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P 181757Z JAN 07
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8648
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 0886
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0032
RUMIAAA/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 MANAGUA 000127 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/CEN, NEA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/18/2017 
TAGS: KDEM MARR MOPS PGOV PINR PREL SNAR IR NU
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES BILATERAL CONCERNS WITH 
NICARAGUAN AMBASSADOR-DESIGNATE CRUZ 
 
REF: A. MANAGUA 02741 
     ¶B. MANAGUA 2724 
     ¶C. MANAGUA 2691 
     ¶D. MANAGUA 2611 
     ¶E. MANAGUA 2608 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Paul A. Trivelli. Reasons 1.4 (B,D). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: Ambassador recently met with Arturo Cruz, Nicaragua's Ambassador-designate to the United States. During the conversation, Cruz first insisted on the importance of President Ortega's participation in the annual Prayer Breakfast; he later reconsidered and suggested Ortega decline the invitation. The Ambassador outlined our bilateral priorities: Nicaraguan government (GON) commitment to help protect the rights of U.S. citizens, properties, and investments; GON cooperation on security and defense, as well as on combating narco, arms, and people trafficking; and, collaboration on our assistance programs. We will next provide Cruz the appropriate written materials followed by a comprehensive briefing. Cruz, who lived and studied in the United States for years, aspires to maintain constructive bilateral relations. His success or failure will in large part depend on his ability to handle the inevitable clash between Ortega's expectations/his allies' rhetoric and our bilateral interests. End Summary.
 
Ortega and the Prayer Breakfast 
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¶2. (C) On January 15, Ambassador, DCM and PolCouns held informal discussions with Arturo Cruz, Nicaragua's Ambassador-designate to the United States. Cruz started off by underscoring his close ties to the United States, commenting that he had lived and studied there for years, and his commitment to maintaining close and constructive bilateral relations. He raised his interest in arranging for President Ortega's participation in the February 1 Prayer Breakfast in Washington, opining that his attendance would help offset the negative publicity generated by Venezuelan President Chavez's and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's anti-U.S. rhetoric and Ortega's recent blitz of meetings/accords with the Venezuelan and Iranian presidents.
 
¶3. (C) Cruz, who related that Honduras-based Nicaraguan businessman Javier Arguello had "nominated" President Ortega and wife Rosario for the annual event, asserted that the breakfast would provide President Ortega the opportunity to meet USG officials and legislators, as well as other influential Americans who will attend the important breakfast. The Ambassador assured Cruz he would convey the message to Washington, but reminded Cruz that the event includes a cast of thousands and there is little face time with dignitaries. Further, it might be more advantageous for the GON if President Ortega's first visit to the United States included meetings with USG officials, which would require time to arrange.
 
¶4. (C) While acknowledging the risks entailed in President Ortega's participation in the annual event, Cruz insisted that the benefits outweigh them. He shared his concern that before his inauguration President Ortega had enjoyed 60% popular support (according to an M & R poll), but he now fears that Ortega's popularity has slipped after the interventions of the Venezuelan and Iranian presidents. (Comment: Cruz contacted DCM on January 16 to inform him that Ortega had decided against participating in the Prayer Event. End Comment.) At this point, the Ambassador suggested that Iranian rhetoric is one thing, but any opening of a large Iranian mission would cause the USG legitimate concern.
 
Seeking Traction on the Volz Case 
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¶5. (C) The Ambassador briefed Cruz on the status of the Eric Volz case (Ref. A), explaining that Volz' family has engaged members of the U.S. Congress on the matter and has created a web site to seek support. Cruz requested additional information and assured us that he will follow through on the case to ensure Voltz is granted due process and his rights are protected.
 
