VZCZCXRO0554
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHKU #0113/01 0271455
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 271455Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8142
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 KUWAIT 000113 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NEA/ARP, NEA/PPD, NEA/PI, NSC FOR RAMCHAND 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/27/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM KISL KU FREEDOM AGENDA
SUBJECT: NEXT STEPS FOR THE FREEDOM AGENDA IN KUWAIT 
 
REF: A. KUWAIT 81 - U/S DOBRIANSKY'S MEETINGS IN KUWAIT 
     ¶B. 06 KUWAIT 4206 - OPPOSITION GROUPS FORM REFORM 
        BLOC 
     ¶C. 06 KUWAIT 3939 - WOMEN ACTIVISTS CALL FOR QUOTA 
     ¶D. 06 KUWAIT 2971 - PARLIAMENT APPROVES FIVE 
        CONSTITUENCIES 
     ¶E. 06 KUWAIT 2600 - KUWAITI WOMEN PROVE THEY ARE A 
        POLITICAL FORCE 
     ¶F. 06 KUWAIT 2394 - IMPLICATIONS OF ISLAMIST GAINS 
        IN ELECTIONS 
     ¶G. 06 KUWAIT 2392 - WOMEN'S ELECTION PARTICIPATION 
     ¶H. 06 KUWAIT 2148 - PROGRESS ON REFORM DEFINED BY 
        PARTICIPATION 
     ¶I. 06 KUWAIT 1888 - REFINING STRATEGIES TO PROMOTE 
        DEMOCRATIC REFORM 
     ¶J. 06 KUWAIT 1529 - COURT REVOKES 
        FREEDOM-RESTRICTING GATHERINGS LAW 
     ¶K. 06 KUWAIT 768 - PARLIAMENT PASSES NEW PRESS LAW 
     ¶L. 06 KUWAIT 347 - POLITICAL ACTIVISTS HOPE FOR 
        GREATER REFORMS 
     ¶M. 05 KUWAIT 3224 - ACTIVISTS LAUD WOMEN'S RIGHTS 
        ACCOMPLISHMENTS 
     ¶N. 05 KUWAIT 2091 - DEMOCRATIC REFORM STRATEGIES TO 
        SUPPORT FREEDOM AGENDA 
     ¶O. 05 KUWAIT 646 - ISLAMISTS IN KUWAIT: CONTOURS OF 
        A GROWING INFLUENTIAL FORCE 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard LeBaron for reason 1.4 (d) 
 
¶1.  (S/NF) Summary: Over the last year, Kuwait has 
implemented two of the three key elements of the Freedom 
Agenda strategy that we described in May 2005 (05 Kuwait 
2091).  These were: women's registration for and 
participation in national elections and the passage of a new 
press and publications law.  Kuwait also passed important 
electoral reform legislation, a top priority for pro-reform 
advocates here.  Given these historic changes, priority 
should now be placed on consolidating Kuwait's democratic 
advances by 1) helping political associations become more 
effective, 2) supporting women's full integration into the 
political system, and 3) encouraging responsible youth 
activism.  A key aspect of this approach should be sponsoring 
training programs to help Kuwaiti political activists develop 
better leadership, organization, strategic planning, and 
public relations skills so they can more effectively advocate 
their views and participate in the political process.  This 
approach would benefit the less organized liberal political 
and civil society organizations and serve as a counterbalance 
to rising Islamist influence. 
 
¶2.  (S/NF) The third element of the Freedom Agenda strategy 
outlined in 2005 was the legalization of political parties. 
While political party creation should be a long-term goal, 
(and is for most Kuwaiti politicians), we now recommend that 
we not push for the legalization of political parties before 
the 2010 parliamentary elections.   With Kuwait already in 
the lead position in the Gulf in terms of political openness, 
legalization of political parties now would likely increase 
anti-democratic aspects of Islamist influence and further 
undermine government efficiency.  We should instead work with 
local partners to encourage implementation of measures to 
strengthen democratic processes in Kuwait, such as 
regulations on campaign finance and reforms to improve 
electoral transparency and reduce government corruption. 
This approach will help address three major obstacles to 
further meaningful reform in Kuwait: political apathy, social 
conservatism, and corruption.  While Kuwait has made 
significant progress over the last two years, social and 
political attitudes change slowly and require a patient, 
measured approach on our part.  We will continue to use all 
the tools of diplomacy to pursue the Freedom Agenda in Kuwait 
-- MEPI grants, IVLP visits, media outreach, educational 
exchange programs, and our close daily interactions with 
political and civil society actors in Kuwait.  End Summary. 
 
