyalty.  The Ambassador raised 
concerns regarding Ortega's choice of personal secretary 
--former Libyan/naturalized Nicaraguan Muhamad Muhktar 
Lashtar.  Martinez Cuenca confided that Lashtar arrived in 
Managua in 1989 and reported directly to Moammar al-Ghadafi's 
security unit that operates independently from the Libyan 
government.  Further, through Lashtar, Libyan monies have 
maintained Ortega for years and Ortega's national and popular 
council model is based on the Libyan "Green Book," claimed 
Martinez Cuenca.  However, if pressed, Ortega will likely 
counter any criticism of his appointment of the Libyan by 
rationalizing his appointment of former Amcit/naturalized 
Nicaraguan Paul Oquist to head the President's "national 
policy" advisory council "compensates" for Lashtar. 
Law 290 and What to Do with Lenin? 
- - - - - - - - - - -  - -  - - - - 
 
¶6.  (C) Expanding on the topic of the revisions to Law 290 
(delineates Executive responsibilities, lines of authority) 
that the National Assembly passed earlier the same day 
(septel), Martinez Cuenca opined that Oquist was likely the 
author of this contentious initiative.  He explained that 
Oquist had left Nicaragua after Ortega lost the 1990 election 
and his concept of Nicaragua had remained frozen in the past. 
 He surmised that Oquist took the old Sandinista regime's 
antiquated organization chart and planned on transposing it 
into the new government; revising Law 290 was the mechanism 
to achieve this task.  Martinez Cuenca believed that after 
opposition parties and civil society objected to a number of 
the more draconian changes that would consolidate Ortega's 
power, the GON retracted somewhat, and eliminated some of the 
more egregious revisions. 
 
¶7.  (C) Regarding the revision to Law 290 removing authority 
over Nicaragua's defense intelligence unit (DID) from the 
Ministry of Defense and shifting it instead to the Armed 
Forces, Martinez Cuenca believed that this revision arose out 
of a comprise between Ortega and Armed Forces chief 
Halleslevens.  After Halleslevens rejected Ortega's proposal 
to appoint Lenin Cerna's wife Marisol Castillo to head the 
Defense Ministry -- in large part because the military would 
not accept Castillo's (and thus, Cerna's) control over the 
DID, Ortega offered to shift DID authority from the MOD to 
the military.  With Hallesleven's objections resolved, Ortega 
might appoint Castillo as Defense Minister, remarked Martinez 
Cuenca.  (Comment:  While before the Law 290 revisions passed 
the Defense Ministry was authorized to oversee the DID, in 
practice, it was controlled by the military.  Now the 
relationship has been formalized.) 
 
ALBA Does Not Contradict CAFTA 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶8.  (C) Martinez Cuenca gave the Ambassador unsigned copies 
of 13 of the 15 agreements Nicaragua signed with Venezuela 
earlier in the month.  He explained that he obtained the 
documents from the Venezuelan Ambassador after his numerous 
attempts to procure the materials from the GON had failed. 
Martinez Cuenca remarked that Chavez' ALBA does not 
contradict CAFTA and is not a trade agreement at all; rather, 
it is a statement of cooperation, a political device 
promising all sorts of benefits to Nicaragua.  However, if 
Chavez' record for lots of talk and agreements and little 
delivery plays out in Nicaragua, Ortega may come up 
shorthanded and unable to meet his campaign promises to 
Nicaragua's poor, he said, adding that Ortega may already 
harbor doubts over Chavez' ability to deliver. 
 
Not in Ortega's Interest to Free Aleman 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶9.  (C) Martinez Cuenca shared our view that Ortega will not 
release Liberal Constitutional Party caudillo/convicted money 
launderer Arnoldo Aleman because he can still exploit him. 
However, Aleman's influence over his party remains a problem 
and the main impediment to Liberal unity, opined Martinez 
Cuenca, who added that Aleman's arrogance after winning the 
presidential election in 1995 had prompted him to pact with 
 
MANAGUA 00000242  003 OF 003 
 
 
Ortega instead of "consulting with the people." 
Who's in Charge? 
- - - - - - - - 
 
¶10.  (C) Martinez Cuenca downplayed somewhat the growing 
fears that Ortega is bent on imposing an authoritarian regime 
-- characterizing Ortega as "anarchic, divisive, and adverse 
to the carpentry of government."  Ortega's wife Rosario, 
however, is another story; she is totally obsessed with 
control, while Ortega thrives on chaos and takes great 
delight in pitting members of his inner circle against one 
another, he said. 
 
Comment 
- - - - 
 
¶11.  (C) Martinez Cuenca's assessment tracks closely with 
ours and a number of other reliable interlocutors.  His 
approval of our stance thus far vis-a-vis the Ortega 
government is encouraging, as he knows how Ortega and his 
inner circle think and what motivates them.  Chavez would 
like nothing better than for us to enter into conflict with 
Ortega and to reduce our footprint in Nicaragua.  To the 
degree we can successfully engage Ortega, his cabinet, and 
FSLN lawmakers and cultivate common ground, we may be able to 
offset Chavez's influence here. 
TRIVELLI