Ending the Logjam on U.S. Oil Company Concessions 
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¶6. (C) The Ambassador then raised our concerns regarding a stay order that has frozen the activities of two U.S. oil firms with exploration concessions for offshore areas on Nicaragua's Atlantic Coast. He clarified that a Sandinista judge in Nicaragua's Southern Autonomous Atlantic Coast Zone (RAAS), in complicity with other Sandinista leaders, was behind the ruling. Cruz, who appeared to appreciate the seriousness of the matter, requested details and promised to pursue the matter.
 
Property Cases and the Annual Waiver Process 
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¶7.  (C) The Ambassador moved on to the importance of the 
annual resolution of properties owned by U.S. citizens and 
seized by the Ortega government in the 1980s.  He clarified 
that while there is no set annual quota of cases that must be 
resolved to obtain the annual Congressionally mandated waiver 
of Section 527 of the Foreign Relations Assistance Act, on 
average 100-150 cases are settled per year.  Cruz, who 
appreciated the importance of the property resolutions, 
requested a list of the most significant pending cases. 
 
Getting up to Speed on U.S. Assistance Packet 
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¶8.  (C) The Ambassador next raised our assistance programs to 
Nicaragua, assuring Cruz we will send him the briefing 
materials we presented in our orientation of Ortega's 
technical transition team (Ref. C) and later provide him a 
similar orientation.  The Ambassador explained that our 
continued assistance to Nicaragua will depend in part on the 
willingness of the new government to work with us, citing as 
an example the need for cooperation from the new Minister of 
Education to continue our assistance in this valuable sector. 
 He added that much of USG assistance is channeled through 
civil society, not government entities. 
 
MANPAD Destruction, White Paper, and Security Leadership 
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¶9. (C) On the subject of security cooperation, the Ambassador underscored the urgency of further MANPADS destruction and the importance of implementing the Defense White Paper. Again, Cruz, requested details. The Ambassador then raised the subject of defense leadership under the Ortega government, referring to indications that Ortega appears poised to assume direct control over both the military and the police. (Comment: According to draft revisions to Laws 290 and 228, which the National Assembly could review as early as January 19, the President would consolidate his power by transferring powers from the Ministries of Defense and Government (quasi Ministry of Interior) to the Presidency. With these reforms, the President would become the "Supreme Chief of the Police," with the National Police Chief (Aminta Granera) reporting directly to him -- no longer to the Minister of Government. Similarly, according to the draft (faxed to desk on 16 January), the President, not the Minister of Defense, will take the lead on sovereignty-related policies and strategies. End Comment.)
 
¶10. (C) After assuring the Ambassador that Lenin Cerna's wife Marisol Castillo would not/not serve as Defense Minister, Cruz proceeded to convey the worrisome alternative: Cerna will serve as President Ortega's national security advisor instead. Cruz, who insisted that Cerna is one of the more "pragmatic and reasonable" members of Ortega's team and is "eager to help," opined that Ortega will be "sensitive" to U.S. security concerns and will be careful to take care of them. The Ambassador clarified that we intend to continue our modest but significant military and police support programs, including the standing up of a joint national Police-Public Prosecutors vetted unit to combat narcotrafficking and money laundering. He explained that some of the funds for the unit originated from monies the U.S. had seized from Liberal Constitutional Party (PLC) leader/convicted money launderer Arnoldo Aleman and returned to the Nicaraguan government.
 
¶11.  (C) Expanding on the topic of military cooperation, the 
Ambassador informed Cruz that our new Southcom Commander, 
Admiral James Stavridis, is planning to visit Managua in 
March for a regional security conference, but could come in 
February as well, particularly if there is GON interest. 
Cruz, who opined that Admiral Stavridis' visit in February 
would be helpful, promised to raise the matter with President 
Ortega at the earliest opportunity.  (Note: Cruz later 
followed up to say that he had conveyed this information to 
Ortega, and a Stavridis visit "would be welcome.") 
 