A Watershed Year 
---------------- 
 
¶3.  (SBU) 2006 was a watershed year in Kuwait's democratic 
development.  In January, following the death of long-time 
Amir Shaykh Jaber Al-Ahmed, former Prime Minister Shaykh 
Sabah Al-Ahmed Al-Sabah became Amir through a constitutional 
process in which Parliament played a prominent role.  In 
March, Parliament passed a new press and publications law 
that removed a ban on licensing new dailies.  In May, the 
Constitutional Court revoked a 1979 law restricting public 
gatherings.  Later that month, after reaching an impasse with 
pro-reform parliamentarians over electoral reform, the Amir 
exercised his constitutional right to dissolve Parliament and 
called new elections for June.  Women participated both as 
 
KUWAIT 00000113  002 OF 005 
 
 
candidates and voters in the elections for the first time in 
Kuwait's history.  Pro-reform candidates won a landslide 
victory, capturing a majority of seats in the 65-member 
Parliament, thanks in part to the support of a grassroots, 
pro-reform movement that emerged in support of electoral 
reform.  Confronted with this call for reform, the Prime 
Minister removed two ministers accused of corruption from the 
new Cabinet and supported electoral reform legislation, which 
was passed in July.  Pro-reform, opposition MPs formed a new 
34-member Reform Bloc in October and agreed to pursue a 
common legislative agenda, focusing primarily on fighting 
corruption and implementing reforms.  However, tensions 
between opposition MPs persist, cooperation has been 
inconsistent, and proposals to provide more benefits to 
Kuwaiti citizens have threatened to further divide the 
opposition and distract Parliament from a reform agenda. 
 
Rethinking Kuwait's Freedom Agenda Priorities 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (S/NF) Given these historic developments, a review of the 
next steps for our Freedom Agenda priorities in Kuwait is 
appropriate.  We believe emphasis should now be placed on 
consolidating and extending Kuwait's democratic gains by 1) 
helping political associations become more effective, 2) 
supporting women's full integration into the political 
system, and 3) encouraging responsible youth activism.  As 
civil society organizations develop, they will be better able 
to advocate for meaningful political reforms.  If adopted 
without necessary preparation and development of civil 
society, additional political reforms, such as legalizing 
political parties in the near term or allowing Parliament to 
choose the Prime Minister, will likely only exacerbate 
existing political problems, contribute to sectarian 
tensions, increase the influence of more organized Islamist 
groups, and further undermine government effectiveness.  The 
approach we outline would help counterbalance non-democratic 
aspects of Islamist influence in Kuwait.  While not always 
the case, civil society organizations in Kuwait tend to be 
more liberal and inclusive than Islamist organizations and, 
with adequate support and training, can serve as effective 
advocates for a wider range of public policy issues.  This 
will be particularly important as local associations assess 
the impact of recent electoral reforms on their political 
strategies. 
 
¶5.  (S/NF) Recent improvements in communication and 
coordination between ideologically disparate political groups 
both inside and outside Parliament suggest that Kuwait's 
political system is developing greater sophistication.  The 
approach outlined above would encourage this process.  But we 
should be realistic about how quickly or how deeply Kuwait is 
ready to change.  Three obstacles will continue to slow 
further democratization: political apathy, social 
conservatism, and corruption.  The most popular issues -- 
those that motivate political activism -- still tend to 
relate to government handouts and many Kuwaitis view their 
elected representatives' primary role as obtaining even more 
benefits for them personally or for their group.  For 
Kuwait's democracy to grow, it must move beyond an 
overwhelmingly familial, tribal, sectarian, and 
patronage-based political culture to one that is more 
inclusive and issues-based.  This will not happen overnight. 
As President Bush has said, it is a "generational challenge," 
and our expectations should be measured in those terms. 
 
Helping Political Associations Become More Effective 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶6.  (S/NF) The majority of Kuwait's political associations 
are organized around narrow familial, sectarian, and 
ideological lines, and lack the structure and strategic 
leadership necessary to effectively and responsibly engage in 
the political process.  There are a few notable exceptions. 
The Islamic Constitutional Movement (ICM), the political arm 
of the Kuwaiti Muslim Brotherhood, has a well-developed 
organizational structure, a clear political agenda, and a 
dynamic leadership.  While much smaller, the Islamic National 
Consensus Movement (INCM), an inclusive, but predominantly 
Shi'a political association, has a similarly well-developed 
structure, leadership, and agenda, and excels at strategic 
planning.  Other groups, most notably the more underdeveloped 
liberal political associations, have expressed an interest in 
improving their organizational structure and strategic 
planning process, but lack the necessary skills, and have far 
less popular political support.  Helping them develop these 
skills through regional and in-country training programs will 
allow them to engage more meaningfully in the political 
process.  This skills-based approach, partnering with local 
organizations, should be the key element of our overall 
 
KUWAIT 00000113  003 OF 005 
 
 
Freedom Agenda strategy in Kuwait. 
 
