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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MANAGUA 000179 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/CEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2017 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR KDEM NU
SUBJECT: FOREIGN MINISTER SANTOS STRUGGLES TO JUGGLE THE 
DEMANDS OF HIS NEW JOB 
 
REF: A. MANAGUA 0155 
 
     ¶B. MANAGUA 0153 
     ¶C. MANAGUA 0127 
     ¶D. MANAGUA 0106 
     ¶E. 2006 MANAGUA 2741 
     ¶F. 2006 MANAGUA 2691 
     ¶G. 2006 MANAGUA 2673 
     ¶H. 2006 MANAGUA 2624 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Paul A. Trivelli. Reasons 1.4 (B,D). 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  Nicaraguan Foreign Minister Samuel Santos 
(Refs. E-H) is struggling to juggle the demands and 
impositions of anti-U.S., populist, authoritarian-minded 
allies against the concerns and expectations of the U.S. and 
other like-minded governments.  We reminded Santos that any 
dangers posed to our security here by Iran or any other 
government would seriously test U.S.-Nicaraguan cooperation. 
Santos insisted that the GON will "not permit Iran to 
threaten the U.S. presence here," but offered no response to 
our concern that President Ortega's personal secretary is 
reportedly Moammar al-Ghadafi's nephew and linked to 
Ghadafi's personal intel network.  Santos -- who is a wealthy 
and pragmatic entrepreneur -- appears to be a "bantamweight" 
in the scheme of Ortega's political power structure, although 
he enjoys some punch through his apparent close relationship 
to Rosario Murillo.  We can expect him to be helpful within 
his operational limitations, while he will likely attempt to 
shirk or downplay the seriousness of any contentious issue we 
raise with him.   End Summary. 
 
Santos Finds MFA in "Disarray" 
- - - - - - - - -  - - - - - - 
 
¶2.  (C) Responding to PolCouns' January 17 phone call to the 
Foreign Ministry to request copies of the recent bilateral 
agreements the new Nicaraguan government (GON) recently 
signed with the Venezuelan and Iranian governments, Foreign 
Minister Samuel Santos invited PolCouns to meet with him at 
the Foreign Ministry later in the day.  PolCouns found Santos 
sporting the apparent official office attire of the new 
Ortega government: a Guayabera-style, white-linen, 
long-sleeved, four-pocket shirt and dark slacks.  ForMin 
Santos started by fretting over how his predecessor had 
erased all computerized records and hard drives, leaving him 
no institutional memory.  He was "shocked by this sorry state 
of affairs" because he had met with former Foreign Minister 
Caldera on several occasions to facilitate the transition 
process and had not expected this unfortunate situation. 
Santos claimed that he had found a recording on his phone 
instructing everyone to "erase all documents," but was 
uncertain whether other ministers were in the same 
predicament. 
 
Assuming Responsibility for Inaugural Faux Pas 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶3.  (C) Foreign Minister Santos -- who was relieved that the 
presidential inauguration was over -- admitted that the new 
Nicaraguan government (GON) had made "several mistakes" in 
the inaugural event (Ref. D).  PolCouns, who thanked him for 
moving the U.S. delegation out of the sun and into shelter to 
await the start of the inaugural ceremonies, remarked that a 
number of people in the audience had complained about the 
almost two-hour delay apparently prompted by Venezuelan 
President Chavez' late arrival.  Santos acknowledged 
"inconveniences," but then hastily deflected Chavez' role in 
the delay and assumed "personal responsibility" for the 
problems.  He recounted how Chavez had warned he might arrive 
later than expected, and thus the Nicaraguans should have 
changed the onset of the ceremonies to a later hour. 
 
Agrement on Track 
- - - - - - - - - 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Polcouns confirmed that we are processing the 
agrement (Refs. A-C) request for Nicaraguan 
Ambassador-designate Arturo Cruz, adding that we will prepare 
a briefing for Cruz, similar to the one presented in December 
(Ref. F) to Daniel Ortega's technical transition team. 
Pleased with the news, Santos opined that Cruz is an ideal 
choice for the job.  He added that his meetings with 
Assistant Secretary Shannon and NSC Senior Advisor Dan Fisk 
 
MANAGUA 00000179  002 OF 003 
 
 
in early January had been cordial and helpful and he looks 
forward to another visit to Washington in the near future. 
As for the meeting with Secretary Leavitt, President Ortega 
and his team believed it had been "extraordinary."  Touching 
on an eventual visit of President Ortega to Washington, 
Santos said he prefers that Washington "take the initiative." 
 
 
In Search of the Elusive MOUs 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶5.  (C) Polcouns turned to the subject that had prompted the 
meeting: our request for copies of the agreements President 
Ortega signed with his Venezuelan and Iranian counterparts 
during their recent visits to Managua.  Santos replied that 
the documents are in the Presidency.  He immediately called 
the Presidency to request them.  (Note: To date, we have not 
received the documents.)  Santos outlined the "justification" 
for the accords, explaining that they serve to "remove the 
five bottlenecks" that lie between Ortega's campaign promises 
and his ability to deliver on them: 
 
--Resolve Nicaragua's energy crisis. 
 
--Increase cement production for hydroelectric projects and 
housing for the poor. 
 
--Improve water distribution and access. 
 
--Provide free education to all Nicaraguans. 
 
--Ensure all Nicaraguans can access free health care. 
 