¶12.  (C) The Ambassador remarked that GON cooperation on 
combating narcotrafficking during the Bolanos era was strong; 
since the beginning of Police Chief Aminta Granera's tenure 
last fall and the removal of the previous head of the 
anti-drug unit, the Nicaraguans had intercepted over 9 tons 
of cocaine.  Additionally, the U.S. is also helping Nicaragua 
refurbish three Dabur patrol boats.  Of course, continued GON 
cooperation is required to maintain these programs. 
 
Dealing with Aleman 
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¶13.  (C) The Ambassador impressed upon Cruz that any effort 
or decision to free Arnoldo Aleman would send the wrong 
signal and sorely test our bilateral relationship.  Cruz 
understood the message and recognized that releasing Aleman 
would cross a red line. 
 
Who is Coming to Washington? 
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¶14.  (C) On the subject of his staffing plans for the 
Nicaraguan Embassy in Washington, Cruz related that he will 
keep on Alcides Montiel as DCM and Kent Shreve as an advisor, 
but he will remove the Consul General, brother of Fausto 
Carcabelos, former Director of Immigration, who was 
investigated for alleged corruption (and whose U.S. visa was 
recently revoked under 212 (f)).  Cruz also hopes to recruit 
former Vice Minister of Trade Julio Teran and ex-Health 
Minister Margarita Gurdian.  He commented that former 
Nicaraguan Consul in Washington, Harold Rivas, who is Supreme 
Electoral Council (CSE) President Roberto Rivas' younger 
brother, has been designated ambassador to Costa Rica. 
(Comment: The GON's assignment of Harold Rivas is likely a 
reward for Roberto Rivas' "cooperation" with the FSLN during 
the electoral process.) 
 
Ortega's Personality Cult 
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¶15.  (C) Ambassador-designate Cruz attempted to downplay the 
ideological intentions of the new Ortega government, 
rationalizing that the new regime is built more around 
personality than a particular ideology.  He claimed that 
while the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) is a 
"machine to win votes," it is not particularly effective or 
committed to a determined path. 
 
Biographical Information 
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¶16. (SBU) Arturo Cruz, Jr. was born in Managua, Nicaragua on August 13, 1953. He is a member of the faculty of the Central American Institute of Business Administration (INCAE), and until recently, served as a political adviser to Salvadoran President Tony Saca. His research is centered on the analysis of social and political trends in Latin America. His articles on U.S. foreign policy and Latin American issues have been published in the "New Republic," "Commentary," the "New York Times Week in Review," the "Washington Post's Book World," among others. He has served as a consultant to the Private Sector Development Council of El Salvador (FUSADES) and is a permanent advisor to Banco Uno's Board of Directors. He also advised the Nicaraguan government during its CAFTA negotiations. Cruz obtained a Master's degree in International Relations for Johns Hopkins and a PhD in Modern History from Oxford University. His book "Nicaragua's Conservative Republic 1858-1893" was published by Palgrave Press and Oxford University. He is the son of Arturo Cruz, Sr., a member of the Sandinista-led National Reconstruction Government Junta in the 1980s. Cruz is divorced and has a daughter who lives in Maryland. 
 
Comment 
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¶17. (C) We will provide Ambassador-designate Cruz the appropriate materials followed by a comprehensive briefing. Cruz, who instinctively almost sat on our side of the table during the January 9 bilat between our Presdel and Ortega (septel) until we whispered to him that he should relocate, appears sincere in his desire to maintain positive bilateral relations. Understandably, Cruz appears overwhelmed by the difficult task ahead. His success or failure will in large part depend on his ability to navigate the turbulence generated by the inevitable clash between Ortega's expectations/his allies' rhetoric and our bilateral interests. While we concur with Cruz's assessment that the Ortega government is in large part based on a personality cult rather than any clear ideology, the end result could be the same: the eventual imposition of an authoritarian, undemocratic regime friendly to countries who oppose us. The preliminary signs suggest that Ortega aims to consolidate his power and attempt to transform the Nicaraguan political model to ensure he remains at the helm for years to come of a leftist, centralized and largely non-democratic state.

TRIVELLI