¶7.  (S/NF) The specific skill areas in which local political 
and civil society leaders have identified training needs 
include: leadership and management; skillful and effective 
negotiation; political survey methodology; strategic 
planning; political organization; public relations; public 
sector advocacy; public speaking; and organizing grassroots 
activism.  This skills-based approach has three key 
advantages.  First, skills-based training is gender inclusive 
and can be extended to all local political associations and 
civil society organizations.  Second, the training will 
largely benefit less organized liberal and moderate groups 
and help balance the influence of Islamists in the next 
parliamentary elections.  Finally, this approach will be less 
immediately threatening to the Al-Sabah leadership than 
pushing for the legalization of political parties or other 
intrusive political reforms.  This reduces the likelihood of 
a near-term destabilizing political crisis that would work 
against democratization. 
 
¶8.  (S/NF) Many reformists, particularly liberals, have 
backed off from active support for legalization of political 
parties, recognizing that Kuwait's political system is still 
underdeveloped and that the premature emergence of political 
parties will likely only exacerbate existing political 
problems and increase the influence of Islamists, who are 
better prepared to capitalize on a party system now. 
However, there are some who do advocate a near-term push for 
the legalization of parties.  One woman activist raised this 
issue in her meeting with Secretary Rice January 17, 
cautioning that legalization should be accompanied by 
restrictions on religious elements in the parties.  The 
Secretary noted that the experience of governing could 
 
SIPDIS 
moderate the Islamist political platform over time, given the 
need to respond to constituent concerns. 
 
¶9.  (S/NF) Given the specific circumstances here in Kuwait, 
we assess that U.S. efforts should not concentrate on the 
establishment of political parties prior to the 2010 
parliamentary elections.  Rather, we should focus on laying 
the groundwork, supporting the development and improvement of 
Kuwait's democratic processes in cooperation with local 
partners.  Some of the reforms suggested by our contacts 
include the implementation of campaign finance regulations, 
stricter anti-corruption controls, and measures to improve 
electoral transparency.  In this way, when political parties 
are legalized, they will be able to contribute constructively 
to the political process rather than serve as mouthpieces for 
narrow sectarian or ideological views, or precipitate a 
premature political crisis with the government that could 
roll back hard-won gains.  We should also continue to engage 
local media to encourage higher standards and more 
responsible journalism that contributes to political 
understanding rather than enflames public opinion. 
 
Supporting Women's Full Political Integration 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (S/NF) Since winning the right to vote in 2005, women 
have emerged as an influential political force and now 
represent a majority of voters.  Women participating in the 
June 2006 elections helped to shape election issues and broke 
conservative social taboos.  Although none of the 27 female 
candidates was elected, most women viewed the elections as a 
success that demonstrated women's political potential in 
Kuwait.  Recognizing the importance of women voters, 
parliamentarians, including Islamists, are now responding to 
and advocating their female constituents' concerns in 
Parliament.  Moving forward, the key will be to capitalize on 
these successes by helping women integrate more fully into 
the political system and prepare for the next parliamentary 
elections. 
 
¶11.  (S/NF) This can be achieved in three ways.  First, we 
should help Kuwaiti women learn lessons from the recent 
elections.  With already approved MEPI funding, the National 
Democratic Institute (NDI) is conducting several public 
surveys on the elections and will share the results with 
local NGOs and political associations.  These and other 
similar surveys will help identify ways women's rights 
activists can more effectively encourage Kuwaiti women to 
participate in the political process.  Second, we should help 
women learn how to overcome traditional social barriers to 
effectively advocate their political views at the local, 
national, and regional levels.  This could be done in part by 
drawing on the experience of female politicians and women's 
rights activists from other Arab countries.  Third, local 
women's groups should be actively targeted for inclusion in 
the skills-based training programs suggested above.  It is 
 
KUWAIT 00000113  004 OF 005 
 
 
important that women in Kuwait are incorporated to as great 
an extent as possible into existing political organizations 
and do not become marginalized in female-only activist groups 
outside the political mainstream.  (Once again, it appears to 
us that the Muslim Brothers are in the lead in organizing 
like-minded women, after getting past their deep opposition 
to women's political rights.) 
 
¶12.  (S/NF) There has been some discussion in Kuwait of the 
merits of a quota system for women in the Parliament.  Some 
women have argued that temporarily setting aside a fixed 
number of seats for women is the only way to ensure they have 
national representation, at least in the short-term.  In a 
recent meeting with U/S Dobriansky, noted women's rights 
activist Dr. Rola Dashti suggested the election law be 
amended to require candidates to run on four person "lists" 
and to stipulate that one of the four must be a woman.  In 
her view, this would ensure that women were elected to 
Parliament.  While a quota system has worked in other 
countries, in Kuwait it could cause other groups, like the 
politically under-represented Shi'a minority, to demand their 
own quota.  For now, there is no consensus on the issue even 
among women activists.  We see no reason to take a position 
on this issue now, but will follow it closely as proposals 
evolve. 
 