Iranians offer Housing, Private Sector "Cooperation" 
- - - - - - - - - -  - - - - - - --  - - - - - - - - 
 
¶6.  (C) According to Santos, Iranian assistance will focus 
primarily on housing developments for poor Nicaraguans, 
cooperation in generating hydroelectric power, and the 
promotion of private sector to private sector "cooperation." 
He conceded that President Ahmadinejad's visit to Managua had 
not produced any tangible outcome except the establishment of 
embassies in each others' capitals.  He recognized that the 
Iranian leader agreed to "consider" forgiving Nicaragua's 
$152 debt, but had made no pledge, although he did promise to 
consider swapping the debt for "development projects" in 
Nicaragua. 
 
¶7.  (C) PolCouns voiced our concerns regarding the 
establishment of an Iranian embassy in Managua, reminding 
Santos that we will have a serious bilateral issue on our 
hands that could test U.S.-Nicaraguan cooperation if the 
Iranians exploit Nicaragua to endanger our security.  Santos 
noted the message and insisted that the GON will "not permit 
Iran to threaten the U.S. presence here."  Polcouns also 
conveyed our concern over President Ortega's appointment of 
Libyan-Nicaraguan Muhammad Lashtar (reportedly Moammar 
al-Ghadafi's nephew and linked to Ghadafi's personal intel 
network). 
 
¶8.  (C) Foreign Minister Santos next recounted how 
Ahmadinejad had "assured" him that U.S.-Iranian relations are 
actually "quite good," not like they are portrayed on the 
international stage.  PolCouns interjected, reminding the 
Foreign Minister that the U.S. official position on Iran is 
clearly known, as is the UN Security Council's.  Further, the 
EU shares our concern over Iran's efforts to become a nuclear 
power.  Santos, who quickly acknowledged that Ahmadinejad may 
have been manipulating the situation, proceeded to downplay 
the Iranian president's intervention in Managua, asserting 
that in his remarks, Ahmadinejad did not directly attack the 
United States, but instead, referred to "imperialism" in 
general. 
 
¶9.  (C) Referring to Ahmadinejad's interview in left-leaning 
Nicaraguan daily El Nuevo Diario (septel), PolCouns remarked 
that there was little reasonable or accurate in the article; 
the Iranian president's implying that the Holocaust never 
occurred is an unacceptable revisionist fabrication and an 
example of why Ahmadinejad's word is untrustworthy.  Polcouns 
recounted that her family had relatives who perished in the 
Holocaust.  Santos hastened to offer his view that 
Ahmadinejad "was wrong on this point" and said he did not 
 
MANAGUA 00000179  003 OF 003 
 
 
agree with Ahmadinejad's position. 
 
¶10.  (C) Santos then recounted his "surprise" when 
Ahmadinejad told him the Iranian government recognizes the 
new Iraqi government and that bilateral relations are 
cordial.   PolCouns clarified that the Iranian-Iraqi 
bilateral relationship given both governments are Shi'a 
dominated.  Noting that the former Nicaraguan foreign 
minister had told us the GON never broke diplomatic relations 
with Iraq, she suggested that Santos consider meeting with 
his Iraqi counterpart to discuss the possibility of reviving 
relations.  Santos appeared amenable to the idea and said he 
will pursue it. 
 
¶11.  (C) Santos then shared his astonishment when the Iranian 
president told him that Saddam Hussein was a "monster" and 
was responsible for the murder of thousands of Iraqis and 
Iranians.  Polcouns shared her "surprise" that the FSLN 
needed the Iranian president to recount this fact to believe 
it when it has been common knowledge for years that Hussein 
committed gross atrocities against his people.  She 
referenced Ortega's December 30, 2006 communique referring to 
Hussein as Iraq's legitimate president, which made no mention 
of the atrocities he committed against his own people -- 
while it accused the "occupation" of committing a "cruel 
genocide." 
 
Venezuelans Deliver Tangible Assistance 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶12.  (C) While Santos conceded that Iran was equivocal on 
debt forgiveness, he asserted that Venezuela's commitment is 
tangible -- citing the fact that President Chavez had 
condoned Nicaragua's $32-million debt.  He related how 
Chavez's assistance to the FSLN had started over two years 
ago -- including urea and oil donations and "other 
assistance."  Polcouns raised the incongruence between 
Chavez' ALBA and his stated plan to help Nicaragua and other 
poor nations by offering favorable loan terms on Venezuelan 
crude -- while he hurt the poor in his attempts to raise 
world oil prices.  Santos conceded that Chavez is "looking 
out for his own interests," and his support for Nicaragua is 
"not free."  He explained that part of the urgency to boost 
Nicaragua's agricultural production is to swap beans and 
other agricultural commodities to the Venezuelans for oil. 
 
Making Deals with God and the Devil 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶13.  (C) Expanding on the topic of foreign assistance, Santos 
elaborated that Nicaragua cannot afford to refuse Venezuelan 
or any other foreign assistance.  However, it does not 
behoove Nicaragua to meddle in conflicts between donor 
governments; the GON will work with everyone and encourage 
donors to settle their differences elsewhere, asserted 
Santos, who cited Nicaragua's relations with both Taiwan and 
China as a case in point. 
 
Comment 
- - - - 
 
¶14.  (C) Santos -- who is a wealthy, pragmatic entrepreneur 
-- appears to be a "bantamweight" in the scheme of Ortega's 
political power structure, although he enjoys some punch 
through his apparent close relationship to Rosario Murillo. 
We can expect him to be helpful within his operational 
limitations, while he will likely attempt to shirk or 
downplay the seriousness of any contentious issue we raise 
with him.  For all the Sandinista government's 
anti-imperialist rhetoric and  assertion that Nicaragua will 
not fall into the orbit of any other country, the GON appears 
to be in a rush to auction Nicaragua's sovereignty and 
national pride to the highest bidder -- at this point, 
Chavez. 
TRIVELLI