Encouraging Responsible Youth Activism 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶13.  (S/NF) Young, politically active men and women are 
another demographic of emerging political importance in 
Kuwait.  These youth activists, many of whom got started in 
politics through the National Union of Kuwaiti Students 
(NUKS), played an influential role in the pro-reform, 
anti-corruption rallies earlier this year and the subsequent 
elections in June.  They represent a younger generation of 
Kuwaitis with an active interest in their country's political 
future and have infused the political system here with new 
life.  Like Kuwaiti women, the key now is to help these young 
activists build on their successes, develop their political 
skills, and integrate more fully into the political system. 
 
¶14.  (S/NF) This can be accomplished by working more closely 
with local student organizations, especially the student 
parties at Kuwait University, to develop their political 
awareness and advocacy skills, and to identify future leaders 
for International Visitor Programs.  It is also important to 
engage with NUKS-U.S., the organization's largest and most 
active overseas branch.  Many of Kuwait's liberal political 
leaders have emerged from NUKS-U.S. and some of the leading 
youth activists have cited their involvement in NUKS-U.S. and 
volunteer activities in U.S. domestic political campaigns as 
the impetus for their political activism in Kuwait. 
 
¶15.  (S/NF) As part of this effort, we should accelerate 
efforts to encourage Kuwaitis to study in the U.S.  We can 
also develop training programs similar to the ones outlined 
above specifically for students and recent graduates, 
equipping them with the tools they need to better understand 
political issues and effectively voice their opinions.  We 
are also developing a cadre of young Kuwaitis who understand 
open political systems through our many exchange programs, 
including YES and Fulbright.  These exchanges are proven, 
powerful tools of influence and we continue to encourage 
major expansion of these programs as an integral part of our 
overall Freedom Agenda strategy in the Middle East. 
 
The Islamist Factor 
------------------- 
 
¶16.  (S/NF) Helping other political groups develop better 
organizational and advocacy skills can to a certain extent 
balance Islamist gains.  However, Islamists will continue to 
exert considerable political influence for the foreseeable 
future given regional political trends and Islamists' 
superior organization and appeal to what is still a quite 
conservative Kuwaiti public.  Islamists here, as elsewhere in 
the region, have significant anti-democratic elements among 
their leadership and embedded in some aspects of their 
ideology.  Moreover, there are considerable differences among 
and even within Kuwait's Islamist organizations, differences 
blurred by the very term "Islamist."  In reality, Kuwaiti 
Islamists run the gamut from moderate, pragmatic and even 
liberal to hard-core Salafis supportive of Al-Qaeda's global 
jihadist ideology.  Increasingly sophisticated in their 
approach, the Islamist message is often carefully calibrated 
to its audience, whether Western, regional, or local. 
 
¶17.  (S/NF)  Islamist dominance of the opposition landscape 
here should inform our approach, but not deter our objective 
 
KUWAIT 00000113  005 OF 005 
 
 
of pursuing long-term democratic change.  There are some 
encouraging factors.  While we may have concerns about their 
activities outside of the country, Islamists have operated 
within Kuwait's political system peacefully for decades. 
Many Islamist groups here have also demonstrated a 
willingness to work with other political groups, including 
liberals and Shi'a, and strongly support political reform. 
There is little convincing evidence to suggest they will 
suddenly depart from this strategy.  However, they are in the 
game for the long term, and in the long term, we believe 
their interests will sharply diverge from U.S. interests. 
 
¶18.  (S/NF)  In the case of Kuwait, the key issue will be 
pursuing gradual change, with both institutional and cultural 
aspects of democratization moving forward in parallel.  That 
way, as Islamist politicians gain more responsibility and 
power, they will be forced to respond to an institutional and 
cultural environment that rejects the anti-democratic 
elements of their ideology.  This can only happen over time. 
If Kuwait is pushed toward rapid institutional change without 
a corresponding democratic cultural development, Kuwait is 
more likely to descend into a series of political crises 
which anti-democratic elements are best positioned to 
exploit.  Now is the time to consolidate and build on the 
gratifying gains for democracy of recent years.  From a 
tactical view, our approach will continue to be guided by a 
philosophy of "partnership and programs"  -- partnering 
always with local organizations and jointly developing 
practical programs to fit their needs. 
 
¶19.  (C/NF) All our Freedom Agenda reporting since 2005 is 
available under the "Freedom Agenda" hot topic link on our 
classified website. 
 
********************************************* * 
For more reporting from Embassy Kuwait, visit: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/?cable s 
 
Visit Kuwait's Classified Website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/ 
********************************************* * 
LEBARON